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INTRODUCTION
DONALD S. CHISUM*
The articles in this symposium grapple with major contemporary
issues in United States intellectual property law. The topics are signifi-
cant: patent law protection for biotechnology; computer software pro-
tection; the Dillon decision's explication of prima facie obviousness of
chemical inventions; trademark law's incontestability concept; the "file
wrapper estoppel" doctrine's effect on claim scope; the Stewart decision
on renewal copyright owner's rights as to use of authorized derivative
works; and competition policy and intellectual property balanced in the
joint venture context.
This Symposium demonstrates that intellectual property law is a
growth industry in the United States and around the world. Increasing
interest in copyrights, patents, trademarks and related areas is the culmi-
nation of major legal and economic events in the 1970's and 1980's,
including: enactment of the long-awaited Copyright Revision Act of
1976; the energy crisis and erosion of the economic position of the
United States among developed countries, both of which focused atten-
tion on the patent system, which is the traditional means of stimulating
investment in research and development;' two new international patent
conventions-the Patent Cooperation Treaty and the European Patent
Convention; the opening of the People's Republic of China and other
new markets with resulting questions concerning trademark protection
and other industrial property rights; developing countries' demands for
changes in the Paris Convention and for adoption of the code of con-
duct governing the licensing and transfer of technology to other econo-
mies by countries in the developed countries; establishment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, with exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over patent matters; negotiations on the interna-
tional harmonization of patent law under the auspices of the World In-
tellectual Property Organization; trilateral discussions among the
United States, Japan and European Patent Offices; focus by the General
* Professor of Law, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington; Of Counsel,
Morrison & Foerster, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Orange County, Palo Alto, Walnut
Creek, Sacramento, Washington D.C., New York, Denver, Tokyo, London, Hong Kong,
and Brussels.
1. At no time has there been greater public expectation that the science and technol-
ogy community will devise solutions to dietary, health, environmental, and other
problems. It is to this community that the public and public officials look for the preven-
tion or cure of heart disease, cancer and AIDS, for better biodegradable materials, for
more efficient usage of energy, etc.
The clamor for new technology comes at a time when there is public resistance to
higher taxes, which are necessary to support high levels of government spending on re-
search and development. Universities and private firms increasingly must rely on private
financing for both basic and applied research.
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) on the trade-related aspects of
intellectual property (TRIPS); and United States adoption of "intent-to-
use" trademark procedures and implementation of the Berne Copyright
Convention.
Apart from these dramatic events, heightened interest in legal
rights in intellectual property is not surprising. Today more than ever,
the products of the mind-aesthetic, technological, and organizational-
constitute humankind's most valuable assets.
One of the most difficult problems confronting companies, practi-
tioners, scholars, and government policy makers concerned with intel-
lectual property law is how to develop fresh approaches to the new
technologies, such as biotechnology, software, semiconductors, and su-
perconductivity. Innovative approaches must take account of trends
around the world, not just in the United States.
Those who prognosticate are doomed to embarrassment, but I will
go out on a limb and identify five trends that are likely to continue
through the 1990's.
* Diminution of national control over intellectual property law policy.
* Increased international scrutiny of the fairness, effectiveness, and ef-
ficiency of domestic intellectual property law systems.
* Harmonization of intellectual property systems.
* Legislative fine-tuning of intellectual property law to accommodate
the needs of new technology industries.
* Moderation of the current movement to strengthen intellectual
property.
A. Diminution of National Control over Intellectual Property Law Policy
Through the 1960's, major industrial countries, especially the
United States, autonomously developed their domestic intellectual
property systems. True, major international conventions, such as the
Paris Convention on patents and trademarks, placed some restraints on
autonomous development. Also, particular countries looked to models
developed elsewhere as instructive guides. Nevertheless, major indus-
trialized countries were not directly constrained by international consid-
erations. Domestic policy makers designed laws on patents, copyrights,
trademarks, trade secrets, and unfair competition to further national in-
terests and to balance the competing interests in free competition and
incentives for the production, disclosure, and development of aesthetic,
technological, and organizational assets.
The 1970's and 1980's saw a diminution in traditional national au-
tonomy over intellectual property law policy. In the United States, for
example, many major intellectual property law changes were driven not
so much by a domestic consensus as by the desirability or necessity of
conforming to international norms or of avoiding putting domestic com-
panies at a competitive disadvantage.
For example, in the United States, many provisions of the 1976
[Vol. 68:2
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Copyright Act 2 were justified primarily by reference to international
norms or constraints. Foremost was the change in copyright term from
fifty-six years to "life of the author plus fifty years." 3 Serious considera-
tion of the proposition that even fifty-six years was too long for all or
some categories of works was precluded because most other countries
belonged to the Berne Convention that dictates the longer term. The
1988 elimination of copyright notice was solely to enable the United
States to join the Berne Convention.
As another example, many policy makers in Japan favored protect-
ing computer software under some specially tailored protection scheme.
Pressure from the United States forced Japan and other countries to fol-
low the American model of copyright protection for software.
In the trademark area, many in the United States favored moving to
an "intent-to-use" registration filing system, but many also opposed it.
Tipping the balance, was the need to avoid putting American companies
at a competitive disadvantage compared to companies in other countries
that had a Paris Convention treaty right to file trademark applications
without showing use.
This trend will surely continue as international sensitivity to the
trade-related aspects of intellectual property (TRIPS) grows. It will be a
major constraint on the intellectual property policy development. In the
United States, it is now commonplace to support or oppose a particular
policy proposal by reference to whether it will set a good or bad prece-
dent that may thereafter be used by other countries. For example, if a
proposal is made that includes a "compulsory license," it will be op-
posed not so much "on the merits" as on the ground that other coun-
tries will cite the United States example in justifying their retention or
adoption of compulsory license provisions that negatively effect the in-
terests of United States companies.
B. Increased International Scrutiny of the Fairness, Effectiveness, and
Efficiency of Domestic Intellectual Property Law Systems
In times past, policy makers in one country often imperfectly under-
stood the workings of other countries' intellectual property systems.
They rarely appreciated the nuisances of law and practice that have a
major impact on the health and competitiveness of national companies
and industries.
In the 1980's, the United States, with qualified support from other
major industrialized countries, began scrutinizing the intellectual prop-
erty systems of its trading partners. It injected the issue of TRIPS into
the current round of GAIT negotiations. The idea is that there should
be minimum standards of property protection, that is, patents, copy-
rights, trademarks, and trade secrets.
Initially, TRIPS proponents assumed that the intellectual property
2. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-119 (1988).
3. Id. § 303(a).
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systems of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan met and ex-
ceeded any minimum standards. More recently, however, the United
States and Japan have began to question the adequacy of each other's
system, with particular attention on patents. As an example, policy mak-
ers abroad, especially in Japan, now question the fairness and efficiency
of two fundamental aspects of the United States patent system.
First is the first-to-invent priority system, which, unlike every other
major patent system, awards priority of invention between rival claim-
ants based on the first to invent rather than the first to file a patent appli-
cation. To aggravate matters, United States law allows proof of a pre-
filing date of invention only by reference to acts in the United States.
4
To illustrate, if United States company US and Japanese companyJ both
invent a new monoclonal antibody, in their respective countries and on
the same date, the US company gains the United States patent right-
even if theJ company files first and even though theJ company had the
same, or even an earlier, actual invention date. Second is the high cost
and uncertainties of United States patent litigation. Not surprisingly,
United States policy makers find comparable parochial features in the
Japanese patent system.
In addition, current United States trademark law requires a foreign
company to actually use a mark in the United States to maintain protec-
tion. Policy makers abroad criticize such a provision as justifying the
very kind of piracy of marks that American companies decry. A recent
court decision illustrates the point. In Person's Co., Ltd. v. Christman,
5
Christman saw the "Person's" mark in Japan, returned to the United
States, began selling a line of apparel under the "Person's" mark, and
obtained a Lanham Act registration. After Christman's first United
States use date, the Japanese "Person's" company expanded into the
United States. It sought to cancel Christman's registration; the theory
was likelihood of confusion based on Person's prior foreign use. The
court affirmed the grant of summary judgment. Under United States
trademark law, in a purely domestic case, a junior user of a mark in a
discrete geographic area obtains valid trademark rights in that mark de-
spite prior use of the mark by another in another market only if the jun-
ior user's adoption is in "good faith." The court refused to extend the
"good faith" requirement to the international fact pattern ofjunior and
senior use. It suggested that a different result might obtain if the for-
eign mark were famous in the United States or if the junior user's use
was nominal and with an intent solely to block the prior foreign user's
planned expansion. Neither circumstance was present.
Person 's conclusion may be technically correct, but surely it exposes
United States policy to foreign criticism and weakens the United States'
ability to combat discriminatory and restrictive intellectual property laws
of other countries. The case illustrates a severe limitation on the ability
4. 35 U.S.C. § 104 (1988).
5. 900 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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of United States intellectual property policy to adjust to international
scrutiny.
In other countries, government ministries play activist roles in de-
veloping intellectual property policy. ForJapan, the Ministry of Intellec-
tual Trade and Industry (MITI) plays this role; in Europe, increasingly it
is the European Commission in Brussels. In the United States, much of
the detail in our policies is left to the sometimes chaotic process of litiga-
tion and court decision. That is most evident with software protection
law. Yet, as seen in Person's, courts do not operate with a free hand. The
appeals court in Person's expressed the point poetically: "When the law
has been crafted with the clarity of crystal, it also has the qualities of a
glass slipper: it cannot be shoe-horned onto facts it does not fit, no mat-
ter how appealing they might appear."6
C. Harmonization of Intellectual Property Systems
International conditions press for harmonization of national intel-
lectual property systems. National systems with differing rules inher-
ently create trade barriers, even if each system - considered in isolation
- is fair and efficient.
The need to harmonize intellectual property laws within a common
market is hardly a new idea. The perception of that need by the framers
of the United States Constitution led them to make patents and copy-
rights a matter of federal rather than state concern. The same percep-
tion drove European countries to harmonize their patent laws in the
1970's.
To illustrate the desirability of harmonization, consider the situa-
tion today in which it is commonplace for an invention to be subject to a
patent in the United States but not in Japan or Europe, or vice versa. In
addition to placing countries at competitive disadvantages, such situa-
tions complicate licensing negotiations, place strains on the remedial
structures of our intellectual property laws and pressure companies to
move production facilities for reasons other than efficiency.
Although the need for and benefits of harmonization are clear,
there are also severe drawbacks. The necessity of compromise often
leads to a system that is less than effective and efficient. Furthermore,
harmonized systems are more rigid because a broad consensus is usually
necessary to change them.
D. Legislative Fine-Tuning of Intellectual Property Law to Accommodate the
Needs of New Technology Industries and New Competitive Conditions
Existing laws on patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets
have proven to be remarkably flexible and responsive to the needs of
new technology industries and new competitive conditions. But there is
good reason to believe that the pace of change, together with the inter-
6. Person's, 900 F.2d at 1570.
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national nature of research, development, manufacturing, and informa-
tion flow, will, on occasion, outstrip the capacities of our aging
intellectual property law system. As a result, we can expect periodic
calls for legislative "fine-tuning" of intellectual property laws or even
enactment of wholly new species of protection.
Consider biotechnology. The industry has operated for ten years
on the assumption that patent protection will adequately protect the
fruits of their research and development, fruits so costly to produce but
so cheap to reproduce. Yet it remains unclear whether the patent sys-
tem will really be up to the task. For example, many biotechnology
projects involve extensive laboratory work by skilled scientists. The
technologies used may in fact be "state of the art," and the end product,
though of immense commercial value, may be "obvious" in the patent
law sense because it was a desirable objective that could be achieved
with a reasonable probability of success. If court decisions apply tradi-
tional patent law in that fashion, will we need a carefully crafted but not
overly rigid scheme to preserve incentives for investment in this type of
productivity?
E. Moderation of the Current Movement to Strengthen Intellectual Property
During the 1980's, virtually every significant legislative change in
intellectual property law and policy involved widening or strengthening
the property owner's rights.
Consider the changes in United States patent law in the 1980's
wrought by the Supreme Court and by Congress. As to the Supreme
Court, in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,7 it held that genetically altered living
microorganisms constituted patentable subject matter. The Chakrabarty
decision spurred new interest in the patent system, particularly in the
nascent biotechnology industry. In Dawson Chem. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 8
the Court applied section 271(d) of the Patent Act to hold that the
owner of a patent, claiming a process of using a certain chemical com-
pound, was not guilty of patent misuse by selling the compound and
refusing to issue licenses to competing compound manufacturers be-
cause the compound was a "nonstaple," that is, was not suited for com-
mercial use other than in the patented process.
As to Congress, in 1982, it established a Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit and granted it exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases
that arise in whole or in part under the patent laws. 9 Today, the Federal
Circuit's patent-related decisions guide the practical administration of
the patent system in the Patent and Trademark Office, in district court
patent litigation, and in International Trade Commission proceedings
7. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
8. 448 U.S. 176 (1980).
9. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
The Act merged two existing courts, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, which had
five judges, and the Court of Claims, which had seven judges. The Federal Circuit came
into existence on October 1, 1982.
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pertaining to patents. Whether the Federal Circuit is excessively "pro-
patent" is a matter of dispute, but few would argue that it has dampened
incentives to obtain and enforce patents.
In the Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984,10 Congress adopted
amendments to sections 103, 116 and 120 of the Patent Act, to allow
freer exchange of information among members of research teams."I It
also made exportation of components of a patented combination an act
of infringement. 12 The same year, it enacted the Drug Price Competi-
tion and Patent Term Restoration Act,' 3 providing for extension of the
terms of certain patents on drug and other products that had been sub-
ject to regulatory review by the Food and Drug Administration. In
1988, it enacted the Patent Misuse Reform Act, 14 restricting application
of the misuse doctrine to certain patent licensing and sales practices.
The same year, it enacted the Process Patent Amendments Act,' 5 ex-
tending to owners of process patents the right to exclude unauthorized
importation of unpatented products made abroad by use of the patented
process.
In the 1990's, there will be calls to moderate the expanded scope of
intellectual property rights to accommodate legitimate interests. These
interests include not only the cost concerns of users and the effect on
product market competition but also the impact of expansive protection
of early, basic steps in the development of technology on the incentives
to develop and improve the technology.
10. Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383.
11. See id. § 104.
12. 35 U.S.C. § 271(0 (1988).
13. Pub. L. No. 98-417, tit. II, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
14. Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-73, 102 Stat. 4674. The Act
added two subsections to 35 U.S.C. § 271(d).
15. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, tit. IX,
subtit. A, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988).
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BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENT LAW: PERSPECTIVE OF THE
FIRST SEVENTEEN YEARS, PROSPECTIVE ON THE
NEXT SEVENTEEN YEARS
LORANCE L. GREENLEE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The era of biotechnology began in 1973 when Stanley N. Cohen
and Herbert W. Boyer reported that a gene could be cut from the DNA
of one organism, recombined in vitro with DNA of a host organism, and
re-introduced into cells of the host to confer the gene's characteristic
trait to the host.' The industry which sprang up to exploit the potential
of Cohen and Boyer's recombinant DNA technology has now existed for
seventeen years-the lifetime of a United States patent. 2 In the world of
patent practice this year constitutes a divide, a point when it is appropri-
ate to take stock of the legal developments of the preceding patent life-
time and to consider what may be in store for practitioners in the next
seventeen years.
This article is divided into two sections. The first provides an his-
torical perspective of the first seventeen years of biotechnology patent
law. The second section examines some current trends and how they
may affect the development of the law over the next seventeen years.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Public Apprehension
Biotechnology grew up under a floodlight of intense public scrutiny
and debate. Many of the new companies formed to exploit the commer-
cial potential of the scientific advances of the preceding two decades
generated publicity to aid in attracting investors. Scientists publicly de-
bated their concerns about the possible hazards or disastrous conse-
quences of certain types of experiments. Some feared the possible
creation of new pathogens which, if improperly contained, could spread
into the environment.
In response to the concerns, the National Institutes of Health
promulgated guidelines for conducting recombinant DNA research.
* President, Greenlee and Associates, P.C., Boulder, CO; Ph.D., Duke University,
1962; J.D., University of Utah College of Law, 1976; Research Fellow, Duke University,
California Institute of Technology.
1. See Cohen & Boyer, Construction of Biologically Functional Bacterial Plasmids in Vitro, 70
PRoc. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 3240 (1973)[hereinafter Cohen & Boyer]. The following United
States patents have issued to Cohen and Boyer on their "biologically functional molecular
chimeras": U.S. Patent No. 4,237,224, issued December 2, 1980; U.S. Patent No.
4,468,464, issued August 28, 1984; and U.S. Patent No. 4,740,470, issued April 26, 1988.
2. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988)(patent term is seventeen years).
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Subsequently, these guidelines underwent a series of revisions that re-
sulted in an increased number and scope of allowable activities. The
revisions were a result of improved understanding of the actual risks
involved from working with genetically engineered microorganisms.
3
Today, risks from "recombinant DNA" research are considered to be
much lower than originally estimated, and more specifically defined.
4
B. Patentability of Living Matter
The issues of patentability that first confronted patent practitioners
were more pedestrian, but acquired a certain cachet in the light of the
intense public interest in the safety and morality debates. Whether a
living organism was patentable subject matter under section 101 of the
Patent Act 5 was a prominent issue. The Patent and Trademark Office
(Patent Office) rejected two applications claiming a microorganism per
se as if it were a device or a composition of matter.6 The Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals 7 held that the microorganisms were patentable
subject matter.8 The United States Supreme Court reviewed the lower
courts' decisions and held that an invention was not unpatentable
merely because it was alive. 9 The Supreme Court stated that the range
of the patent laws was intended to encompass "anything under the sun
that is made by man." 1 0 The Court, however, did not specify in which
3. Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, 51 Fed. Reg. 16,958
(1986)(listing the most current version of the guidelines). The National Institutes of
Health is the major funding agency for biomedical research.
4. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, RECOMBI-
NANT DNA SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS (1986):
Concern has been expressed that application of... rDNA organisms in the envi-
ronment may present ecological risks, and attempts have been made to evaluate
this potential for harm.... Past experience with species introduction have been
studied in attempts to establish possible risks. In the great majority of instances
no adverse consequences were noted.
Id at 28.
5. Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may ob-
tain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
6. The Patent Office rejected the application of Malcolm E. Bergy for a biologically
pure culture of the microorganism streptomyces vellosus. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 971
(C.C.P.A. 1979), vacated as to Bergy sub nom. Diamond v. Bergy, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980), aff'd
sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). The Patent Office similarly re-
jected the application of Amanda M. Chakrabarty for a novel strain of oil-degrading
Psuedomonas. Id. at 971.
7. Appellate jurisdiction for patent matters now resides in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
164, § 127(a), 96 Stat. 37 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1988)).
8. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d at 973.
9. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
10. Id. at 309 (citing S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No.
1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952)). The same language was used in testimony by PJ.
Federico regarding the 1952 Patent Act recodification legislation. Id. at 309 n.6. See also,
Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before Subcomm. No.3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. 37 (1951).
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category under section 101 microorganisms belonged." This exercise
of judicial restraint may ultimately prove most wise.
It is no coincidence that the patentability of living matter became an
issue when it did. Microorganisms were in common use for producing
antibiotics by fermentation since the 1950s. Patents for methods of syn-
thesis using a specified microorganism strain were not uncommon. Vac-
cines made using microorganisms or containing killed or attenuated
microorganisms were also the subject of patents. In fact, patents to
organisms per se had already been granted.1 2 The concept that the
property of being alive could constitute a bar to patentability gained no-
toriety concurrently with the extensive public debate on the hazards of
recombinant DNA and genetic engineering. The politics of the times
generated this issue, abetted by misperceptions of the chemical and
physical underpinnings of biological science. As one amicus curiae to
the Chakrabarty Court pointed out, the issue before the Court consti-
tuted yet another last gasp of the vitalistic fallacy.) 3 When viewed in this
light, it is not only remarkable that the patentability of living matter be-
came an issue, but also remarkable that the Supreme Court agreed to
decide it.
Other cases interpreting the scope of patentable subject matter
under section 101 in the context of other technologies also affected bio-
technology patent law. In particular, Parker v. Flook 14 and several cases
involving geophysical prospecting' 5 dealt with inventions using infor-
mation in the form of programs, algorithms, read-only memories, and
other embodiments of information in combination with other process
steps. DNA is a molecule that embodies genetic information, a read-
only memory for programming biological systems. Consequently, the
approaches taken in these cases also ultimately affected the direction of
biotechnology patent law.
C. Products of Nature
Advances in biotechnology have also forced closer scrutiny of the
"product of nature" rule. Statements in court opinions, often dicta, un-
supported by statutory reference have fostered the misconception that
all naturally occurring materials are unpatentable subject matter. The
11. 447 U.S. at 318. The categories under 35 U.S.C. § 101 include process, machine,
manufacture, and composition of matter.
12. In a foresighted review, Edward S. Irons and Mary Helen Sears showed that the
patentability of microorganisms was never questioned prior to the 1970s, despite numer-
ous opportunities to do so. Irons & Sears, Patents in Relation to Microbiology, 29 ANN. REv.
MICROBIOLOGY 319 (1975).
13. Brief for Dr. George Pieczenik as Amicus Curiae at 3-4, Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303 (1980)(No. 79-136). "To attempt to separate patentable and unpatentable
subject matter on the basis of [living matter and non-living matter] is to invite confusion in
the art, to ignore existing law and to ignore scientific reality." Id. at 3-4 (citations
omitted).
14. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
15. In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809 (C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237
(C.C.P.A. 1978); In reJohnson, 589 F.2d 1070 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165
(C.C.P.A. 1951).
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underlying policy is that what exists in nature is part of the public do-
main and therefore freely available to all.' 6 In expressing the rule thus,
the statutory underpinning for this argument would seem to be section
10117 or section 102 of the Patent Act.18 When the very existence of a
natural compound is unknown before the inventor's activities, however,
it strains logic to characterize the compound as not new or lacking nov-
elty. Courts, persuaded by evidence of the technical value added by the
inventor's activities, have held materials isolated and purified from na-
ture patentable. 19 When human intervention has so altered the natural
material from its natural state as to make it more useful, or useful in new
ways, or cheaper, or available in greater quantity, the result is an addi-
tion to value over the natural state that merits patent protection. View-
ing the natural state as prior art, the analysis of patentability of products
of nature most logically proceeds under section 103.20
Many of the inventions in biotechnology involve materials purified
from nature or otherwise manipulated from their natural state. Thus the
cases interpreting the "product of nature rule" as an aspect of unobvi-
ousness have facilitated patent protection for biotechnology most signif-
icantly. As long as the fundamental criteria set forth in Graham v. John
Deere21 are met, valid claims to compounds isolated from a natural
16. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641, 642 (3d Cir.
1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 656 (1929)
If it is a natural thing then clearly, even if [the patentee] was the first to uncover it
and bring it into view, he cannot have a patent for it because a patent cannot be
awarded for a discovery or for a product of nature, or for a chemical element.
(citing United States Indus. Chem. Co. v. Theroz Co., 25 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1928);
Anheuser-Busch Ass'n v. United States, 207 U.S. 556, 562 (1908) (cork, without "having a
distinctive name, character or use" held unpatentable)(citation omitted); Hartranft v.
Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887)(shells that have not been manufactured into a new
and different article held unpatentable).
17. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (product of nature is not "new").
18. 35 U.S.C. § 102 provides in part that a person shall be entitled to a patent unless:
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the inven-
tion thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States ....
35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
19. See, e.g., In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979), vacated as to Bergy sub nom.
Diamond v. Bergy, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980), aff'd sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303 (1980); In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970); Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathie-
son Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 164 (4th Cir. 1958)(Compositions of "great therapeutic
and commercial worth" are patentable where they are purifications of naturally occuring
fermentates.).
20. Section 103 mandates that a patent be denied where:
mhe differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior
art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the
time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which
said subject matter pertains.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
21. 383 U.S. I (1966). According to the Court in Graham, an analysis of obviousness
under section 103 must be based on several factual inquiries: (1) the scope and content of
the prior art; (2) the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue; (3) the level
of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made; and (4) objective evidence of
nonobviousness, if any. Id. at 17-18.
[Vol. 68:2
BIOTECHNOLOGY PA TENT LA W
source, such as biological material, can be obtained. Examples of pat-
entable products include cloned genes, DNA segments recombined in
novel combinations, novel organisms possessing heterologous DNA, mi-
croorganisms isolated from natural sources, and purified proteins.
D. Novelty
Although biotechnology has experienced rapid and expansive pro-
gress, the field could not be characterized as crowded. Issues of antici-
pation under section 10222 have not been encountered with great
frequency. Those items which have been confronted could be catego-
rized as matters of interpretation. Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation,
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.2 3 suggests that a protein synthesized by recombi-
nant means is anticipated by the naturally occurring protein in purified
form. Patent examiners occasionally consider whether an unpurified
mixture of DNA fragments sorted into vectors (a genomic or cDNA li-
brary24 ) anticipates a cloned gene. The rationale behind this is uncer-
tain, since pure compounds are not deemed anticipated by impure
mixtures. 25 Similar to the product of nature rule, such situations are
best analyzed by determining how obvious the cloned gene would be to
one skilled in the art, given knowledge of the library.
E. Obviousness
Due to the pioneering nature of many biotechnology inventions
during the first seventeen years, issues of obviousness under section 103
have not been fully explored. The chemical structures of nucleic acids
and proteins are so similar to one another that standard chemical analy-
sis of monomer composition, molecular weight, viscosity and the like
would lead to a conclusion of obviousness on structural criteria alone.
Details of the sequences of nucleotides or of amino acids are the struc-
tural features that distinguish one nucleic acid or protein from another.
The crucial distinguishing features are functional: how the compounds
behave in biological systems, or how the compounds affect the behavior
of biological systems themselves. Consequently, where sequence is an
element of the disclosure, its main value, beyond proving novelty, is to
help satisfy disclosure requirements. 26 No comprehensive theory relat-
ing chemical structure to biological function yet exists. Thus, if a bio-
chemist develops a composition with novel structure and unobvious
function, the Patent Office might consider the cloned DNA or purified
22. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
23. 666 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Gal. 1987).
24. For a definition ofa genome and references that discuss genomic or cDNA librar-
ies see infra note 49.
25. See, e.g., In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d at 1401-02 ("[B]y definition, pure materials
necessarily differ from Less pure or impure materials and, if the latter are the only ones
existing and available as a standard of reference... perforce the 'pure' materials are 'new'
with respect to them.")(citation omitted); In re Gofer, 354 F.2d 664 (C.G.P.A. 1966); In re
Seaborg, 328 F.2d 996 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
26. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
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protein unobvious. When the composition possesses a structure (se-
quence) similar to that possessed by a prior art compound and no new
function or unobvious property can be shown, the standard of section
103 may not be met.
2 7
Together, the recent cases of In re Durden
2 8 and In re Pleuddemann2 9
have cast doubt on the unobviousness of processes where the only novel
and unobvious element is the starting material. These cases do not ex-
pressly overrule prior cases that reached a contrary result,8° making it
unclear if a principle of law can be extracted from them. Many biotech-
nology process inventions could be affected by these decisions. Current
efforts to clarify the situation by legislation are discussed elsewhere in
this issue.
3 l
Despite the fact that many biotechnology inventions could be con-
sidered pioneering, the "obvious to try" issue has been frequently
raised, partly, because much of the prior art has been published aca-
demic work. In re O'Farrell3 2 clarified the line between what is merely
obvious to try and what is obvious. The applicants' published prelimi-
nary result was effective prior art against their own application. The
claimed result was correct expression of a foreign gene in a recombinant
host cell. The preliminary result was synthesis of an uncharacterized,
high molecular weight protein using as the foreign "gene" a segment of
DNA not known to encode a protein. In finding the invention obvious
over the prior art, the court stated that "[o]bviousness does not require
absolute predictability of success." 3 3 This case suggests that one
crosses the line from "obvious to try" to "obvious" when the prior art
discloses a crude version of the end result.
F. Description and Enablement
A variety of issues have arisen in the biotechnology art regarding
description and enablement under section 112 of the Patent Act.
3 4
Many fall into the category of adequacy to support desired claim
breadth, while others fall into the category of deposits of living organ-
27. For a discussion of the historical development of the obviousness question in
chemical patents, how similarity in structure between a new compound and prior art leads
to a pnma facie case of obviousness, and how the current views of the Federal Circuit on
this subject may impact the biotechnology field see Wall & Dituri, The En Banc Rehearing of
In re Dllon: Policy Considerations and Implications For Patent Prosecution, 68 DEN. U.L. REv. 261
(1991) [hereinafter Wall & Dituri].
28. 763 F.2d 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
29. 910 F.2d 823 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
30. See, e.g., In re Mancy, 499 F.2d 1289 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
31. Baechtold, Property Rights in Living Matter: Is New Law Required?, 68 DEN. U.L. REv.
141 (1991); Beir & Bensen, Biotechnology Patent Protection Act, 68 DEN. U.L. REv. 173 (1991).
32. 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
33. Id. at 903.
34. To obtain a valid patent on a new, useful, and nonobvious invention, the patent
applicant must file a specification fully disclosing the invention and how to make and use
it. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982). Section 112 requires that the applicant describe three items:
(1) the invention (the description requirement); (2) the manner and process of making and
using the invention (the enablement requirement); and (3) the best mode contemplated by
the inventor of carrying out his invention (the best mode requirement).
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isms. The initial success of Cohen and Boyer in obtaining broad patent
protection for a process that is the basic tool of the industry encouraged
other pioneers in the field to hope for similar broad coverage. For a
time, researchers feared that a number of broad blocking patents could
limit opportunities for later entrants into the field. As the industry has
grown, however, it now appears that problems of securing adequate
claim breadth are more likely to be encountered.
Biotechnology is a field where functionally equivalent -variants
abound. Despite the fact that at critical loci a single base change in a
nucleic acid sequence or a single amino acid substitution in a protein
can drastically alter function, many non-critical loci occur which tolerate
all sorts of sequence variations without affecting function. A claim lim-
ited to one sequence, or even half a dozen functionally equivalent se-
quence variants, is virtually worthless if a competitor can simply make
another functional variant outside the claim. Given that literally
thousands of functionally equivalent sequence variants exist, and that
defining each of them is an impossible task (and useless since no new
function is achieved thereby), practitioners have resorted to claiming a
combination of sequence and function to obtain adequate claim cover-
age. Such claims, while they purport to be drawn to a family of com-
pounds, take on the character of mechanical claims having means plus
function language.3 5 The case law relevant to the field of biotechnology
is not limited to the field of chemical practice. Until the field develops
its own body of precedents, precedents from other arts will be
influential.
G. Organism Deposits
The practice of depositing a sample of a living organism in a public
depository in order to comply with the requirements of section 11236 is
peculiar to biotechnology. This practice originated with making volun-
tary deposits to support process claims that used a specific novel micro-
organism strain. The deposit of the organism supplemented the written
disclosure, where the specification could not describe how to make and
use the microorganism.3 7 In the late 1970s to mid-1980s, deposits were
used extensively throughout the world.38 With the Budapest Treaty,
3 9
an applicant could make a single deposit to satisfy the deposit require-
35. Adequate support for such claims must include teaching how to make and use
functionally equivalent variants. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Nos. 90-1273,
-1275 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 5, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library, U.S. App. file 3481; WESTLAW,
CTAF database 27262), aff'g in part, rev'g in part, vacating in part 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737
(D. Mass. 1989).
36. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
37. In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
38. See Winner & Denberg, Requirements For Deposits of Biological Materials For Patents
World Wide, 68 DEN. U.L. REv. discussing (1991)[hereinafter Denberg & Winner](deposit
requirements in various countries).
39. Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Micro-
organisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure, April 28, 1977, 32 U.S.T. 1243, T.I.A.S.
No. 9768, 17 I.L.M. 285.
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ment for any signatory country where the applicant's case was filed. The
United States promulgated rules governing deposit practice in 1989.40
Upon issuance or publication, deposited materials must be available
to the public. Applicants who are bound by this requirement do not
favor it. For those who wish to enter the field, however, the deposit
system is a boon, since they can avail themselves of the claimed organ-
isms. The direct public access to the invention is unique to biotechnol-
ogy. In other fields, public disclosure merely provides a set of
instructions enabling competitors to reproduce the invention. Access to
a deposited organism, however, short-cuts the need for sufficient skill to
make the invention. The end product is placed directly into the hands
of would-be competitors. Furthermore, such access is granted to any-
one, even those not subject to United States law. The net effect is to
encourage copying and counterfeiting. An applicant who must deposit
materials to comply with section 112 has very little protection against
such copying, short of infringement litigation. 4 1 Applicants who wish to
avoid deposits must resort to trade secrets or provide a written disclo-
sure teaching how to make the claimed organism from publicly available
precursors. Lack of consistent standards among countries as to why a
deposit is required and when it should be made results in added uncer-
tainty for applicants.
42
H. Prosecution Delays
A serious threat is presented by the infrastructural problems within
the Patent Office. A recent report from the General Accounting Office
stated that the backlog of biotechnology applications swelled by twenty-
seven percent, from 6200 inJanuary, 1989, to 7914 in May, 1989. 4 3 As
a result, long delays occur, often as long as seven years, from the filing
date to the issue date.4 4 Despite the promulgation of new rules in-
tended to resolve interferences within two years, cases are frequently
suspended from prosecution for more than six months before an interfer-
ence is declared. Litigants must frequently wait a year for decisions on
preliminary motions.
Prosecution delays create incalculable consequences for the indus-
try. As long as ownership rights remain unclear, companies continue to
invest in research and development, and to introduce new products. By
the time the patents issue, products are already in the market and litiga-
tion may be the only recourse. Litigation, interferences and even pro-
tracted prosecution are serious economic burdens, especially for small
40. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.801-1.809 (1989).
41. The American Type Culture Collection will provide, for an additional fee, names
of persons who have accessed the deposit. The applicant then has a basis for taking action
against any infringer foolish enough to access the deposit in his own name.
42. See generally Denberg & Winner, supra note 38.
43. Andrews, Long Delay Seen in Patents for Genetic Engineering, N.Y. Times, July 19,
1990, at Dl.
44. See Cohen & Boyer supra note 1. The parent Cohen-Boyer patent, for example,
was pending for seven years before the first claim issued.
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companies. Because most innovation takes place in smaller companies,
the ultimate effect of the exaggerated costs and economic burden of
procuring and enforcing patent protection is to stifle innovation rather
than to promote it.
III. PROSPECTIVE VIEW
Turning to the next seventeen years, what trends can be projected
and what hidden issues lie waiting to be exposed by the emergence of
novel technology?
45
A. New Technologies
Several recent developments in the biological sciences suggest new
directions that may expand the scope of biotechnology. Recently, sev-
eral papers have been published describing processes that open the
door for new "biological" materials that have no counterpart in living
organisms.4 6 Novel proteins and nucleic acids can be developed by a
combination of selection methods and specific amplification methods
that yield molecules having a desired function. The ability to generate
an endless number of new functions using variants of a single method
will further emphasize the differences in rationale between chemical and
biotechnology patent practice.
The technologies of the foregoing type will include a basic set of
steps, modified only by varying a selection step. The starting material is
the same-a pool of randomized sequences from which one having the
desiredfunction is ultimately isolated. Structure will not be predictable,
however, the selected structure will be one of those present in the start-
ing mixture. The method can isolate other structures having the same
function, but those may have different sequences. While the structures
would be patentable under conventional analysis as an unpredictable
structure, once a technique for isolating structures having a particular
function is known, other compounds with the same (equivalent) function
can be generated. Techniques of this sort inherently possess means for
generating a compound having a function. Similar to nonchemical in-
ventions, such processes shift the emphasis from the structure of the
resulting compound (sequence of amino acids or nucleotides), to its
function. The same situation is reflected in existing technology where
alternative functional sequences abound. The technological trend
45. No one understands better than a patent attorney the cruel disjunction of fore-
sight and hindsight. That which is crystal clear after the fact is shrouded in fog before-
hand. The following is offered with a painful sense that whatever is attempted as an
exercise in foresight will have only entertainment value a few years hence. It may be that
the author's prejudices, fears and wishful thinking also play a part.
46. Abelson, Directed Evolution of Nucleic Acids by Independent Replication and Selection, 249
Sci. 488 (1990); Devlin, Panganiban & Devlin, Random Peptide Libraries: A Source of Specific
Protein Binding Molecules, 249 Sci. 404 (1990); Scott & Smith, Searchingfor Peptide Ligands with
an Epitope Library, 249 Sd. 386 (1990); Tramontano, Janda & Lerner Catalytic Antibodies,
234 Sci. 1566 (1986); Tuerk & Gold, Systematic Evolution of Ligands by Exponential Enrichment:
RNA Ligands to Bacteriophage T4 DNA Polymerase, 249 Sci. 505 (1990).
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seems to be toward ever more predictable methodologies that permit
those skilled in the art to attain alternative functional equivalents. As
the trend progresses, chemical structure will become less important than
function in patenting biological macromolecules. In this respect, bio-
technology patent law may diverge from the precedents of chemical pat-
ent laws.
B. Divergence from Chemical Patent Law
The recent en banc reversal of In re Dillon4 7 comes as a shock to bio-
technology practitioners. The absolute primacy of structural relatedness
as the key to establishing a prima facie case of obviousness seems mis-
placed in a field where structural similarity provides little guidance to
functional properties. The relative unimportance of chemical structure
in the biotechnology field suggests that Dillon should have little rele-
vance. Misapplication of Dillon to biotechnological inventions has the
potential to create considerable mischief.
48
C. Human Genome Project
4 9
The human genome project represents another area of biotechnol-
ogy whose results may affect the development of biotechnology patent
law. The process of mapping and sequencing the human genome is a
47. 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990). For an in-depth analysis of the en banc rehearing of
Dillon, see Wall & Dituri supra note 27.
48. At present, models of protein structure are not sufficiently developed to predict
accurately three-dimensional configurations of a given sequence. The functional proper-
ties of a given amino acid sequence are almost never predictable from sequence alone.
One can analyze sequence data in probability terms. Homologous sequences are more
likely to have a common function than unrelated sequences. However, a single amino acid
change at a critical locus can nullify the function, or can result in creating a new function.
It is possible, through trial and error mapping experiments, to locate regions of sequence
which tolerate a relatively wide range of sequence variation without affecting function.
Through comparison of common functions in different sequences, certain sequence motifs
are identifiable as associated with specific attributes. However, the level of predictability
afforded by such information is rather crude, analogous to being able to identify which end
of an automobile is the front. While the inventor of a novel protein may be unable to state
from knowledge of its structure alone specifically which among thousands of possible se-
quence variants will retain equivalent function, he can predict with certainty that a very
large number of such variants can easily be made. The same holds true for nucleic acids
where redundant codings for identical amino acid sequences are known. Therefore, until
a comprehensive understanding of structure-function relationships in biological systems is
achieved, structural data are of value primarily to prove novelty and purity, but of little
value to prove obviousness or to limit claim scope. See Wall & Dituri, supra note 27.
49. All living organisms are composed of cells, each no wider than a human hair.
Each of our cells contains the same complement of DNA constituting the human
genome. The DNA sequence of every person's genome is the blueprint for his or
her development from a single cell to a complex, integrated organism that is
composed of more than 10" (10 million million) cells.
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL COMMrrrEE ON MAPPING AND SEQUENCING THE HUMAN GEN-
OME, MAPPING AND SEQUENCING THE HUMAN GENOME 12 (1988). Currently there is no
single human genome project, instead there are many projects in both the public and
private sectors. Among the objectives of the genome projects are to create maps of human
chromosomes consisting of DNA markers that would permit scientists to locate genes
quickly, and to determine the DNA sequence of a large fraction of the human genome and
that of other organisms. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT, MAPPING OUR GENES GEN-
OME PROJECTS: How BIG, How FAST 6-7 (1988).
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departure from traditional avenues of scientific inquiry. Segments of
human DNA will be cloned and sequenced without concomitant infor-
mation regarding the function. An enormous amount of position and
sequence data will be added to the databases, often without correlated
information of associated functional properties. 50 The prior art effect of
such data is difficult to predict. It remains an open question whether
Dillon is applicable where the prior art reveals only structure, with no
hint of functional properties. The debate in Dillon over the relative sig-
nificance of "structure" and "properties" as factors in establishing a
prima facie case of obviousness can be expected to continue. The re-
sults, however, may be different in the biotechnology field than in the
chemical field. 5 1
D. Transgenic Animals
The next seventeen years will witness an exponential increase in the
kinds of transgenic animals created. The parameters of patentability for
transgenics are currently unknown. Both genotype (the structure of the
introduced gene and its control elements) and phenotype (the charac-
teristics of the transgenic animal attributable to the introduced gene) are
key features of a transgenic animal that serve to characterize it and to
distinguish it from the prior art. The question of which of these features
is more significant to determine obviousness or to establish a prima facie
case of obviousness is likely to occupy examiners, practitioners, and the
courts for some years. The parallel to the debate over "structure" ver-
sus "properties" in the chemical field is inescapable.
5 2
The problems of patent enforcement for self-replicating products
are likely to be particularly serious for products sold in a mass market.
For patent holders, the prospect of extending transgenic animal tech-
nology to agriculture presents unusual problems. Congress has pro-
posed special legislation that would provide exemptions for farmers,
permitting them to breed and sell patented transgenic animals without
50. Much of the data may be in the form of partial sequences, specifically just enough
sequence at the ends of a cloned segment to allow the same segment to be reisolated from
a library by polymerase chain reaction, using the disclosed sequences as primers. See Ap-
penzeller, Democratizing the DNA Sequence, 247 Sc. 1030 (1990); Roberts, New Game Plan for
Genome Mapping, 245 Sci. 1438 (1989).
51. When doing research, the chemist's attention is generally directed first toward the
structure of a compound and second toward determining its functional properties. In bio-
technology, the reverse is most often the case: research is directed initially toward finding
a compound having a particular function, then secondarily to elucidating its structure.
Within the epistemologies of the two sciences, the relative significance of structure and
properties are quite different. Therefore, the law affecting these two fields of art is likely
to reflect this dichotomy.
52. The kinds of questions which could arise are numerous. If the gene introduced
into mouse A differs only in its promoter from that introduced into mouse B, is A unobvi-
ous in view of B on the ground that the phenotypes of A and B are unpredictably distinct?
If the gene introduced into mouse A yields a characterized phenotype, are rat A, dog A,
horse A, etc., each having the same gene and phenotype obvious in view of mouse A? Will
mouse A', having the same phenotype as mouse A but a slightly different introduced gene,
infringe a claim to mouse A? Is a claim to mouse A overly broad if the gene construct is
recited in terms of equivalent sequences rather than limited to a specific sequence?
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infringement. 53 Underlying such legislation is the fear that effective pat-
ent protection for valuable farm breeding stock might dislocate farm ec-
onomics in socially unfavorable ways. 54 Whether such dislocations
would occur and whether legislation of the sort proposed would have
the effects desired by its sponsors may become a matter of political
debate.
E. Internationalization
In addition to legal issues driven by new science, there are issues
generated by changes in business economics, and by current political
and legal trends. The internationalization of commercial enterprise and
the increasing worldwide interdependence of national economies cre-
ates pressure to develop a more uniform set of national patent laws.
Talks leading to a Patent Harmonization Treaty have been in progress
over the past few years.5 5 The prospects for successful internationaliza-
tion are encouraged by the strength and quality of the European Patent
Convention. 56 The pros and cons for the United States patent system
presented by the Patent Harmonization Treaty have been discussed by
many commentators.5 7 As a practical matter, the international character
of the modern market economy is such that even small businesses must
take into account foreign laws governing patentability and enforce-
ment. 58 The present trend toward increasing harmonization and stand-
ardization of patent laws seems likely to continue.
The nationalistic view of patents as a means to protect local propri-
etary interests is being displaced by a view of patents as a means of pro-
viding world-wide proprietary rights, regardless of the invention's
origin. 59 If the United States adopts a first-to-file system, interferences
53. Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act, H.R. 4970, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988)
(The statute proposed exemptions for farmers with gross incomes of less than $500,000,
or are single family farmers, or farmers who do not engage in the growing of animals for
sale.).
54. See H.R. REP. No. 888, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 72 (1988).
55. See H.R. CON. RES. 354, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. 94, H5198, E2425
(daily ed. July 20, 1990)(statement of Rep. Porter); Summary of Proceedings at Special Meeting
of the Membership on Harmonizaton on Patent Law, ABA SEc. or PAT., TRADEMARK AND COPY-
RIGHT L., September 9, 10, 1989, at 83 (1990); Interference Issues in a First-to-File World, 18
A.I.P.L.A. Qj. No. 1 (1990).
56. European Patent Convention, art. 93, (1973), reprinted in 78 PAT. & TRADEMARK
REv. 31, 39 (1980).
57. See sources cited supra note 55.
58. Activities which do not bar patentability in the United States, such as public dis-
closure within one year of the patent filing date, can defeat patentability in most other
countries. Small businesses and academic inventors sometimes fail to consider the effects
of such disclosures on patent rights outside the United States, to their increasing detri-
ment. Small businesses increasingly look to foreign markets and academic inventors in-
creasingly seek industrial funding for which world-wide patent rights are a common
consideration. In the absence of a formal harmonization treaty, a kind of street harmoni-
zation exists in which the most restrictive provisions of the laws of each relevant jurisdic-
tion are observed.
59. The trend is uneven, being more pronounced in the more industrialized countries
with strong orientation toward a market economy, weaker in less developed countries
where developing a local industrial-technical base has a high priority.
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will eventually be phased out, although oppositions may come to occupy
a substantial part of the practitioner's docket. Canada has abandoned its
first-to-invent system for a first-to-file system. 60 Although changes oc-
cur with glacial slowness in the international patent arena, the prospect
of an international patent agency, along the lines pioneered by the Euro-
pean Patent Office, providing a unified patent enforceable throughout
the industrialized world is entirely feasible by the end of the next seven-
teen years.
F. Infringement, Equivalence, Claim Interpretation
While issues of patentability have been dominant in the first patent
lifetime, issues of infringement, equivalence and claim interpretation
6 '
may come to dominate the second. Issues of fact, such as whether an
accused organism is identical to a claimed organism, may entail amas-
sing significant amounts of evidence to be resolved. By the end of the
next patent term, the body of case law on equivalence and reverse equiv-
alence is likely to be greatly expanded in breadth and sophistication.
6 2
Indeed, many terms used in biotechnology claims, while definable in
ways that reasonable people would consider clear, may require resort to
an equivalence type of analysis when litigants are involved.
G. Patent Judiciary
The composition of the judiciary may be affected by the growing
number of practitioners and patent examiners that have advanced de-
grees in science. In both the examining corps and the practicing bar,
the number of persons with Ph.D.s or Master's degrees in a biotechnol-
ogy-related discipline 6 3 has increased in response to the technical de-
mands of the subject matter.64 A familiarity with scientific language and
practices ought to be as valuable in court as a familiarity with business
practices and terminology. Both administrative and judicial decision
making may be enhanced. The infusion of a greater degree of scientific
knowledge into decision making, both in patent law and in general law,
will be a side benefit of the growth of biotechnology.
60. The Patent Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. p-4, § 27 (1985), amended by ch. 33, § 8 (3rd
Supp. 1987) (As a result of this amendment the United States and the Philippines are the
only remaining countries with a first-to-invent system.).
61. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608
(1950) ("[A] patentee may invoke this doctrine [of equivalents] to proceed against the pro-
ducer of a device 'if it performs substantially the same function in substantially the same
way to obtain the same result.' ").
62. See Genentech, Inc. v. The Wellcome Found. Ltd., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1363 (D.
Del. 1990)(Denying summary judgment in a biotechnology patent infringement action
brought by Genentech against Wellcome, the judge found a triable issue of fact concern-
ing whether the patented compound and infringing compound performed in substantially
the same way.).
63. Biotechnology-related disciplines include physics, chemistry, microbiology, bio-
chemistry, genetics or molecular biology and physiology.
64. That some of these will eventually complete the transit from lab bench to judicial
bench should be a healthy trend provided their legal qualifications are the primary selec-
tion criteria.
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IV. CONCLUDING SUMMARY
The existing precedents, based primarily in the chemistry field,
served adequately during the early development of biotechnology. Ma-
jor threshold questions of patentability, relative to living organisms and
products of nature, are now largely resolved. The courts now accept
products of biotechnology as patentable subject matter, subject to the
same statutory criteria of novelty, unobviousness, description and en-
ablement as inventions in other fields. Applying the statutory criteria to
the facts of biotechnology inventions is an ongoing process, whose out-
lines in the .case law are only beginning to take shape. As biotechnology
patent practice matures, it is being viewed less as a direct descendant of
chemical practice than as a cousin. The body of biotechnology prece-
dents is expected to take on a more individualistic character separate
from chemical practice and drawing from precedents in other arts as
well.
The future will be characterized by further definition of a body of
biotechnology case law, which in turn will be affected by new technolo-
gies that further accent differences between biotechnology practice and
chemical practice. General trends toward internationalization of busi-
ness and harmonization of patent laws can be expected to bring about
more uniform treatment of biotechnology in patent systems around the
world.
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PROPERTY RIGHTS IN LIVING MATTER:
Is NEW LAW REQUIRED?
ROBERT L. BAECHTOLD,* LAWRENCE S. PERRY,** JENNIFER A.
TEGFELDT,*** PETER KNUDSENJ PATRICIA CARSONtt
I. INTRODUCTION
In non-technical parlance, biotechnology means the manipulation
of the basic substance of living matter and its modification to achieve the
purposes of the manipulator. A Congressional Committee has defined
biotechnology, for example, as "(a)ny technique that uses living organ-
isms (or parts of organisms) to make or modify products, to improve
plants or animals or to develop microorganisms for specific uses.",
These techniques include disparate levels of sophistication, ranging
from the selective breeding of animals to the manipulation and altera-
tion at cellular and molecular levels of hybridomas, RNA, DNA, vectors,
plasmids, monoclonal antibodies, vaccines and altered microorganisms.
Researchers employing these techniques within the broadly defined
field of biotechnology may as likely be working toward a cure for AIDS,
creating a genetically modified research animal particularly susceptible
to cancer, or producing a steer or chicken with desired characteristics
previously available only through selective breeding programs. As as-
serted before Congress, biotechnology represents 1988 revenues of
$762 million and export sales of $215 million, figures which are nearly
double the revenues for 1987 and quadruple those for 1986.2 The
growth of the industry has been projected to be $40 billion within the
next ten years, with research and development comprising a significant
portion of investment for the industry.3 As a new field of scientific re-
search and development, biotechnology has spawned its own language
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born of concepts distinct from the well-known mechanical arts. This fac-
tor, combined with the significant commercial success of technology re-
lating to living matter that has been achieved within the last few decades,
has prompted strong pressure to create legislation tailored to the new
technology.
In that vein, some practitioners in the arts of biotechnology contend
that fundamental changes are required to adapt patent law to the needs
of this rapidly growing and heavily research and development intensive
industry. Within the last few years a number of bills have been
presented in Congress to address problems perceived as unique to bi-
otechnological inventions, including the Patent Competitiveness and
Technological Innovation Act of 19904 which proposed, in part, to
amend provisions relating to infringement and patentability.
No doubt, the unique circumstance of inventions that self-replicate
and the difficulty of distinguishing what was made by man from what
existed in nature are peculiar to the law of patenting living things. His-
tory tells us, however, that the well-established and basic premises of
patent law that have been responsive to other new and rapidly develop-
ing technologies unenvisioned even a short number of years ago, should
be flexible enough to accommodate the new technologies relating to liv-
ing matter.
The patent system has always been premised on the basic idea of
encouraging innovation, an idea that is inherently flexible. So important
was this idea to the framers of the Constitution that they charged Con-
gress with promoting the "Progress of Science and useful Arts" by the
grant of exclusive rights to writings and discoveries. 5 This mandate
does not provide any particular definition for the subject matter of such
inventive discoveries, but Congress has interpreted it to include "any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of mat-
ter, or any new and useful improvement thereof."' 6 These broad defini-
tions are based, in substantial part, on patent legislation enacted as early
as 1793.7 Few changes have been made to the basic character of the
patent system since its constitutional birth, despite the significant tech-
nological advances in electronics, superconductivity, pharmaceuticals
and polymer chemistry, and despite the early bases of biotechnology
provided in the publication of Gregor Mendel's genetics studies in
1866.8 In the interest of maintaining a coherent system of patent law
principles upon which future and presently unknown developments can
predictably be built, the temptation must be avoided to create individu-
alized patent laws for any new technology.
4. H.R. 5598, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. H7498 (1989).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
6. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
7. See generally W. BENNETr, THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM 64-67 (1943) (history of.
American patent system).
8. G. MENDEL, EXPERIMENTS IN PLANT HYBRIDISATION (Harvard University Press
1950).
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II. PATENTABILITY OF LIVING MATTER: A BRIEF HISTORY
Although it is often assumed that biotechnology is a modem devel-
opment and that the Patent and Trademark Office only recently began
considering "biotechnical" inventions, patents covering biotechnology
developments have historic origins. For example, the patent issued to
Louis Pasteur claimed a yeast. 9 Other early patents claimed a vaccine in
the form of an altered virus10 and a process for optimizing the efficiency
of anaerobic bacteria.' 1 In addition, patents were routinely granted on
fermentation processes. All of these were issued without any fundamen-
tal change in the patent statutes or any serious dispute over the author-
ity to issue patents that related to living matter.
The patentability of inventions using living matter was brought to
high visibility when a scientist at General Electric Company, Ananda
Chakrabarty, tried to obtain a patent for a strain of Pseudomonas that me-
tabolized components of crude oil.1 2 Chakrabarty's claims to the bacte-
rium were rejected by a United States Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) examiner as being "products of nature" and "not patentable sub-
ject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101." 13 Chakrabarty appealed the rejec-
tion to the Patent Office Board of Appeals, which affirmed the rejection
on the second ground.14
The issue of the per se patentability of microorganisms was
presented to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in Chakrabarty
and another earlier case, In re Bergy, 15 which concerned a claim for a
biologically pure culture of a bacterial strain capable of producing an
antibiotic.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed the PTO's re-
jection, in both Bergy and Chakrabarly, holding that "the fact that micro-
organisms, as distinguished from chemical compounds, are alive is a
distinction without legal significance" for the purposes of the patent
law. 16 Bergy and Chakrabarty were consolidated for reconsideration; the
earlier judgments were reaffirmed and although certiorari was sought
for both, it was ultimately Chakrabarty that placed the issue before the
Supreme Court.'
7
In considering whether the claimed microorganism constituted a
"manufacture" or "composition of matter" within section 101 of the
Patent Act, 18 the Court applied its earlier definition of "manufacture" as
9. U.S. Patent No. 141,072.
10. U.S. Patent No. 197,612.
11. U.S. Patent No. 634,423.
12. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
13. Id. at 306. The PTO reasoned that, since the passage of the 1930 Plant Patent Act
"extended" patent protection to include some living material (asexually reproduced
plants), Congress did not intend sectionl0l to cover any living material. See id.
14. Id.
15. 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977), vacated, Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978),
vacated & aft'd, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980).
16. Id. at 1038.
17. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 306-07.
,18. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
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"the production of articles for use from raw or prepared materials by
giving to these materials new forms, qualities, properties, or combina-
tions, whether by hand-labor or by machinery."' 9 Similarly, a composi-
tion of matter was construed to include "all composite articles, whether
they be the results of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture."
'20
Thus, in affirming the judgment of the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, the Supreme Court acknowledged that section 101 was in-
tended to "include anything under the sun that is made by man."' 2 1 In-
deed, the Court stated that the only consideration relevant to a section
101 analysis is that the living thing results from human intervention and
has a distinctive name, character and use.
2 2
Chakrabarty opened the door for the patenting of every kind of living
matter. The PTO readily accepted the holding as permitting patent pro-
tection for bacteria, viruses, fungi and yeasts, human and animal cell
lines. The PTO even extended section 101 to plants that fell within the
scope of the Plant Variety Protection Act.23 In a case decided nearly two
years after Hibberd, it became clear that altered animals such as non-nat-
urally occurring polyploid oysters were also considered to fall within the
purview of section 101.24 On April 12, 1988, the first patent issued on a
mammal, claiming "a transgenic non-human mammal [preferably a
rodent such as a mouse] all of whose germ cells and somatic cells con-
tain a recombinant activated oncogene sequence," known as the
"oncomouse." 25
All this was accomplished without the necessity for any statutory
changes to accommodate the new technology. Indeed, the use of depos-
its for the continued preservation of genetic materials and organisms is
an example of how the industry took the necessary steps to fit itself into
the established framework of laws.
Despite these accomplishments, we are now told by representatives
on both sides of the patent fence that some fundamental patent law
principles must be changed to accommodate biotechnical inventions.
One side argues that the constitutional provision of exclusivity and the
long history of repugnance for compulsory licenses must give way to a
special exemption allowing free reproduction of patented animals. The
other side argues that a new class of per se nonobviousness must be
created, in contradiction of long-standing case law, obligating the PTO
to grant patents automatically on processes previously recognized as ob-
vious, provided only that an essential element used in that process is
novel and unobvious. Before special exceptions are granted for any
19. 447 U.S. at 308 (quoting American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S.
1, 11 (1931)).
20. Id. (quoting Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279, 280 (D.D.C. 1957)).
21. Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5; H.R. REP. No. 1923,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 2394, 2399).
22. See id. at 309-10.
23. See Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (PTO Bd. Pat. App. & Int'f. 1985).
24. See Alien, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (PTO Bd. Pat. App. & Int'f. 1987), aff'd, No.
87-1393 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 14, 1988).
25. U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866.
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technical field, however, we should examine critically whether it is either
wise or necessary to tinker with a body of principles that is basically
sound and well-understood.
III. PROTECTING RIGHTS IN PROPAGATING LIFE FORMS
Particularly since the issuance of the "oncomouse" patent, the sci-
entific and political communities have uniformly recognized that patent-
ing life forms raises novel political, ethical, and legal issues
inconceivable in inventions relating to non-living matter. One of the
more troublesome issues relates to protection of the patent holder's
rights when the invention is capable of propagation. In the case of mi-
croorganisms, propagation is usually a prerequisite to the practice of the
invention. However, the use of transgenic animals for the purposes of
the patented invention does not necessarily involve the propagation of
these genetically altered animals.
A. The Technology of Transgenic Animals
Transgenic animals differ from animals of nature because they con-
tain foreign DNA within their genetic blueprint, or genome, that has
been introduced by man through recombinant DNA techniques. For ex-
ample, "oncomice" have a mouse tumor gene, broadly known as an
"oncogene," inserted into their genome, the expression of which is
under the control of a gene sequence derived from a tumor-causing vi-
rus. The patent claims are broadly directed to non-human mammals
having cells containing recombinant, activated oncogenes introduced
into the mammal or its ancestor at an embryonic stage. The utility of
the claimed animals is primarily in cancer research. Mammals contain-
ing genes of the type claimed are highly susceptible to cancer and there-
fore are ideal "test tubes" for testing suspected carcinogens or
evaluating the efficacy of anti-cancer drugs. Transgenic animals could
also be produced with other genetic deficiencies or modifications useful
in the study of the causes of human diseases, and the search for their
cures.
Transgenic techniques also permit the insertion into the genome of
one species, gene sequences from another species. Such techniques
provide an important new way to produce superior livestock without re-
sort to conventional breeding programs. Moreover, these animals con-
taining "foreign" gene sequences can be protected under the patent
laws, whereas animals produced under selective breeding programs
cannot.
Transgenic animals of the same line, that is, homozygous animals
carrying the same inserted gene sequence, can be mated to produce off-
spring with the same genetic makeup. Consequently, a purchaser of a
patented animal who acquires at least two transgenic animals of oppo-
site sex acquires the capability of producing more animals of that line.
The issue arises whether the purchaser of such patented animals also
1991]
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acquires the right to produce more animals based on the ones obtained
from the patent holder. Similar questions accompany the sale of plant
seeds, microorganisms, and other living matter that can either self-repli-
cate, or from which genetic material can be extracted and used by the
purchaser to produce similarly modified variants.
B. Propagation of Animals and Cell Cultures
A pharmaceutical firm purchasing patented mice for the purposes
of testing an antitumor drug might also use some of the mice for breed-
ing, in order to maintain a line for use in further tests and in other ex-
periments without resorting to the patent holder or his licensee. The
purchaser may assert that the sale of patented animals by the patent
holder exhausted the patent monopoly, thereby depriving the patent
holder of the right to control or restrict subsequent use of the animals
sold.
Precedent for that argument is Adams v. Burke,26 in which the Court
found that the sale of a patented invention by one authorized to sell it
gives the purchaser an implied license to use or resell the invention
without restriction. 27 Mechanical devices do not present a problem
since they cannot inherently reproduce. However, in the case of a pat-
ented animal, or any other living matter whose inherent capabilities in-
clude reproduction, the question becomes difficult to resolve.
Statutory solutions to the reproduction question were provided in
the Plant Patent Act 28 and the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970.29
The Plant Patent Act expressly provides that "[imn the case of a plant
patent the grant shall be of the right to exclude others from asexually
reproducing the plant or selling or using the plant so reproduced." 30
Similarly, the Plant Variety Protection Act provides that it is an act
of infringement to:
(3) sexually multiply the novel variety as a step in marketing
(for growing purposes) the variety; or
(4) use the novel variety in producing (as distinguished from
developing) a hybrid or different variety therefrom; or
(5) use seed which had been marked "Unauthorized Propaga-
tion Prohibited" or "Unauthorized Seed Multiplication Prohib-
ited" or progeny thereof to propagate the novel variety; or
(6) dispense the novel variety to another, in a form which can
be propagated, without notice as to being a protected variety
under which it was received.
3 '
The issue of propagation is thus expressly resolved when protection
is obtained under either of these statutes. However, for subject matter
26. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873).
27. Id. at 456-57.
28. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (1988).
29. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (1988).
30. 35 U.S.C. § 163 (1988).
31. 7 U.S.C. § 2541 (1988).
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protected by a utility patent, that question has not been addressed by
either Congress or the courts.
If there is no statutory prohibition against self-propagation, and
case law allows no restraint on the use of a patented product after sale
by the patentee, is there any way the patentee of living subject matter
can prevent purchasers from replicating it? Yes, because the "no re-
straint" rule is somewhat of an overstatement. In the context of "repair
and reconstruction," the courts have recognized that there are some lim-
its on the activities of the purchaser.
C. The Doctrine of Repair and Reconstruction
The Supreme Court has interpreted the doctrine of repair and re-
construction in a number of its decisions. In Wilson v. Simpson,32 the
Court considered a planing machine intended for long-term use. The
Court concluded that putting new blades into the planing machine when
the blades had worn out from use was permissible repair of the inven-
tion necessary to preserve the purpose for which the machine was in-
tended and sold.
3 3
More than thirty years later, in Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons 3 4 the Court
considered the issue again in the context of a patent that claimed ties
constructed from a metal buckle in combination with a metal band. The
band was placed around a cotton bale and the ends were confined by the
buckle. On each of the buckles the patent holder had stamped into the
metal: "[1]icensed to use once only." 35 The accused infringer
purchased the discarded straps and buckles as scrap iron, straightened
the bands of the tie, punched holes in it, riveted the pieces together and
formed new bands with the buckles attached. These ties were then sold
to others who used them to bail cotton. In holding that this activity
amounted to impermissible reconstruction of the invention, the Court
focused on the fact that the ties, when removed from the bales of cotton,
had served their complete intended function.
36
The Supreme Court later returned to the question of what consti-
tuted permissible repair and impermissible reconstruction in the case of
Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.3 7 The patent
claimed in combination an automobile body of a flexible top fabric, sup-
porting structures, and a mechanism for sealing the fabric against the
side of the automobile body to prevent rain from entering. All the com-
ponents of the combination were expected to last throughout the life of
the car with the exception of the fabric component, which had a life span
of approximately three years. 38 The Court reasoned that a purchaser is
entitled to repair a worn out part within a patented combination to re-
32. 50 U.S. (9 How.) 109 (1850).
33. Id. at 125-26.
34. 106 U.S. 89 (1882).
35. Id. at 91.
36. Id. at 94-95.
37. 365 U.S. 336 (1961).
58. Id. 337-38.
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store the combination to its original function in order to realize the ex-
pected function and useful life of the patented combination.3 9 When
the activities effectively constitute making a new embodiment of the in-
vention, that is "reconstruction" and is infringement. 40 In other words,
sale by the patentee of the patented invention carries the implied condi-
tion that the purchaser be allowed to do those things necessary to enjoy
the purchased material for its expected use, for its full anticipated life,
but not to make additional or new copies or fit it for other uses, or give it
new life.
D. Application of the Reconstruction Doctrine to Self-Propagating Inventions
As discussed above, what constitutes impermissible "reconstruc-
tion" depends, in large part, on the intended purpose of the product
sold and the expected useful life of the product in that intended use.
Applying the same principles to living matter provides an analysis that is
flexible and rational.
The famous "oncomouse," for example, is entirely analogous to the
single-use cotton bale tie. It is designed for one experiment, and one
experiment exhausts its useful life. Replication is not intended and
therefore would be an infringement.
Similarly, a patented crop seed is intended for propagation, but
only one stage. Planting the seed and growing one plant from the
purchased seed is expected and permitted, even though that action may
result in the production of more seed. Planting the second generation,
however, is not intended.
In the case of Chakrabarty's oil-eating microorganism, the patented
life form must replicate extensively in order to perform its intended
function. Accordingly, such replication would not constitute in-
fringement.
For each of these three self-propagating inventions with three dif-
ferent intended uses, the repair/reconstruction rationale concludes that
a sale authorizes, respectively, no reproduction, one stage of reproduc-
tion, and extensive reproduction. Applying those well-established prin-
ciples produces reasonable, rational results.
E. Licensing of Self-Propagating Inventions
In addition to statutory restrictions, another way to control use of a
product is to use contractual obligations. Where the patent holder
makes and sells the patented invention, he is precluded from restricting
the field in which the invention is used because the sale is deemed to
exhaust the monopoly in that article.
4 1
In contrast, where the patent holder grants a license to another to
manufacture and sell the patented subject matter, he may restrict the
39. Id. at 343-46.
40. Id. at 346.
41. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942).
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field in which that subject matter is used, even after the licensee has
parted control. 4 2 In fact, even purchasers with notice from a restricted
licensee are bound by the limitations of the license.43 Thus, if the pat-
ent holder can license his living matter, he can permit the useful, desired
function but not the self-replicating one.
Another alternative for controlling the use of a product is to lease
the essential material rather than sell it, a practice that is well-developed
in the catalyst field. Leasing is particularly feasible when the living mat-
ter is a single relatively long-lived entity, such as a cow whose genetic
makeup is modified to express a useful protein in its milk, or where the
living matter, although it reproduces, remains reasonably constant in
composition during its useful life, such as a microorganism culture that
produces a desired product. It is more cumbersome when the user must
realize profits by eventually selling the living item, for example, beef
cattle.
Licensing is most feasible when the patent contains process claims,
especially those processes that produce a product on which a royalty can
be based. However, there are some limitations on the availability of pro-
cess protection in the wake of decisions such as In re Larsen,44 In re Albert-
son,4 5 and In re Durden.
4 6
All of these cases involved a process that was generally known in the
art, with the difference between the claimed process and the prior art
process being that a starting material or resulting product was novel and
unobvious, but with no unexpected result. In each case, the rationale
was that although there was inventive subject matter in the starting ma-
terial or the resulting product as a composition, such novelty did not
confer on the inventor the right to claim old, manipulative steps that
produced an expected result. This rationale was based on the realiza-
tion that once a new chemical structure is defined, chemists of ordinary
skill would readily recognize the applicability of conventional processes
that would produce that structure or convert it into other structures.
Because the invention of the new compound added nothing to those
conventional processes, it would be unfair to allow the inventor to ap-
propriate them. As summarized in Durden:
Of course, an otherwise old process becomes a new process
when a previously unknown starting material, for example, is
used in it which is then subjected to a conventional manipula-
tion or reaction to produce a product which may also be new,
albeit the expected result of what is done. But it does not neces-
sarily mean that the whole process has become unobvious in the
sense of § 103. In short, a new process may still be obvious,
even when considered "as a whole," notwithstanding the spe-
42. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 180-81
(1938).
43. Id. at 181-82.
44. 292 F.2d 531 (C.C.P.A. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 936 (1962).
45. 332 F.2d 379 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
46. 763 F.2d 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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cific starting material or resulting product, or both, is not to be
found in the prior art.
4 7
At the same time, the court cautioned against an overexpansive use of
"black letter" rules that disregard the factual circumstances inherent in
a section 103 analysis:
We are sure that there are those who would like to have us state
some clear general rule by which all cases of this nature could
be decided. Some judges might be tempted to try it. But the
question of obviousness under § 103 arises in such an unpre-
dictable variety of ways and in such different forms that it
would be an indiscreet thing to do. Today's rule would likely
be regretted in tomorrow's case. Our function is to apply, in
each case, § 103 as written to the facts of disputed issues, not to
generalize or make rules for other cases which are
unforeseeable.
48
Despite the court's admonition, Durden has been widely relied upon
as "black letter" law to reject process claims under section 103. In bio-
technology cases, for example, these rejections have presented
problems in patenting processes such as culturing cells containing DNA
encoding a certain protein, and recovering that protein.
Because process claims are of special importance in biotechnol-
ogy4 9 some proponents have pressed for new legislation creating a per
se class of patentable process inventions. In February, 1990, legislation
was introduced to amend section 103 to provide that "a process of mak-
ing a product shall not be considered obvious under this section if an
essential material used in the process is novel under section 102 and
otherwise non-obvious under section 103."5o
A more recent version of the bill, introduced in September, 1990,
provided that:
[W]hen a process of making or using a machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter is sought to be patented in the same
application as such machine manufacture or composition of
matter, such process shall not be considered as obvious under
this section if such machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter is novel under section 102 and nonobvious under this
section. If the patentability of such process depends upon such
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, then a single
patent shall issue on the application. 5 1
While the proposed legislation appears on its face to be applicable
47. Id. at 1410 (emphasis in original).
48. Id. at 1411.
49. Of course, process claims generally have assumed greater importance because
they give unique opportunities for protection against extraterritorial use. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(g); 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988). Use of a patented product abroad is not subject to the
same prohibition. See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 706 F. Supp. 94 (D.
Mass. 1989).
50. H.R. 3957, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H298 (1990).
51. H.R. 5664, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H7825 (1990) (the "Boucher
Bill").
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to any field of technology, it was very clearly keyed specifically to a bio-
technology dispute.
In 1983 Amgen, Inc. filed a patent application directed to DNA se-
quences encoding recombinantly produced erythropoietin, an essential
blood protein that patients with diseased kidneys cannot produce in suf-
ficient quantities. Amgen originally attempted to obtain claims to cover
the manufacturing process for erythropoietin, but those claims were
cancelled in view of a rejection based on the Durden decision. 52 In Octo-
ber 1987, Amgen was granted a patent including claims to the gene en-
coding erythropoietin and recombinant host cells containing the gene.
Although the patent issued to Amgen claimed only the recombinant
gene and the recombinant host cell, Amgen charged a foreign manufac-
turer with infringement under section 271(g) of the Patent Act for im-
portation and sale of recombinant erythropoietin. Amgen argued that
the court should construe the claims to the recombinant gene and host
to include processes for making erythropoietin by expressing a gene so
encoded. 53 Faced with the question of whether the Amgen patent in-
cluded process claims, the court held that it did not based on the cancel-
lation of such claims during prosecution.
Amgen also filed a complaint in the International Trade Commis-
sion (ITC) to block importation of the foreign-produced erythropoietin.
The ITC dismissed the complaint by order, ruling that the imported er-
ythropoietin was not within its jurisdiction under section 1337 of the
Tariff Act of 193054 because the Amgen patent did not contain process
claims.5 5 On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed that the ITC's exclu-
sionary power did not reach such imports. However, the court vacated
the Commission's order and remanded on the basis that the case should
have been dismissed on the merits, not for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.5 6
The Boucher Bill 57 was introduced as a direct consequence of the
Amgen, Inc. v. United States International Trade Commission situation. 8 One
purpose of the bill is to overrule legislatively the holding in Durden; an-
other is to amend section 1337 of the Tariff Act, 59 to grant to the ITC
the jurisdiction it found lacking in the Amgen erythropoietin case.
The need for this bill has been debated extensively. Supporters of
the bill contend that Durden acts as an obstacle to the development of the
52. Amgen has subsequently succeeded in overcoming the rejection of its process
claims, but those claims have failed to issue pending the outcome of an interference
proceeding.
53. 706 F. Supp. at 97.
54. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
55. In re Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1906, 1911
(U.S.I.T.C. 1989), vacated, Amgen, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 902 F.2d
1532 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
56. 902 F.2d at 1540.
57. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
58. 902 F.2d 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The bill was deliberately drafted in general terms
to avoid the sensitivity to industry specificity.
59. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (1988).
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United States biotechnology industry, because the essence of biotech-
nology is in the application of known processes to novel starting materi-
als. Methods for expression of a novel gene to produce the
corresponding protein usually use well-established vectors and tech-
niques. The "inventiveness" most often lies in the application of those
techniques and materials to express the novel gene. Viewed from the
point of view of transgenic technology, the physical manipulations re-
quired to produce and reproduce an animal with foreign DNA intro-
duced are essentially established. Supporters also argue that automatic
patentability for a class of process patent claims, directed to processes of
making patentable products, will reduce the workload of the PTO, which
has been partly responsible for the long pendency of biotechnology
applications.
Opponents of the bill raise concerns that per se patentability (1) is
alien to our concepts of invention, (2) would encourage an applicant to
"overclaim" in the application, that is, include process claims encom-
passing a large number of manipulative steps not covered by the inven-
tive concept, and (3) is unnecessary to solve any perceived problem.
Creating black letter laws of what is patentable is as wrong as creat-
ing ones for what is not patentable. Under the proposed bill, the inven-
tor of a new ratchet wrench could claim the process for bolting together
metal parts, using the wrench, then the process for assembling cars by
bolting together metal parts using the new wrench, and so on. Invoking
the provisions of section 2 7 1(g) of the Patent Act or the jurisdiction of
the ITC under section 1337 of the Tariff Act, the wrench inventor can
then enjoin importation or sale of cars. Per se patentability creates new
problems at least as absurd as the ones it is intended to solve.
Again, the answer lies in living within our existing legal framework.
Durden and its predecessors do not stand alone as guidelines to the pat-
entability of processes involving the use of previously unknown materi-
als. In In re Mancy,60 for example, the claims related to a process of
preparing the known antibiotic, daunorubicin, by aerobically cultivating
a previously unknown microorganism. One of the appealed claims re-
cited a:
process for the production of Daunorubicin which comprises
aerobically cultivating Streptomyces bifurcus, strain DS 23,219
(NRRL 3539), of [sic, or] a daunorubicin-producing mutant
thereof, using an aqueous nutrient medium containing assimil-
able sources of carbon, nitrogen and inorganic substances, and
separating daunorubicin formed during the culture.6 1
The PTO examiner rejected the claims on the basis that it was not
patentable to produce a known antibiotic from either a different strain of
the same species of organism or a different species of the same genus
without something more than merely the use of another source from the
60. 499 F.2d 1289 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
61. Id. at 1290.
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same field of sources of these products.62 The Board of Appeals agreed
that the choice of a different strain of the same microorganism was
prima facie obvious.
63
On appeal, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed the
Board, holding that "[w]ithout Streptomyces bifurcus, strain DS 23,219,
knowledge of which is supplied by appellants' application and availabil-
ity of which is supplied by appellants' deposit of the microorganism with
the Department of Agriculture, one skilled in the art would not find it
obvious to produce daunorubicin by aerobically cultivating Streptomyces
bifurcus.64 Appellants did not have any allowed claims to the novel strain
of Streptomyces because, although not shown in the art of record, the
strain was considered unpatentable as a "product of nature." 65 How-
ever, the court emphasized that a patentable starting material was not
required for the unobviousness of the method of use claims. 66
That reasoning was carried further by the Federal Circuit in the re-
cent case, In re Pleuddemann.6 7 The invention related to a silane coupling
agent that included the reaction product of an isocyanatoalkyl ester with
an aminoorganisilane, and imparted superior moisture resistance to
mineral-filled unsaturated polyesters, as well as other unsaturated resin
composites. 6 8 The silane compounds improved the mechanical proper-
ties of the final product by coupling or bonding the polyester resins to
the fiberglass filling material.6 9 Noting that silanes had been used previ-
ously as coupling agents, the examiner rejected claims directed to a pro-
cess for bonding a polymerizable material to a mineral filler, and a
method for priming a surface to improve its bonding to particular
organic resins on the authority of Durden, and the Board of Appeals
affirmed.
The Federal Circuit, however, recognized that there are process in-
ventions in which the new composition and the manner of using it are
highly interrelated, so that the composition gives special or new value to
the process steps. In such cases, "the constitutional purpose of the pat-
ent system is promoted by encouraging applicants to claim, and there-
fore to describe in the manner required by 35 U.S.C. 112, all aspects of
what they regard as their inventions, regardless of the number of statutory classes
involved. "70 On the specific facts of the case before it, the court held
that:
It is the properties of appellant's compounds as bonding/prim-
ing agents for certain polymers and fillers or support surfaces
that give them their utility.... [T]he compounds and their use
are but different aspects of, or ways of looking at, the same in-
62. Id. at 1291.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1292.
65. Id. at 1294.
66. Id. See In re Schneider, 481 F.2d 1350 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
67. 910 F.2d 823 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
68. Id. at 824.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 826 (emphasis in original).
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vention and consequently that invention is capable of being
claimed both as new compounds or as a new method or process
of bonding/priming. On the other hand, a process or method
of making the compounds is a quite different thing; they may
have been made by a process which was new or old, obvious or
nonobvious. In this respect, therefore, there is a real difference
between a process of making and a process of using and the
cases dealing with one involve different problems from the
cases dealing with the other.
7 1
By looking at the interrelationship between the process and the novel,
unobvious composition, Pleuddemann provides a rational, flexible
mechanism that the proposed statutory revision does not. The inven-
tion of a new ester adds nothing to the old, known manipulative steps of
coupling an acid and an alcohol, and does not justify a claim to a process
invention. The invention of a new ratchet mechanism for a wrench adds
nothing to the process of bolting together metal panels. It may be fairly
argued, however, that the invention of a new DNA sequence does directly
impact the expression of that sequence into a useful protein.
Pleuddemann provides the rationale for distinguishing appropriate
situations of patentability and awarding patent rights where deserved.
The result was achieved by considering, not the special needs of bio-
technology, but rather the general premises of patent law on which the
patent system is based.
F. Infringement of Biotechnology Inventions
Assessing infringement of a biotechnology patent raises a number
of novel questions. Do the established doctrines of claim construction
and equivalence work for patents that involve living matter? When is
one microorganism equivalent to another? How does one decide
whether changes in base sequence or amino acid sequence are sufficient
to avoid a claim to a defined sequence of DNA or to a protein? Is a
patent based on a protein obtained only in minuscule quantities by isola-
tion from natural sources infringed by a product produced in commer-
cial quantities through a later-developed, inventive recombinant
process?
In order to determine the scope of a patent holder's rights in the
patented invention, "resort must be had in the first instance to the
words of the claim." 72 Whether an accused device, method or composi-
tion infringes the patent necessarily begins with this step, "and then the
trier must decide whether the claims cover the accused device."
7 3
"If properly construed claims read on the infringing product, there
is literal infringement."'74 Even if a product does not literally infringe
the claims, it can still be held to infringe under the doctrine of
71. Id.
72. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
73. Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
74. Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1579 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
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equivalents. 7 5 Thisjudicially created doctrine was designed to protect a
patent holder from an infringer who appropriates the invention but
avoids the literal terms of the claims. As recognized by the Supreme
Court in Graver Tank,
to permit imitation of a patented invention which does not copy
every literal detail would be to convert the protection of the
patent grant into a hollow and useless thing. Such a limitation
would leave room for-indeed encourage-the unscrupulous
copyist to make unimportant and insubstantial changes and
substitutions in the patent which, though adding nothing,
would be enough to take the copied matter outside the claim,
and hence outside the reach of law.
7 6
Therefore, "[t]o temper unsparing logic and prevent an infringer from
stealing the benefit of an invention," 7 7 a patent holder can invoke the
doctrine against an accused device "if it performs substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result."7 8
Equivalence requires that each element recited in the claim find a
counterpart in means, function and result in the accused device. 79 A
patentee cannot, by equivalence, claim what is in the prior art. To deter-
mine whether a particular range of equivalents is barred by the prior art,
the conceptual exercise is to rewrite the claim to include the accused
device literally, then test it for patentability.8 0 There have been only a
handful of decisions applying these principles to biotechnology
inventions.
In Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc.,81 Scripps
charged Genentech with infringement of claims directed to Factor
VIII:C, one of the factors used to activate the proteins that permit blood
clotting. Scripps obtained a patent for the products of and a process for
purifying and concentrating Factor VIII:C from human and porcine
blood plasma.8 2 The Scripps patent included both process and product-
by-process claims. A reissue of this patent subsequently added claims
directed to human Factor VIII:C preparations having specific purity and
concentration characteristics.
8 3
Genentech was accused of infringement based on its manufacture of
Factor VIII:C by recombinant techniques. Genentech scientists se-
75. Id.
76. 339 U.S. at 607.
77. Id. at 608 (quoting Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, 168 F.2d 691, 692
(2d Cir. 1948)).
78. Id. (quoting Sanitary Refrigeration Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
79. Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Electric U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1259-60
(Fed. Cir. 1989); Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931,935-36 (Fed. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
80. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
81. 666 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1987), modified, 678 F. Supp. 1429 (N.D. Cal. 1988),
aff'd in part, rev"d in part, vacated in part, and remanded, Nos. 89-1541, -1542, -1543, -1646, -
1647 (Fed. Cir. March 11, 1991) (consolidated appeal in which the Federal Circuit re-
versed and remanded on the infringement issues).
82. U.S. Patent No. 4,361,509.
83. 666 F. Supp. at 1383.
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quenced the protein, cloned the Factor VIII:C gene, then cloned the
cDNA encoding the actual coding sequence, expressed the DNA in a
mammalian cell system, and devised a protein purification process. This
process avoided the use of human plasma pools, which potentially con-
tained infectious agents including HIV-1, the etiological agent of AIDS,
and monoclonal antibodies, and made large-scale production feasible.
Among the claims asserted to be infringed by Genentech were the
following product claims:
24. A human VIII:C preparation having a potency in the
range of 134 to 1172 units per ml. and being substantially free
of VIII:RP.
25. A human VIII:C preparation of claim 24, wherein the
VIII:C concentration is at least 160,000 fold purified relative to
VIII:C in plasma.
84
Also asserted were product-by-process claims, including:
13. Highly purified and concentrated human or porcine
VIII:C prepared in accordance with the method of claim 1.
Claim 1 as incorporated by reference in Claim 13 recited:
1. An improved method of preparing Factor VIII procoagu-
lant activity protein comprising the steps of
(a) adsorbing a VIII:C/VIII:RP complex from a plasma
or commercial concentrate source onto particles bound to
a monoclonal antibody specific to VIII:RP,
(b) eluting the VIII:C,
(c) adsorbing the VIII:C obtained in step (b) in another
adsorption to concentrate and further purify same,
(d) eluting the adsorbed VIII:C, and
(e) recovering highly purified and concentrated VIII:C.8 5
Genentech argued that it did not infringe the Scripps product
claims because its Factor VIII:C was not derived from human blood
plasma. On a motion for summary judgment on the issue of
Genentech's infringement of the product claims, the district court con-
sidered whether "the asserted product claims must be interpreted to ap-
ply solely to concentrates of Factor VIII:C derived directly from human
blood plasma or whether they extend also to other concentrates of Fac-
tor VIII:C having the same characteristics as those derived from human
blood plasma."
86
The court held that the claims were directed to preparations of the
disclosed purity or concentration having characteristics specific to Fac-
tor VIII:C found in humans, and that Scripps was entitled to a claim for
purified Factor VIII:C, whether derived through the disclosed process of
the specification, or any other process achieving the same result.87 The
court granted summary judgment, concluding literal infringement as to
product-by-process claim 13 on the basis that the same process was used
84. Id. at 1385.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1389.
87. Id. at 1390.
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to produce the claimed product.8 8 With respect to the product claims,
the court held that "Human Factor VIII:C as claimed in the patent
therefore applies to any Factor VIII:C preparation, regardless of how
produced, having the same material structural and functional character-
istics as the plasma-derived preparation."
8 9
On the question of whether Factor VIII:C produced by recombinant
processes infringed the product claims so interpreted, the court
explained:
The production of Genentech's recombinant Factor VIII:C,
although it takes place in hamster rather than human cells, is
directed by the controlling human gene.... That gene, trans-
planted from a human cell to a hamster cell, determines the
amino acid sequence and other fundamental structural traits
and functions of the protein. 90
The court concluded that "[i]n effect, Genentech's process transfers the
site of Factor VIII:C production (1) from the human body to the labora-
tory and (2) from the cells of the human kidneys, liver, spleen and lymph
glands to the cells of the hamster kidneys. The master plan for Factor
VIII:C production, however, remains constant." 9 1
In response to Genentech's argument that there may be substantial
changes in the protein product following its translation from the gene,
the court found that any such differences resulting from post-transla-
tional changes in the protein were not relevant, as there was no evidence
that they alter the in vitro biological activity of the enzyme.9 2 Accord-
ingly, the court held that Scripps was entitled to an infringement judg-
ment on all but two product claims (on which insufficient evidence of
infringement had been provided) because the recombinant Factor
VIII:C was structurally and functionally the same as plasma-derived Fac-
tor VIII:C.
93
The issue of whether infringement of product or composition
claims can be avoided by varying the structure of claimed peptides was
considered in Hormone Research Foundation, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. 94 Hor-
mone Research Foundation sued Genentech on the basis that
Genentech's recombinant human growth hormone product infringed
88. Id. at 1388. The district court subsequently modified its order by deleting refer-
ence to claim 13, on the basis that the activity alleged to infringe the claim occurred before
its reissue date. 678 F. Supp. at 1433.
89. Id. at 1390.
90. Id. at 1391.
91. Id. at 1392.
92. Id. at 1394.
93. The patent in Scripps was subsequently invalidated in Scripps Clinic & Research
Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 1547 (N.D. Cal. 1989), for failure of disclosure of
best mode, for inequitable conduct, and for failure of the reissue patent to comply with
reissue requirements. In a very recently decided consolidated appeal, the Federal Circuit
inter alia reversed and remanded on these issues. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v.
Genentech, Inc., Nos. 89-1541, -1542, -1543, -1646, -1647 (Fed. Cir. March 11, 1991)
(consolidated appeal).
94. 708 F. Supp. 1096 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd in part, vacated tn part, and remanded, 904
F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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several claims of their patent,9 5 including Claim 12, which concerned "a
composition of matter consisting essentially of a synthetic, biologically
active substance which has a structure corresponding to FIG. 2 of the
accompanying drawing."
9 6
The accused recombinant product differed from the sequence struc-
ture of FIG. 2 in that it had two additional amino acids, and several
slightly different amino acids in certain positions of the sequence struc-
ture. On a motion for partial summary judgment, the district court held
that the claims were not literally infringed because the "[t]he properties
are different and in chemical structures as sensitive as these the literal
infringement showing must be exacting."'9 7 The district court inter-
preted the claim term "corresponding" to limit the claimed protein se-
quence to the identical amino acid sequence and conformation
depicted. 98
Further, the court held that infringement was precluded under the
doctrine of equivalents because of prosecution history estoppel. 99 It in-
terpreted certain arguments in the prosecution of the subject patent to
limit the claims to the sequence structure shown in FIG. 2, as opposed
to broadly including human growth hormone and its derivatives.' 0 0
Although it did not agree with the district court's interpretation of
the term "corresponding" in construing the claims, the Federal Circuit
nonetheless affirmed the finding of no literal infringement on the basis
that identity in all respects to the sequence of FIG. 2 was consistent with
both the specification and the prosecution history.' 0 l However, the
Federal Circuit vacated the portion of the judgment holding that the
claims were not infringed under the doctrine of equivalents on the basis
that the meaning of the statements made during prosecution was ambig-
uous, leaving certain factual issues unresolved.' 0 2 Accordingly, the case
was remanded to the district court to determine the intent and effect of
arguments made during prosecution.
Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation, Ltd. 103 involved the issue of
post-invention improvements and what limits should apply to the use of
the doctrine of equivalents. The patents in suit included claims directed
to human glycoprotein tissue plasminogen activator (t-PA). As it exists
in the human body, t-PA is composed of 527 amino acids, and is divided
into five "domains."' 0 4 One of the patents claimed human t-PA isolated
95. U.S. Patent No. 3,853,833.
96. 708 F. Supp. at 1099.
97. Id. at 1102.
98. Id. at 1101.
99. Prosecution history estoppel, also known as file wrapper estoppel, prevents a pat-
entee from recapturing, during an infringement action, claim scope surrendered during
prosecution of the patent application.
100. 708 F. Supp. at 1106.
101. Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1563-64 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
102. Id. at 1567.
103. 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1363 (D. Del. 1990).
104. Id. at 1365.
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from melanoma cells as follows:
Human plasminogen activator, having thrombolytic properties,
immunologically distinct from urokinase and having a specific
activity of about 500,000 IU/mg. using the WHO First Interna-
tional Reference Preparation of t-PA (tissue plasminogen acti-
vator) as assay standard or a specific activity of about 90,000
IU/mg. using the WHO First International Reference Prepara-
tion of urokinase as assay standard. 10 5
Another of the patents asserted to be infringed included claims di-
rected to genetically engineered cells capable of producing t-PA:
1. A DNA isolate consisting essentially of DNA sequence en-
coding human tissue plasminogen activator;
2. A recombinant expression vector containing a DNA se-
quence encoding human tissue plasminogen activator, wherein
the vector is capable of expressing human tissue plasminogen
activator in a transformed microorganism or cell culture; and
3. A cell culture capable of expressing human tissue plasmi-
nogen activator, obtained by transforming a mammalian cell
line with a vector according to claim 3 [sic, 2].106
The accused products included met-t-PA, which differed from t-PA
only in a substitution of the amino acid methionine for valine at position
245, and a variant of met-t-PA, known as FE 1X, in which the amino acids
in two of the "domains" had been deleted.107
The district court considered summary judgment motions made by
both parties based on the asserted infringement of the two patents.
Having interpreted the claims to require a human t-PA immunologically
distinct from urokinase, and with a specific activity of about 500,000 IU/
mg., the district court did not find literal infringement because the prod-
ucts had a methionine substitution distinguishing them from the human
t-PA claimed, and because the specific activity of met-t-PA was different
from that claimed.1
0 8
Regarding the question of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents, the district court noted that the patented product stimu-
lated dissolution of a fibrin clot by enzymatic cleavage of plasmin, and,
applying the Graver Tank function-way-result test,' 0 9 held:
There is no question that the function and result of both FEIX
and met-t-PA is likewise to stimulate dissolution of fibrin clots
through the cleavage of plasminogen to plasmin. In this case,
any distinction between the patented product and the accused
products hinges on the means of producing the cleavage of
plasminogen to plasmin. 10
Summary judgment was precluded on this issue, however, because
105. Id. at 1367.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1368.
108. Id. at 1370.
109. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
110. 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1370.
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of material issues of fact with regard to the "means" used by the accused
products in performing their function. Accordingly, the court held:
The trier of fact will have to determine the impact of both the
deletion of the F and E regions and the substitution of methio-
nine on the cleavage of plasminogen. So, although the court is
persuaded that Genentech's t-PA and Genetic Institute's FEIX
have the same intended result, it is unclear at this point if they
achieve it by the same means. 11 1
While strictly in accordance with classic analyses of equivalence, the
court's rationale in this case portends some substantial problems. Ap-
plication of the doctrine of equivalents is straight-forward when the rela-
tionship between structure and function is well defined, for example as
in most mechanical devices, or when a chemical equivalence can be un-
derstood through well-accepted principles of reaction mechanisms or
physical properties.
When structure-function relationships are less well understood, or
when it is not possible to demonstrate to the trier of fact exactly how the
invention functions, as in biotechnology inventions that involve complex
systems of proteins, genes, or cells, for practical purposes the test of
equivalency may reduce to an examination of the observable results pro-
duced by the accused embodiment and the patented invention.
In the t-PA case, for example, the evidence involved the mode of
binding of t-PA and its analogs to the fibrin substrate, and the half-life in
circulation following injection into animals. The court found that where
"there are genuine issues of material fact with regard to the question of
means, that cannot be resolved,"' " 2 summary judgment is precluded;
such issues must be resolved by a layjury. Thejury's eventual finding of
the accused embodiment as equivalent to the patented invention con-
tributed to Wellcome's decision to discontinue its six-year effort to de-
velop t-PA in the United States." 
3
With decisions on patent infringement having such large potential
impact on companies and the public, it is important that they be fairly
and rationally reached. Identity of function, means and result must indi-
cate, in biotechnology inventions, more than just that the same general
overall effect, as for example clot dissolving, is reached by both. Of
course, inconsequential alterations in an amino acid sequence made to
avoid literal correspondence should not escape infringement for the
simple reason that a fundamental purpose of the doctrine of equivalents
is to avoid fraud on the patent; a second-comer should not be allowed to
appropriate the patentee's contribution to the art. At the same time,
there must be room for independent innovation and development. Im-
provements in effectiveness may make the difference between something
that is useful in the real world and something that is not.
Equivalence analyses should always consider the benefit the accused
III. Id. at 1371.
112. Id.
113. Wall St.J., May 11, 1990, at BI, col. 6.
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infringer derived from the patentee's work. The balance between unfair
appropriation of the claimed subject matter and the legitimate activities
of "designing around" the patent has always been a factor in equiva-
lence cases. The ultimate consideration in such a balance is whether it
was the patentee or the accused infringer who more substantially en-
riched the art, and whether the accused infringer's activity was mechani-
cal, predictable substitution or original innovation.
Tremendous advances have been made since the concept of an an-
tibody was first developed by Landsteiner, 114 in terms of a haptene-spe-
cific protein, to the current view of an antibody having three-
dimensional structure, with well defined sets of gene segments sepa-
rately encoding variable, joining, and constant regions. Viewed on a
macro level, a hypothetical "antibody" invention in 19 10 would likely be
considered equivalent under a function-way-result analysis to an "an-
tibody" in 1990. If a more refined analysis were conducted, however,
the two "antibody" devices would be distinguished by their different
structural and functional elements. A better understanding of how liv-
ing systems "work" would help in a determination of whether two things
work in the same way.
Finally, we, as advocates, must learn how best to communicate so-
phisticated and complex scientific principles to a lay trier of fact. That,
however, is not unique to biotechnology. In almost every field, from
computer science to pharmaceutical research, the level of ordinary skill
in the art is that of a highly trained and educated specialist who uses
words and concepts wholly outside the experience of any judge or jury.
Effective communication of this information in understandable terms
presents the greatest challenge to the creativity and preparedness of ad-
vocates, without regard to the technical field of specialty.
G. The "Farmer's Exemption" and Transgenic Animals
Among the concerns that have been expressed regarding the pat-
enting of farm animals are arguments by certain farm coalitions that pat-
enting will harm small and family farms by raising prices to farmers of
new breeds of animals. Some opponents of animal patenting also fear
that patenting of animals will lead to an overconcentration in the animal
sector in industry. Opponents are also concerned that patenting of ani-
mals will result in impoverishing the gene pool.
Although depletion of the gene pool is a valid concern in breeding
endeavors, this consideration must be weighed against the reality of
transgenic technology. First, there is really nothing new about attempts
to create new life. Selective breeding to produce animals with particular
attributes - bigger, leaner, faster growing, stronger, healthier - has
long been employed. Genetic engineering techniques are simply a bet-
ter, more efficient means to accomplish that purpose. Furthermore, ge-
netic alterations in transgenic animals are limited to confined changes,
114. K. LANDSTEINER, THE SPECIFICITY OF SEROLOGICAL REACTIONS (1936).
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for example the introduction of a gene encoding growth hormone, or a
gene rendering the animal exquisitely susceptible to cancer. The goal of
transgenic animal creation is to produce a variety of animals having a
variety of desired properties, much like the oil-eating bacteria of
Chakrabarty. The purpose of transgenic research is not to produce a
single new breed to the exclusion of other breeds, anymore than
Chakrabarty intended to replace all Pseudomonas with the novel oil-eating
variety.
With respect to whether patenting animals will lead to industrial
domination of the animal breeding sector, the purpose of the patent sys-
tem must be considered. The grant of patents is justified for all areas of
technology because it rewards innovation, encourages disclosure and
stimulates competitiveness by permitting innovators to "design around"
the patented subject matter. The protection of a patent is available to
industrial giants, fledgling companies, and individual inventors alike.
Indeed, patenting is the way start-up companies gain a foothold in the
market. Concerns about the economic effects of transgenic animal pat-
enting on farmers has prompted legislation specifically drafted to pro-
tect rights in transgenic inventions. In 1988, the Transgenic Animal
Patent Reform Act 1 5 was introduced in the House of Representatives in
which an infringement exemption was proposed for farmers and re-
searchers and was subsequently approved by the Judiciary Committee.
The bill was reintroduced the following year in March 1989,116 propos-
ing the following additional new subsections to section 271 of the Patent
Act, the statute governing infringement:
(h)(1) It shall not be an act of infringement for a person
whose occupation is farming to reproduce a patented trans-
genic farm animal through breeding, use such animal in the
farming operation or sell such animal or the offspring of such
animal.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1), it
shall be an act of infringement for a person to sell the germ
cells, semen, or embryos of a patented transgenic farm animal.
(3) For purposes of paragraphs (1) and (2)
(A) the term "transgenic farm animal" means a farm
animal whose germ cells contain genetic material originally de-
rived from another animal other than the parent of the farm
animal; and
(B) the term "farm animal" means any animal used or
intended for use as food or fiber.
This exemption was patterned after the crop exemption provided in
the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA), which recites in pertinent part:
[I]t shall not infringe any right hereunder for a person to save
seed produced by him from seed obtained, or descended from
seed obtained, by authority of the owner of the variety for seed-
115. H.R. 4970, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H4992 (1988).
116. H.R. 1556, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. H835 (1989).
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ing purposes and use such saved seed in the production of a
crop for use on his farm, or for sale as provided in this section:
Provided, That without regard to the provisions of section
2541(3) of this title it shall not infringe any right hereunder for
a person, whose primary farming occupation is the growing of
crops for sale for other than reproductive purposes, to sell such
saved seed to other persons so engaged, for reproductive pur-
poses, provided such sale is in compliance with such State laws
governing the sale of seed as may be applicable.' r-7
The perceived economic threat to farmers was the primary reason
for the proposed "Farmer's Exemption." Upon closer analysis, how-
ever, the economic detriment argument does not match economic real-
ity. The farmers will be under no obligation to purchase transgenic
animals. The choice of whether or not to purchase a transgenic breed
will simply be a business decision, much as the decision is made to
purchase an improved piece of farm equipment. The farmer will weigh
the cost of the animal against the expected benefits and on that basis
determine whether purchase of the animal is economically sound.
Indeed, transgenic animals may prompt an entirely new line of busi-
ness for some small farmers. For example, transgenic animals that pro-
duce desirable proteins such as insulin, interferons, and blood factors
are presently being developed. These animals may provide the means
for protein production as a new line of farming.
The Farmer's Exemption, as proposed for transgenic animals, has
met considerable, and justified, opposition from the biotechnology in-
dustry. It is viewed as a compulsory license that would unfairly elimi-
nate a significant source of revenue to the patent holder. In evaluating
the fairness of this exemption, it is useful to look at the type of protec-
tion to which this form of exemption has previously been applied.
When Congress passed the Plant Patent Act, protection was only
made available to asexually reproduced plants, due to concerns that
plants would not otherwise breed true to seed. Subsequent technologi-
cal advances permitted reliable reproduction and the PVPA was enacted
in 1970 to provide protection for sexually reproduced plants. A PVPA
certificate is not a patent, however, and offers only a limited scope of
protection.
The requirements to obtain a PVPA certificate are less rigorous
than the standards for a utility patent. The plant must be a novel vari-
ety, but this requirement is met if there is "distinctness," "uniformity,"
and "stability."" 8 There is no non-obviousness provision in the PVPA
and, unlike the requirements for a utility patent, 1 9 there is no enabling
provision that must be met before a certificate can issue. The Act re-
quires only that the description of the plant be as adequate and com-
plete as possible. 120 A seed deposit must also be submitted with the
117. 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1970) (emphasis in original).
118. 7 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1988) (defines terms).
119. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
120. 7 U.S.C. § 2422(2) (1988).
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application to the Plant Variety Protection Office. 12 1
PVPA certificates protect a single plant variety. Multiple claims and
broad coverage, possible with utility patents, cannot be obtained
through the PVPA certificate application process.
With respect to enforcement, the PVPA specifically enumerates
eight acts that constitute the totality of infringement. Accordingly, there
is no provision for the doctrine of equivalents under the PVPA.
Thus the rights and requirements attendant a PVPA certificate are
plainly different from the rights accorded under the patent system and
the exemptions are not rationally transferred.
The crop exemption of the PVPA was founded on a historical right
of tenant farmers to reserve seed for the next year's crop. Whatever the
basis for its inclusion in the PVPA, engrafting its analogue onto utility
patent protection flies in the face of a long history of abhorrence of com-
pulsory licensing. If the PVPA becomes the stepping stone for the first
form of statutory compulsory licensing, the farmers' animal exemption
is likely to be the stepping stone for the next incursion into the patent
holder's traditional rights. It is neither logically justified nor good sense
in a world in which we are trying to convince other countries that strong
enforcement of patents is essential, and compulsory licenses are
counter-productive.
IV. CONCLUSION
The question first posed was whether we need to change the legal
principles relating to intellectual property, including patentability and
infringement, to accommodate biotechnology inventions. Quite plainly
the answer is no. As with any emerging technology it will take some
time for fine tuning on a case-by-case basis, but on the whole these prin-
ciples do appear to be working and should not be changed.
121. Id. § 2422(3).
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ADDENDUM
One of the principal concerns faced by authors is the very real risk
that new and important decisions will issue during the time required for
editing, organizing and printing of the article. That happened to us;
two landmark decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
were handed down within the two weeks after our text was sent to the
printer. Although it was then too late to revise the manuscript and still
make the publisher's deadline, the Law Review graciously accommo-
dated us by allowing us to include this addendum to discuss some of the
ramifications of Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. I and Scripps Clinic
& Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc. 2 Each of these decisions merits a
full article devoted to it. We will discuss, in brief summary, only the
points most germane to biotechnology.
The two decisions are of immediate and considerable interest be-
cause they add to a relatively small body of appellate precedent in bio-
technology, and they illustrate how the court can use existing principles
to resolve disputes in this new field.
THE BASIC FACTs OF AMGEN
In Amgen, the Federal Circuit reviewed determinations of validity
and infringement involving U.S. Patent 4,703,008 ('008 patent) issued
to Dr. Fu-Kuen Lin, an employee of Amgen, and U.S. Patent No.
4,677,195 ('195 patent) issued to Dr. Rodney Hewick and assigned to
Genetics Institute (GI). Amgen's '008 patent claimed purified and iso-
lated DNA sequences encoding erythropoietin (EPO), including any se-
quence that encoded a protein that exhibited EPO-like activity, and host
cells containing the cloned sequences. GI's '195 patent claimed homo-
geneous EPO compositions of defined minimum purity (stated in terms
of specific activity), and was based on the purification of the protein
from natural sources. Amgen sought to enforce the '008 patent against
GI. GI, in turn, asserted that Amgen's recombinant EPO infringed GI's
patent.
GI contended the '008 patent was invalid because (i) the isolated,
purified DNA sequence for EPO was previously invented by GI's Dr.
Edward Fritsch, (ii) the Amgen disclosure was not commensurate with
the scope of its claims, and (iii) Amgen did not disclose the "best mode"
(the best transfected cell) of carrying out the invention. Amgen attacked
the validity of the GI patent on the theory that the minimum specific
activity recited in the claims could not be achieved by the disclosed puri-
fication process.
3
1. Nos. 90-1273, 90-1275 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 5, 1991).
2. Nos. 89-1541, 89-1542, 89-1543, 89-1646, 89-1647 (Fed Cir. Mar. 11, 1991).
3. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1738-40
(D. Mass. 1989).
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How IS AN INVENTION MADE AND How FULLY DOES IT
HAVE TO BE DESCRIBED
Typically, a research project is prompted by the realization that
there is a protein that performs some useful function. Knowing that, the
researcher deduces that there is a gene that expresses that protein
which, if isolated and put into a suitable environment, will enable the
production of the protein in large quantities. Often, purification of the
protein from a natural source is a key step in the understanding of both
its existence and function. When obtained in sufficient purity, the natu-
ral protein can be analyzed to determine the sequence of amino acids
composing its structure. The purified natural protein itself typically has
utility and is usable in therapy. However, if the gene can be obtained
and expressed, the quantity and purity of the product and the efficiency
of its production can usually be enhanced.
The search for the human gene is typically carried out by using a
suitable complementary construct to probe a DNA library. The probe
may be a DNA fragment obtained from another animal species. The
probe may also be constructed synthetically from knowledge of the
amino acid sequence of the naturally derived protein, although this ap-
proach is complicated because a given amino acid may correspond to
two or more different DNA codons. Thus, synthetically constructing all
of the possible variations that encode for a specified amino acid se-
quence can be a formidable job.
When the gene is obtained and sequenced, the researcher may ex-
plore ways to improve it by adapting it for expression in a variety of cells
or by modifying the codon sequence to produce a protein with one or
more variations in its amino acid structure in the hope of producing en-
hanced potency, resistance to degradation or some other desirable
quality.
If the realization of the existence of the protein from a natural
source is sufficient to predict the existence of the gene producing it, and
using probes to obtain the gene is within the ordinary skill of the art, at
what point is the invention of the isolated gene made? In other words, is
the level of skill in biotechnology so high that isolation and expression
of the gene are now a routine matter whose success is assured once
some basic information is in hand?
In Amgen, inventor Lin probed a genomic DNA library using two
sets of probes, each of which encoded the same amino acid sequence,
but incorporated different combinations of DNA codons. GI contended
that the isolated EPO gene was previously invented by Dr. Fritsch, who
had earlier developed the same probing strategy to obtain it, even
though he did not successfully perform the physical operations until af-
ter Lin did.
4
4. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Nos. 90-1273, -1275, slip op. at 8-9
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 5, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library, U.S. App. file 3481; WESTLAW, CTAF
database 27262), aff'g in part, rev ' in part, vacating in part 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737 (D.
Mass. 1989).
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The court found that, while Fritsch had the goal of obtaining the
isolated EPO gene, whatever its identity, and even had an idea of a pos-
sible method of obtaining it, he did not invent the claimed purified and
isolated DNA sequence or possess a viable method for obtaining it until
he actually carried out the steps and realized the goal, which he did later
than Lin. Until then, the court said, what Fritsch had was "simply a wish
to know the identity of any material with [EPO] biological activity." 5 In
reaching that result, the Federal Circuit simply considered that -[a] gene
is a chemical compound, albeit a complex one ' 6 and it therefore applied
the "well established" law of conception as it had been developed in
other chemical cases that "[c]onception does not occur unless one has a
mental picture of the structure of the chemical, or is able to define it by
its method of preparation, its physical or chemical properties, or
whatever characteristics sufficiently distinguish it."'7 Thus, in biotech-
nology inventions, as in other chemical inventions, "when an inventor is
unable to envision the detailed constitution of a gene so as to distin-
guish it from other materials, as well as a method for obtaining it, con-
ception has not been achieved until reduction to practice has occurred,
i.e., until after the gene has been isolated."
'8
Another issue in biotechnology inventions is whether having the
natural gene permits the inventor to claim all possible variations of its
structure. That was also treated in Amgen.
The '008 patent included generic claims directed to all possible
DNA sequences encoding analogs of EPO having EPO-like activity. For
example, claim 7 reads:
A purified and isolated DNA sequence consisting essentially of
a DNA sequence encoding a polypeptide having an amino acid
sequence sufficiently duplicative of that of erythropoietin to al-
low possession of the biological property of causing bone mar-
row cells to increase production of reticulocytes and red blood
cells, and to increase hemoglobin synthesis or iron uptake. 9
The trial court found that prophetic claim to be broader than what was
"enabled" by the disclosure of the specification.10
Under section 112 of the Patent Act,' 1 the specification must con-
tain sufficient disclosure to enable one of skill in the art to make and use
the invention as claimed without undue experimentation. Substitution
at a single amino acid site could result in over 3,600 different EPO ana-
logs, and over a million analogs could be produced by substitution at
three different amino acid sites. 12 The number of claimed DNA se-
5. Id. at 11.
6. Id. at 10.
7. Id. at 10-11.
8. Id. at 11.
9. Amgen, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1741.
10. Id. at 1776.
11. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
12. Amgen, slip op. at 27.
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quences that could produce a product with EPO-like activity was there-
fore potentially enormous.
In reaching its conclusion of insufficiency of disclosure, the district
court relied on the inability to predict with certainty which of those
many analogs would have the desired activity, noting that Amgen was
unable to do that even after five years of experimentation.' 3 The Fed-
eral Circuit agreed the disclosure was inadequate but rested its decision
on established principles of what is required for an enabling chemical
disclosure rather than any unusual degree of unpredictability in biotech-
nology cases. Citing In re Angstadt, 14 the Federal Circuit held that sec-
tion 112 does not mandate that a patent applicant test all of the
embodiments of the invention, but does require a disclosure of how to
make and use enough of the claimed DNA sequences to justify the scope
of the generic claims. The specification of the '008 patent contained
only broad statements to the effect that all analogs of EPO could be
made, but with actual details for preparing only a handful, and was
therefore insufficient.
DISCLOSING THE "BEST MODE" OF LIVING MATTER AND ITS PRODUCTS
All patent applicants are required to disclose the "best mode"
known to them of carrying out the invention as part of the consideration
for the grant of a seventeen-year monopoly. 15 Applicants for patents in
the field of biotechnology have an added complication in complying with
that requirement. Whereas inventors of ordinary chemical products and
processes can generally describe their materials and how to get them
with words, and a described chemical process presumably reliably pro-
duces the same result every time it is carried out, cells cannot be made
available by verbal description, and processes carried out in living sys-
tems are subject to greater variability so that a written description does
not guarantee that the reader will achieve an exact replication of what
the patentee got.
To solve those problems, living materials and their essential parts
can be "disclosed" by depositing them in a depository which undertakes
to maintain them throughout the life of the patent. While that alterna-
tive is always available to applicants, the question frequently arises
whether a deposit is required in particular instances; that is, whether the
disclosure is fatally deficient when a deposit is not made.
The best producer of EPO known to Amgen was a strain of Chinese
hamster ovary (CHO) cells transfected with an expression vector in or-
der to amplify expression. Amgen's expression method used selective
pressure to cause a CHO cell containing the expression vector having a
gene coding for resistance to a particular drug in association with the
EPO gene to produce EPO protein. The '008 specification described
13. Id. at 28.
14. 537 F.2d 498 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
15. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
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the strain of cells that were used as a starting material and both the tech-
niques and specific drug concentrations that were used in the amplifica-
tion process.
GI invited the court to require a deposit "[in the field of living
materials such a microorganisms and cell cultures" so that the public
could have access to exactly the best mode contemplated by the inven-
tor.1 6 Although treating the question as one of first impression, the
Federal Circuit referred to established principles and declined to create
a new "best mode" requirement for biotechnology inventions. It held
that Amgen had satisfied the best mode requirement by disclosing what
the preferred strain was and by describing how to prepare it using stand-
ard techniques and known starting materials. Even though exact dupli-
cation of the cells used by the patentee might not be achieved, the court
held that the statute does not require a guarantee that every aspect of
the specification be precisely and universally reproducible.
17
The "best mode" issue also came up in Scripps Clinic & Research
Foundation v. Genentech, Inc. 18 There, it concerned whether the patentee
had adequately described certain monoclonal antibodies whose use was
very important in the extraction of the desired protein, Factor VIII:C,
from natural sources. The antibodies were obtained by the patentee by
injecting mice with concentrated Factor VIII, collecting their spleen
cells, fusing those cells with cancer cells to produce hybridomas, screen-
ing those hybridomas for the ability to produce the desired antibodies,
and evaluating the produced antibodies for their ability to bind Factor
VIII sufficiently to allow efficient extraction. This exercise, which the
court described as "laborious," resulted in the production and identifi-
cation of a specific antibody called "2.2.9" that worked admirably well
for the purification. 19
The patent described in detail all of the manipulations that led to
"2.2.9," but no deposit was made of the antibody or of the hybridoma
that produced it. Although a deposit would have avoided considerable
effort and uncertainty for one who wished to practice the claimed inven-
tion, the court found such a deposit was so clearly unnecessary that it
reversed the trial court's entry of summary judgment of invalidity for
failure to disclose the best mode and directed entry of summary judg-
ment for the patentee on that issue.
2 0
THE SCOPE AND MEANING OF CLAIMS
Scripps was a consolidated appeal of four district court cases be-
tween Scripps Clinic and Research Foundation and Genentech, Inc.
2 1
16. Amgen, slip op. at 20.
17. Id. at 25.
18. Nos. 89-1541, -1542, -1543, -1646, -1647 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 11, 1991).
19. Id. at 28.
20. Id. at 30. This aspect of the Scripps decision, as well as others, is now the subject of
a petition for rehearing en banc.
21. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D.
Cal. 1987), modified on reconsideration, 678 F. Supp. 1429 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Scripps Clinic &
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The proceedings involved a number of motions for summary judgment
of patent validity and enforceability, infringement, inducement to in-
fringe, and reissue law and practice, each of which could be the basis for
a full review article. For present purposes, the point of greatest interest
is the Federal Circuit's treatment of issues of infringement and claim
scope.
As discussed in the main article,22 Scripps accused Genentech of
infringing the Scripps claims directed to Factor VIII:C, a blood clotting
factor. The claims in suit were product-by-process claims and product
claims. Scripps made the invention by isolating the protein from a natu-
ral source, blood plasma. Genentech was accused of infringing because
it produced Factor VIII by recombinant means. The question was
whether a patent claim obtained on the basis of isolating and purifying
the natural protein was infringed by the same protein when produced by
recombinant means. Genentech argued infringement should not be
found for two reasons: (i) the process of manufacture should be read
into the claims as an implicit limitation; and (ii) the recombinant product
was so far changed in principle that it was non-infringing under the "re-
verse doctrine of equivalents." The trial court found no triable issue of
fact under either of those theories and granted summary judgment that
the recombinant product infringed the claims.
2 3
The Federal Circuit also refused to construe the claims to include
the inherent process limitation proposed by Genentech. 24 As a matter
of simple literal construction, the recombinant product was not
excluded.
The court, however, found that Genentech's invocation of the "re-
verse doctrine of equivalents" raised contested issues of fact that pre-
cluded summary judgment. The doctrine exists "to prevent
unwarranted extension of the claims beyond a fair scope of the paten-
tee's invention," and to avoid infringement when the accused product is
"so far changed in principle from a patented article that it performs the
same or similar function in a substantially different way."
25 Issues of
fact existed because "[aipplication of the doctrine requires that facts
specific to the accused device be determined and weighed against the
equitable scope of the claims, which in turn is determined in light of the
specification, the prosecution history, and the prior art."
2 6
The only evidence in the record cited by the court as showing differ-
ences between Factor VIII:C products derived from plasma recovery
Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 1547 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Scripps Clinic &
Research Found. v. Genentech Inc., 724 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, vafated in part, Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., Nos. 89-154 1, -
1542, -1543, -1646, -1647 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 11, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library, U.S. App. file
3925).
22. See supra text accompanying notes 81-93.
23. Scripps, 666 F. Supp. at 1390, 1394.
24. Scnpps, slip. op. at 32.
25. Id. at 32-33 (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605,
608 (1950)).
26. Id. at 33.
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and recombinant techniques related to purity levels and specific activi-
ties (which is another way of expressing purity), and conclusory testi-
mony that the products were "apples and oranges."'2 7 This rationale,
which seems to put biotechnology inventions into a special category, is
troubling. To our knowledge, no one has ever successfully argued that a
patent claim to ordinary chemical compbund X is not infringed merely
because the accused infringer makes it in a purity superior to what can
be achieved using the process described in the patent. On the contrary,
it is generally recognized that purity differences do not avoid infringe-
ment.2 8 Of course, the court did not say that application of the "reverse
doctrine" will lead to a finding of non-infringement, but only that there
is an issue of fact to be resolved. Even so, it is questionable whether the
same result would have been reached if the invention had been one of
conventional chemistry and, if it would not, whether the decision reflects
a sound distinction between those technologies.
The final point of interest in the Scripps decision is its treatment of
"product-by-process" claims. The Scripps patent has a number of
claims in which a product is claimed but is defined in terms of the pro-
cess used to produce it, that process being extraction from plasma by a
series of defined steps. Genentech did not practice plasma extraction,
and the trial court refused to grant summary judgment with respect to
those claims, reasoning that there could be no infringement unless the
recited process were practiced.
29
The Federal Circuit disagreed with that analysis. Relying on state-
ments from decisions dealing with the inability of process limitations to
render a claim patentable over a disclosure of the same product in the
prior art, the court said:
In determining patentability we construe the product as not
limited by the process stated in the claims. Since claims must
be construed the same way for validity and for infringement,
the correct reading of product-by-process claims is that they
are not limited to product[s] prepared by the process set forth
in the claims.
30
No authority was cited for that proposition.
While there is little precedent on this issue, we have found none
that directly holds what the Federal Circuit characterized as "the correct
reading of product-by-process claims." 3' The Federal Circuit made no
comment on the applicability of the Supreme Court decision in Cochran
v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik,3 2 on which the district court relied as
support for its conclusion that "[a] product-by-process claim is infringed
only by a product produced by following the same process described in
27. Id.
28. Merck v. Chase, 273 F. Supp. 68, 82 (D.NJ. 1967).
29. Scripps, 666 F. Supp. at 1388-89, as modified, 678 F. Supp. at 1433.
30. Id. at 39-40.
31. Id. at 39.
32. 111 U.S. 293 (1884).
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the claim." 3 3
Moreover, it is doubtful whether the patentability decisions on
which the Federal Circuit relied support the concept of invariable sym-
metry. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the predecessor
court of the Federal Circuit, held in In re Moeller34 that where an inven-
tor can only claim his invention as a product by process, he is limited in
his protection to articles produced by the method recited in the
claims.
3 5
If the Scripps decision withstands the challenges of the petitions for
rehearing, it will have a major impact on the scope of patent rights ob-
tainable by those who isolate proteins from natural sources. In a sense,
the decision reflects two antagonistic results, by creating possible pro-
cess-related exceptions to infringement of a product claim that, on its
face, makes no reference to any process parameters, but reading process
limitations out of a claim that expressly recites them.
33. Scripps, 666 F. Supp. at 1386-87.
34. 117 F.2d 565, 568 (C.C.P.A. 1941).
35. See also In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 697 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("[E]ven though product-
by-process claims are limited by and defined by the process, determination of patentability
is based on the product itself.").
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BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENT PROTECTION ACT
DAVID BEIER*
ROBERT H. BENSON**
I. SUMMARY
Current United States patent and trade laws are inadequate to pro-
tect the creative and scientific genius of American inventors who use
recombinant techniques to produce proteins that are useful as human
therapeutics.' The potential for unfair foreign competition, the need
for enhanced incentives to develop new biotechnology-derived pharma-
ceutical products, and basic notions of fairness and economic certainty
dictate that Congress should enact amendments to our patent law.
II. INTRODUCTION
The promise of modem biotechnology can only be assured by
strong intellectual property protection. Patent protection for break-
through inventions secures for inventors, and the financial sponsors of
the research, sufficient rewards to stimulate further innovation. During
the past Congress, 2 and again this Congress,3 legislation was introduced
to improve the degree of patent protection offered to biotechnology-
derived products and processes. This article outlines the case for such
legislation, describes the legislative process to date, and offers sugges-
tions for further action.
III. GENERAL BACKGROUND ON THE PROBLEM
Biotechnology is a singular contribution to the modem age. This
technology, in its recent incarnation, represents an opportunity to create
dramatic breakthroughs in pharmaceuticals, medical devices, veterinary
products and agricultural products. The promise offered by biotechnol-
* Vice President, Government Affairs, Genentech, Inc. B.A. 1970, Colgate Univer-
sity; J.D. 1973, Albany Law School, Union University.
** Senior Patent Attorney, Genentech, Inc. Ph.D. 1972, University of Florida; J.D.
1980, University of Houston Law Center. The views expressed in this article are those of
the authors and not necessarily those of Genentech, Inc.
1. Similar problems and possibilities exist for recombinant polypeptides which are
useful as animal drugs, in manufacturing and for other commercial purposes.
2. H.R. 3957, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), see also 136 CONG. REc. E213-14 (daily
ed. Feb. 7, 1990)(statement ofRep. Boucher); S. 2326, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG.
REc. S3107-08 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1990)(statement of Sen. DeConcini); and H.R. 5664,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990)(introduced by Rep. Boucher Sept. 18, 1990). For a more
complete discussion of this proposed legislation, see infra sections V.B. and V.C.
3. H.R. 5664 has been reintroduced as the Biotechnology Patent Protection Act of
1991, H.R. 1417, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), S. 654, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG.
REC. S3286 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991). See also 137 CONG. REC. E946 (daily ed. Mar. 14,
1991)(statement of Rep. Boucher); 137 CONG. REC. S3284-86 (daily ed. Mar. 13,
1991)(statement of Sen. DeConcini).
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ogy is virtually limitless. It has already produced significant improve-
ments in human health care,4 and will result in similar changes in
agriculture. These developments are threatened, however, by the exist-
ence of a set of patent law rules that thwart innovators' receipt of a full
and fair reward for their scientific contribution.
In an era of demonstrably increased competition, the United States
should act affirmatively to protect those industries that are on the tech-
nological frontier and that offer the greatest hope for competitive ad-
vantage. Biotechnology is just such an industry. Since the discovery of
DNA technology, the majority of breakthrough research has occurred in
the United States.5 Moreover, American biotechnology companies ap-
pear to be ahead of their foreign competition in most respects-for the
moment.
Unfortunately, this American leadership may not persist over time
for two basic reasons. First, United States patent law appears to have
fallen behind industrial needs. Second, American companies may face
unfair foreign competition from imported products based on American
inventions.
One long term consequence of inadequate patent protection for
biotechnology-derived products is the likelihood that some promising
therapies will not be pursued. A second consequence of patent uncer-
tainty is the proliferation of patent litigation in this area. 6 The high
costs of such litigation may seriously drain the research budgets of bi-
otech companies. 7 Moreover, the absence of legal certainty for biotech-
nology has a dampening effect on venture capital investments.
IV. SPECIFIC DEFICIENCIES OF UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADE LAW
A. Product Patents and Naturally Occurring Proteins
Product patents are patents which cover a composition of matter.
As explained in United States v. Studiengeselischaft Kohle:
8
The essential difference between [process and product patents]
relates to scope. A product patent gives the patentee the right
to restrict the use and sale of the product regardless of how and
4. Examples of biotechnology-derived human health care products include insulin,
human growth hormone, erythropoietin (a protein which stimulates the production of red
blood cells) and tPA (a protein used to dissolve clots). See NAT'L ACADEMY OF ENG'G, ENGI-
NEERING AND THE ADVANCEMENT OF HUMAN WELFARE: 10 OUTSTANDING ACHIEVEMENTS
1964-1989, at 42-45 (Dec. 5, 1989), reprinted in The Process Patent Amendments of 1990: Hear-
rngs on H.R. 3957 and H.R. 5664 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and the
Admnistration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 33, at 260
(Sept. 25, 1990) [hereinafter Hearings].
5. The United States leads in research, but Japan has a strong commercial base in
biotechnology. OFFICE OF INDUS., U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, AN OVERVIEW OF COMMER-
CIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES at v (1990).
6. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, 5 NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY: PATENTING LIFE-SPECIAL REPORT 56-58 (1989).
7. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOL-
OGY: AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS 403 (1984).
8. 670 F.2d 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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by whom it was manufactured. A process patentee's power ex-
tends only to those products made by the patented process. A
process patent thus "leaves the field open to ingenious men to
invent and to employ other processes."
A sale of a product made by a patented process does not
itself infringe the patent; it is the unauthorized use of the pro-
cess that infringes the patent.9
In the field of pharmaceuticals, the patented product is usually de-
scribed in terms of the structure of an active ingredient of the drug sub-
stance. Product patents are generally considered to provide better
protection for drugs than process or use patents because the latter two
types usually can be circumvented more easily or with less visibility. In-
ventors of some recombinant versions of naturally occurring products
have found it difficult to obtain adequate patent protection because of
the mere existence of literature disclosing incomplete information about
the natural protein.' 0
When the scientific literature or other available information reveals
that the naturally occurring version of the protein has been purified to
some extent, even if it has not been definitively characterized, a patent
for the recombinant version may be denied for lack of novelty; in patent
law terms, the product has already been discovered. 1' This may occur
even when the amount of the natural product that has been isolated is
insufficient for any practical use and the method employed cannot pro-
vide practical quantities of the material.
A second hurdle inventors must overcome is that a patent may be
denied because the recombinant product is deemed unpatentably obvi-
ous despite its novelty. In many cases, although the protein has never
before been isolated in a substantially pure form or the product was not
well characterized prior to the recombinant synthesis, if its basic proper-
ties and some aspects of its structure are known, the Patent and Trade-
mark Office (Patent Office) may assert that the use of recombinant
technology to make a pure form of such a product is obvious. Most lay
persons would be astonished to learn that scientific breakthroughs, in-
cluding those leading to international scientific recognition, have been
denied patent protection because they were held to be obvious. Yet that
is the current state of affairs.
12
9. Id. at 1127-28 (citations omitted).
10. A natural protein is a protein encoded by DNA that occurs in nature. A recombi-
nant protein is a protein encoded by DNA that has been produced by combining genetic
material from at least two different sources.
11. See generally Murashige, Section 102/103 Issues in Biotechnology Patent Prosecution, 16
A.I.P.L.A. Q.J. 294, 303-04 (1988-89); Andrews, Unaddressed Question in the Amgen Case, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 9, 1991, § 1, at 30, col. 5.
12. A researcher's ability to obtain a patent for a purified version of a protein to block
the use of a process to make commercially viable quantities of a recombinant version of the
protein has been criticized. See Merges & Nelson, On the Comple Economics of Patent Scope,
90 COLuM. L. REv. 839, 903-04 (1990). See also Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v.
Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1987), modified on reconsideration, 678 F.
Supp. 1429 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 707 F.
Supp. 1547 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 724 F.
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The existing law, as it is being applied, has the effect of offering an
incentive to firms who lag behind in research and technology develop-
ment to attempt to leapfrog the innovators by patenting, or otherwise
disclosing, an allegedly purified protein, thereby blocking the scientific
leaders' ability to obtain a patent. This occurs even though the innova-
tive contribution of the leaders is essential to make the protein available
as a practical matter. This technique produces little, if any, public good
and thwarts beneficial developments in public health. 13
The mere existence of a previously discovered protein should not,
by itself, preclude the issuance of a patent for a recombinantly created
version of the same protein. The rationale under which a patent may be
granted for a product existing in nature is that in its natural form, such a
product was not available and useful to the public without further isola-
tion and purification. By the same rationale, if a product is made avail-
able in virtually unlimited quantities and in a highly purified state by the
application of recombinant technology, the recombinant product should
be patentable if its natural counterpart was available for the intended
use only in impractical quantities or with undesirable impurities or con-
taminants. Therefore, Congress should enact an amendment to the pat-
ent law that creates an appropriate incentive to use recombinant
technology to produce proteins.
B. Process Patents
1. Misapplication of In re Durden
The second major defect in the United States patent law is the erro-
neous and inconsistent application of In re Durden,14 a nonbiotech patent
case, to important biotechnology-derived processes. As recognized by a
Patent Office supervisor, the use of this case as a basis for rejecting pro-
cess patent claims in biotechnology is on the rise. 15 This is so because
many examiners have been incorrectly applying Durden to
biotechnology. 16
Supp. 690 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, vacated in part, Scripps Clinic & Re-
search Found. v. Genentech, Inc., Nos. 89-1541, -1542, -1543, -1646, -1647 (Fed. Cir.
Mar. 11, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library, U.S. App. file 3925)(reserving for further analysis
by the district court the issue whether a patent on a purified protein should serve to block
a patent on a recombinant version of the same protein).
13. This is not to suggest that all, or even most, disclosures of isolated or purified
proteins are made with this motive; however, the potential for abuse exists.
14. 763 F.2d 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
15. Wiseman, Biotechnology Patent Practice-A Primer, 16 A.I.P.L.A. Qj.. 394, 411 (1988-
89). See generally Litman, Obvious Process Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. 103, 71J. PAT. & TRADE-
MARK OFF. Soc'y 775 (1989); Wegner, Much Ado About Durden, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'y 785 (1989).
16. Durden involved a challenge to the denial of a patent for a process to make a novel
chemical. The process was similar to that of a previously issued patent; however, the Dur-
den process utilized a novel, but related, starting material and produced a novel, but re-
lated, end product. It appeared predictable once the new starting material and new
product were disclosed, that the old process would work with the new starting material to
produce the new product. The court in Durden concluded, in the narrow, factual context of
that case, that a chemical process, otherwise obvious, is not patentable even if either or
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The Patent Office has cited Durden in denying patents to processes
for producing proteins which use as starting materials, DNA, vectors or
biological microorganisms made by recombinant DNA technology. This
denial of process claim protection is routine even if the starting materi-
als are found by the Patent Office examiner to be novel and nonobvious
and, therefore, patentable in their own right.
The rote application of Durden in the biotechnology context involv-
ing the use of microorganisms as starting materials is in direct conflict
with In re Mancy. 17 In Mancy, the court held that a new microbe could
not be treated as prior art in determining the patentability of a method
of using the microbe to produce an antibiotic therefrom by an otherwise
standard process.1 8 In other words, novelty and nonobviousness of the
microbe imparted patentability to a method of using it. Mancy is a much
more appropriate case to the biotechnology industry than Durden. The
net result of the present Patent Office practice has been to delay severely
or to prevent the issuance of process patent protection to deserving
inventors.
Moreover, inventors hve been forced to suffer inconsistent results
regarding process patent Frotection. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) acknowledges that there
have been conflicting views on this issue both in the Patent Office Board
of Appeals and in the Federal Circuit Court's predecessor, the United
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.). 19 But, Durden
is indefensible especially when applied to biotechnology.
20
Without appropriate process claims in their patents, biotechnology
inventors cannot take advantage of the benefits of the Process Patent
Amendments Act of 1988,21 thereby nullifying this Act's advantages for
the biotechnology industry. Resolution of these conflicts should be ac-
complished by additional legislation that will enable inventors to benefit
from the provisions of the 1988 Act.
The law as currently expressed provides that to be considered
obvious:
the differences between the subject matter sought to be pat-
ented and the prior art [must be] such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains.
2 2
both the specific starting material employed and the product obtained, are novel and
unobvious.
17. 499 F.2d 1289 (C.C.P.A. 1974); see also In re Kuehl, 475 F.2d 658 (C.C.P.A. 1973);
MacAdams, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 445 (PTO Bd. App. 1978); Glaister, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
255 (PTO Bd. App. 1975).
18. Mancy, 499 F.2d at 1289.
19. Durden, 763 F.2d at 1409.
20. See generally Litman, supra note 15; McAndrews, Removing the Burden of Durden
Through Legislation: H.R. 3957 and H.R. 5664, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 1188
(1990); Wegner, supra note 15; Wiseman, supra note 15.
21. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1563 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
35 U.S.C.).
22. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988)(emphasis added).
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The Federal Circuit court and the C.C.P.A. have reiterated many
times that an applicant's disclosure in a patent application cannot be
treated as prior art in determining the obviousness of the claimed inven-
tion. 23 The court has also emphasized that the invention as a whole
must be considered in assessing obviousness. 24 Finally, the court has
cautioned that a patentability determination must be made as of the time
the invention was made, and not as part of a hindsight reconstruction of
the invention given the applicant's disclosure.
25
The denial of process claims in circumstances where either the
starting material in a process, the product of the process, or both, are
novel and nonobvious (and therefore patentable) is contrary to all of
these principles. The essential elements, without which the claimed pro-
cess could not have been described, were unknown before their disclo-
sure by the applicant. They are not prior art and cannot be treated as
such. The essential elements are incontrovertibly a part of the subject
matter as a whole; without their presence in the claim, the claim cannot
be properly described. Furthermore, at the time the invention was
made, the claimed process could not have been obvious; its essential
elements being known only to the inventor.
2. The Effect of In re Pleuddemann on the Need for Legislation
In re Pleuddemann26 is a recent case that may have a significant im-
pact on biotechnology patent litigation. Both Pleuddemann and Durden
deal with process (method) patent claims involving a novel composition.
The Durden decision illustrated that a claimed process of making a novel
composition is not automatically patentable but must be analyzed on a
case-by-case basis in light of the prior art. 27 Pleuddemann dealt with the
process of using a novel compound. The Patent Office examiner had
rejected Pleuddemann's claims for using patented organosilanes as
bonding or priming agents to bond to a mineral filler or to prime a sur-
face to improve bonding to organic resins. Pleuddemann's compound
was incorporated into the products made. The Patent Office examiner
and the Patent Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences used a
Durden argument to reject Pleuddemann's process-of-using claims, as-
serting that such a method was obvious based upon the prior art.28
That is, it was obvious to use the Pleuddemann compound for bonding
or priming because other analogous compounds had been similarly
used.
The Federal Circuit court reversed the Patent Office's rejection say-
ing that Durden did not apply, in part because Pleuddemann's process
23. See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1567-88 (Fed. Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1052 (1987); In re Katz, 687 F.2d 450 (C.G.P.A. 1982).
24. See John Deere Co. v. Graham, 333 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1964), aft'd, 383 U.S. I
(1966).
25. In re Kuehl, 475 F.2d 658, 663-65 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
26. 910 F.2d 823 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
27. In re Durden, 763 F.2d 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
28. Pleuddemann, 910 F.2d at 825.
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was a process-of-using, not a process-of-making.2 9 The court repeated
aspects of the Durden decision, emphasizing that obviousness under the
patent laws must be decided on the basis of each fact situation and that
there is no generally applicable rule.30 "It is the properties of [Pleud-
demann's] compounds as bonding/priming agents for certain polymers
* . . that give them their utility. As stated above, the compounds and
their use are but different aspects of, or ways of looking at, the same
invention .... 31
Pleuddemann does not reverse the Durden analysis rejecting process-
of-making claims; therefore, Durden presently stands as good law appli-
cable to any process-of-making claims, despite the presence of a novel
starting material or novel product. Indeed, the Federal Circuit court
explicitly distinguished the Durden process-of-making rejection from the
Pleuddemann process-of-using rejection.
32
The Patent Office and the courts continue to apply Durden and re-
ject claims involving methods of using novel DNA sequences and other
recombinant intermediates to make protein products. The classic Dur-
den rejection maintains that a process of making a protein using a novel
DNA sequence is obvious, because others have previously used the same
process with other DNA sequences to make other proteins. It might be
asserted that recombinant DNA patent applications no longer need fear
such a Durden rejection of process-of-making claims which are based
upon a novel DNA sequence encoding a desired protein X. Unfortu-
nately, the situation is not clear.
A prudent attorney certainly would seek to use Pleuddemann to the
client's advantage by rephrasing "a recombinant DNA process of making
protein X" into a Pleuddemann-style process-of-using claim, such as,
"contacting DNA with cellular enzymes or with a transcription/transla-
tion apparatus." This approach was successful in U.S. Patent 5,004,690,
issued April 2, 1991. However, it is not clear that such a semantic
change would always be successful. For example, the Patent Office ex-
aminer could assert that such a claim was really a process-of-making
claim in disguise. Such arguments would not apply to the situation in
Pleuddemann, where the method-of-using was totally unrelated to any
method-of-making. Thus, the examiner might claim that Pleuddemann
does not apply to methods of using DNA sequences and other recombi-
nant intermediates, which would still be governed by the newly reaf-
firmed Durden analysis.
Additionally, if Pleuddemann-style using recombinant DNA claims
were allowed, the question of enforcement against those practicing the
claimed method outside the United States would remain. If the claim
only covered using the recombinant DNA in an expression vector (which
is not imported) then there would be little enforcement advantage over
29. Id. at 826-27.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 827.
32. Id.
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the claim to the recombinant DNA itself. The United States Interna-
tional Trade Commission (ITC) and the Federal Circuit court found
such claims unenforceable against imports in a recent decision regard-
ing erythropoietin.3 3 Claims to using the recombinant DNA in a method
of protein synthesis could, however, be enforced against those who
would practice the synthetic method outside the United States and im-
port the protein product.
Alternatively, some have argued that given the right case on appeal,
the Federal Circuit court might, at some future date, reverse Durden by
applying a Pleuddemann-type analysis finding that making is also not obvi-
ous because the Durden-type rejection presumes the new starting mate-
rial or novel product to be prior art. While this possibility is consistent
with the analysis in Pleuddemann, there clearly is no certainty that such a
future decision will ever occur.
Some had hoped the November 9, 1990 rehearing of In re Dillon3 4
would provide guidance regarding Durden and perhaps overrule it. In
very clear dicta, the Federal Circuit court summarized its attitude re-
garding Durden as follows:
Suffice it to say that we do not regard Durden as authority to
reject as obvious every method claim reading on an old type of
process, such as mixing, reacting, reducing, etc. The materials
used in a claimed process as well as the result obtained there-
from, must be considered along with the specific nature of the
process, and the fact that new or old, obvious or nonobvious,
materials are used or result from the process are only factors to
be considered, rather than conclusive indicators of the obvi-
ousness or nonobviousness of a claimed process. When any
applicant properly presents and argues suitable method claims,
they should be examined in light of all these relevant factors,
free from any presumed controlling effect of Durden.3 5
Therefore, Durden is very much alive, but weakened and unpredictable in
its application by the individual patent examiner.
Durden-type rejections remain an even greater problem following
Pleuddemann because the Federal Circuit court explicitly avoided ques-
tioning Durden as good law, and distinguished making and using as two
different types of process claims. 36 A patent applicant may ask what new
route to protect a recombinant DNA process claim is available after
Pleuddemann? The answer is not clear because Pleuddemann does not ad-
33. Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, USITC Pub. 2186, Inv. No. 337-TA-281, 10
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1906 (ITC Apr. 10, 1989), vacated and remanded sub nom. Amgen, Inc. v.
United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 902 F.2d 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) at the ITC had determined that Amgen's patent
did not "cover" a foreign company's process for producing a certain recombinant product,
and thus there was no trade law violation. The ITC adopted the ALJ's analysis of the
patent issue, but dismissed Amgen's complaint for lack of subject matterjurisdiction. The
Federal Circuit court found that the ITC had subject matter jurisdiction and vacated and
remanded.
34. 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc).
35. Id. at 695 (emphasis in original).
36. Pleuddemann, 910 F.2d at 827.
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dress that question. One could rephrase making claims as using claims
and then wait years to see whether the Patent Office and the courts will
accept this semantic manipulation as a means of avoiding a Durden-style
obviousness rejection. Certainly, however, congressional passage of
clear statutory language that explicitly removes the Durden-style rejec-
tion is a more direct and unambiguous route to protect recombinant
DNA method-of-making protein claims.
C. Unfair Imports
The third and final deficiency in our law is best seen by examining
the glaringly unfair practice of permitting a foreign manufacturer to use
host cells, DNA isolates or vectors to produce a product and to ship it
into the United States without legal recourse for the holder of the patent
on the host cell. This practice has been endorsed by the ITC on the
basis of a crabbed reading of the trade law's Tariff Act provisions.
3 7
The importance of process claim protection is illustrated by Amgen,
Inc.'s inability to prevent importation of erythropoietin (EPO) into the
United States fromJapan by Chugai Pharmaceutical Company. Amgen's
patent did not contain a claim to a process of making EPO using pat-
ented host cells. The ITC refused to interpret the claims to the host
cells alone as constituting a process claim under existing law. Conse-
quently, Amgen was denied relief based upon its patented host cells
since the ITC held that such claims to "host cells" per se were not pro-
cess of making claims. When amendments to the Tariff Act were
adopted in 1988,38 Senator Lautenberg, a sponsor of the bill, observed:
The continued broad jurisdiction of the International Trade
Commission will help U.S. industry address the unfair activity
of foreign competitors who, for example, import products man-
ufactured using patented genetic engineering technology.
Merely moving manufacture offshore does not absolve the
wrongdoer from the requirement to compete fairly. This
Trade Act protection prohibits the foreign enterprise from tak-
ing jobs from American workers by doing offshore that which
they could not lawfully do in the United States. 39
If at the end of a long and uncertain period of discovery of innovated
drug products and development of patented technology, a United States
innovator must watch helplessly as infringing foreign imitators reap the
harvest to which the innovator is entitled, there will be a substantial dim-
inution or elimination of the economic incentives intended to encourage
those efforts.
The most controversial and public patent dispute in biotechnol-
ogy40 involves the innovative product, recombinant erythropoietin
37. 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906.
38. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
39. 134 CONG. REc. 20,086 (1988).
40. See, e.g., Andrews, Mad Scientists, Bus. MONTH, May 1, 1990, at 54.
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(rEPO), as litigated in Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. 4 1 In this
case, Amgen conducted ground-breaking scientific research enabling it
to produce commercially viable commodities of rEPO.4 2 This major sci-
entific and medical advance did not, however, give Amgen sufficient pat-
ent rights to prevent importation of competing products from Japan
even though Amgen's competitors could not produce rEPO within the
United States without infringing Amgen's patents. The fundamental un-
fairness of this situation served, in part, to motivate congressional inter-
est in the problem of patent protection for biotechnology.
4 3
Genetics Institute, Amgen's competitor, held the legal rights to a
product patent on nonrecombinant EPO.4 4 This patent, standing alone,
would not have permitted Genetics Institute to create enough EPO to
introduce a new pharmaceutical product to the market. To reach a via-
ble product stage it was necessary to have the ability to determine the
DNA sequence of the protein, to locate a host cell to produce the pro-
tein, and to develop a method for producing the end product. Amgen
made all of these scientific contributions.
When Amgen attempted to enforce what it thought were its supe-
rior rights, it was denied relief in two separate forums. Both the ITC
and the Federal Circuit court denied Amgen's attempt to bar the impor-
tation of rEPO.4 5 The denial was based on the ground that the jurisdic-
tional statute for enforcement actions, section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930,46 required that the petitioner hold a valid United States process
patent. The court declined to decide whether, on the basis of a different
record, a more expansive reading of the statute was possible which
would thereby extend the scope of the host cell patent to products pro-
duced by the host cell.
4 7
41. 706 F. Supp. 94 (D. Mass. 1989)(Young, J., granting partial summary judgment
for Chugai and Genetics Institute).
42. Amgen is currently alone on the market with its version of EPO, EPOGEN, be-
cause the provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, § 527, 21 U.S.C. 360cc
(1988). Under this Act, the sponsor of a new drug or biologic can, if certain market crite-
ria are met, obtain market exclusivity for a period of seven years. In this case, Amgen
obtained market exclusivity because it established that rEPO was a safe and effective ther-
apy for treatment of chronic renal failure, the relevant patient population of which is less
than 200,000.
43. See supra notes 2 & 3.
44. After this article was already set for publication, the Federal Circuit court handed
down an opinion which, in essence, upheld Amgen's patent claims with respect to its host
cell patent and invalidated Genetics Institute's patent with respect to the product, EPO.
See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Nos. 90-1273, -1275 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 5,
1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library, U.S. App. file 3481; WESTLAW, CTAF database 27262),
aff'g in part, rev'g in part, vacating in part 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737 (D. Mass. 1989) (The
district court had upheld the validity of both parties' patents and had found mutual
infringement.).
45. Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, USITC Pub. 2186, Inv. No. 337-TA-281, 10
U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) 1906 (ITC Apr. 10, 1989), vacated and remanded sub noma. Amgen, Inc. v.
United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 902 F.2d 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
46. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
47. This argument was explicitly raised for the first time in an amicus brief by
Genentech, Inc. The Federal Circuit court, however, declined permission to file this brief,
apparently because other parties objected that new untimely raised arguments would prej-
udice their position.
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Genetics Institute has filed a motion for a rehearing en banc of the
Federal Circuit's recent ruling that Amgen's product patent on the host
cell for making EPO was valid and infringed, while Genetics Institute's
product patent on purified EPO was invalid. The result of this case,
even if upheld, would not alter the lack of remedies to permit Amgen to
enforce its valid host cell patent in a manner to prevent importation of
the end product, EPO.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. General Background
Legislation should be proposed in Congress to provide that a per-
son who has undertaken the research and supplied the inventive skills to
meet the underlying purposes of the patent law can be granted a patent.
A person who has the genius to make a significant technical advance
deserves to enjoy the maximal benefits of the incentives offered by the
patent laws.
The American patent law is largely a product of the fertile mind of
Thomas Jefferson who said, "ingenuity should receive a liberal encour-
agement."'4 8 To enable Jefferson's vision, the Founders included spe-
cific authority in the Constitution for Congress to enact patent laws "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their... Discoveries."
4 9
The Constitution vests Congress with the right to create incentives
for inventors to undergo the often enormous cost of developing new
products. 50 As the Supreme Court has construed the patent clause, the
"public interest" must be preserved by the patent laws Congress en-
acts. 5 1 One of the primary public purposes served by the patent laws is,
to paraphrase patent owner Abraham Lincoln, to add fuel to the fire of
genius in the discovery of new and useful things.5 2 The proposed bill5"
meets this challenge by recognizing two important facts. First, unlike
some other industries (including some in high-technology areas), the
biotechnology industry is very dependent on patent protection. The ec-
onomics of the pharmaceutical industry demonstrate the essential na-
ture of patent protection to secure adequate rewards for the significant
research and development costs involved in creating a new drug. Sec-
ond, biotechnology poses unique, even ingenious, patent law problems
as outlined above.
48. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1980) (quoting 5 WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 75-76 (Washington ed. 1871)).
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
50. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974).
51. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277-78 (1942).
52. A. LINCOLN, Discoveries, Inventions and Improvements, in 5 COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRA-
HAM LINCOLN 99-113 (J. Nicolay &J. Hay eds. 1984).
53. See infra section V.B.
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B. A Proposed Remedial Bill: Section-By-Section Analysis
In the following discussion, this article outlines a proposed reme-
dial bill to address the patenting problems faced by the biotechnology
industry. This proposed remedial bill consists of two sections. The lan-
guage of proposed Section 2 has been previously introduced in the
United States House of Representatives and in the Senate.
54
1. Proposed Section 1
Proposed Section 1 would add the following new paragraph at the
end of 35 U.S.C. § 112:
55
A recombinant biological process to make a product may
be expressed as a claim to such recombinant product when pre-
pared by a specified recombinant biological process, and such
claim shall be limited to such recombinant biological process
for determination of patentability under section 102 and sec-
tion 103 and infringement under section 271 of this title.
This additional language provides that the mere existence of a purified
naturally occurring protein in the literature or in a previous patent does
not per se act to block the issuance of a patent on a product produced by
recombinant methods.
56
Under current law, Patent Office examiners reject, on the grounds
of obviousness or anticipation, claims to a recombinantly produced
polypeptide if it has been previously disclosed.5 7 Thus, current policy
has the direct result of providing an incentive merely to purify naturally
occurring proteins; it does not offer an incentive to create a practical
method to produce such proteins in useful quantities. In addition, this
view tends to favor the creation of new proteins that differ only slightly
from the naturally occurring protein solely to secure patent protection.
Some may argue that virtually all of the useful naturally occurring
proteins have already been found and characterized. This claim seems
astonishing in light of the existence of more than 50,000 such proteins.
Very few of these proteins have been produced in quantities that permit
evaluation of their utility in human therapies. Under the current law,
however, scientists and research-based companies have little incentive to
use sophisticated recombinant techniques to produce a protein once it
has been purified and the results have been published or patented.
The traditional pharmaceutical industry may be critical of proposed
Section 1 and express concern about the apparent deviation it makes
54. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
55. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
56. This proposed section does not alter the existing patent law doctrine that permits
the patenting of purzfied proteins. See, e.g., Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F.
95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912) (L. Hand, J., upholding a patent
for purified adrenalin).
57. Proposed Section 1 establishes a more liberal standard of patentability for prod-
uct-by-process claims in the area of recombinant technology. See, e.g., In re Fitzgerald, 619
F.2d 67, 70 (C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1255 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In reThorpe,
777 F.2d 695 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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from settled patent law doctrines. 58 Such an argument fails to recognize
that the courts and Congress have previously modified product patent
law to benefit the traditional, small-molecule pharmaceutical industry. 59
This proposal heeds the Supreme Court's cautionary note by not
recapturing any invention already in the public domain 60 and by balanc-
ing disclosure with reward. 6 1 Under this proposal, the person who has a
pre-existing patent on a purified product or on a nonrecombinant
method of making the product continues to have dominant rights. The
proposed legislation expands the storehouse of knowledge by providing
an appropriate incentive to create these naturally occurring proteins in a
more pure form, for less cost, in larger quantities, and by more sophisti-
cated technology.
The proposed bill appropriately moves from a single focus on pro-
tein structure to a combined focus on protein structure, practicality of
use or function, and cost. The reduction in cost of producing a protein
may be the only method by which the protein can be delivered in suffi-
cient quantity to a patient population. Thus, in a sense, permitting the
Patent Office to grant patents on such products by a recombinant pro-
cess is, in reality, merely a reward for a new use.
It should be noted that nothing in this proposal eliminates the gen-
eral existing patent law requirements that a new product-by-process
claim must itself be nonobvious. Thus, if a previously granted patent or
publication would have led an ordinary person skilled in the art to use
recombinant technology, and that previous disclosure had provided suf-
ficient information to make the use of recombinant technology obvious,
58. For example, the traditional "phenomena of nature" rules enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130-31
(1948).
59. These doctrinal changes in the law de-emphasize a focus on mere structure in
determining patentability of small molecules. The doctrine that permits patents to be is-
sued even if there is close structural similarity to prior art if the compound exhibits sur-
prisingly good effectiveness for a therapeutic application is an example of this shift in
focus. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Generix Drug Sales, Inc., 460 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1972);
In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Pfizer, Inc. v. International Rectifier
Corp., 545 F. Supp. 486 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aft'd, 685 F.2d 357 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1172 (1983). Secondly, section 100(b) of the 1952 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.
§ 100(b)(1988), explicitly permits process claims for new uses of old compounds. Finally,
the Supreme Court in Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980),
permitted product-like protection over nonstaple products sold by a patentee in conjunc-
tion with a patented "method of use." In each of these instances the law was altered to
meet new economic necessities.
60. See generally Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
This proposed bill also meets the four-part test for new intellectual property legislation
suggested by former Representative Robert Kastenmeier. See Kastenmeier & Remington,
The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984: A Swamp on Firm Ground?, 70 MINN. L. REv. 417,
440-41 (1985) (outlining harmony, clear definition, honest analysis of costs and benefits,
and enhancement of aggregate public domain as test factors).
61. Important distinctions between patent law and trade secrets involve length of
term and disclosure. The failure of current patent law to offer sufficient proprietary pro-
tection to biotechnology creates a greater temptation to rely on trade secrets. In turn,
greater reliance on trade secret protection in this field has high costs in terms of a reduced
pace of scientific advance, duplicative research and, perhaps, increased transaction costs.
See H.R. REP. No. 888, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 53-54 (1988).
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then a patent would not lie. For example, if a scientist has previously
purified a protein-like growth factor and has discovered both its genetic
sequence and potential uses, and routine recombinant steps would pro-
duce the protein, then a Patent Office examiner could reasonably con-
clude that the use of recombinant technology was obvious. The
underlying purpose to this proposed section is to permit assessment of
patentability on a case-by-case basis rather than to sanction the contin-
ued denial of such claims solely on the ground that a protein has been
disclosed previously, albeit in a form or quantity making its practical
utilization unlikely.
Finally, this proposal does not eliminate the requirement to ex-
amine the claims under the established enablement standards. 6 2 Thus,
the breadth and scope of such claims will still be determined based on
the amount and sufficiency of disclosure, the amount of prior art, and
the predictability and level of skill in the art.63 Nor does this proposal at
all prevent patentability of improved methods of recombinantly prepar-
ing the product. Even if a broad claim is warranted under the examina-
tion standards of section 112, others can still obtain patent protection
for improved processes. The obtained claim to a broad product-by-pro-
cess would then be dominant or superior to the subsequent claim.
2. Proposed Section 2
Section 2 of the proposed legislation would amend 35 U.S.C.
§ 10364 by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
A process of making a product shall not be considered ob-
vious under this section if an essential material used in the pro-
cess is novel under section 102 and otherwise nonobvious
under section 103.65
This addition legislatively overrules Durden and codifies the holding of
Mancy.
There is general agreement in the biotechnology patent bar that
Durden should not apply to biotechnology, yet some may assert that this
legislative solution to the so-called Durden problem is unnecessary and
that the ordinary appeal process should be sufficient. While this argu-
ment has superficial appeal, it ignores the real-world transactional costs
of such an approach. For companies wishing to obtain rapid FDA ap-
proval and marketing of a new drug, the luxury of pursuing a process
62. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). The enablement standards in the first paragraph of sec-
tion 112 provide:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
63. See, e.g., In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Forman, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
546 (PTO Bd. Pat. App. & Int'f 1986).
64. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
65. S. 2326, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 1, 136 CONG. REC. S3108 (daily ed. Mar. 22,
1990); H.R. 3957, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1990).
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claim through a multiyear appeals process may not be available. 66 Sec-
ond, this argument misses the point that all such appeals would be de-
cided on a case-by-case basis. Thus, there is no certainty that a "test"
case would solve the problem on anything other than an individual
basis.
The best argument in favor of legislation addressing the Durden
problem is the total absence of such a limitation in Western Europe or
Japan.67 Both of these legal systems have a strong tradition of protect-
ing process patents. Removal of the Durden limitation will fully avail the
United States biotech industry of the benefits afforded by the Process
Patent Amendments Act of 1988.68
When the availability of process claims is limited or delayed by Dur-
den problems, that 1988 Act is as much as non-existent, especially to
innovators in the biotechnology industry. The present proposal there-
fore corrects an unintended effect of the Patent Office's policy: denying
a promising nascent United States industry the advantages of legislation
intended for its benefit.
Proposed Section 2 provides certainty and protects the rights not
only of biotechnology innovators but of innovators in other United
States industries as well. While Durden's effects are perhaps most visible
in the biotechnology field, they lead to irrational decisions as to obvi-
ousness in all fields.
The proposed text of Section 2 of the bill addresses virtually all of
the problems that are likely to occur with respect to the protection of
biotechnology-derived products. If, as proposed here, the innovator is
able to obtain a valid process patent free from the impediments and de-
lays arising as a result of Durden, there is little need for a remedy specific
to the products of patented host cells. This is so because under current
law69 the holder of a process patent can obtain adequate remedies at the
border through the use of the International Trade Commission, or do-
mestically under United States patent law.
70
In the earlier versions of the legislation, a specific remedy was pro-
posed for making, using, or selling the product of a patented "essential
biological material" (i.e., a host cell or other similar essential biological
intermediate).7 1 While this proposal would have served to meet the
66. For example, Amgen, Inc. deferred pursuit of its process claims on EPO when a
Durden objection was raised by the Patent Office.
67. S. BENT, R. SCHWAAB, D. CONLIN & D.JEFFERY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY WORLDWIDE 504-05 (1987).
68. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
69. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107. This policy orientation was also a motivating function when Congress overruled
Deep South Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972) as part of the Patent Law
Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383.
70. 35 U.S.C. § 2 71(g) (1988).
71. H.R. 3957, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1990) and companion bill S. 2326, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. § 2, 136 CONG. REC. S3108 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1990) are identical except
the Senate bill uses the term "an essential biotechnological material" where the House bill
uses the term "a biotechnological material."
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specific needs of the biotechnology industry, it proved to be broader
than generally necessary and extremely controversial.7 2 As a result of
that controversy and of a recognition by proponents of the legislation
that the vast majority of the problems addressed by this legislation could
be resolved without resort to an industry-specific provision, this section
of the bill was deleted.
7 3
This is not to say that there will not be a narrow range of circum-
stances in which an innovator will be unable to obtain complete protec-
tion from unfair offshore competition. This narrow problem could
occur with respect to innovators who have been denied process patent
protection because of Durden and who cannot take advantage of the pro-
posed legislation because they can seek reissuance under United States
law.
74
There could also be parties who could lose the benefits of this re-
medial legislation if they are, or were, unable to obtain a process patent
in a timely fashion because of non-Durden problems-such as questions
arising from issues of "first to invent." This may be the case temporarily
for Amgen which is currently in an interference in the Patent Office con-
cerning the validity of its claim for priority for a method of making EPO.
Amgen's claim to a process patent appears to be strong in light of the
factfinding by the district and Federal Circuit courts. If, as a result,
Amgen obtains a process patent, there is no need for a "host cell" rem-
edy. Such a process patent, if acquired, would provide Amgen with all
the rights necessary to obtain a remedy that would prevent the importa-
tion of EPO.
3. Legislation
When the original Biotechnology Patent Protection Act was intro-
duced in early 1990,7 5 it generated substantial support from the indus-
try7 6 and academia.7 7 Over time, however, the legislation provided a
72. Unfortunately, earlier proposals to address these situations proved to be contro-
versial. The Bush Administration in particular objected to providing a specific fix for the
biotechnology industry. It also feared that to tread on amendments to section 337 of the
Tariff Act could complicate the already delicate international trade talks in the General
Agreement on Tariff and Trade. See letter from Wendell L. Willkie, II, General Counsel of
the U.S. Dep't of Commerce to Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcomm. on
Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary (July 5, 1990) [hereinafter Willkie Letter], reprinted in Hearings, supra note 4, at
108-13.
73. Compare H.R. 3957, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) with H.R. 5664, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1990). See also Hearings, supra note 4, at 17-33 (statement of Harry F. Manbeck, Jr.).
74. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1988) (relating to reissuance).
75. The Biotechnology Patent Protection Act of 1990 (H.R. 3957 and its companion
bill S. 2326) was introduced in the House of Representatives in February, see 136 CONG.
REC. E213-14 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) and in the Senate in March, see 136 CONG. REC.
S3107-08 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1990).
76. See Hearings, supra note 4, at 115-28 (statement of the Industrial Biotechnology
Association) and at 118 (table indicating that of I 1 top biotech companies, 9 support the
legislation, I has no position, and only I opposes it).
77. See, e.g., letter from Katharine Ku, Pres. Ass'n of Univ. Technology Managers to
Rep. Rick Boucher (Dec. 15, 1989), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 4, at 129-30; letter from
Sheldon E. Steinbach, Vice Pres. & Gen. Counsel, Am. Council on Educ. to Rep. Robert
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degree of controversy, especially regarding the effective date.78 Oppo-
nents, such as Genetics Institute, argued that the bill would have af-
fected the outcome of a pending case involving EPO. 79 This
controversy effectively derailed the detailed consideration of the original
bill.
After the bill was introduced, the relevant congressional commit-
tees asked the Bush Administration for its views of the pending meas-
ures. In a July 1990 letter, the Department of Commerce, speaking for
the Administration, offered its views. 80 The letter reasoned that special
remedies for products of patented host cells were unnecessary because
sufficient remedies were available if the inventor secured a process pat-
ent. The Department of Commerce argued that if Durden was the only
impediment to obtaining process patents, then the solution lay with
amendments that addressed only that issue. In addition, the Adminis-
tration expressed strong opposition to the effective date provisions of
the original bill.
As a result of the objections of the Administration and others, a
second bill, the Process Patent Amendments of 1990,81 was introduced
in September of 1990 by Representative Boucher. This bill was largely
crafted in response to the recommendations of the Administration.
C. Congressional Hearings
A congressional hearing on H.R. 3957 and H.R. 5664 was held in
September of 1990.82 The witnesses at this hearing were far from uni-
form in their views. The Administration testified in favor of H.R. 5664,
but against H.R. 3957. Representatives of biotechnology firms were
similarly divided. Genetics Institute and Upjohn, parties to the dispute
about EPO, testified against H.R. 3957. Amgen's Chairman and CEO
testified in favor of H.R. 3957. The witness representing Genentech,
one of the authors of this article, testified in favor of legislation to ad-
dress this problem generally. Finally, a witness representing some large
W. Kastenmeier (April 4, 1990), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 4, at 150-51; letter from
KarlJ. Hittelman, Ph.D., Assoc. Vice Chancellor Academic Affairs, Univ. of Cal., San Fran-
cisco to Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier (June 27, 1990), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 4, at
201; letter from Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of Tennessee,
Knoxville to Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier (July 17, 1990), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 4,
at 206-09; letter from Thomas J. Bennett, Director, Research Services, Loyola Univ., Chi-
cago to Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier (Aug. 3, 1990), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 4, at
211; letter of Richard L. Wallace, Vice Pres. for Academic Affairs, Univ. of Missouri to
Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier (Aug. 20, 1990), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 4, at 212.
One of the underlying reasons for the support of the university community is that
universities appear to suffer disproportionately from Durden rejections. See Hearings, supra
note 4, at 122 (statement of the Industrial Biotechnology Ass'n discussing forfeiture of
process patent protection by deserving universities).
78. See Andrews, Disputed Provision in Gene Bill, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1990, § 1, at 36,
col. 5. See also Hearings, supra note 4, at 33-38 (testimony of Bruce M. Eisen, Vice Presi-
dent-Chief Patent Counsel, Genetics Institute, Cambridge, Mass.).
79. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 706 F. Supp. 94 (D. Mass. 1989).
80. Willkie Letter, supra note 72.
81. H.R. 5664, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). See supra note 3.
82. Hearings, supra note 4.
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industrial companies testified in favor of letting these issues be resolved
by further judicial developments.
The hearing clearly established the fault lines for further considera-
tion in the next Congress. Some parties will continue to push for con-
gressional resolution of a judicially created problem, while others will
continue to insist on awaiting further judicial action. The second major
issue of division concerns the competing equities of Congress involving
itself in an ongoing commercial dispute. Unfortunately, this latter issue
has come to dominate the discussion. Fair and complete resolution of
the problems associated with the effective date of this legislation will be
difficult to achieve without further compromise by the parties and by
further judicial decisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
International competition, industrial competitiveness, and funda-
mental fairness demand the enactment of new laws to enhance the in-
centives for biotechnology-derived products. This initiative will work to
benefit high risk, high cost, innovative scientific research and will stimu-
late investment in new technologies leading to dramatic advances in bio-
therapeutics beneficial to public health.
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A PROPOSED LEGAL ADVISOR'S ROADMAP FOR
SOFTWARE DEVELOPERS: ON THE SHOULDERS OF
GIANTS MAY No BREACHERS OF ECONOMIC
RELATIONSHIPS NOR SLAVISH COPIERS
STAND
BY
JOHN T. SOMA* ROBERT D. SPRAGUE**
M. SusAN LOMBARDI*** CAROLYN M. LINDH****
INTRODUCTION
Computer programs are literary works entitled to copyright protec-
tion under federal law. Although this may seem common knowledge
today, until recently courts were still being asked to determine whether
computer programs were entitled to any copyright protection at all.
The debate began when the first microcomputers became available in
the mid-1970s and the number of people using computers increased
dramatically. By 1980, companies such as Tandy, Commodore, and Ap-
ple all offered a complete line of microcomputers. IBM, then the largest
computer company in the world, entered the market in 1981 with the
extremely popular microcomputer called the PC (Personal Computer).'
Much of the software for the early microcomputers was shareware or
public domain.2 Many of the initial software developers were one- or
two-person companies, usually run out of the programmers' basements
or garages. Overall, the microcomputer software industry was small,
unstable, and unorganized, and developers did not vigorously seek
copyright protection.
During the 1980s, however, microcomputer software development
* John T. Soma, Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; B.A., 1970,
Augustana College; J.D. 1973, University of Illinois College of Law; M.A. 1973, University
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Law.
**** Carolyn M. Lindh, Research Associate, University of Denver College of Law;
B.A., 1988, University of Northern Colorado; J.D. Candidate, May 1991, University of
Denver College of Law.
1. A "Personal Computer" or "PC" is a microcomputer-a computer which operates
with a microprocessor. The terms PC, personal computer and microcomputer are, both in
general usage and in this article, considered synonymous.
2. Shareware is software distributed initially without charge or for a nominal fee. If
the user likes the program and uses it, he or she is encouraged to send a registration fee to
the software's author. Public domain software has no proprietary rights attached. The
software can be freely copied and distributed without charge.
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became a multi-billion dollar industry with tens of thousands of employ-
ees. Small startups such as Microsoft Corporation and Lotus Develop-
ment Corporation began to approach one billion dollars per year in
sales. As software developers established major positions in the market
and began to appreciate the money to be made, they wanted protection
for their products. And, for the first time, they had the money to seek
such protection.
Developers initially turned to the copyright laws for protection, but
found them to be inadequate. Responding to this demand for protec-
tion, courts and Congress over the last fifteen years have refined the
copyright laws to accommodate computer programs. Lotus Development
Corp. v. Paperback Software International8 is the most recent in a long line
of such software protection cases. To better understand the holding in
Lotus, the practitioner should be familiar with the development of
software copyright cases and laws during the last fifteen years.
This article is intended to aid the practitioner in understanding the
direction software copyright case law is taking. To do so, the article will
review past cases and offer insight into the Lotus decision. Further, it will
assist the practitioner in advising a software development client as to
both what to do and not to do to avoid future copyright infringement
litigation. Finally, the graphic "roadmap" provided will not only guide
the practitioner through past cases, but also give direction for safe pas-
sage in the future.
Section I of this article offers a brief overview of the history and
development of the copyright acts. Section II provides a background of
the court-derived copyright laws, while section III reviews the more sig-
nificant software copyright cases of the last fifteen years. It is the con-
tention of the authors that these cases can be separated into three
generations of software copyright cases, with each successive generation
constantly expanding the legal envelope of protection. Section IV then
provides a thorough analysis of the Lotus case. Section V follows with a
chart of approximately 25 cases which can be used to help the practi-
tioner predict a future case. Finally, section VI will attempt to predict
the future of copyright law based upon the decisions discussed in this
article.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
COPYRIGHT AcTs
The United States Constitution authorizes Congress to pass laws
"To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries." '4 This provision gives Congress the
authority to confer monopolies to the extent it deems necessary to pro-
3. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
4. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, ci. 8. The copyright laws, codified in Title 17 of the United
States Code, rest upon this explicit grant of legislative authority.
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mote learning, culture and development. 5 Monopolies are not granted
solely for the purpose of rewarding authors. Rather, Congress has
granted copyright monopolies to serve the public welfare by encourag-
ing authors to generate new ideas and disclose them to the public, being
free to do so in any uniquely expressed way they choose.
6
In deciding the nature of the copyright laws, however, Congress
must strike a balance between encouraging new expression and allowing
that new expression to be used by others. 7 Achieving the proper bal-
ance has been a painstaking task.
[Courts] must take care to guard against two extremes equally
prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed
their time for the service of the community, may not be de-
prived of their just merits, and the reward for their ingenuity
and labour; the other, that the world may not be deprived of
improvements, nor the progress of the arts be retarded.
8
It was with these goals in mind that Congress passed the first Copy-
right Act in 1790. 9 The 1790 Act attempted to list all the items that
would be granted copyright protection. This list soon proved inade-
quate. 10 In 1909 Congress changed its approach and extended protec-
tion to "all the writings of an author." 1' Even this general statement
proved to be too inflexible to accommodate advances in technology.'
2
In the mid-1950s, Congress began consideration of another major revi-
5. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v.Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
6. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
7. If Congress were to determine, for example, that copyright protection is un-
necessary to "promote the progress of" computer programming-because, for
example, in Congress' view the financial incentives alone of developing new com-
puter programs (without the added benefit of copyright) are enough to en-
courage innovation, or because incremental innovation might be stifled by
expansive copyright protection-then Congress could, without offending the
Constitution, provide no copyright protection for computer programs. At the
other extreme, were Congress to find that strong copyright protection is neces-
sary to promote the progress of computer programming, Congress could provide
for expansive copyright protection for all aspects of computer programs, again
without having strayed beyond the bounds of the constitutionally permissible.
Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 46.
8. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1235 n. 27, quoting Sayre v. Moore, 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 140 n.6
(1785) (Lord Mansfield).
9. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1831). This Act ex-
tended copyright protection to "any map, chart, book or books already printed."
10. Congress expanded copyright protection by adding "designs, prints, etchings and
engravings" in 1802, "musical composition" in 1831, "dramatic composition" in 1856,
"photographs and the negatives thereof" in 1865, and "statuary" and "models or designs
intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts" in 1870. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36,
§ 2, 2 Stat. 171, 171, repealed by Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 14, 4 Stat. 436, 436, 439,
amended by Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138, 139, amended by Act of Mar. 3, 1865,
ch. 126, §§ 1, 2, 13 Stat. 540, 540, repealed by Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat.
198, 212 (repealed 1909).
11. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 4, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (previously codified at 17
U.S.C. § 4, reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. App. § 4 (West Supp. 1990); recodified 1947; repealed
1976).
12. In 1912, Congress added "motion pictures" as a further example of"all the writ-
ings of an author," Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, § 5(1)-(m), 37 Stat. 488,488 (previously
codified at 17 U.S.C. § 5(l)-(m), reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. App. § 5(1)-(m), recodified 1947,
repealed 1976), and in 1972, Congress added "sound recordings" to the list, Act of Oct.
1991]
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sion of the copyright law. It was not until 1976, however, that Congress
passed a new copyright act.' 3 The Copyright Act of 1976 extended
copyright protection to: "original works of authorship fixed in any tan-
gible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device."' 4
The 1976 Act also codified the judicially created doctrine of the
idea versus expression dichotomy. Section 102(b) states that "[i]n no
case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."' 15 The Copyright
Act of 1976 also impliedly extended copyright protection to computer
programs. Congress, in the legislative history for the Act, dearly stated
that computer programs were considered literary works and were pro-
tected by copyright laws.
16
Further changes to the Copyright Act were forthcoming. In 1978,
the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works (CONTU), a committee formed by Congress to investigate copy-
right protection for new technologies, delivered its report to Con-
gress. 17 CONTU recommended two changes to the Copyright Act: (1)
the Act should include a definition of a computer program and (2) allow
copies of computer programs for archival purposes.' 8 In 1980, Con-
gress amended the Copyright Act and included both of CONTU's rec-
ommendations. 19 The 1976 Act and its 1980 Amendment provide the
basis for the courts' analyses in the copyright cases discussed in sections
III and IV of this article.
20
15, 1971, Pub. L. 92-140, § 1(b), 85 Stat. 391, 391 (previously codified at 17 U.S.C. § 5(n),
reprnted in 17 U.S.C.A. App. § 5(n), repealed 1976).
13. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-801).
14. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
15. Id. at § 102(b).
16. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5664-67, 5731.
17. CONTU's purpose was to study the use of the copyright laws for "automatic sys-
tems capable of storing, processing, retrieving, and transferring information", and to
make recommendations to ensure that such works were protected by the copyright laws.
Act of Dec. 31 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 201(b)-(c), 88 Stat. 1873, 1873-74 (1974).
18. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEw TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS,
20-21 (1978), reprinted in 5 COPYRIGHT, CONGRESS AND TECHNOLOGY: THE PUBLIC RECORD
(N. Henry ed. 1980).
19. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, §§ 9-10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified at
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988)). The Copyright Act currently defines a computer program as "[a]
set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to
bring about a certain result." Id.
20. One commentator believes that the 1976 Act and the 1980 Amendment are not
adequate protection for software developers, and has suggested amending the Copyright
Act again. See Abramson, Why Lotus-Paperback Uses the Wrong Test and What the New Software
Protection Legislation Should Look Like, COMPUTER LAw., August 1990 at 6.
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II. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF COPYRIGHT LAW AS IT RELATES TO
COMPUTER SOFTWARE
The fundamental basis of copyright law is that only the expression
of a work is subject to protection, not its underlying idea. To establish
copyright infringement, both ownership and copying must be proved.
2 1
Ownership requires originality and copyrightability of the subject mat-
ter.2 2 Copying requires proof of access and substantial similarity of the
two works. 2 3 Copyright infringement of computer software can first
be separated into two distinct categories based upon what part of the
work is copied: (1) literal elements and (2) non-literal elements. The
source code and object code of computer programs constitute the literal
elements. 24 Literal aspects of a computer program are clearly
copyrightable.
2 5
In general, the user interface-the part of the computer program
which the user sees and uses to interact with the program-is the non-
literal aspect of the expression. Courts have long recognized that non-
literal expressions of a work can be copyrightable and subject to protec-
tion.2 6 When the alleged copying is of literal elements, substantial simi-
larity is established by showing duplication of the original work or
substantial portions of it. Establishing substantial similarity of non-lit-
eral elements is much more difficult. In determining the substantial sim-
21. Warner Bros. v. Amer. Broadcasting Cos., 654 F.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 1981); Man-
ufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 990 (D. Conn. 1989); 3 M.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01 at 13-14 (1990).
22. Ownership also requires the author to be a U.S. citizen and proper registration of
the copyright. If the plaintiff is not the author of the work, then the plaintiff must be an
assignee of the copyright. In all the cases discussed in this article, these elements are not
at issue and are, therefore, not considered pertinent. For further discussion concerning
these elements, see 3 M. NiMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.01[A] (1990).
23. Proof by direct evidence of copying is generally not possible since the actual
act of copying is rarely witnessed or recorded. Normally, there is no physical
proof of copying other than the offending object itself. Copying therefore is gen-
erally established by showing that the defendant had access to the copyrighted
work and that the offending and copyrighted articles are 'substantially similar.'
Atari, Inc. v. North Amer. Phillips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, 843 F.2d 600,606 (Ist Cir. 1988). See also
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT supra note 21 at § 13.01.
24. Source code is the program written in a programming language such as Pascal or
BASIC. Object code is the machine readable code, that is, the binary representation of the
source code. A command written in source code is translated into object code in order for
the computer to interpret the command. See Lotus, 740 F. Supp. 37, 43-45 for a further
discussion of the literal aspects of computer programs.
25. See Id. at 45 for a list of cases supporting the holding "that literal manifestations of
a computer program-including both source code and object code-if original, are
copyrightable."
26. "[A]n infringement is not confined to literal and exact repetition or reproduction;
it includes also the various modes in which the matter of any work may be adopted, imi-
tated, transferred, or reproduced, with more or less colorable alterations to disguise the
piracy." Universal Pictures Co., Inc. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.
1947).
And, as Judge Learned Hand stated, copyright "cannot be limited literally to the text,
else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations." Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). See also Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc.
v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977).
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ilarity between two computer programs based upon non-literal
elements, courts have used three basic approaches: (1) the "abstrac-
tions" test, (2) the "idea/expression dichotomy" test, and (3) the "look
and feel" test.
A. The Abstractions Test
The abstractions test was developed by Judge Learned Hand in
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co. :27
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of
patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more
and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be
no more than the most general statement of what the play is
about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a
point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer
protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use
of his "ideas," to which, apart from their expression, his prop-
erty is never extended.
28
In other words, an author cannot claim protection for a basic plot such
as "boy meets girl," nor can protection be claimed because the plot un-
folds in a particular city. But where the plot, location, types of charac-
ters, and segments of dialogue all start to become substantially similar,
the elements of the work then begin to constitute more of an expression
subject to protection than of abstract ideas.
29
The critical step under the abstractions test, therefore, is distilling
the unprotected idea from the protected expression.3 0 Applying the ab-
stractions test has led to a two-step analysis to determine substantial
similarity between two works: applying first an "extrinsic test," and then
an "intrinsic test."3 1 Under the initial extrinsic test, the court will dis-
sect and analyze the basic components of a work (i.e., the type of work
involved, the materials used, the subject matter, and the setting for the
subject), to determine "whether there are sufficient articulable similari-
ties to justify a finding that the defendant has copied from the protected
work."
32
If copying is established under the extrinsic test, the court then ap-
plies the intrinsic test to determine whether copying has occurred to the
extent that the two works are substantially similar. The basis of the test
applied in deciding whether there is substantial similarity in expressions
is "the response of the ordinary reasonable person."'3
3
In applying the abstractions test, the court in Sid & Marty Krofft Tele-
27. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) (copyright infringement of a play by a motion picture).
28. Id. at 121 (citations omitted).
29. Id.
30. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1163 (9th Cir. 1977).
31. Id. at 1164.
32. Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, 843 F.2d 600, 608, relying upon,
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
33. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164, relying upon, Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468-69.
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vision Production, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.34 stated that if "there is substan-
tial similarity in ideas, then the trier of fact must decide whether there is
substantial similarity in the expressions of the ideas so as to constitute
infringement."' 35 This test has led to an evolution of the basic test to
establish copyright infringement when analyzing non-literal elements:
"To establish copyright infringement, the plaintiff must prove owner-
ship of the work in question, access to the work by the defendant, and
substantial similarity of both the general ideas and the expression of
those ideas between the plaintiff's and defendant's work."
3 6
B. Idea/Expression Dichotomy
The idea/expression dichotomy attempts to differentiate between
an idea and its expression. This test was first applied in Baker v. Selden.3 7
As noted in Lotus, the Baker Court held that:
the text of a book describing a special method of double-entry
accounting on paper spreadsheets-the now almost universal
T-accounts system-was copyrightable expression, but that the
method itself, which embodied the idea of this particular kind
of double-entry bookkeeping, was not. The Court thus con-
cluded that Baker did not infringe Selden's copyright when
Baker wrote his own treatise, in his own words, describing the
special double-entry method of bookkeeping.
38
If it is determined that the idea and its expression are indistinguish-
able, and that there is no greater similarity between the works than is
inevitable from the expression of that idea, then any copying of that par-
ticular expression will essentially be excused because there is no other
way to express that idea. The idea and expression have merged.3 9 Con-
versely, "the scope of copyright protection increases with the extent ex-
pression differs from the idea." 40
C. Look and Feel
The origination of the look and feel concept is credited to Roth
Greeting Cards v. United Card Co.,41 in which the court considered whether
greeting cards created by the defendant infringed upon the plaintiff's
cards. In dissecting various elements of expression of the plaintiff's
cards, the court noted:
the textual matter of each card, considered apart from its ar-
34. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
35. Id.
36. Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. dened,
485 U.S. 977 (1988) (emphasis in original), citing Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v.
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
37. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
38. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l., 740 F. Supp. 37, 54 (D. Mass.
1990).
39. Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Vector Intercontinental, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 135, 139
(N.D. Ohio 1986).
40. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1168.
41. 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970).
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rangement on the cards and its association with artistic repre-
sentations, was not original to Roth and therefore not
copyrightable. However, proper analysis of the problem re-
quires that all elements of each card, including text, arrange-
ment of text, art work, and association between art work and
text, be considered as a whole.
4 2
The Roth court, keeping in mind that it was protecting expression
and not ideas, determined that plaintiff's cards, taken as a whole, were
copyrightable. 43 In determining whether there was a substantial similar-
ity between the two works, the court held that "in total concept and feel the
cards of United are the same as the copyrighted cards of Roth."
44
III. THREE GENERATIONS OF COMPUTER COPYRIGHT CASES
The 1976 Copyright Act and the 1980 Amendment extended copy-
right protection to computer programs. The degree of protection ex-
tended, however, was left to the courts. The cases applying copyright
protection to computer programs can be separated into three genera-
tions. The first generation of software copyright cases dealt with frag-
mented literal copying consisting mainly of the copying of substantial
portions of the source and object codes. In the second generation, the
courts began to consider the extent non-literal aspects of computer pro-
grams were protected. The courts' focus was on the structure of the
source and object code. The third generation of cases further extended
protection of non-literal elements, focusing on the structure and organi-
zation of the user interface.
A. The First Generation
The first generation of software copyright cases culminated with Ap-
ple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.4 5 Prior to Apple, the courts
generally recognized the copyrightability of the source code of com-
puter programs. The basic definition in the 1980 amendment made it
clear that Congress intended to protect the source code.4 6 Apple pro-
vided the court with the novel issue of whether the object code of a
program and a program embedded in read-only memory (ROM) chips
were copyrightable. The defendant in Apple, Franklin Computer Corpo-
ration, manufactured and sold the ACE 100 personal computer which
was designed to be "Apple compatible." In order to be Apple compati-
42. Id. at 1109 (footnote omitted).
43. Considering all of these elements together, the Roth cards are, in our opin-
ion, both original and copyrightable. In reaching this conclusion we recognize
that copyright protection is not available for ideas, but only for the tangible ex-
pression of ideas. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217, 74 S. Ct. 460, 98 L. Ed. 630
(1954). We conclude that each of Roth's cards, considered as a whole, represents
a tangible expression of an idea and that such expression was, in totality, created
by Roth.
Id. at 1109-10 (citation omitted).
44. Id. at 1110 (emphasis added). See also Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. Inc., v.
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
45. 714 F.2d 1240 (3rd Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
46. See supra n. 19.
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ble, Franklin copied Apple's operating system verbatim.4 7 Apple sued
Franklin for copyright infringement. Franklin raised two defenses based
upon the non-copyrightability of the subject matter: (1) object code and
programs embedded in ROM were not copyrightable subject matter and
(2) operating systems were not copyrightable subject matter.4 8
Franklin asserted that the object code was not copyrightable be-
cause of the 1908 case of White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.
4 9
In White-Smith, the Supreme Court had drawn a distinction between
works that could be interpreted by individuals, and those that required a
machine to interpret the work. The Apple court found that both the 1976
Act and its legislative history clearly intended to "obliterate distinctions
engendered by White-Smith." 50 Under the Act, copyright protection ex-
tends to works in any tangible forms which can be "perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device." 5 1 In addition, the definition of a computer pro-
gram includes "sets of statements or instructions to be used directly or
indirectly in a computer."' 52 The Third Circuit concluded that a com-
puter program, whether in object code or source code, was a "literary
work" and was protected from unauthorized copying, whether from its
object or source code version.
53
The Apple court also rejected Franklin's second argument that oper-
ating systems were not copyrightable. This argument was based upon
the premise that operating systems are methods or processes. 54 The
court reasoned that if the instructions in an application program are not
methods or processes, then by analogy neither are the instructions in a
system program. The court relied on the CONTU report which stated
that works of a program which are "used ultimately in the implementa-
tion of a process should in no way affect their copyrightability." 5 5 Apple
clearly established that application programs and operating systems, in
either object or source code form, are copyrightable.
B. The Second Generation
The second generation of software copyright cases, represented by
Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc. ,56 extended protec-
tion to the structure, sequence and organization (non-literal aspects) of
47. There was evidence at trial that Franklin had blatantly copied Apple's programs.
Franklin had even left in the object code the name of the original programmer and the
original program's name, "Applesoft." Apple, 714 F.2d at 1245.
48. Id. at 1249.
49. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
50. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1240, 1248.
51. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1249.
54. The Copyright Act does not protect a method or process. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(1988).
55. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1252 (quoting NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 1 (1979) at 21).
56. 797 F.2d 1222 (3rd Cir. 1986), cerl. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
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a program's source and object code. The plaintiff, Whelan Associates,
developed a program for the operation of a dental laboratory for the
defendant, Jaslow Dental Laboratories. The program, Dentalab, was
written in Event Driven Language for the IBM Series One computer.
Jaslow and Whelan entered into a licensing agreement which authorized
Whelan to sell Dentalab and to pay Jaslow a ten percent royalty on all
sales. Jaslow used Dentalab for two years. Jaslow later realized, how-
ever, that if the program was converted to BASIC programming lan-
guage, it could be used on a wider variety of personal computers. Jaslow
thereafter developed and marketed its own version of the program in
BASIC. Jaslow was ultimately sued for infringing Whelan's copyright of
the software written in Event Driven Language. The Whelan court was
presented with the issue of whether the structure and organization of
the computer code could be infringed. The court analyzed the issue
under the idea/expression dichotomy. Jaslow argued that the computer
program's structure was the idea, not the expression. The court re-
jected Jaslow's argument based upon the distinction made in Baker v.
Selden 5 7 between an idea and an expression. The Whelan court noted
that in Baker, the purpose or function of the work was the idea, and
everything else was the expression.5 8 The Whelan court then deter-
mined that the idea of Dentalab was the efficient management of a den-
tal laboratory and the expression was everything else, including the
structure of the program. The court noted that the Copyright Act of
1976 implicitly protects the sequence, order, or structure of a work:
Although the Code does not use the terms "sequence," "or-
der" or "structure," it is clear from the definition of compila-
tions and derivative works, and the protection afforded them,
that Congress was aware of the fact that the sequencing and
ordering of materials could be copyrighted.... [T]he sequence
and order could be parts of the expression, not the idea. 59
Jaslow next contended that if the structure was "expression," then it
merged with the idea. The court reasoned that since the program's
structure could be written in a variety of ways, the structure did not
merge with the idea.
60
The Whelan decision has been criticized for misapplying the idea/
expression dichotomy. The court identified the idea underlying the pro-
gram and then decided that everything else was expression. In so doing,
the court assumed that there could only be one idea in every program.
Certain functions of a computer can only be performed a particular way,
usually because of hardware configurations or the programming lan-
guage involved. Additionally, certain types of programs require a cer-
tain basic structure. To assume, however, that there was only one idea
57. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
58. 797 F.2d at 1236. Cf. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp.
775, 783 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aft'd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Apple seeks here not to
protect ideas, (i.e., making the machine perform particular functions) but rather to protect
their particular expressions .....
59. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1239.
60. Id. at 1236.
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underlying the program was erroneous. The court should have applied
the abstractions test to ascertain whether there were other ideas not sub-
ject to protection.
Whelan extended copyright law further than other courts. The
Third Circuit effectively prohibited developers from producing substan-
tially similar source and object codes. Courts will not extend protection
to source and object codes beyond this point. Whelan set the stage for
the third generation in copyright protection where the issue became
whether the copyright laws protect the structure, sequence, and organi-
zation of a program's user interface.
C. The Third (and Final?) Generation
In the third generation of software copyright cases, courts have
struggled with the question of what other non-literal aspects of a com-
puter program are protected. There are three major third generation
cases.
Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co.61 is generally rec-
ognized as the first case to decide if a computer program's user interface
is copyrightable. Synercom developed a program to test the tolerance
levels of a building. The program had an easier and more efficient
method to input data on format cards. The format cards had lines and
shaded areas that told "the user what data to place where and how to do
it."'62 The input forms had been properly copyrighted. The defendant,
Engineering Dynamics, Inc. (EDI) developed another program that
competed with Synercom's program. In fact, EDI believed that to com-
pete in the marketplace, its new program had to be wholly compatible
with Synercom's data input format.63 EDI did not copy the format cards
themselves, but instead wrote a program to accept data from Synercom's
input format cards. 64
The Synercom court began its analysis by using the idea/expression
dichotomy, approaching this issue differently, however, than did the
Whelan court. In Whelan, the court tried to discern what the idea was
behind the program, whereas in Synercom, the court tried to discern
"whether the material proffered for copyright undertakes to express." 65
Judge Higginbotham found that the input format did express an idea.
The lines, shading, and words communicated to the user the selection,
arrangement and sequence of data.66 The issue presented was: "If se-
61. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (Although it was decided in 1978, this case is
identified with the third generation because it addressed issues not generally raised until
the mid-1980s, and is often distinguished in the holdings of third-generation cases.).
62. Id. at 1012.
63. Id. at 1008.
64. Id. at 1012.
65. Id. at 1011.
66. Generally, blank forms are not the subject of copyright. See Baker v. Selden, 101
U.S. 99 (1879); Aldrich v. Remington Rand, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Tex. 1942).
"Forms" which communicate information can, however, be the subject of copyright. See
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
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quencing and ordering [was] expression, what separable idea [was] ex-
pressed?"'6 7 If the idea was the sequence and ordering of data, there
was no infringement; if, however, sequencing and ordering of data was
the expression, there was an infringement.
6 8
Judge Higginbotham resolved this issue with the now classic exam-
ple of the "figure-H" pattern in manual transmission automobiles which
he analogized to the input formats used in the program. Once a manu-
facturer chose the "figure-H," it was the only pattern that would work in
that particular model of car. The "figure-H" may be expressed in sev-
eral different ways. It can be described in a driver's manual, through a
diagram, photograph, or driver training film. Each of these expressions
may be protected through copyright, but a copyright does not prohibit
another manufacturer from marketing a car using the same pattern.
Judge Higginbotham concluded that the order and sequence of the data
was an expressed idea. "[O]nly to the extent the expressions involve
stylistic creativity above and beyond the bare expression of sequence and
arrangement, should they be protected."
'6 9
The Synercom holding has been cited in defense of copyright in-
fringement on the basis that it provides authority that the non-literal
aspects of a program-the sequence, organization, and structure-are
merely expressed ideas, not copyrightable expression. In subsequent
cases, courts have generally not reached the same result as Judge Hig-
ginbotham. This may be largely explained by the fact that the 1978
Synercom decision preceded both CONTU's report to Congress and the
1980 amendment to the 1976 Copyright Act.
Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc.70 was the first case to
determine that the structure, sequence and organization of a computer
program's audiovisual display is copyrightable. The plaintiff,
Broderbund Software, marketed a program called Print Shop for the
Apple computer. The defendant, Unison World, contacted Broderbund
to negotiate the rights that would allow Unison to adapt Print Shop to
run on the IBM/PC. Broderbund tentatively agreed to allow Unison to
convert Print Shop. Under the tentative agreement, Unison was re-
quired to produce an exact copy of Print Shop. Unison painstakingly
duplicated the interface of Print Shop. After Unison had copied a sub-
stantial portion of Print Shop, the parties were unable to reach a final
agreement, and terminated negotiations. Unison continued to develop
its own enhanced version of Print Shop for the IBM/PC called
Printmaster. Unison did not, however, rewrite the portions of
Printmaster that had already been copied from Print Shop. Broderbund
sued Unison for copyright infringement of the audiovisual portion of the
program.
The Broderbund court also analyzed the idea/expression dichotomy
67. Synercom, 452 F. Supp. at 1013.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1014 (emphasis in original).
70. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
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underlying the program. 7 1 The court found that the idea was the crea-
tion of greeting cards, banners, posters and signs, and everything else
was expression. 7 2 Unison argued that the idea and expression merged
such that any menu-driven computer program used to print greeting
cards, signs, banners, and posters would have a user interface substan-
tially similar to that of Print Shop. At trial, however, the plaintiff intro-
duced evidence of another printing program, Stickybear Printer, that
had a substantially different interface from Print Shop. Based upon the
Stickybear Printer program, the court concluded that the idea and ex-
pression had not merged.73  Unison also raised a variation on the
merger doctrine, the rules and instruction test.7 4 The rules and instruc-
tion test applies when there are a limited number of ways to express the
idea, and granting copyright protection to the expression would be tan-
tamount to protecting the idea or process itself. Again, the court relied
upon the Stickybear Print program to reject this argument. Based upon
the evidence, there was more than one way to express the idea.
Unison next argued, relying on Synercom, that the interface of a com-
puter program is not copyrightable. 75 The court, however, rejected
Synercom and found Whelan, which extended copyright protection to the
structure, sequence, and organization of the program's code, to be the
controlling authority. The court reasoned that in non-computer copy-
right cases, courts protect the non-literal aspects of a work, and that
computer programs should be afforded the same protection.76 The
court noted that Congress "intended sequencing and ordering to be
protectable in the appropriate circumstances.., and the computer field
is not an exception to this general rule." 77 Unison also raised the de-
fense that the audiovisual displays of the Print Shop program were not
eligible for copyright protection because they do not fall within the defi-
nition of "pictorial" or "graphic" works. 78 In response to this defense
the court ruled:
In the present case, it is clear that the structure, sequence,
and layout of the audiovisual displays in "Print Shop" were dic-
tated primarily by artistic and aesthetic considerations, and not
by utilitarian or mechanical ones .... The bottom line is that
the designer of any program that performed the same functions
as "Print Shop" had available a wide range of expression gov-
erned predominantly by artistic and not utilitarian
considerations.
79
Digital Communications Assocs. v. Softklone Distribution Corp. 8 0 is the final
71. Id. at 1131.
72. Id. at 1132.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1134.
75. Id. at 1132.
76. Id. at 1132-33.
77. Id. at 1133.
78. Id. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
79. 648 F. Supp. at 1134.
80. 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
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third generation case. Plaintiff, Digital, developed Crosstalk XVI, a tele-
communications program for personal computers. Crosstalk had a
unique "status screen" or "main menu" that made its telecommunica-
tions software easier to use than other programs. The defendant, Soft-
kione, decided to clone Crosstalk XVI and aptly called it Mirror. Digital
asserted that Softklone's copying of the Crosstalk XVI status screen in-
fringed Digital's copyright of both the status screen and the program.
The Digital court concluded that copyright protection of a computer
program does not extend to screen displays generated by the program
and that "copying of a program's screen displays, without evidence of
copying of the program's source code, object code, sequence, organiza-
tion or structure, does not state a claim of infringement. ''si Since Digi-
tal claimed a separate copyright for the Crosstalk XVI main menu, the
court next considered whether that copyright had been infringed. Soft-
klone contended that the status screen was "not copyrightable because
it is a necessary expression of the idea underlying the status screen and/
or because it is simply a 'blank form.' ",82 The court concluded that the
"idea" behind the Crosstalk XVI status screen was the process or man-
ner by which the status screen operated, and the "expression" was the
method by which the idea was communicated to the user.88
The court noted that certain aspects of the status screen were ideas
that could not be copyrighted. The "idea" underlying the status screen
was a two symbol command-driven menu with the changes reflected on
a screen listing the computer program's commands. All of these ele-
ments related to how the program received commands from the user
and how the program reflected the results on the screen, and were thus
ideas. Certain aspects of the status screen were, however, unrelated to
how the program operated and were "expression." The arrangement of
the commands, the sequence for entering the command, and highlight-
ing and capitalizing two letters of the command terms had no relation to
how the program operated, and thus were protected expression.8 4
Softklone, also relying upon Synercom, contended that the Crosstalk
81. Id. at 456. The court based this finding upon its conclusion that:
screen displays generated by computer programs are not direct "copies" or "re-
productions" of the literary or substantive content of the computer programs.
This distinction results from the fact that the same screen can be created by a
variety of separate and independent computer programs. It is somewhat illogical
to conclude that a screen can be a "copy" of many different programs.
Id. at 455-456.
The court also based its finding upon the conclusions reached in Whelan, Inc. v.Jas-
low Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987):
While finding that copying of a program's screen displays may serve as indi-
rect evidence of copying of a program, the Whelan court did not specifically ex-
tend a computer program's copyright protection to its screen displays. The
Whelan court cited approvingly those cases which have found a computer pro-
gram's screen displays, at least in the context of "video games," to be separately
copyrightable as "audiovisual works."
Digital Communications Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distribution Corp., 659 F. Supp 449
(N.D. Ga. 1987) (citations omitted).
82. Digztal, 659 F. Supp. at 457.
83. Id. at 458.
84. Id. at 459.
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XVI status screen is a necessary expression of the idea it expresses and
therefore is expression merged with idea.8 5 Digital concluded that the
difference between Synercom and the instant case was that in Synercom the
sequence of the data input into the computer was relevant to the func-
tioning of the Synercom computer program. The defendant in Synercom
duplicated the sequence within its "source code" but did not create for-
mat cards with the same headings and shaded areas. On the other hand,
Softklone's arrangement of the status screen had no relationship to the
functioning of the computer program.8 6 The arrangement of the status
screen in Crosstalk XVI involved "stylistic creativity and authorship
above and beyond the ideas embodied in the status screen." T8 7 The
commands and techniques used in Mirror could have been arranged and
delineated in an infinite number of ways that would have been different
from Crosstalk. The modes of expression chosen by the plaintiff for its
status screen are not necessary to the "idea." The plaintiff's expression
of the status screen, therefore, did not merge with the idea of the status
screen.
88
Softklone's last argument was that the status screen was analogous
to a "blank form" and that blank forms which do not convey information
or contain original pictorial expression are not copyrightable. 89 The
court concluded, however, that in the instant case "the status screen,
even if found to be a 'form,' clearly expresses and conveys information
and, therefore, is copyrightable." 90
The three cases discussed in this section, Synercom, Broderbund, and
Digital, illustrate that the courts are not in agreement on the scope of the
protection for the structure, sequence, and organization of the non-lit-
eral aspect of a computer program. Synercom impliedly determined that
the structure, sequence, and organization of data input formats are not
subject to protection. Both Digital and Broderbund declined to follow
Synercom's lead, and instead found that the program's interface-its
method of communicating and accepting data to and from a user-is
protected expression, but for different reasons. The uncertainty created
by the ad hoc nature of the software cases has hampered the develop-
ment and progression of the computer software field. Software develop-
ers have no adequate guidelines regarding what level of independent
development is required to avoid copyright infringement. 9 1 In Lotus De-
velopment Corp. v. Paperback Software International, discussed in the next
section, Judge Keeton attempted to distill all the previous cases con-
cerning copyright protection of non-literal elements, particularly related
to computer software, and define the scope of the Copyright Act as it
applies to the non-literal aspects of a computer program.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 460.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 461.
90. Id. at 462.
91. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A] (1990).
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IV. LOTUS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V PAPERBACK SOFTWARE
INTERNATIONAL
9 2
In Lotus, the court was asked to determine two critical issues: "(1)
whether and to what extent plaintiff's computer spreadsheet program,
Lotus 1-2-3, is copyrightable, [and] (2) whether defendants' VP-Planner
[a competing spreadsheet program] was, on undisputable facts, an in-
fringing work containing elements substantially similar to copyrightable
elements of 1-2-3." 93 It was generally not disputed in Lotus "that literal
manifestations of a computer program-including both source code and
object code-if original, are copyrightable."'94 The central issue in Lotus
was whether, and to what degree, non-literal elements of a computer
program, in particular the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface, are copyrightable.
Central to the court's decision was whether non-literal elements (includ-
ing the overall organization of a program, the structure of a program's
command system, and the presentation of information on the screen)
were copyrightable, and if so, how the non-literal elements that are
copyrightable could be identified.
95
The Lotus court developed its own three-step test to determine
copyrightability of the non-literal elements of computer software. Ini-
tially, the underlying idea of the work must be identified. Next, individ-
ual elements of expression which comprise the work must be evaluated
to determine whether each expression is limited to the functional re-
quirements of the work or is in the public domain, or whether, con-
versely, it constitutes an original expression. Finally, to determine
copyrightability of the work, it must be determined whether any of the
elements not determined to be limited to the functional requirements of
the work or in the public domain constitute a substantial part of the
work.
9 6
The first step in the Lotus test is essentially a restatement of the ab-
stractions test first expressed by Judge Learned Hand in Nichols v. Uni-
versal Pictures Corp.9 7 The Lotus court noted that, at the most general
92. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
93. Id. at 42.
94. Id. at 45.
95. Id. at 46.
96. FIRST, in making the determination of 'copyrightability,' the decisionmaker
must focus upon alternatives that counsel may suggest, or the court may con-
ceive, along the scale from the most generalized conception to the most particu-
larized, and choose some formulation-some conception or definition of the
'idea'-for the purpose of distinguishing between the idea and its expression.
SECOND, the decisionmaker must focus upon whether an alleged expression
of the idea is limited to elements essential to expression of that idea (or is one of
only a few ways of expressing the idea) or instead includes identifiable elements
of expression not essential to every expression of that idea.
THIRD, having identified elements of expression not essential to every ex-
pression of the idea, the decisionmaker must focus on whether those elements are
a substantial part of the allegedly copyrightable 'work.'
Id. at 60-61.
97. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
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level, the idea of an electronic spreadsheet is not copyrightable. 98 Thus,
considered at the most general level, the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface, like
a blank form, is also not copyrightable. "[I]f a particular expression of
the idea of an electronic spreadsheet communicates no details beyond
those essential to stating the idea itself, then that expression would not
be copyrightable." 99 A simple diagram illustrates this analysis:
Idea (Electronic Spreadsheet:I Lotus 1-2-3; Excel;
VP-Planner)
User
Ineacej
I (E.g., Lotus 1-2-3
Menu Command Structure)
Expression
The key to determining whether the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface is
copyrightable is found in the Lotus court's use of the idea/expression
dichotomy as the second step in its test. "The issue here is whether
Lotus 1-2-3 does go beyond those details essential to any expression of
the idea, and includes substantial elements of expression, distinctive and
original, which are thus copyrightable." 10 0
Over the years, the question as to whether an expression is distinc-
tive and original has been determined on a sliding scale. Expressions
that were once considered original have entered into the public domain
and are now considered essential to the operation of computer pro-
grams. Likewise, expressions that today are considered original and
non-functional may someday be considered an essential element of a
standard interface. For example, the following graph illustrates the pro-
gression of the "Esc" key (the standard key to "undo" or back out of an
98. At the most general level of Hand's abstractions scale, Nichols, 45 F.2d at
121-the computer programs at issue in this case, and other computer programs
that have been considered during the course of trial, are expressions of the idea
of a computer program for an electronic spreadsheet. Defendants are quite cor-
rect, then, in asserting that the idea of developing an electronic spreadsheet is not
copyrightable-that the core idea of such a spreadsheet is both functional and
obvious, even to computer users who claim no technical competence.
Lotus, 740 F. Supp at 65.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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operation) and the "F I" key (the standard key to invoke on-screen help)
from original expression to public domain:
Protectable
Expression
Functional H
Expressions in
Public Domain
1960s Mid-1970s 1990s
The Lotus 1-2-3 user interface was described by the plaintiffs as in-
cluding "such elements as 'the menus (and their structure and organiza-
tion), the long prompts, the screens on which they appear, the function
key assignments, [and] the macro commands and language' . . . .,o
The court determined that, with the exception of the menu command
structure, all of the identified elements of expression within the Lotus 1-
2-3 user interface merged with the idea of an electronic spreadsheet
(i.e., each is an essential element present in most if not all expressions of
an electronic spreadsheet).1 0 2 The Lotus court specifically found that
"[ain example of distinctive details of expression is the precise 'struc-
ture, sequence, and organization' of the menu command system.' 0 3
Since the Lotus court did identify an expression within the Lotus 1-
2-3 user interface that was original and did not merge with the underly-
101. Id. at 63 (quoting Plaintiff's Post-Trial Brief at 53).
102. The macro command structure was deemed to be dependent upon the menu com-
mand structure. Id. at 66-67.
103. Id. at 67 (citation omitted).
This particular expression of a menu structure is not essential to the elec-
tronic spreadsheet idea, nor does it merge with the somewhat less abstract idea of
a menu structure for an electronic spreadsheet. The idea of a menu structure-
including the overall structure, the order of commands in each menu line, the
choice of letters, words, or "symbolic tokens" to represent each command, the
presentation of these symbolic tokens on the screen (i.e., first letter only, abbrevi-
ations, full words, full words with one or more letters capitalized or underlined),
the type of menu system used (i.e., one-, two-, or three-line moving-cursor
menus, pull-down 'menus, or command-driven interfaces), and the long
prompts-could be expressed in a great many if not literally unlimited number of
ways.
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ing idea of an electronic spreadsheet, the final step in establishing the
copyrightability of the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface was accomplished by
the court's determination that this particular expression is a substantial
part of the user interface. 10 4 In general, therefore, the more copying of
substantial elements which are expressions subject to protection, the
greater the likelihood of a finding of copyright violation. This analysis
can be expressed as follows:
Insubstantial
Element No
Violation Violation [ioaton
Probable Possible No
Violation Violation Violation
Definite Probable No
Violation Violation Violation
Substantial
Element
Extensive Partial No
Copying Copying Copying
The test developed by the Lotus court is an attempt to differentiate
between copyrightability and copying. Under the Lotus test, copyright-
ability is first determined before copying is considered.' 0 5 The abstrac-
tions test and the idea/expression dichotomy, from which the first two
steps of the Lotus test are derived, have traditionally been applied to de-
termine whether the copying that exists is permissible.
The traditional abstractions test questions whether the defendant
has copied so much of the non-literal elements of the plaintiff's work so
as to go beyond using the basic underlying idea. The Lotus test requires
the court to first determine whether the plaintiff's work, taken alone, is
no more than an idea or an expression of that idea. The traditional
idea/expression dichotomy is concerned with whether the defendant
copied portions of the non-literal elements of the plaintiff's work be-
cause those particular elements of expression were the only practical ex-
pressions available. The Lotus test determines whether the plaintiff's
selection of expression was dictated by functional requirements or in-
dependent, distinctive expression.
Finally, both the traditional approaches were used to determine
104. Id. at 68.
105. Id. at 42.
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substantial similarity (i.e., did the defendant impermissibly copy a sub-
stantial portion of the plaintiff's work). As Judge Hand stated when first
discussing levels of abstraction, the "question is whether the part so
taken is 'substantial,' and therefore not a 'fair use' of the copyrighted
work."1
0 6
Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc. 10 7 offers another
example of the traditional manner in which courts consider infringe-
ment of non-literal elements. In discussing the application of the idea/
expression dichotomy, the Concrete court stated that it:
first must determine whether there has been "copying." This
step involves "dissection" of the work, perhaps aided by expert
testimony, to assess whether there are sufficient articulable sim-
ilarities to justify a finding that the defendant has copied from
the protected work.... Second, once "copying" is established,
the court must determine whether the copying is sufficiently
substantial to constitute "unlawful appropriation" ("illicit
copying"). That is, copying only trivial aspects of another's work will
not result in substantial similarity; it is only when the copying is
sufficiently extensive that infringement occurs.108
Under the Lotus test, however, substantiality is initially an element
of copyrightability; the third step of the Lotus test is whether any ele-
ments which pass the first two steps constitute a substantial part of the
work. Although the Lotus court essentially applied existing tests of in-
fringement of non-literal elements, it is questionable whether the appli-
cation of its own test in this particular case is accurate. The critical
factor is whether the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command structure is an original
and non-obvious manner of expression. While a menu command struc-
ture for an electronic spreadsheet can be expressed in a variety of ways,
the court specifically noted that "some of [the] specific command terms
[in the Lotus 1-2-3 menu system] are quite obvious or merge with the
idea of such a particular command term."' 09
The court further noted that "[m]ost of the submenus ... present a
list of up to about ten full-word menu choices, presented in order of pre-
dicted frequency of use rather than alphabetically." 10 The court nevertheless
concluded that the Lotus 1-2-3 "menu structure, taken as a whole-in-
cluding the choice of command terms, the structure and order of those
terms, their presentation on the screen, and the long prompts-is an
aspect of 1-2-3 that.., meets the requirements of the second element of
the [Lotus court's] legal test for copyrightability.""11 It is interesting
that the Lotus court first broke down the whole Lotus 1-2-3 user interface
into separate components and then considered the individual compo-
nents as a whole.
106. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
107. 843 F.2d 600 (1st Cir. 1988).
108. Id. at 608 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
109. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 67.
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 68.
[Vol. 68:2
PROPOSED LEGAL ADVISOR ROADMAP
In deciding whether the menu command structure is a substantial
part of the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface-the only element of the Lotus 1-
2-3 user interface determined to be subject to protection-the Lotus
court merely stated:
The user interface of 1-2-3 is its most unique element, and is
the aspect that has made 1-2-3 so popular. That defendants
went to such trouble to copy that element is a testament of its
substantiality. Accordingly, evaluation of the third element of
the legal test weighs heavily in favor of Lotus. 12
Despite the fact that the Lotus court viewed the Lotus 1-2-3 menu com-
mand structure, taken as a whole, to be subject matter ripe for protec-
tion, the court rejected using a "look and feel" analysis which rests upon
considering a work as a whole. The Lotus court specifically rejected the
"look and feel" analysis because it is conclusory, indicating that courts
have "used the concept, not in determining copyrightability, but, appar-
ently assuming copyrightability, in applying the substantial similarity
test to determine whether forbidden copying had occurred."'
15
The Lotus determination that the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command struc-
ture is a substantial part of that user interface appears, itself, to be con-
clusory. The only support provided for the premise that the menu
command structure made Lotus 1-2-3 "so popular" is the fact that the
defendants attempted to copy it. Even this conclusion loses some of its
support by the court's own later statements.' 
14
Once the Lotus court determined that the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface
is copyrightable subject matter, it then turned to actual copying by the
defendants. Based upon a reading of the court's decision, establishment
of infringement can be interpreted two ways: (1) defendants' user inter-
face, taken as a whole, is substantially similar to plaintiff's user interface,
taken as a whole; or (2) defendants' menu command structure, taken as
a whole, is substantially similar to plaintiff's menu command structure,
taken as a whole.
In support of the first interpretation, the Lotus court specifically
found that, based upon its three-step test, "copyrightability of the user
interface of 1-2-3 is established." '1 15 When determining whether there
had been copying by the defendants, the court first noted general dis-
similarities between the two works, such as the organization of help
screens, the greater width of the VP-Planner screen, and the ability of
112. Id.
113. Id. at 63.
114. Regarding the defendants' decision that the Lotus 1-2-3 command structure had
to be copied in order to ensure the popularity of VP-Planner, the court stated that "[t]o
some degree at least, defendants' premises have proved incorrect in hindsight." Id. at 69.
If the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command structure's substantiality is based upon it being the
most unique element of the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface and that which made 1-2-3 so popu-
lar, as evidenced by the defendants' desire to copy it, if that desire is misplaced, is that not evi-
dence that the menu command structure is not quite so substantial after all. As the court
also stated, Excel (a competing electronic spreadsheet) achieved commercial success with-
out copying the Lotus 1-2-3 command structure. Id.
115. Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
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VP-Planner to hide certain columns."l 6 The court then determined that
the "works are, nevertheless, substantially, indeed, strikingly, simi-
lar." 117 In support of the second interpretation, the Lotus court dwelled
on the similarities between the two works' menu command structure:
"The court's comparison of the 1-2-3 menu command hierarchy and the
VP-Planner menu hierarchy confirms that VP-Planner 'has the same
command tree' as 1-2-3-that is, that defendants copied the expression
embodied in the 1-2-3 menu hierarchy.""18 The court also noted that
"defendants . . . have admitted that they copied these elements of pro-
tected expression." ' 19
It is unclear which "elements of protected expression" the defend-
ants copied: the elements of expression, including the source and ob-
ject codes (contained within the whole of Lotus 1-2-3 which constitute
the user interface) or the elements of expression within the Lotus 1-2-3
user interface, namely the menu command structure (which the court
determined to be subject to protection). The court concluded its discus-
sion of the defendants' copying by phrasing the issue as
Does [defendants' product] have significant features that are
substantially similar [to Lotus 1-2-3]? ... The answer to this
question must be "yes."
Accordingly, I conclude that it is indisputable that defend-
ants have copied substantial copyrightable elements of plaintiff's
copyrighted work.
120
This again begs the question: Which copyrightable elements of Lotus 1-
2-3 were defendants guilty of copying-the user interface, taken as a
whole, or the menu command structure? If the latter, and had defend-
ants not copied the menu command structure, but copied the remaining
substantial, non-protected, elements of the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface,
would they have been guilty of infringement?
Another statement by the court implies that it was focusing on the
defendants' copying of the menu command structure:
Moreover, even if some elements of VP-Planner were very
different, it would not give defendants a license to copy other
substantial elements of 1-2-3 verbatim. If one publishes a
1,000-page book of which only a 10-page segment is an unau-
thorized reproduction of copyrighted material, and if the 10-
page segment is a qualitatively substantial part of the copy-
righted work, it is not a defense to a claim of infringement that
the book is 99% different from the copyrighted material. Thus,
116. Id. at 70.
117. Id. In support of its conclusion of substantial similarity despite some differences,
the court notes: "[A] laundry list of specific differences ... will not preclude a finding of
infringement where the works are substantially similar in other respects .... When ana-
lyzing two works to determine whether they are substantially similar, courts should be
careful not to lose sight of the forest for the trees." Id. (quoting Atari v. North Amer.
Phillips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 618 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880
(1982)).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 68.
120. Id. at 70 (emphasis added).
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defendants' proof that VP-Planner has many features that are
different from Lotus 1-2-3 is off point.
121
By the court's holding that the defendants' copying of a "qualita-
tively substantial part" (the menu command structure of Lotus 1-2-3)
was enough to constitute infringement, it could be implied from Lotus
that if the menu command structure had not been copied, but every
other non-literal element within Lotus 1-2-3 had been, then no infringe-
ment would have been found. 122 Such a conclusion is reasonable if it
were determined that the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command structure was
such a unique and distinctive part of Lotus 1-2-3 that, on its own, it
represented to the lay observer the Lotus 1-2-3 product. Very little evi-
dence was presented in the Lotus opinion to support the "substantiality"
of the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command structure.
As noted previously, the Lotus court specifically rejects applying the
"look and feel" analysis developed in Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card
Co. 123 In Lotus, the court created a more restrictive test by requiring that
not only must an element subject to protection be found within the non-
literal elements, but it also must be a substantial element. The Lotus
court may have been mindful of the strong dissent in Roth which stated:
I cannot... follow the logic of the majority in holding that
the uncopyrightable words and the imitated, but not copied art
work, constitutes such total composition as to be subject to
protection under the copyright laws. The majority concludes
that in the overall arrangement of the text, the art work and the
association of the art work to the text, the cards were copyright-
able and the copyright infringed. This conclusion, as I view it,
results in the whole becoming substantially greater than the
sum total of its parts. 124
121. Id. (citations omitted).
122. There is case law which supports a finding that copying even relatively minuscule
parts of a copyrighted work can constitute infringement. In Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Kamar Indus., Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1162 (S.D. Tex. 1982), the court held that exact
copying of two lines from a movie could constitute infringement. In this case the defend-
ant began to promote and market certain merchandise, such as drinking mugs and pencil
holders, bearing prominent inscriptions in the form of"I E.T." and "E.T. Phone Homel!"
In finding infringement of the plaintiff's copyrighted movie, the court stated:
The character "E.T." is a central component of [the movie] "E.T. The Extra-
Terrestrial." "E.T." is a unique and distinctive character about whom the movie
revolves. Plaintiffs contend, and the Court believes, that "E.T." is more than a
mere vehicle for telling the story and that "E.T." actually constitutes the story
being told. The name "E.T." itself is highly distinctive and is inseparable from
the identity of the character. The use of the name "E.T." on Kamar's products
inevitably conjures up the image and appeal of the "E.T." character. The Court
finds that the average lay observer would recognize readily the "E.T." name as
used on Kamar's products as having been taken from the central character of
Universal's copyrighted motion picture. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact
that the name "E.T." appears on Kamar's products in conjunction with actual
lines of dialogue from the movie, and that it is displayed on at least one of
Kamar's products in a distinctive style and format similar to that used in connec-
tion with Universal's movie.
Universal, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1165.
123. 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970). Roth found plaintiff's greeting cards eligible for
copyright, even though they were comprised of non-copyrightable elements. Id. at 1109.
124. Id. at 1111.
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There is, however, a strong line of authority which provides copy-
right protection, under the theory of compilation, to the non-literal ele-
ments of a work, even though that work is comprised of non-protectable
components. 125 Indeed, the Lotus court noted that the statutory provi-
sions regarding compilation, while not essential to its analysis under its
legal test, did reinforce it. 126 A very important element of granting
copyright protection to a work which is composed of non-copyrightable
elements is the degree of protection granted to that work.' 27 Where
the computer program in question is utilitarian in nature (such as an
electronic spreadsheet) as opposed to fictional (such as a computer
game), it is logical to conclude that its user interface is more of a "fac-
tual" work. This approach, indirectly supported by Lotus, would require
essentially a verbatim appropriation of the plaintiff's work before in-
fringement could be found. Since the Lotus court found a number of
dissimilarities between the two computer programs, verbatim copying
could not be established. This may be the reason for the Lotus court
using a test which avoided the ability to establish copyrightability with-
out at least a substantial protectable element.
Despite the difficulties contained within the Lotus decision, it still
reaches the correct result for the particular facts at hand, if only for pub-
lic policy reasons. In Lotus, the defendants raised a public policy argu-
ment that the need to achieve standardization and compatibility within
the computer software industry should preclude a finding of copyright-
ability of the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface.' 28 While certain aspects of a
computer program's user interface may or may not constitute substan-
tial elements of the work taken as a whole, user interface design is im-
portant. Enhancing the user's productivity through better user interface
design incorporates the sciences of anatomy, physiology, and psychol-
125. See Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197, 204-05 (9th Cir.
1989) for a summary of cases which hold that a copyrightable compilation can consist
mainly or entirely of uncopyrightable elements.
126. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 67 (noting 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103).
127. One consequence of the policy in favor of free use of ideas is that the degree
of substantial similarity required to show infringement varies according to the
type of work and the ideas expressed in it. Some ideas can be expressed in myr-
iad ways, while others allow only a narrow range of expression. Fictional works
generally fall into the first category. The basic idea of a fictional work might be
that classic, boy meets girl. This idea can be expressed, as it has been through
thousands of years of literature, with infinite variations in setting, sequence of
incident, and characterization. An author wishing to write yet another work using
the "boy meets girl" idea can choose from a wide range of materials in compos-
ing his or her own expression of the idea. Therefore a new work incorporating
that idea need not be a verbatim copy or close paraphrase of an earlier work to
infringe that work. A resemblance in details of setting, incident, or characteriza-
tion that falls short of close paraphrase may be enough to establish substantial
similarity and infringement....
Factual works are different. Subsequent authors wishing to express the ideas
contained in a factual work often can choose from only a narrow range of expres-
sion .... Therefore, similarity of expression may have to amount to verbatim
reproduction or very close paraphrasing before a factual work will be deemed
infringed.
Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th Cir. 1984)
(citations omitted).
128. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 71.
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ogy. 129 Judge Keeton acknowledged this when he noted the menu-
choice commands in the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface were "presented in
order of predicted frequency of use rather than alphabetically."'13 0
Commentators within the computer industry have been promoting
standardization and compatibility since the first microcomputers were
introduced. Attempts to standardize have been driven by user demands
to allow different programs to share a common user interface, forming
the basis for open systems that share many common attributes, commu-
nication protocols, and data formats so that users can "easily intercon-
nect different computers and programs and avoid learning a multitude
of user interfaces." 3
1
Finally, the cost of learning a software package is substan-
tial. During the early use of a new software package, a user
spends considerable time hunting for advice and correcting
mistakes. The anticipation of interface angst has inhibited
many potential users from employing new software applica-
tions that would increase productivity. Even those who take the
time to learn to use a software package may choose to master
only a small number of its functions.'
3 2
The Lotus court referred to the defendants' standardization argu-
ment as the "OTSOG (on the shoulders of giants) Principle": innova-
tion in computer programming is advanced as each programmer builds
upon the ideas of previous programmers.133 The fallacy of defendants'
contention is that they specifically discarded any innovations in their
own product in order to become a "workalike of 1-2-3."'3 4 Defendants
were standing on the shoulders of Lotus not to see further, but to steal
market share. Their goal was not to create a new and better electronic
spreadsheet but to produce a cheaper Lotus 1-2-3. In this respect, the
defendants fit the classic role of "mudball."
129. Curtis, Engineering Computer "Look and Feel" User Interface Technology and Human Fac-
tors Engineering, 30 JURIMEMICS J. 51, 63 (Fall 1989).
130. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 68.
131. Curtis, supra at note 129.
132. Id.
133. Defendants' general contention-that "Progress of Science and useful Arts"
cannot occur unless authors and inventors are privileged to build upon earlier
progress and earlier innovation-has long been a virtually unchallenged premise
in all branches of the law of intellectual property. An early expression of the
point is Newton's declaration: "If I have seen further it is by standing on ye
sholders of Giants." Sir Isaac Newton, Letter to Robert Hooke, February 5,
1675/1676, quoted in R. Merton, On the Shoulders of Giants: A Shandean Postscript 31
(1965).
Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 77. See also Id. n.3.
134. It is incontrovertible that, in the process [of making VP-Planner compatible
with Lotus 1-2-3, defendants] ... copied the expressive elements of 1-2-3 that the
court has concluded are copyrightable:
[M]aking the changes required for macro compatibility meant that we had to
revise existing elements of the [VP-Planner] spreadsheet interface, including the
hierarchical menu structure; ensure that keystroke sequences would bring about
the same operational result in both programs; add certain functional elements
found in Lotus 1-2-3 which VP-Planner did not yet support; and discard certain
features which, although beneficial, were inconsistent with the macro compatibility requirement.
Id. at 69 (emphasis added).
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While the intent of the infringing party is not a factor in determin-
ing liability,13 5 it may be indirectly relevant if it impacts the underlying
policy reasons for copyright protection. No one should be rewarded for
rejecting new and beneficial creations in order to exploit another's ex-
penditure of time, money, and effort to create an original expression.
Any other finding would be in direct contradiction to the policies under-
lying copyright protection.
While the holding in Lotus may reach the correct results for the facts
of that particular case, there is concern that the legal test developed in
Lotus, when applied to a different set of facts, will lead to an incorrect
result. Of particular concern is the pending legal actions between Lotus
Development Corporation and Borland International, Inc. Borland pro-
duces a competing electronic spreadsheet (Quattro Pro) which many
critics consider to be superior to Lotus 1-2-3.136 There is no question,
overall, that Quattro Pro's user interface is substantially different from
the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface, except in one respect. The Borland
product can be executed in a "Lotus 1-2-3 emulation mode," that is, by
specifying a particular command the Borland spreadsheet incorporates
the Lotus 1-2-3 menu structure into its own. "Because [Lotus] 1-2-3 is
the de facto standard for spreadsheets, any company hoping to achieve
significant success must be compatible with it.
1 3 7
Since the Lotus court determined that the Lotus 1-2-3 menu com-
mand structure is a substantial, protectable part of the Lotus 1-2-3 user
interface, there is concern that Quattro Pro, just like VP-Planner, may be
found to infringe Lotus 1-2-3. Quattro Pro, however, unlike VP-Plan-
ner, was never written to be a "workalike of 1-2-3." This issue is com-
pounded by the fact that the Lotus-compatible menus in Quattro Pro do
not even look like the Lotus originals and may even be considered
superior. 138
Lotus only partially addressed this issue. Just as Broderbund
Software used a third party's computer program to establish that an un-
derlying idea can be expressed in different ways, Lotus used Microsoft's
Excel product to demonstrate a unique user interface for an electronic
spreadsheet. The Lotus court noted that Excel contained a macro con-
version program to convert Lotus 1-2-3 macros to Excel-executable
macros, establishing that complete menu compatibility was not required
for Lotus 1-2-3 macros to function within a competing product.13 9 The
court also indicated that VP-Planner would not have infringed if it had
provided an on-line help function that would show users the VP-Planner
135. See generally 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.08 (1990).
136. New York Times, July 22, 1990, at F4, col. 1. See generally Seymour, Victory Spurs
Lotus to Take-No-Prisoners Campaign, PC WEEK, July 16, 1990, at 12.
137. New York Times, supra note 136 at F4, col. 1.
138. "Instead of wandering through a wilderness of one-line menu options with no
sign of where you've been, Quattro delivers drop-down windows and daughter windows,
and, when necessary, more daughter windows.
You can easily trace the command sequence you've typed-something that eludes
(and frustrates) many Lotus users." Seymour, supra note 136 at 12.
139. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 69.
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equivalent for 1-2-3 commands, as Excel also does.1 40
What the Lotus court did not address is how far one can help a user
transfer 1-2-3 commands to a competing spreadsheet. Excel does so by
having the user type in the sequence of keystrokes that would execute
the command were Lotus 1-2-3 being used. Excel then interprets the 1-
2-3 commands and presents a screen to the user with instructions on
how to execute the same command in Excel. The Lotus decision gave no
indication of where a software developer may cross the line of infringe-
ment in assisting users to adjust from Lotus 1-2-3 to a new product.
Lotus tells us Microsoft's approach is permitted; Borland's approach may
not be. What we do not know is whether an approach in the middle,
such as having the user type in the Lotus 1-2-3 command keystrokes and
then having the program automatically execute them (without showing
the user a Lotus 1-2-3 menu), is permissible. This dilemma can be
graphically displayed as follows:
Safe
Excel's 1-2-3
On-Line HelpI
User Enters 1-2-3 Keystrokes;
Program Automatically Executes
I
Borland's 1-2-3
Emulation Mode?
Infringing 14 1
140. Id.
141. Microsoft's recently released Excel Version 3.0 actually goes one step further by
providing users with the ability to turn on a "Help for Lotus 1-2-3 Users" option which
gives users the ability to "watch Microsoft Excel demonstrate ... equivalent procedure[s]
for the Lotus 1-2-3 command (specified]." MICROSoFr GUIDE: USING HELP FOR Lorus 1-
2-3 USERS at 4. When this option is activated (by pressing the "/" (slash) key), Excel lists
the Lotus 1-2-3 main menu commands in order of their appearance in Lotus 1-2-3 (though
in a column rather than a single row), with submenu commands listed for the particular
main menu command highlighted.
The submenu commands are listed in a single row toward the bottom of the screen
and change as different main menu commands are highlighted. Excel Version 3.0 users
can then select Lotus 1-2-3 commands by pressing the first letter of each command (as in
Lotus 1-2-3). Once the commands have been selected, Excel activates its own commands
to execute the selected procedure (demonstrating to the user how the particular
procedure is executed under Excel), and then executes the selected procedure. In this
way, users of Excel Version 3.0 are able to have the entire Lotus 1-2-3 menu structure
displayed (though in a slightly different visual representation), can select Lotus 1-2-3
1991]
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While the Lotus decision promotes public policy by preventing a
software developer from marketing a product which was designed solely
to siphon off market share and not to compete because it offered better
tools and options, this decision has the potential of having the com-
pletely opposite effect when applied to different circumstances.
V. ANALYSIS OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE COPYRIGHT CASES
The table of cases provided in this section is based on an extensive
selection of cases in which the scope of software copyright protection
was a major issue. The authors also analyzed several cases in which the
issue of software copyrights was a side issue. These less important cases
are noted in a footnote to the table of cases. The analysis of this exten-
sive number of cases has resulted in several observations concerning
how an attorney can best advise a software developer to avoid copyright
infringement when creating new software products.
Each column was chosen for specific reasons. Naturally, the date,
consisting of month and year, was a logical starting point as well as the
case name and level of court. The "winners circle" was used to identify
the true winner, which at times could be either plaintiff or defendant,
given the procedural posturing of the case. The "stage of the proceed-
ing" is the next column, and aids in the analysis due to the different
burdens of proof. The "type of software" is presented next to show
whether the disputes occur over operating system or application
software. The critical issues are always questions of fact, and thus the
trier of fact has enormous discretion in these cases.
A column indicating the economic relationship between the parties,
and whether the relationship was breached, is provided to aid in analyz-
ing any equity concerns. Following this column, "access" is of course
needed for all copyright infringement cases, followed by "reasons for
copying." Reasons for copying aids in understanding the alleged in-
fringer's rationale for any copying. The amount of work the alleged in-
fringer did and the degree of copying are included due to the subtle
influence equitable considerations undoubtedly have on the trier of fact.
The "legal conclusions" column assists in showing the development of
various legal theories. The "precedent column" is last, and helps show
how the cases have become interrelated over time.
menu options in an identical manner as though in Lotus 1-2-3, and can then have those
commands executed in Excel.
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DATE CE NAIIE LEVEL OF STAGE OF WINXnt'S Tsi'e OF EcoNoMIC RELATIONSHIP/ ACCESS To
COURT PRocEDmG CmcLE SorsWAR BREAcH oF DuTY SOFTWARE
Copic
8/78 Synercom v. Univ. Computing Dist. Trial No Application D Developed S1W pgm that n/a
462 F. Supp. 1003 N.D.T infringement Input Formats utilized P's data input card
by D formats- Prior Economic
Relationship/No Breach
5/80 Data Cash %. JS&A Group App. Summary No Application No Economic Relationship/ Same628 F,2d 103$ 7th Cir. Judgmsent infingement Chess Game No Breadh ROM Chip
by D acq. from
Same
manuf.
1/82 Stem Elec. v. Kaufman App. Preliminary P's valid C/R App Game No Economic Relationship/ Access to
669 F.2d 852 2nd Cit. Injunction was infringed No Breach ame User
Interface
5/82 Willams v. Artic App, Injunctive P's valid C/R App-game No Economic Relationship! Yes
685 F.2d 870 3d Cir. Order was infringed Op- No Breach
Audiovisual
9/82 GCA v. Chance Dist. Preliminary IP's valid C/R App/ Former Employees/Breach of Yes
217 USPQ718 N.D. Calif. Injunction was infringed Diagnostic Confidence
operating Sys
2/83 Hubco Data v. Mgmit Assis DistL TRO & D's valid Operating Sys No Economic Relationship/ Yes
219 USPQ450 D Idaho Prelim C/K was Utility Breach of Licensing
Injunction infringed Agreement
8/83 Apple v. Franklin App. Preliminary P's valid C/R Operating sys No Economic Relationship/ Yes
714 F.2d 1240 3rd Circuit Injunction was infringed No Breach
2/84 Apple %. Formula App. Preliminary P's valid C/R Operating Sys No Economic Relationship/ Yes
725 F.2d 521 9th Cir. Injunction was infringed No Breach
3/85 SAS v. S&H Dist. Trial P's valid C/P Application D was Licensee of P/ Yes
605 F. Supp. 816 M.D. Tenn was infringed Stat. Analysis Breached
9/85 Williams v. Arndt Dist. Trial P's vAid C/R Application P & D under Contract/ Yes
626 F. Supp, 571 D. Mass was infringed Market Breached
Trading
12/85 Q-CO Ind. v. Hoffman Dist. Preliminary No Application D was Employee of P/ Yes
625 F. Supp. 608 S.D.N.Y. Injunction infringement Teleprompter No Breach
by D
1/86 K amer Mfg. ,. Andrews App. Trial P's valid C/R Application D was distributor of P/ Yes
783 F.2d 421 4th Cr. was infringed Game Breach of distribution
arrangement
8/86 Whelan s.Jaslow App. Injunctive P's valid C/R Application D hired P to write pgm to Yes
797 F.2d 1222 3rd Cir. Order was infringed Dental lab manage dental labs. C/R
S/W eventually vests in P. D
breached relationship and
translated pgm to another
computer language
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REASON FOR COPMING AMovr oF DEGREE OF LEGAL CoNcLusIoNs PutcEDirwr
WoR INFRINGER CoMING
DiD
Competitor indeterminable Input formats If order and sequence of data is
expression. then it's copyrightable
Competitor None Total S/W C/R exists in ROM but C/R
owuer must have C/R notice on
chip. Pre-Berne Cotoention
Competitor Minimal Total copy of Repetitive sequence of images is William v. Attic;
game user C/R -Pa)ers interaction with game Atari s. Amusemsent World;
interface doesn't make pgm not fixed Midway v. Driksthneider
Competitor Minimal Total Fixation of S/W in ROM Chip Data Cash v.jS&A Group;
occured; C/R protection Permitted Sten s. Kaufman;
Tandy v Pen. Micro
Midway V Drikschneider,
Atari v. Phillips;
Midway v. Attic
Competitor Minimal Total P distribution was limited, thus no Tandy v. Pet Micro;
C/R notice required Data Cash v.JS&A Group;
"iofft v. McDonald's
Copied D's S/W to Upgrade Min to upgrade Total Was the copying of an idea or an Krofft v. McDonald's;
P's Computer expression? Must have subst. Williams v. Attic;
stimilarity of idea and expression Apple v. Franklin;
Tandy v. Pets Micro
To make D's operating system Minimal Total Pgms on ROM Chips are C/R. No Willams . Artic,
compatible with P's operating Distinction between source, object Midway v. Strohson.
System software and firm ware Data Cash v.JS&A Group;
GCA v. Chance,
Tandy v. Pets Micro;
_Apple v. Formula
To make D's operating system Minimal Total No distinction between source, Williams v. Antic
compatible with P's operating object and firm ware Krofft ,. McDonald's,
system software Apples. Franklin.
Atari v N.Aser, Phillips
D wanted to migrate P's S/W Some Copied S/W Pgm deieloped by D was denvatne Midway v. Attic
to a new platform from one work Apple %. Franklin;
platform to Willams s. Atic
another
D allowed translation of 's Minimal Translated Translation of written book to S/W Whelan v.Jaslow (Dist. CL Case)
book to S/W written book is infringement Russell v. Price
D created new S/W for new Substantial Minimal/ D only copied P's unprotected ideas Synercom v. Univ, Computing,
platform Ideas only SASs. Sidt
Make game substantially Minimal Total Audiovisual S/W is C/R; C/R of Midway v. Banda,;
similar to P's audiovisual S/W includes underl)ing Midwa, s. Attic.
pgm; D willful copying infringed P's Siam s. Kaufman:
C/R Atari s. Phillips;
Williams . Attic
Midway v. Dirkschneider;
Atari s. Amusement World;
Apple v. Franklin;
Midwa) v Strohon
To translate pgra to a Translated S/W Copied: C/R protection extends be)ond Midwa% v. Strohon;
different language for a to a new Structure. pgra's literal code to structure, Williams s. Attic
new market language Sequence, sequence &organization of pgm Arnstein v. Porter
and Stem V. Kaufman;
Organmzation SAS s. S&H;
Apple s. Franklin
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DATE CASE NAME LEL OF STAGE OF WINNER'S TYPE OF ECONOMIC R o.ArioNSnrr/ ACCES TO
CoURT PROCEEDINo CIRcLE SoFiwTAR BREACH or Durm SOFTWARE
COPIED
9/86 NEC % INTEL Dist Trial D's C/R Microcode D licensor of P/No Breach of Yes
645 F Supp. 590 N.D. Calif. valid, no duty
infringement
by P
10186 Broderbund v Unson DioL Trial P's valid C/R App. D had preliminary agreement Yes
648 F. Supp. 1127 N.D. Calif was infringed Printship S/W with P to translate P's pgtn;
Negotiations failed, D
breached duty to terminate
the translation process
1/87 Plains Cotton%. Goodpasture App. . 5th Preliinary P's C/R Application Ds were former employees of Yes
807 F.2d 1256 Cir. Prelim Injunction valid, no Cotton P/No Breach
Inj infringement Futures S/W
by D
3/87 Frybarger % IBM App Summary P's C/R Application Economic Relationship/ Yes
812 F 2d 525 9th dit. judgment valid. no Telecomm No Breach
infringement 5/W
by D
3/87 Digttal %. Softklone Dit Preliminary Separate Application No Economic Relafionship/ To user
659 F Supp. 449 N.D. Georgia Injunction &c Screen C/R Game No Breach interface
Permanent Valid/D
infringed
6/88 Vault Corp %. Quaid Software App. Preliminar No Application No Economic Relationship/ Yes
847 F-2d 255 5th Cir. Injunction Infringement Utility Pgrn No Breach
by D
7/88 Pearl Competition Elec. Dist. Declaratory D's C/R Application No Economic Relationship/ Yes
8 US-P.Q.2d 1520 S.D. FL judgment valid, P Timing No Breach
infringed Device
1/89 Manuf Tech. ,. CAMS Dist. Trial P's vaid C/R Application Economic Relationship/ Yes
706 F Supp. 984 D. Conn was infringed CAD/CAM Breached
9/89 Telemarketing%. Synsantec Dist. Summary No Application Economic Relationship/ Yes
12 U.S P.Q2d 1991 ND. Calif Judgment infringement Outline pgm No Breach
by D
9/89 S.OS ', Pa)da) App. Summary P's -alid CIR Application Economic Relationship/ Yes
886 F 2d 1081 9th Cir. [udgment was infringed AcctgPayroll Breached
10/89 ohnson Controls v. Phoenix App. Preliminary P's vahd CIR Application Economic Relationship/ Yes
886 F2d 1173 9th Cir. Injunction was infringed Process Breach
Control
6/90 Lotus %. Paperback Software Dist. Summary P's valid C/R Application No Economic Relationship/ Yes
740 F. Supp. 37 Mass. judgment was infringed Spreadsheet No Breach
* Cases reviewed but not found useful to analss:
Bngnoli' Balch. 645 F Supp 1201
D,,mmc' , Planning and Control. 646 F. Supp. 1127
Ashton-Tate %. Russ 728 F. Supp. 597
Apple V Microsoft. 717 F. Supp. 1428
Kehstall-Whire, % Mahar. 1990 WL 69013
ISC-Bunker % Altech. 1990 WL 103579
Allen Msland ' IBM. 1990 Corp. L Dec. P 26.631
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REAsoN FOR COPYING AmOUNT OF De.GEE OF LEGAL CONCUISIONS PLRcEDLE'r
WorX INOKINGERt COPYING
DiD
No Copying, P developed own Substantial Limited to Microcode is C/R. Apple v. Formula;
Microcode ideas Copying is excused when expression Apple v. Franklin
merges into idea
Migrate S/W for different Substantial some User interface was protectable Krofft . McDonald's;
computer uses expression; P's C/R violated by D's Synercom v. Un. Computing;
substantially similar interface Whelan v. Jaslow,
Arnstein v. Porter
Ds developed new competitise Substantial D copied D's structure, sequence and Apple v. Franklin;
ideas of P's organization determined by market; Apple Barrel ".. Beard;
pgm Idea/Expression merger Synercom %.. Ur. Computisg
Whelan v. jasow
No copying D developed None Ideas were substantially similar but Krofft v. McDonald's
Independent chosen aenues of expression were Atari v. Phillips;
work different Atar '.. Amusement World
Developed competing product Devel. done with Identical Substantially similar menu screen Whelan v. Jaslows
same menus infringed C/R on Menu Screen and Stein v. Kaufman;
functionality not C/R on pgm code Midway v. Strohon
SAS %. S&H; Apple v. Franklin;
Krofft v. McDonald's;
Fox v. MCA.
Williams . Attic
No Copying. D developed Substantial None/only P's contractual restriction on Atari v. JS & A Group;
pgmn to defeat P's anticopying disassemble disassembl) and decompilation of Midway v. Stroson:
pgm pgm was unenforceable Whelan v,. Jaslow Midwa) v Attic
Develop competing product Some User interface User Interface C/R Atari". Phillips;
copies Williams ' Artic'
Whetn '.Jaslow;
Krofft . McDonald's;
SAS '.5S&H
Plains Cotton v. Goodpasture;
S% ercom v. Univ. Computing;
Frbarger ,. IBM.
Apple Barrel '. Beard.
Digital %. Sofilone
Develop competing product Some User Interface Use interface valid C/R and was Broderbund .. Unison;
copies infringed Whelan %..Jaslow.
Dsgital % Softklone;
Arustem '.. Porter
Deelop competing product D de% eloped Substantial Only ideas or licensed expressions Whelan s. Jasow
both pgms min. copied Data East '. Epyx
work on 2nd
Deselop competing product Minimal Substantial D exceeded license thus its copumg Kroft '.. McDonald's;
infringed P's valid C/R Whelan %. jasow
Des elop competing product Minimal Total Nonliteral aspects of a computer Apple %. Formula.
program are protectable expression Fr.barsger'.. IBM;
rofft '. McDonald's
Develop competing product Minimal ,ork to Total Leel of abstractions test refined to Synercom .. Un. Computing;
deelop user a 3 part test Data Cash'. JS&A.
interface Stem '. Kaufman;
Apple % Franklin;
Whelan . Jaslow:
NEC'. INTEL
Broderbund . Unison;
Digital . Sofiklone.
Vault' Q aid
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As seen in Lotus, the scope of software copyright protection is
always a question of fact. Interestingly, all of the decisions have been
decided by judges, rather than juries. Given that judges are making
factual decisions concerning highly subjective factors (i.e.,Judge Hand's
level of abstractions analysis, the Broderbund "look and feel" test, and
now the Lotus three-part test), the relative equity and wholesomeness of
the parties will continue to play a critical, but only an implicit, part in the
decision process. In addition, sixteen of the twenty-five cases are at the
pretrial level where the burden of proof for preliminary injunctions and
temporary restraining orders is higher than at trial. In the cases at
pretrial, the alleged infringer lost in ten of those sixteen cases.
Although the cases overwhelmingly involved disputes over
application software, a few concerned operating system software. Of the
operating system software cases, Appe 14 2 and NEC v. Intel 143 are most
commonly cited. In Apple, the level of copyright protection clearly
included total copying of source code as well as code embedded in
firmware. NEC, the other major operating system software case, found
that in operating system software, technical constraints may only permit
a few or only one method of writing the program. In these specific
areas, the merger of idea and expression will be the dominant issue. In
operating system software copyright disputes, the alleged infringer will
most likely prevail if it has performed a substantial amount of
independent work, can show where idea and expression merge, and can
prove it with a clear paper trail.
Application software is the primary battle ground. The scope of
copyright protection shows a gradual increase of protection from literal
copying to protection of non-literal aspects including the structure,
sequence, and organization as in Whelan 144 and the user interface as in
Lotus. As the scope of software copyright is pushed to the edge of its
"envelope," the authors have noticed a subtle influence which the issues
of breach, amount of the alleged infringer's independent work, and
amount of actual copying done by the alleged infringer have on the trier
of fact in making the highly subjective factual decision on substantial
similarity.
In the fifteen cases in which there was an economic relationship, the
authors determined that nine alleged infringers had breached that
economic relationship. The classification of economic relationship is
somewhat subjective. The authors did not include alleged infringers
who had simply purchased a license to mass market software. Rather,
the classification of economic relationship is limited to those situations
where the copyright holder and the alleged infringer had some type of
ongoing economic relationship. Of these alleged infringers who also
had breached an economic relationship, all nine were found to have
infringed valid copyrights. This unanimous court determination of
142. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
143. 645 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
144. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
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infringement is not unexpected to the authors, given the highly
subjective and factually intense decision the trier of fact must make, as
well as the undoubtedly subtle influence the trier of fact must feel from
knowing there was a breach of economic relationship by the alleged
infringer.
In all copyright disputes, access and similarity are the two critical
elements to prove infringement. Naturally, in each case where
infringement was found, access had occurred. The access issue in
copying of source code, object code, firmware, and the internal
structure, sequence, and organization is critical, and usually has
occurred in conjunction with a breach of an economic relationship. In
the non-literal element disputes, including the user interface, access can
almost be assumed, in that any competent software programmer has
undoubtedly seen, and probably even used, the software which is being
cloned.
The next three columns each build on the thesis of the authors that
the relative equity or wholesomeness of the alleged infringer plays a
critical, but subtle, role in the decisional process of the trier of fact. The
three columns show the reasons for copying, the amount of work
performed by the alleged infringer (including the innovative items
added), and the degree of copying. For the alleged infringers in Lotus,
their goal was to make as identical a copy of the Lotus spreadsheet as
possible, and even eliminate several innovations. With the benefit of
hindsight, of course, the position of the authors is that an alleged
infringer which slavishly copies software will probably be found guilty of
infringement, given the inherent subjective process the trier of fact goes
through in arriving at the decision of substantial similarity. The amount
of work done by the alleged infringer supplements the decision
concerning the relative equity and wholesomeness of the alleged
infringer.
Of the seven cases where the authors could determine the amount
of work done by the alleged infringer was substantial, only one of the
alleged infringers, Unison, was found guilty of infringement. All of the
rest of the infringers were found not to have infringed. In Broderbund,
the economic relationship had been terminated, after which the
defendant continued to use identical lines of the plaintiff's code in its
program. For the degree of copying classification, the authors
determined that of the twelve alleged infringers who had substantially
copied, ten were found guilty of infringement. The remaining two cases
were Data Cash v. JS & A Group,14 5 which concerned lack of copyright
notice and public domain issues, and Telemarketing v. Symantec,1 46 which
involved licensing of copyrightable expression.
The advice to software developers is that good guys almost always
win, and mudballs almost always lose. After reviewing these selected
cases, counsel advising software developers can greatly influence the
145. 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
146. 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
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outcome of any infringement suit by several relatively simple
suggestions. In the operating system area, counsel should alert software
developers of the idea/expression dichotomy, and have them
appropriately document, with contemporaneous memos, why the
software developer wrote the operating system software in the manner
in which it was written, why certain design decisions were made, and
explanations as to why some decision choices were limited to a few or
even one option. If the developer is working on a software application
which has any similarities to an existing application, counsel should
focus on whether any economic relationship exists and ensure that no
breach occurs. In addition, counsel should ensure that the software
developer is not merely slavishly cloning software as the reason for the
development, but rather is seeking to improve the existing product with
substantial independent work. With these general guidelines, counsel
can steer software developers away from the vast majority of
infringement actions.
VI. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The copyrightability of the literal components of computer software
is no longer an issue. The copyrightability of the non-literal aspects,
however, remains uncertain. Rather than provide guidance as to what
may or may not constitute infringement of non-literal elements of com-
puter programs, the Lotus decision has increased the confusion and anxi-
ety within the computer industry. The greatest fear among industry
executives is that a legal free-for-all could develop, having a chilling ef-
fect on product development. Progress could be retarded due to fear of
legal reprisals. Strategic litigation could become an accepted business
practice in the computer industry.
14 7
Many observers in the software field have cried foul after the Lotus
decision and subsequent threats and actual suits by Lotus against other
software developers. The authors believe that these cases have a logical
pattern which is evolving into a set of rules and procedures for software
developers to follow in developing new software products. Indeed,
upon review of the selected cases, Lotus was not the major watershed
case it first appeared to be, given the earlier Digital Communications 1
4 8
and Pearl v. Competition Elec. 14 9 cases. The software industry had ex-
pected Lotus to provide a definite bright line test regarding copyright
infringement for non-literal aspects of computer software. The Lotus
court, however, determined that a bright line test is not possible, given
the complex factual issues which must be analyzed in each case.
Although the software development industry is still growing, the indus-
147. The founder of Lotus Development Corporation, Mitchell D. Kapor, stated that
the "uneasiness of the industry shot up after Lotus sued Borland.... Lotus winning the
Paperback suit has had an enormous destabilizing effect on the industry. This whole thing
is starting to unravel and nobody knows what is going to happen." New York Times, supra
note 136 at F4, col. 1.
148. 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
149. 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1520 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
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try is beginning to mature and will continue to mature in the 1990s.
Given this maturing process, intellectual property law, including copy-
rights, will play an ever increasing role in the software industry.
Public policy underlying copyright protection dictates that innova-
tion and new expressions be encouraged by appropriate levels of protec-
tion. Software developers are certainly permitted to stand on the
shoulders of giants in their quest to create new and innovative software.
When a software developer discards innovation for the sole purpose of
slavishly copying the work of another, public policy requires that this
slavish copying be prohibited. The Lotus court was correct in its refer-
ence to Sir Isaac Newton's observation that innovators must stand on
the shoulders of previous giants. The authors would respectfully sup-
plement Newton's observation by adding that on the shoulders of gi-
ants, may no mudballs stand.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article addresses various procedural issues involved in patent-
ing biological materials, including the requirements for depositing mi-
croorganisms. Since patentable subject matter and deposit
requirements vary among countries, there is no easy way of knowing
when or how to proceed. The following is a discussion of the require-
ments and policies regarding deposits, and access to deposits, in many
countries around the world.
The statutory law of the United States is representative of the law
adopted by many other countries on this subject. It states:
Every patent must contain a written description of the inven-
tion sufficient to enable a person skilled in the art to which the
invention pertains to make and use the invention. Where the
invention involves a biological material and words alone cannot
sufficiently describe how to make and use the invention in a
reproducible or repeatable manner, access to the biological
material is necessary .... I
A deposit is an actual, viable sample of biological material that is
stored in a culture collection and made accessible to authorized parties
for the purpose of obtaining or maintaining a patent. 2 Deposits comple-
ment written specifications in patent applications by providing tangible
information which cannot be expressed in words alone. Deposits, in
conjunction with written descriptions, provide the information neces-
sary to enable a skilled person to carry out inventions involving microor-
ganisms. For example, a written description is often insufficient by itself
to enable others to make and use a microorganism when the microorga-
nism has been isolated from the soil and may be difficult to isolate again.
A written description may also be insufficient when there is a lack of
genetic sequence data for the functional component of the organism,
such as in DNA coding for certain antibiotics. In general, deposits do
1. 54 Fed. Reg. 34,864 (1989) (supplemental information describing the statutory
requirements under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988)). See 37 C.F.R. Part 1.
2. This article deals with the requirements for patenting of microorganisms. In
some cases, the law may be applicable to plants as well, but industrial patent offices often
have different requirements for plants. In the United States, for regulations pertaining to
the deposit of biological material for purposes of patents,
[t]he term biological material shall include material that is capable of self-replica-
tion either directly or indirectly. Representative examples include bacteria, fungi
including yeast, algae, protozoa, eukaryotic cells, cell lines, hybridomas, plasmids,
viruses, plant tissue cells, lichens and seeds. Viruses, vectors, cell organelles and
other non-living material existing in and reproducible from a living cell may be
deposited by deposit of the host cell capable of reproducing the non-living mate-
rial. 37 C.F.R. § 1.801 (1989).
To be considered a novel invention, the microorganism will most commonly be newly
discovered, man-mutated, adapted, or genetically engineered.
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not take the place of written descriptions; they simply supplement them
to make them complete.
3
When attempting to obtain a patent for an invention that involves
biological material, a deposit is often required. The question of whether
to make a deposit can often be complex; it is not always clear under what
conditions a deposit is necessary.4 ,5 It is frequently preferable to avoid
making deposits at all.6 The advantages of making a deposit must be
weighed against certain distinct disadvantages.
Uncertainty as to whether an examiner in a reviewing country will
require a deposit compels many applicants to routinely make deposits
even though they may be unnecessary. For example, the United States
3. With very few exceptions (e.g., the Netherlands), industrial property offices do not
view deposits and (taxonomic) descriptions as alternatives, but rather as complements. A
deposit without a description is not satisfactory. The written description should provide
enough information to ensure that the specification actually refers to the deposited mate-
rial and that a skilled reader can ascertain that he or she has the required microorganism.
A written description should also provide enough information to reduce the danger of the
invention being lost if the deposit mutates or otherwise becomes unavailable after expira-
tion or lapse of the patent. Just how much written information should be provided to
satisfy these objectives must be determined separately in each case; however, some taxo-
nomic description is required by the large majority of patent offices. In most instances
where a deposit is required, it is to the applicant's advantage to provide a taxonomic de-
scription as it may permit the courts to employ the doctrine of equivalents.
4. CHARACTERIZATION OF MICROoRGANisMs, at 16-17 (1989) (paper written by the
Biotechnology Committee of the New Zealand Patent Office). This paper discusses what
types of microorganism inventions may require deposits and what types can be adequately
described by means of full written descriptions:
[i]t is clear that it is at best very difficult, and in practice virtually impossible, to
define a pure strain of algae, bacteria, blue-green algae, fungi, lichens, viroids, or
viruses, to a universally acceptable standard, without a reference strain (or "de-
posit") being provided.
On the other hand, when the organism under consideration is not limited to a
particular strain, such as when all members of a new species are covered or when
its "identity" is actually dependent on its properties, method of manufacture, or
the products produced from it, then it would normally be possible to define it
adequately by means of a full written description.
"Cell lines" are nearly always considerably more complex than the prokaryotic
cells of most microorganisms and there is little visual, or morphological, distinc-
tion between cell cultures. It seems, therefore, that, as with prokaryotic orga-
nisms, it would be virtually impossible to adequately characterize a particular cell
line without a deposit being provided.
On the other hand, when the "cell line" under consideration is a mixture of cell
lines or a cell line whose "identity" is actually dependent on its properties,
method of manufacture, or the products produced from it, then it would normally
be possible to define it adequately by means of a full written description.
Plasmids are usually much simpler than living cells and it would normally be pos-
sible to define them with a written description, particularly if a complete base
sequence is given. In most cases, a deposit should not be necessary, unless the
description is clearly inadequate, for example when a complete base sequence is
not available for a totally new plasmid.
5. See K. MURASHIGE, Biotechnology Deposit Requirements, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
COUNSELING AND LITIGATION 8-8 (1988) (identifying a set of questions for analyzing
whether to make a deposit: Could one of ordinary skill practice the invention based on a
written description along with materials available to him? Or would the practitioner actu-
ally need the specific physical embodiment of biological material described in the applica-
tion, but unavailable to him?).
6. If a deposit must be made, it is generally preferable to deposit only the starting
materials, and not the microorganism claimed, if the steps for producing the claimed mi-
croorganism from these starting materials can be adequately described in words.
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patent examiner informs the applicant if a deposit is required and allows
him to make a deposit during pendency of the application. 7 However,
the European Patent Office (EPO) examiner does not follow this proce-
dure; if a deposit is not made, but later deemed necessary, the applicant
will not have the opportunity to make a deposit and the patent will not
issue.
Applicants may be obliged to make deposits prior to their United
States filing date even though this is not required under United States
Patent Law in order to ensure granting of priority rights in other coun-
tries.8 Certain countries will not allow priority unless a deposit was
made before the filing date of the priority application. For example,
when a deposit is required by the EPO, Japan and many other countries,
the claimed priority date relying on a United States filing will be valid
only if a deposit was made on or before that date in a recognized deposi-
tory, and only if the original United States application made reference to
the deposit.
In some countries a requirement to disclose the "best mode"9 of an
invention may also compel the making of deposits. For instance, even
though an invention may have applicability to many different strains of a
microorganism, and can be described in a fashion that enables others to
make and use the microorganism, information may be lacking to enable
the specific embodiment which represents the best mode. In these
cases, a separate claim to the embodiment is desirable, and a deposit is
required. From the inventor's point of view, a deposit of the best mode,
or specific embodiment, may be desired when broad coverage for an
invention or process is hoped for, but it is not known whether such cov-
erage will be allowed. When a specific embodiment of an invention ex-
ists (which cannot be completely described in a written description), if
nothing else, it may be entitled to patent protection. Consider, for ex-
ample, a screening process which isolates bacteria with certain proper-
ties. Such a process, any time it works, may be proved to isolate bacteria
with these properties, but it is not guaranteed to always isolate the same
strain of bacteria. The inventor may or may not be able to get broad
coverage for the process and all strains of bacteria that can be isolated
from it, but he will desire and should be expected to get coverage
for those strains that he has isolated and preserved. Thus, there are
compelling reasons for applicants to deposit samples of their
microorganisms.
Unfortunately, there are several undesirable consequences to mak-
7. In re Lundak, 773 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
8. International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (The Paris
Convention), March 20, 1883, Paris, art. 4, 25 Stat. 1372. The first filing date in any mem-
ber country (priority date) is the filing date for purposes of evaluating novelty and nonob-
viousness over the prior art. To be awarded this priority date, however, the application
must be filed in the foreign country within one year of filing in the priority country.
9. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). "The specification shall contain a written description of
the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it... and shall set forth
the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention."
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ing deposits. For example, reliance on a deposit may unnecessarily nar-
row the scope of a patent. Should there be an infringement action, a
court may narrowly interpret the claims to cover only the actual de-
posit.' 0 The potential for severe reduction in the scope of claims for an
invention is worrisome and must be careftilly analyzed. In addition, re-
lying on a deposit that later mutates or becomes non-viable (and which
can not be replaced) may lead to invalidation of the patent. "
Another practical problem involves the cost of establishing and
maintaining microorganism deposits. Depending on the type of protec-
tion sought, this fee can run anywhere from $570 to over $970 in one of
the major depositories in the United States, 12 and may be even higher in
foreign countries.' 3 When inventors need to make several deposits to
ensure broader scope of their patents, these costs can multiply.
In many countries which have deposit requirements, deposits be-
come accessible to the public upon issuance of the patent. In others,
however, the public may have access during pendency of the application.
When samples become available before the granting of patent rights, it
is very difficult for the depositor to charge infringement. Moreover, the
option of keeping the invention a trade secret should the patent not is-
sue is markedly impaired.
Finally, when microorganism samples are made generally available,
third-party requesters are not limited to a recipe or written description,
but are essentially provided with the actual, complete invention. This
serious drawback has several ramifications: it may significantly reduce
the research and development efforts required by a competitor to de-
velop improved, non-infringing strains; it becomes very difficult to po-
lice infringement of the patent because in many instances these parties
may make the microorganism available to other, unknown third parties;
and it is almost impossible to assure that the biological material is not
exported to a country for which a relevant patent has not been
granted.'
4
For obvious reasons, applicants will usually wish to limit public ac-
cess to deposits. When applying for international patents, applicants
should be aware of the policies and practices that may motivate patent
office requirements for deposits and affect the availability of their micro-
organism inventions.
10. This issue has not yet been tested in United States courts.
11. This issue has not yet been tested in United States courts.
12. As of 1987, the American Type Culture Collection (ATCC), Rockville, Maryland,
charged $570 for 30 years maintenance, $300 to inform depositors for 30 years of all
recipients of deposits, and $100 for viability testing.
13. China's depository, the Chinese Center for Type Culture Collections (CCTCC),
wanted to charge one of our clients $36,000 for the deposit of 82 plasmids which were
considered one deposit in a United States depository.
14. These issues have been considered in the United States, but no safeguards have
yet been put into the rules. "A restriction against exports could be considered to be viola-
tive of 35 U.S.C. 112 since foreign requesters would be denied access to deposits where a
patentee had never sought foreign patent protection." 54 Fed. Reg. 34,873 (1989)
(comments).
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II. DEPOSITS
In most countries, when patents are sought for biological materials
which are not known and readily available to the public, or cannot be
made without undue experimentation, deposits of the materials are re-
quired. Depository institutions have been established to accept, main-
tain, and furnish samples of organisms to authorized parties for the
purposes of fulfilling patent requirements. To make a deposit, a deposi-
tor provides the depository with sample cultures of the organism along
with detailed information about how to maintain them and test for their
viability. This information is specified on a standard contractual form
which is sent to the depository along with the samples. Upon receipt of
the deposit, the depository will assign it an accession number. 15 The
applicant uses this number to reference his deposit in the written patent
specification.
Once the deposit is made, the depository releases samples to re-
questing parties according to guidelines set out by the relevant patent
office, and for a time period which usually covers, and extends some-
what beyond, the enforceable life of the patent. It is expected that the
depository will check the viability of the samples periodically and re-
quire the depositor to replace them if it they become non-viable. In
some instances, the depository must maintain records detailing the par-
ties to whom samples have been provided; the depository may be re-
quired to make this information available to the depositor. In exchange
for a fee, the depository provides these services for the party on whose
behalf a deposit is made.
In general, industrial property (patent) offices recognize as valid
only those depository institutions which are independent of the parties
applying for patent. Depositories should be "impartial and objec-
tive," 1 6 and "[e]nsure the safe and reliable storage of a deposited bio-
logical material under circumstances that are free of the opportunity for
intentional or negligent handling of the deposited material."' 7 A de-
pository institution recognized for patent purposes in a country must
follow the rules and regulations established by that country's industrial
property office.
III. THE BUDAPEST TREATY COUNTRIES
To facilitate the filing of patent applications in foreign countries
and obviate the need for making individual deposits in many deposito-
ries, a number of countries established a union, known as the Budapest
Treaty, for the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorga-
15. Depositories will not accept samples under certain conditions, such as when they
present a danger to the environment, or when the depository does not have the facilities to
keep them viable. Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of
Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure, Apr. 28, 1977, 32 U.S.T. 1242,
T.I.A.S. No. 9768 [hereinafter Budapest Treaty].
16. Id. at art. 6(2)(iii).
17. 54 Fed. Reg. 34,869 (1989) (advance notice).
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nisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure.' 8 There are now twenty-
two member countries of this treaty, including the United States, the
European Patent Office, Australia, Japan, and the Soviet Union. 19 De-
pository authorities which acquire international status through the office
of the Director-General of the World Industrial Property Organization
20
(WIPO) will be recognized as valid in all the member countries, and an
industrial property office in any of these countries will be entitled to
samples of a deposit when a patent application referring to the deposit
has been filed in that country. When a deposit is made under the treaty,
the depository will store and keep the samples viable and uncontami-
nated for a period of at least 30 years after the date of the deposit and
for at least 5 years after the most recent request for furnishing of a sam-
ple was received.2 1 The international depository authority will also no-
tify the depositor of those parties to which it has furnished samples, the
date, and the name and address of the industrial property office through
which such release was effected.
2 2
The Budapest Treaty stipulates that the industrial property offices
in contracting states are entitled to samples provided that their requests
are accompanied by a declaration affirming that:
(i) an application referring to the deposit of that microorga-
nism has been filed with that office for the grant of a patent and
that the subject-matter of that application involves the said mi-
croorganism or the use thereof;
(ii) such application is pending before that office or has led to
the grant of a patent;
(iii) the sample is needed for the purposes of a patent proce-
dure having effect in the said contracting state or in the said
organization of its member states;
(iv) the said sample and any information accompanying or re-
sulting from it will be used only for the purposes of the said
patent procedure.
23
Although the Budapest Treaty requires member countries and interna-
tional depository authorities to be in conformity with these general pro-
visions, it does not specifically identify the parties, besides the industrial
18. Budapest Treaty, supra note 15, art. 1.
19. The following countries and organizations have ratified the treaty: Australia, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the European Patent Organization,
Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Hungary,
Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Republic of Korea,
the Soviet Union, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Notably absent from the treaty are Canada, China, all the Latin American countries, New
Zealand, South Africa, Taiwan and Thailand. Letter from AJ. Lyons, U.S. Dep't of Agric.,
to Thomas Denberg (May 4, 1990) (discussing the Budapest Treaty).
20. A complete list of recognized depositories is available from the Agricultural Re-
search Service Patent Culture Collection, 1815 North University Street, Peoria, Illinois
61604.
21. Budapest Treaty, supra note 15, Rule 9. Budapest Treaty depository contracts
require the depositor to keep the sample in the depository for this period of time, even if a
deposit is not required for a patent issued by a signatory country.
22. Id. at Rule 11.4(g).
23. Id. at Rule 11.1.
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property offices themselves, who will have access to deposits, 24 the con-
ditions under which such access will be granted (e.g., requiring a re-
quester to sign an undertaking not to infringe the patent), nor does it
specify when such access will be granted. These details are determined
by the individual patent offices and vary from country to country.2 5 In
most countries, certified parties will have access to deposits after publica-
tion,2 6 which in most countries is before the grant of a patent.
A. Australia
"A microorganism must be deposited where a person skilled in the
art could not reasonably be expected to perform the invention without
having a sample of the microorganism before commencing to perform
the invention and the microorganism is not readily available to a person
skilled in the art.
' '27
An applicant should be able to ask the examiner to determine if a
deposit is necessary. If a specification refers to a deposit deemed unnec-
essary by the examiner, the reference may be deleted, thereby prevent-
ing public access.
As a member of the Budapest Treaty, Australia recognizes all inter-
national depository authorities, and apparently no others.2 8 The Aus-
tralian Government Analytical Laboratories (AGAL) in Sydney is the
local Budapest Treaty depository.
The best mode known to the applicant must be disclosed at the date
of filing the complete specification. The patentee must show good faith
and describe the best mode in sufficient detail for a skilled worker to
perform the invention. This may entail making the microorganism avail-
able to the public via a deposit.
The deposit must be made on or before the filing date of the patent
specification. If a deposit is made after the priority date of the patent
application, any claim based on the microorganism would not be ac-
corded that priority date, and a new application for claims related to the
microorganism would have to be filed.
Deposits become available to third parties only when specifications
become open to public inspection. Generally, patent applications be-
come public eighteen months after the priority date. Before this time,
24. Id. at Rule 11.2. The Treaty stipulates that the depositor may authorize any "au-
thority, natural person or legal entity" he chooses to be furnished with samples of his
deposits at any time.
25. The Treaty provides that a "certified party has a right to a sample of the microor-
ganism under the law governing patent procedure before that office and, where the said
law makes the said right dependent on the fulfillment of certain conditions, that that office
is satisfied that such conditions have actually been fulfilled .... Id. at Rule 11.3 (a)(iii).
Thus to whom, when, and under what conditions samples are provided is determined ac-
cording the "law governing patent procedure before that office." Id.
26. Budapest Treaty, Rule 11.3 (a)(ii). This is the case in the United States andJapan.
27. Letter from Louis C. Gebhardt to Thomas Denberg (Mar. 27, 1990) (discussing
Australian patent law relating to microorganisms).
28. Id.
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availability is limited to the patent office itself and to those authorized by
the depositor.
Once the specification is open to public inspection, any person may
request the Patent Commissioner to issue a certificate authorizing re-
lease of a sample of the microorganism. If granted, the certificate can
then be presented to the depository authority, whether inside Australia
or not, and the sample will be released. The issuance of the certificate
by the Commissioner is discretionary, but the Commissioner is required
to give all parties, including the applicant or patentee, an opportunity
for hearing before a request to issue a certificate is granted. Presuma-
bly, the patentee is entitled to suggest certain conditions on release of
the deposit (e.g., providing security for damages, signing an undertak-
ing not to infringe the patent, and agreeing not to transfer samples to
third parties).
If mention of an unnecessary deposit is not removed, denying ac-
cess to the deposit would probably be very difficult since, by implication,
the deposit is reasonably necessary to perform the invention. Nonethe-
less, during hearings, the patentee could still present counter arguments
to the Commissioner concerning issuance of certificates. How much
weight the Commissioner would give to such arguments would depend
on the facts of the case.
B. The European Patent Office
2 9
If an invention concerns a micro-biological process or the
product thereof and involves the use of a micro-organism
which is not available to the public and which cannot be de-
scribed in the European patent application in such a manner as
to enable the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in
the art, the invention shall only be regarded as being disclosed
as prescribed in article 83 if: (a) a culture of the microorganism
has been deposited with a recognized depository institution
30
Unfortunately, the applicant in the European Patent Office (EPO)
must decide for himself whether a deposit is likely to be required. A
patent examiner in the EPO will not make this determination and then
allow the applicant to respond. If a deposit is required, but none has
been made, the patent will not issue.
31
29. European Patent Convention, concluded Oct. 5, 1973, 13 International Legal
Materials, No. 2,263 (Mar. 1974), U.K.T.S. 20 (1978) (entered into force Oct. 7, 1977)
[hereinafter EPC]. Members include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany (FDR),
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland (together with
Liechtenstein) and the United Kingdom. The treaty provides for a central examination in
the European Patent Office with issuance and interpretation of patents in the designated
countries. It will likely be some time before Ireland and Portugal join the EPC.
30. EPC, Rule 28(1).
31. On the other hand, most European Patent Office examiners now accept that the
majority of recombinant DNA inventions can be reproduced without the need for a de-
posit. Letter from Adrian Fisher to Thomas Denberg (Apr. 19, 1990) (discussing EPC
patent rules relating to microorganisms).
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Only deposits made in accordance with the Budapest Treaty are ac-
cepted by the EPO.3 2 Therefore, only deposits made in recognized Bu-
dapest Treaty depositories will be valid.
There is no requirement under the European Patent Convention to
disclose the most preferred embodiment of an invention. On the other
hand, quite commonly the EPO will accept generic claims, but allow
more specific claims only if the appropriate deposits have been made.
The microorganism must be deposited with a recognized deposi-
tory institution no later than the date of filing of the application.
33 If
priority rights are sought based on a foreign filing, a deposit must have
been made before the claimed priority date. For example, if a priority
date is claimed based on a United States filing, and a deposit is required,
it must be made before the United States priority filing in order for pri-
ority rights to be granted.
If a deposit is necessary, the application must include relevant infor-
mation such as the characteristics of the microorganism, the name of the
depository, and the accession number of the culture on deposit. The
name of the depository and accession number may be submitted within
sixteen months after the priority filing date, up to the date of a request
for early publication of the application, or within one month after the
EPO has communicated its right to inspect files, whichever comes first.
3 4
It is important to realize that if a deposit is made and referred to in
an EPO application, it is automatically considered an immutable part of
the patent application and will become publicly available upon issuance
of the patent, even if the patent would otherwise have issued without
reference to a deposit.3 5 Thus, applicants should be careful not to make
unnecessary deposits.
From the date of filing, the depositor agrees that the deposit shall
be made available to any person having the right to inspect files3 6 for
the purposes of patent application examination. The depositor also
agrees that once the application is published, any person shall have the
right to access deposits unless the depositor specifically requests such
access to be limited to "experts" during pendency of the application.
3 7
An expert includes any natural person who has the approval of the ap-
32. Id.
33. EPC, Rule 28(l)(a).
34. EPC, art. 128, para. 2.
35. EPC, rule 28(2) (providing that communication of this information "shall be con-
sidered as constituting the unreserved and irrevocable consent of the applicant to the de-
posited culture being made available to the public .. "). At one time, the EPO allowed
deposits to be made under non-Budapest Treaty conditions and to be referred to in appli-
cations. If the examiner determined that a deposit was unnecessary, reference to it could
be deleted from the specification. If, on the other hand, a deposit was deemed necessary,
the applicant could convert his deposit to a Budapest Treaty deposit in order to fulfill the
EPO requirements for granting patents. This provided a way for the applicant to protect
his deposits from access by the public if the deposit was ultimately not required. Since
July, 1986, however, this situation no longer pertains. Letter from Adrian Fisher to
Thomas Denberg (Apr. 19, 1990).
36. EPC, art. 128, para. 2.
37. EPC, Rule 28(4).
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plicant, or any natural person recognized as an expert by the President
of the EPO. 38 The purpose of this provision is to allow third parties to
ascertain, through an expert, whether a deposit indeed possesses certain
relevant properties. As in the United States, once the patent issues, the
deposits become available to any person, without territorial restriction.
Unlike in the United States, however, the EPO requires the requester to
sign an undertaking not to infringe the patent. The EPO also requires
that the deposit not be transferred to any third party before the expira-
tion of the patent in the last state in which it expires, and that it be used
for experimental purposes only during this time period.3 9 To receive a
sample of a deposit, a requester must go through the EPO. The EPO
will then transmit a copy of the request, with certification, to the deposi-
tory institution as well as to the applicant or proprietor of the patent.40
C. Japan
The deposit of a microorganism is required any time a patent appli-
cation for an invention involving or using the microorganism is filed,
except when the microorganism is readily available to persons with ordi-
nary skill in the art to which the invention pertains.4 1
As in the EPO, the depositor should be aware that if a deposit is not
made by the filing date and is determined to be necessary, the patent
will not be granted. The written specification must refer to the acces-
sion number of the deposit; it cannot be added after filing.
If a written specification refers to a deposit, but the Patent Office
later determines the deposit to be unnecessary, reference to it may be
deleted from the application to prevent access by the public.
As a party to the Budapest Treaty, Japan recognizes deposits made
in any authorized international depository. Deposits may also be made
with the Fermentation Research Institute (FRI) in Ibaraki-ken 42 if the
applicant prefers not to apply under the provisions of the Treaty.
There is no requirement to disclose the most preferred embodi-
ment of an invention under the Japanese Patent Law,43 hence no depos-
its are required unless narrow claims are sought for a specific
embodiment which is not readily available to routineers.
If a deposit is required, it must be made prior to the patent applica-
tion priority date. If made after this date, the date is lost. When a de-
38. EPC, Rule 28(5).
39. EPC, Rule 28(3)(a),(b). These provisions shall not apply insofar as the requester
is using the culture under a compulsory license. The term "compulsory license" is defined
as including ex offiio licenses and the right to use patented inventions in the public interest.
EPC, Rule 28(3).
40. EPC, Rule 28(8).
41. Letter from Shusaku Yamamoto to Thomas Denberg (Apr. 11, 1990) (citing Japa-
nese Patent Law, rule 27-2(1)).
42. S. BENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY WORLDWIDE 505
(1987).
43. Letter from Shusaku Yamamoto to Thomas Denberg (Apr. 11, 1990) (citing Japa-
nese Patent Law, rule 36(3)).
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posit is made after the priority date and on or before the Japanese filing
date, only the Japanese filing date is retained. 44
In Japan, normal patent procedure calls for two publications of an
application. The first (Kokai or "laying-open") publication occurs after
the complete application is received by the patent office. The applicant
then has seven years in which to request examination of the application,
after which time a second (Kokoku) publication takes place if a patent is
granted.
The deposited material will become available to members of the
public, both international and domestic, after the patent application has
been published the second time, that is, after the Kokoku publication
when the patent is granted.4 5 Access to deposits before the Kokoku
publication (and after Kokai publication) is limited to those who have
been both approved by the Japanese Patent Office and issued an in-
fringement warning by the applicant or to those who require a sample in
order to respond to the Patent Office in other patent applications (e.g.,
to those who have received an Official Action for rejection of their appli-
cations filed after the subject application). If, for some reason, reference
to an unnecessary deposit is not deleted from a specification, it may be
possible to petition the Japanese Patent Office not to authorize its
release.
46
Individuals who request samples of a deposit are not required to
sign an undertaking not to infringe the patent, but they must agree not
to use the deposited material for any purpose other than tests and ex-
perimentation, and are prohibited from giving the material to third par-
ties.47 Furthermore, they are required to make direct contact with the
depository. The depository, in turn, seeks authorization from the Japa-
nese Patent Office. For example, if ajapanese patent relies on a deposit
made in the ATCC (an American depository), a request should be
presented to the ATCC for release of a sample of the deposit. The re-
quest is then forwarded to the Japanese Patent Office. The Japanese
Patent Office grants approval according to the provisions established by
that office, and then communicates this back to the ATCC. Assuming
approval is granted, a sample is then made available to the requester.48
D. The Philippines
In the Philippines, requests for patents involving novel strains of
microorganisms, or useful substances derived from them, require
deposits in Budapest Treaty depositories. Furthermore, the deposit
44. Id. (discussing Japanese patent law).
45. Id. (citingJapanese Patent Law, rule 27-3(1)).
46. Additionally, if an unnecessary deposit is made in the Japanese FRI depository,
under non-Budapest Treaty conditions (all deposits made under Budapest Treaty condi-
tions cannot be removed for at least 30 years, according the provision of the contract), the
depositor can remove the deposit by written request or by ceasing to pay the yearly main-
tenance charges. Letter from Shusaku Yamamoto to Thomas Denberg (Apr. 11, 1990).
47. Id. (citing Japanese Patent Law, Rule 27-3).
48. Id.
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must be referenced in the written specification. 49 Thus, even if a written
specification alone provides enough information for enabling others to
make and use a microorganism, a deposit must still be made in order to
meet the requirements of Philippine patent law.50 In addition, the best
mode devised by the inventor for carrying out his invention must be set
forth.
5 '
The Philippines does not currently have a depository of its own.
Nationals typically make deposits in Japan, but any depository of recog-
nized standing is valid. Applicants, however, have the burden of show-
ing that a depository should be recognized. All Budapest Treaty
depositories are considered valid.
The best time to make a deposit is before or at the time of filing. If
no deposit is made by the time of filing, the patent examiner will require
one. Presumably, this means that an application will not be rejected if a
deposit is not made by the time of filing; the patent examiner will simply
issue a reminder to make a deposit before examination of the
application.
Philippine law is not clear as to whether a priority date can be based
on the date of an original filing if a deposit was made after this date.
Likewise, it is not apparent what happens when no deposit was required
in the priority filing. However, if an applicant seeks to base his priority
date on a filing in another country, the priority date actually assigned
will not be any later than the date the original deposit was made. In this
case, the applicant must certify that the taxonomic information in the
application corresponds to that of the deposit.
Deposits are made available to the international public at the time
the patent is issued. Prior to issuance, the application and the deposit
are confidential. There are no regulations regarding restrictions on ac-
cess to deposits, such as undertakings not to infringe. The Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer may notify the deposi-
tory to release deposits to the public, but ordinarily it is the responsibil-
ity of the party obtaining the patent to do so.
E. South Korea
Deposits should be made if an invention cannot be easily worked by
a person skilled in the art, however there is no special requirement to
disclose the best mode of an invention under Korean Patent Law.
52
Korea is a member of the Budapest Treaty, thus any recognized Bu-
dapest Treaty depositories are valid. In addition, Korea has two internal
depositories, the Korean Collection for Type Cultures and the Korean
49. Letter from Llewellyn L. Llanillo to Thomas Denberg (July 17, 1990) (citing to
BUREAU OF PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, MEMORANDUM-CIRCULAR
TSE/73-1 (1973)).
50. Philippine Patent Law § 14-(d).
51. Letter from Llewellyn L. Llanillo to Thomas Denberg (July 17, 1990) (citing to
Rules of Practice in Patent Cases, rule 62(b)).
52. Letter from Kim Myung Shin to Thomas Denberg (June 12, 1990).
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Federation of Culture Collection of Microorganisms. Although these
are not currently Budapest depositories, they are expected to be desig-
nated as such within the year. If the first filing occurs in Korea, the
microorganism must be deposited with one of the Korean domestic de-
positories designated by the Commissioner of the Korean Patent Office
no later than the filing date. The specification must include the acces-
sion number. If priority is claimed based on a foreign filing, the deposi-
tor need only submit the Deposit Certificate from that depository to the
Commissioner of the Korean Patent Office at the time the application is
filed in Korea. Presumably, in the course of prosecution, it should be
possible to inquire as to the necessity of making a deposit. If a deposit is
not required, any reference to it should be deleted from the
specification.
If a specification refers to a deposit, the deposit must be made avail-
able upon publication of the application, which normally occurs
eighteen months after the filing date in Korea (or eighteen months after
the priority date if priority is claimed). The depositor or applicant for
the patent should notify the depository, or confirm, that deposits are
available at this time. If the deposit is not available at this time, an inter-
ested party may demand a trial, through the Korean Patent Office, call-
ing for invalidation of the patent. The depositor and depository agree,
at the time of deposit, that samples shall be furnished to the Commis-
sioner of the Korean Patent Office, to the depositor or any person ap-
proved by the depositor, or to anyone, as long as: (a) the furnishing of
samples of the microorganism is restricted to within the national terri-
tory; (b) the purpose of furnishing a sample is clearly for experiment or
research; and (c) the microorganism furnished is not refurnished to a
third party. Furnishing of a microorganism is made by contract between
the depository and the person requesting a sample. The person seeking
the sample must sign an agreement not to infringe the patent.
F. The United States
According to the United States statutory requirements, an applica-
tion for a patent must include a specification which contains:
a written description of the invention, and of the manner and
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and
use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated
by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
5 3
In addition to the written specification, actual biological material
must be deposited if it is not known and readily available to the public or
cannot be made or isolated without undue experimentation. 54 Unlike
mechanical inventions, a person with ordinary skill in the art may have
53. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
54. 37 C.F.R. § 1.802(b) (1990).
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insufficient knowledge about the particular biological material to enable
him to make or use the invention solely from a written description.
The necessity of making a deposit is decided on a case-by-case basis
by the patent examiner.55 Reference to a deposit of biological material
in a specification does not create any presumption that a deposit is re-
quired.5 6 Thus, if the examiner decides that a deposit is unnecessary,
reference to it may be deleted from the disclosure, preventing public
access.
In the United States the best mode of an invention must be dis-
closed.5 7 Whether an actual deposit is required to disclose the best
mode will be decided on a case-by-case basis by the patent examiner
according to the inventor's claims. 58 In some instances, deposits not
required to broadly enable an invention may still be required to enable
the specific, preferred embodiment. As most patent applications pre-
sent both broad and narrow claims, the patent examiner may determine
that a deposit is necessary for the latter if the best mode cannot be de-
scribed in words alone.
The United States honors deposits made in any recognized Buda-
pest Treaty depository. 59 In the United States, the principal depository
agencies are the Agricultural Research Culture Collection (NRRL) in Pe-
oria, Illinois, the American Type Culture Collection (ATCC) in Rock-
ville, Maryland, and the In Vitro International, Inc. depository in
Linthicum, Maryland. Each is recognized as an authorized international
depository under the Budapest Treaty. If the depositor wishes, deposits
may be made under the provisions of the Treaty.
Deposits not made in Budapest Treaty depositories may be made in
other depositories, such as university laboratories, as long as the deposi-
tory is independent of the assignee or inventor, and complies with the
requirements for acceptable depositories as determined by the Commis-
sioner of Patents and Trademarks. 60 Deposits made in these institutions
will be valid for United States patent procedures only, and will not be
honored in Treaty countries.
A deposit needed to satisfy statutory requirements can be made at
any time before filing the application for patent, or any time during the
pendency of the application. 6 1 If made during pendency, the deposit
must be made no later than the time period set by the examiner at the
time the Notice of Allowance and Issue Fee Due is mailed. 62 The time
55. 37 C.F.R. § 1.809(a) (1990).
56. 37 C.F.R. § 1.802(c) (1990).
57. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
58. 37 C.F.R. § 1.809(a).
59. 37 C.R.F. § 1.803(a)(1) (1990).
60. 37 C.F.R. § 1.803.
61. In re Lundak, 773 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
62. 37 C.F.R. § 1.809 (1989). But note that "[w]hen the original deposit is made after
the effective filing date of an application for patent, the applicant shall promptly submit a
verified statement from a person in a position to corroborate the fact, and shall state that
the biological material which is deposited is biological material specifically identified in the
application as filed, except if the person is an attorney or agent registered to practice
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period is normally three months although petition for extension can be
made.65 If a required deposit is not made according to these provisions,
the application will be abandoned for failure to prosecute. 64
As mentioned above, applicants who plan to rely on a filing date in
the United States for claiming priority rights in foreign countries need
to be aware of those countries' requirements regarding deposits. In cer-
tain countries, if a deposit is not made before the original filing date in
the United States, the claimed priority date may not be honored.
The depositor may, at the time of making a deposit, elect to either
make the deposit available to any bona fide requester from the interna-
tional public as of the date of deposit or, more commonly, elect to limit
access until a patent issues. In any event, during pendency of an appli-
cation the depositor agrees to make the deposit available to anyone enti-
tled to it, as determined by the Commissioner of Patents. In this way,
the deposit is afforded the same confidentiality as the written patent ap-
plication.65 Once a patent issues, all restrictions regarding access to the
deposit will be removed 66 and the depository will release the deposit to
any bona fide requesters. 67 The depositor may, however, require the
depository to notify him in writing of the date, name, and address of the
parties to whom samples are furnished.68 These provisions are auto-
matic for deposits made under the Budapest Treaty69 and the depositor
is not required to make special arrangements with the depository. In the
case of the NRRL, the depository will notify the depositor when strains
are distributed to third parties if the strain was deposited under the Bu-
dapest Treaty. Otherwise, it is the depositor's responsibility to request
this information, as is necessary.
70
Notification presumably gives the depositor an idea of who might
be infringing his patent. Parties receiving deposits, however, are not
specifically required to sign an undertaking not to infringe, and may give
samples to any third party they wish. Further, there is no requirement
that an obtained deposit be used for experimental purposes only. In
order to receive a sample of a deposit kept in the ATCC or NRRL, the
before the Office, in which case the statement need not be verified." 37 C.F.R. § 1.804(b)
(1989).
63. 37 C.F.R. § 1.136 (1989).
64. 37 C.F.R. § 1.809(c) (1990).
65. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1988).
66. 37 C.F.R. § 1.808(a)(2) (1990).
67. A. LYONS, PROCEDURES AND POLICIES FOR DEPOSITION OF STRAINS OF MICROORGA-
NISMS FOR PATENT PURPOSES IN THE AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH SERVICE CULTURE COLLEC-
TION (NRRL) 1 (1989). Note, however, that where a deposit is not required but mentioned
in a specification, public access becomes a requirement of the depository but not the Pat-
ent and Trademark Office. If a deposit made and referred to in an application is deemed
unnecessary, its lack of availability will not affect the validity of the patent. This is illus-
trated in circumstances where a deposit becomes non-viable: the depositor will not have
to replace the sample in the depository. Statutory law states that "in no case is a replace-
ment or supplemental deposit of a biological material necessary where the biological mate-
rial.., need not be deposited." 37 C.F.R. § 1.805(g) (1989).
68. 37 C.F.R. § 1.808(b)(3).
69. Budapest Treaty, supra note 15, at Rule 11.4(d),(g).
70. A. LYONS, supra note 67, at 5.
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requester may go directly to the depository with a copy of the issued
patent. Other depositories may require the depositor to notify them
when a patent has issued and authorize them to release samples in order
to fulfill the requirements for patent.
G. The USSR
Any invention which "is a microorganism or the use of said micro-
organism" 71 requires a deposit in a depository within Russia or in a de-
pository recognized under the Budapest Treaty. There are no Budapest
Treaty depositories within the USSR. Deposit is not obligatory if the
applicant can prove that the microorganism has been previously avail-
able to the public, provide the deposit access numbers from recognized
depositories, or show that the organism is widely used in a scientific
practice, such as taxonomic standard, model, or neomodel strains.
Members of the public may be given access to the deposit after pub-
lication of a report about the issuance of a patent if the Patent Office
certifies that the particular person requesting the deposit has a right to
obtain the organism and specifies the registration number of the de-
posit.72 However, the depository is not bound to make samples of mi-
croorganisms which have properties harmful to humans and the
environment available to a person who is considered to be unable to
handle the microorganisms with proper care.
It is recommended that deposits be made prior to filing a patent
application. The certificate proving deposit can be filed with the Patent
Office up to two months after the filing date of the application, however
the date of receipt of the certificate will be regarded as the application
priority date.
There is no "best mode" requirement for patent applications in the
USSR, however, if a preferred embodiment is claimed, such as in a de-
pendent claim, it must be supported by deposit.
IV. THE NON-BUDAPEST TREATY COUNTRIES
A. Argentina
Although Argentina has not adopted the Budapest Treaty, 73 it per-
mits microorganisms to be patented and ascribes to the conditions of
the Treaty, namely that a deposit is required when a written specification
alone is not enabling, or the materials are not available to the public. If
the examiner determines that a deposit is not necessary, reference to
such may be deleted from an application. If a deposit is necessary, how-
ever, it must be made before the Patent Office examines the application
to avoid compromising the filing date. Only Budapest Treaty deposito-
ries are recognized; Argentina does not have a depository of its own.
71. USSR Regulations under the Budapest Treaty, §§ 11.1, 11.3.
72. Id. § 11.3(c).
73. Letter from Hausheer, Belgrano & Fernandez to Thomas Denberg (May 2, 1990).
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Further, there is no requirement to disclose the best mode of an inven-
tion. Finally, there are no rules governing public access to the deposits.
B. Brazil
While patenting microorganisms has been the object of study of the
Brazilian Patent Office, universities and research institutes, Brazil has
not accepted the Budapest Treaty74 and currently has no regulations
regarding this matter. The studies have focused on defining the best
manner of protection, rather than raising the threshold issue of whether
microorganisms should be patented. Thus, one may conclude that, in
Brazil, microorganisms per se are patentable. The only prohibition for
patenting microorganisms relates to inventions involving foodstuffs and
medicines. These are not patentable. 75 Conversely, inventions involv-
ing microorganisms that are processes are patentable.
Presently, no deposit is required to support the description of bi-
otechnological inventions. Nonetheless, it is recommended that the ap-
plicant refer to deposits made in Budapest Treaty depositories in his
specification.
C. Canada
Canada is not a member of the Budapest Treaty and there are no
statutory provisions in the Canadian Patent Act regarding the deposit of
microorganisms. 76 A recommendation that Canada accede to the
Treaty is under consideration, 77 but no bill has been introduced into the
House of Commons. There has been a precedent, however, for allowing
deposits of microorganisms to satisfy the disclosure requirements of the
Patent Act.
7 8' 7 9
To satisfy the requirements of the Canadian Patent Act an applicant
must, in the specification of his invention, correctly and fully describe
the invention and its operation or use, as contemplated by the inven-
tor.80 In practice, this means that a specification must be enabling in
and of itself. One case,8 1 however, established a precedent for allowing
deposits of microorganisms to fulfill description requirements, although
74. Letter from Carlos C.C. Pires to Thomas Denberg (May 3, 1990).
75. Brazilian Patent Law, art. 9.
76. Letter from Cynthia J. Ledgley to Thomas Denberg (May 8, 1990).
77. "Canada should sign and ratify the Budapest Treaty." TASK FORCE ON THE STATUS
OF CULTURE COLLECTIONS IN CANADA, REPORT TO THE MINISTER OF STATE (SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY), Recommendation 26 (1988) [hereinafter TASK FORCE].
78. In re Application of Abitibi Co., 62 C.P.R.2d 81 (1982) (holding that a mixed yeast
culture was patentable per se and that a deposit of the culture in a culture collection would
enable reproduction of the invention by the public).
79. Note that this applies to microorganisms only. Plants are not included as has re-
cently been emphasized by the Supreme Court of Canada in Pioneer Hi-Bred v. Commis-
sioner of Patents, 25 C.P.R.3d 257 (1989), in which a seed deposit was not accepted to
fulfill the description requirements for a soya-plant line cultivated naturally but resulting
from artificial cross-breeding of three known varieties to produce a new hybrid, because
the court did not feel such a deposit supported the case.
80. Patent Act, CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-4, § 34(a) (1985).
81. Abitibi, 62 C.P.R.2d at 81.
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current practice regarding deposits is not codified in any written
document.
Apparently, deposits would be allowed in instances where a written
description alone is not enabling, as in the United States and EPO. In
Pioneer Hi-Bred v. Industrial Commissioner of Patents,8 2 Judge Lamer notes in
dicta that "the practice of a deposit is simply intended to require the
applicant submitting a process involving a microorganism unknown and
inaccessible to the public as a necessary part of reproducing the invention to
deposit a culture of the microorganism with the authorities.8 3 The lan-
guage "microorganism unknown and inaccessible to the public" is very
similar to that of other countries, such as the United States, 84 which
have specific requirements regarding deposits. It seems that deposits in
Canada should be made for the same reasons they would be made in
these countries; namely, to complete the description insofar as the de-
posit provides a specific embodiment of the invention and enables the
invention to be reproduced.8 5 To meet the requirements of the Cana-
dian Patent Act, however, a written description should be as complete as
possible; a mere reference to a deposit will be rejected.
Since there are no provisions for requiring deposits, the Canadian
Patent Examiner will not automatically issue a determination regarding
the necessity of a deposit. The applicant must decide whether a deposit
is required for the granting of a patent. The Canadian Patent Office will
accept deposits made in any Canadian tissue culture collection, 6 as well
as deposits made in the ATCC, but again, there is no law addressing this
point.
The Act is silent with respect to best mode requirements for inven-
tions involving microorganisms. An applicant must determine indepen-
dently whether a deposit would be helpful for getting broad coverage of
claims for an invention or narrow coverage for a specific embodiment.
It is recommended that deposits be made before filing the applica-
tion. Alternately, a deposit may be made before the patent issues, if it
can be established that the deposited material is the same as that on
hand at the time of filing.8 7 Presumably, if an examiner determines that
a written description alone is enabling, an amendment can be made to
the specification, within one year of the date of filing,8 8 to eliminate
82. 25 C.P.R.3d 257 (1989) (emphasis added). Judge Lamer refers here to the Abitzbi
case but erroneously limits the ratio decidendi in Abitibi to "a process." That case also al-
lowed claims to the cell line per se.
83. Id. at 272.
84. 37 C.F.R. § 1.802(b) (1990). "Biological material will need to be deposited if it is
not known and readily available to the public or cannot be made or isolated without undue
experimentation." Id.
85. There is a recommendation under consideration that Canada should require both
a description and a deposit of the organism in order to meet the disclosure requirements.
If adopted, deposits would be required in all instances. See TAsK FORCE, supra note 75,
Recommendation 24.
86. The Directory of Canadian Culture Collections 1986 lists 140 collections in Canada.
87. This is in line with United States policy. See In re Lundak, 773 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
88. See Patent Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch.33, § 27(1.1) (Supp. 1989).
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references to the deposit. The applicant should be aware of the danger
of the deposit being considered new subject matter in instances where
the written description cannot be proved to correspond to the deposit.
In this case, the filing/priority date may be lost. No statutes or other
written policies address the question of to whom, when and under what
conditions deposits are released. At the present time, it appears that a
depository will not release a deposit without written consent from the
patent applicant.
D. China
China is not presently a member of the Budapest Treaty,8 9 how-
ever, Chinese patent law stipulates that:
[i]n the case of microorganisms, including various bacteria, ac-
tinomycetes, yeasts, filamentary fungi, higher fungi, cell lines,
viruses, plasmids existing in the above host cells, and strains of
unicellular algae, which are essential in the embodiment of the
subject invention, are not available to personnel of this area of
technology (in the People's Republic of China), and are in-
volved in the applications in China for patents, the subject mi-
croorganisms are deemed to be essential components of
application specifications, and must be submitted in the form of
two samples to the China Center for Type Culture Collection
(CCTCC), designated by the Chinese Patent law, for deposit,
prior to, at least not later than the date of filing of the subjected
applications with the C[hina] P[atent] O[ffice]. 90
Thus, deposits are mandatory and only the CCTCC is a recognized
depository. The period of deposition of a culture is thirty years, with an
extension of five years if the applicant makes a request before expiration
of the patent. Additionally, the specification of the patent application
must describe in detail the best mode contemplated by the applicant for
carrying out an invention. 9 1
According to the law cited above, deposits must be made no later
than the filing date. Moreover, the applicant must determine indepen-
dently if a deposit is likely to be required for complete disclosure. Fail-
ure to submit the necessary strains in a timely manner may cause the
examiner to reject the application on the ground that the specification is
insufficient.
If priority is based on a foreign filing, deposits must be made in
China before the Chinese filing date. Even though China is not a mem-
ber of the Budapest Treaty and recognizes only its own depository, it
appears that China will grant priority rights based on foreign filings,
even if the granting of the priority patent did not rely on a deposit and
none was made.
89. Letter from Xu Yiping to Thomas Denberg (Mar. 28, 1990).
90. Regulations for the Implementation of the Patent Law of the PRC, STATUTES AND
REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA, vol. II, § 850119, art. 25 (University of
East Asia Press 1987).
91. Id. at art. 18(8).
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After the pre-examination publication of an application, but prior to
the granting of a patent right, anyone wishing to use the microorganism
in question must file a request with the Chinese Patent Office. This re-
quest must include: (a) an undertaking by the entity or individual mak-
ing the request not to make the microorganism available to any other
person; and (b) an undertaking to use the microorganism for experi-
mental purposes only before the grant of the patent right.9 2
After the granting of the patent right, deposits are released only to
those parties authorized by the owner of the patent. In negotiating con-
tracts with other parties, the patentee can place any restrictions he
wishes on the release of the deposit. A requester must go through the
patentee to access a deposit.
E. Colombia
In principle, microorganisms are not patentable in Colombia.
93
The issue, however, of whether a particular microorganism is patentable
seems to be decided on a case-by-case basis by the patent examiner. It
does not appear that Colombia is considering becoming a member of
the Budapest Treaty, and there is no legislation related to the issue of
deposits.
F. Costa Rica
Costa Rica has not ratified the Budapest Treaty and there is no indi-
cation that it will do so.94 Although Costa Rica does not allow patenting
of microorganisms per se, nor of processes that involve microorga-
nisms, 95 their Supreme Court is currently hearing arguments against
this policy.
G. Ecuador
Like Costa Rica, Ecuador does not currently allow microorganisms
to be patented. Certain reforms, however, are under consideration.
H. Egypt
The question of becoming a member of the Budapest Treaty is not
under consideration in Egypt.96 Patent applications with claims related
to strains or species of microorganisms per se are not allowed. Inven-
tions related to foodstuffs, new substances, medicinal drugs and phar-
maceutical compounds are not patentable, 9 7 but the processes for
92. Id. at art. 26.
93. "Patents shall not be granted for: ... b) Vegetable varieties or animal breeds, or
essentially biological procedures for obtaining vegetables or animals." The Andean Pact,
art. 5, Decision 85.
94. Letters from Hugo Jimenez Gutierrez to Thomas Denberg (May 1990).
95. Law Governing Patents for Inventions, Industrial Drawings and Models, and Im-
provement Models, COSTA RICA LAw 6867, art. 1, § 3(b) (1983).
96. Letter from Moufid El Dib to Thomas Denberg (Apr. 21, 1990).
97. Patents Act of Egypt, art. 2B.
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making such materials may be patentable if they are new. If a process
relies on the use of microorganisms, the specification must contain a
complete scientific description and taxonomic information concerning
the microorganism used in the production. Since the situation has yet to
arise, it is not known whether Egypt would accept deposits to supple-
ment incomplete written descriptions when it is impossible to provide
the necessary additional information in written form.
I. India
India does not permit patents for processes or substances involving
microorganisms. Further, there is no indication that India will accede to
the Budapest Treaty in the near future.
98
J. Ireland
Ireland has no present plans to become a member of the Budapest
Treaty. The Irish Government, however, intends to ratify the European
Patent Convention before 1992, and it is expected that ratification of the
Budapest Treaty will follow.9 9
While it has no specific legislation regarding the deposit of microor-
ganisms, Ireland will most likely adopt the policy of the United King-
dom 0 0 and require deposits where a written specification alone is not
enabling or where the relevant materials are not available to one skilled
in the art.
Since specific legislation regarding deposits does not exist, it is un-
likely that a patent examiner would require a deposit. It appears,
though, that where a written specification alone is insufficient, the Irish
Patents Office will honor a deposit. Deposition in a recognized Buda-
pest Treaty depository is recommended. Further, there is a requirement
to disclose the best mode of an invention.
A deposit should be made as of the filing date of the patent applica-
tion or by the priority date in the case of a European Patent Convention
application. It is not clear whether the Patent Office will allow a late
deposit if the specification is deemed insufficient. All provisions for the
release of deposits should be negotiated by the depositor with the rele-
vant depository since Ireland, not a member of the Budapest Treaty, has
no formal agreements with these institutions. It is unclear as to when a
deposit is made available to the public.' 0 ' It appears that Ireland would
prefer to follow the provisions of the EPO with respect to matters such
98. Letter from Pravin Anand to Ellen P. Winner (June 1, 1990).
99. Letter from Don McAleese to Thomas Denberg (May 2, 1990).
100. Id. McAleese believes that the Irish Court would follow the decisions of the Eng-
lish Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in Dann's Application 1966 R.P.C. 532, 1971
R.P.C. 425 (holding that a specification was not insufficient for lack of a deposit since it
was sufficiently identified in the specification).
101. In American Cyanamid (Dann's Patent), 1971 R.P.C. 425, the court states in dicta
that public access need not be granted until publication of the application following ac-
ceptance. In American Cyanamid v. Berk, 1976 R.P.C. 231, however, the court suggests
that the relevant date is the filing date of the complete specification.
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as timing, authorization and restrictions placed on making deposits
available.
K. Israel
Although Israel has signed the Budapest Treaty, it has not yet been
ratified by the Israeli government. A committee is currently reviewing
Israeli Patent Law, and, if the law is amended, it is expected that the
provisions of the Budapest Treaty will be incorporated, and the Treaty
ratified. 1
02
Currently, Israel has no legislation regarding deposits. Accord-
ingly, it does not require deposits of microorganisms in any particular
instance. If a written description alone is not enabling, it may honor
deposits to supplement the written description. Presumably, one may
ask the examiner if a written specification is sufficient and, if so, delete
any unnecessary reference to deposits. Further, it is sufficient that the
specification indicates how the invention can be carried out. There is no
stipulation that the best mode must be disclosed.
Deposits should be made prior to filing the first application. Depos-
its made after this date may necessitate postdating of the application if
they are required for enablement. Israel has no recognized depository
of its own. Any authorized collection in the United States, Europe or
Japan will be recognized.
Provisions for release of deposits must be made between the depos-
itor and the depository. Deposits should be made available, at least to
the public in Israel, when the complete specification has been published
and the patent granted. Requiring undertakings not to infringe, not to
give samples to third parties, and to use the material for experimental
purposes only is most likely permitted in Israel.
L. Mexico
Biotechnological, genetic and chemical (pharmaceutical) inventions
are not patentable in Mexico. Biotechnological processes are also not
patentable at present.' 0 3 A new patent law, currently being considered
by the Mexican Congress, would allow patenting of such inventions. If
approved, the law would be effective by June 199 1.104
M. New Zealand
In 1988 the Industrial Property Advisory Committee (IPAC) of New
Zealand strongly recommended that New Zealand accept the Budapest
Treaty but, to date, this has not occurred.' 0 5 New Zealand's law is un-
clear on the requirement for deposits and the release of deposits. Noth-
ing in their Patents Act or Regulations specifically mentions deposits,
102. Letter from Dr. Yitzhak Hess to Thomas Denberg (Mar. 22, 1990).
103. Letter from Jaime Delgado to Thomas Denberg (Mar. 26, 1990).
104. Letter from Oswaldo Pacheco to Dr. Donna M. Ferber (May 24, 1990).
105. Letter from D.C. Calhoun to Thomas Denberg (Mar. 22, 1990).
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however, they can be used to complement written descriptions for pat-
ent applications involving microorganisms. At a meeting of the Com-
mittee of Experts on Biotechnological Inventions and Industrial
Property convened by the New Zealand Patent Office in October,
1988,106 a majority of delegates and representatives approved the fol-
lowing World Intellectual Property Organization suggestion regarding
the requirement for deposits:
Where an invention concerns a microorganism, or involves the
use of a microorganism, which is not available to the public and
which cannot be described in a patent application in such a
manner as to enable a person skilled in the art to carry out the
invention, such an invention shall be regarded as having been
sufficiently disclosed only if the microorganism has been de-
posited with a recognized depository institution and samples
thereof are available according to the applicable law, and if the
patent application contains such relevant information as is
available to the applicant on the characteristics of the
microorganism. 1
0 7
Although this suggestion has not been enacted into law, it is very similar
to legislation in the United States, EPO, and Australia, and will probably
become the official policy of the New Zealand Patent Office. Case law
affirms that a deposit is necessary, when there is insufficient information
in a disclosure, to enable an invention to be performed or to enable
microorganism strains to be identified.10 8
Since there is no formal statute governing deposits, a patent exam-
iner will not issue an unsolicited opinion as to whether a deposit is re-
quired. Hence it is the applicant's responsibility to either make a
deposit before filing an application or, if no deposit is made and an ap-
plication is deemed non-enabling by an examiner, to make a deposit af-
ter filing and amend the specification accordingly.
Although not a signatory to the Budapest Treaty, New Zealand only
accepts deposits made in Budapest Treaty depositories. There are no
recognized depositories in New Zealand at present, and, according to
the Assistant Commissioner of Patents, none will be recognized in the
future unless they are able to meet the requirements of the Budapest
Treaty. 109
There is a requirement" 0 to disclose the best method of putting an
invention into practice, similar to the best mode requirements of the
United States. In some instances, deposits not required to broadly en-
able an invention may still be required to enable the specific, preferred
embodiment. As most patent applications present both broad and
106. Letter from D.C. Calhoun to Thomas Denberg (Apr. 23, 1990) (referring to a
discussion paper prepared by the Biotechnology Committee).
107. INTERNATIONAL BUREAU OF WIPO, WIPO DOCUMENT BioT/CE/IV/3: REVISED
SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS CONCERNING INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, PROTECTION OF BIOTECHNO-
LOGICAL INVENTIONS (1988).
108. See American Cyanamid (Dann's Patent), 1971 R.P.C. 425.
109. Calhoun, supra note 103.
110. New Zealand Patents Act, § 10(3)(b) (1953).
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narrow claims, the applicant may decide that a deposit is necessary if the
best mode cannot be described in words alone.
The recommended time for making a deposit is before filing of the
priority application. If a deposit is made after this date, the difficulties
encountered are much the same as those discussed above for Canada.
There is always some danger that a deposit made after the filing date
could constitute a new matter giving rise to postdating of the applica-
tion. If it can be shown, however, that the organism was held by the
applicant on the filing date and subsequently deposited, then the de-
posit and reference to it is considered to have been disclosed in the orig-
inal description. This is the principle of inherent disclosure, and in
instances where it can be shown to apply, filing/priority dates should not
change. ' 1 '
There are no formal provisions governing public access to deposit
samples. Presumably, the Patent Office has access to deposits during
pendency of an application. It should be noted, however, that the New
Zealand Patent Office has no written agreement with Budapest Treaty
depositories. Accordingly, Treaty depositories will not release samples
without written consent of the depositor. It is recommended that sam-
ples be made available, at least to bona fide requesters in New Zealand,
at the time the complete specification is published. According to the
recommendations made by IPAC, failure to make a deposit publicly
available by this date would invalidate the patent. Interested third par-
ties can oppose the granting of a patent within three months from the
date of acceptance and publication. In order to present counter argu-
ments, these parties should have access to the complete description, in-
cluding deposits if these are required for enablement.
If a deposit is made and referenced in a specification which is later
determined to be enabling by itself, reference to the deposit can be de-
leted during prosecution in order to prevent public access. If reference
to a deposit is not deleted, it is unclear whether the deposit would have
to be released. Not releasing the deposit could give rise to an action for
revocation on the grounds that the patent was issued under false pre-
tenses, namely that the culture would be available.
There are no provisions in New Zealand regarding what type of re-
strictions may be placed on the release of deposits, however, the IPAC
recommends following the practice of the United Kingdom which re-
quires undertakings that samples be used in a non-infringing manner.
Currently, the means of preventing the misuse of a sample obtained by a
third party is to start an infringement action.
111. Calhoun, supra note 103. According to this source, there is a decision before the
Assistant Commissioner in the New Zealand Patent Office which supports this principle.
In that case a description was made of a chemical compound whose formula was not
known at the date of filing of the complete specification. The applicant was allowed to
enter the chemical formula into the specification without postdating. This would appear
to be the same in principle as the entry of details of a deposit made after the date of filing.
Id.
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To obtain a sample, a member of the public must have the deposi-
tor's authorization and go through the depository since the New Zea-
land Patent Office has no formal agreements with international
depository authorities.
N. Paraguay
In Paraguay, there is no legislation referring to the patentability of
microorganisms or biotechnology.'
12
0. Peru
In Peru there is no special legislation covering the patentability of
microorganisms or biotechnology.' 
13
P. South Africa
Suggestions that South Africa become a member state of the Buda-
pest Treaty have met with opposition. 114 The issue has yet to be fully
addressed and no steps have been taken to achieve membership status.
It is expected that South Africa will adopt the EPO legal and procedural
requirements relating to microorganism deposits. Thus, where no spe-
cific statutes exist regarding microorganism deposits, it is safest to refer
to EPO policy.
The South Africa Patents Act states:
If a complete specification claims as an invention a microbio-
logical process or a product thereof, and requires for the per-
formance of the invention the use of a microorganism which is
not available to the public on the date of lodging of the applica-
tion and which cannot be made or obtained on the basis of the
description in the specification, the microorganism shall before
the acceptance of the application be dealt with in the pre-
scribed manner.
1 1 5
This section, which leaves the term "prescribed manner" undefined, is
not yet in operation. Proposed regulation 28bis would provide clarifica-
tion of this law. It states that a specification, in instances where a micro-
organism is not available to the public and cannot be obtained by the
written description alone, will be regarded as fully describing, ascertain-
ing and disclosing the invention if:
(a) A culture of the microorganism has been deposited in a
culture collection recognized by the European Patent Office for
the purpose of Rule 28 of the implementing regulations to the
Convention or the grant of European patents;
(b) the complete specification gives such relevant information
as is available to the applicant on the characteristics of the mi-
croorganisms; and
112. Letter from Gladys Bareiro de Modica to Thomas Denberg (Mar. 26, 1990).
113. Letter from Alejandro Botto B. to Thomas Denberg (May 10, 1990).
114. Letter from G.L. Erlank to Thomas Denberg (Mar. 16, 1990).
115. South Africa Patents Act, § 32(6).
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(c) the complete specification gives the date when the culture
was deposited, the culture collection in which it was deposited
and the file number of the deposit.'
16
These regulations have not been implemented, and the mode of de-
posit currently has no relevance as to the validity of a patent. It would
be prudent to comply with the provisions of section 32(6) until South
Africa adopts regulations because patents may be considered invalid on
the ground of insufficiency of disclosure if the written description alone
is not enabling.
South Africa has no provisions for opposing patent applications.
An application received by the Patent Office undergoes a formal exami-
nation in which the examiner verifies that the proper drawings accom-
pany the specification and that the application is otherwise in proper
form. Once the application is accepted and published, any party can go
to the Court of Commissioner of Patents to apply for revocation of the
patent. Apparently the examiner will not decide whether a deposit is
required, hence the applicant carries the burden of deciding whether a
deposit is necessary. It is also the responsibility of the applicant to make
sure that the deposit is available to the proper parties or risk challenge
and revocation of the patent on the grounds of insufficiency.
No depositories are officially authorized at present, but based on
proposed regulation 28bis, it appears that South Africa will recognize
the same depositories as the EPO. Since the EPO recognizes only Buda-
pest Treaty depositories, this means that only international depository
authorities of the Budapest Treaty will be recognized by South Africa,
whether or not South Africa accedes to the Treaty. Since South Africa is
not a member of the Treaty, and thus has no formal agreements with
Budapest depositories, applicants must authorize the depositories to re-
lease samples to the proper parties after the patent has issued.
According to the Patents Act, a complete specification shall "dis-
close the best method of performing the invention known to the appli-
cant at the time when the specification is lodged at the patent office.'
1 17
The term "best method," as opposed to "best mode," presumably refer-
ences inventions involving processes only. If narrow claims are sought
for a specific embodiment, a deposit may be required even if none is
required to broadly enable the invention.
It appears that the acceptance date, not the filing/priority date, is
the deadline for deposits in South Africa. To comply as closely as possi-
ble with the EPO's legal and procedural requirements of deposit before
the priority date, deposits should be made before the priority date in
South Africa as well.
Proposed regulation 28bis, discussed above, also provides that the
applicant must be able to prove to the satisfaction of the Registrar that
samples of the microorganism in question are available to the public in
116. Letter from G.L. Erlank to Thomas Denberg (Mar. 8, 1990).
117. South Africa Patents Act, § 32(3)(c).
1991]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LI W REVIEW
the Republic of South Africa. Since there is no substantive review of
patent applications by the South African Patent Office, this proof pre-
sumably would be required only if reference to a deposit is made in the
specification. There is no provision or proposed provision that access to
deposits will be required for members of the international public, as
there is in the EPO.
There are no statutes or proposed statutes governing what kinds of
restrictions can be placed on requesters for samples of deposits. In light
of South Africa's intent to follow EPO practice and legislation as closely
as possible, it would seem permissible for a depositor to require reques-
ters of samples to sign an undertaking not to infringe the patent or
transfer samples to third parties and to use the samples for experimental
purposes only.
Q Taiwan
The Taiwan Government (Republic of China) has not yet studied
the possibility or necessity of becoming a member of the Budapest
Treaty.11 8 Presently, the National Bureau of Standards in Taiwan does
not require microorganism deposits for patent-filing purposes.
Although processes for creating new strains of microorganisms are eligi-
ble for patent protection, new species of microorganisms per se are
barred from patent protection." 19
This policy is currently under review. A proposed amendment to
the patent law would allow new species of microorganisms to be eligible
for patent protection. This amendment stipulates a deposit requirement
for patent applications involving microorganism inventions. The follow-
ing discusses what policies are likely to be adopted in the event the pro-
posed amendment is enacted.
Presently, an invention must be described in a written specification
such that those skilled in the art understand it and can put the invention
into practice accordingly. 120 Under the new amendment, when micro-
organisms cannot be adequately described, a deposit will be required. It
is expected that the National Bureau of Standards may require the pat-
ent applicant to provide proof of deposit if a deposit is deemed an es-
sential element in identifying the objective, the technical contents, the
characteristics and the effectiveness of the invention involved. The
proposed amendment to the patent law will most likely allow deposits to
be placed with any international depository authority recognized under
the Budapest Treaty. The Culture Collection and Research Center
(CCRC) is the first and most widely used depository in Taiwan, and it is
expected to be one of the designated institutes recognized by the Na-
tional Bureau of Standards.
118. Letter from C.V. Chen to Thomas Denberg (Apr. 24, 1990).
119. ROC Patent Law, art. 4(2). "The following items shall not be granted a new in-
vention patent: ... 2. New species of animal, plant and microorganism, except the cultivat-
ing processes for the new species of plants and new strains of microorganism ..... Id.
120. ROC Patent Law, Enforcement Rules, art. 10(5).
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Although the Republic of China's patent law does not contain any
provision regarding the inclusion of the "best mode" in the patent spec-
ification, the National Bureau of Standards, under a draft Patent Exami-
nation Manual, requests patent applicants to describe the "best manner
in which their inventions could be practiced" in the patent specification.
Although the National Bureau of Standards uses this manual exten-
sively, it is not considered to be binding regulation.
Since Taiwan is not a signatory to any international conventions or
treaties concerning patent matters, no conventional priority can be
claimed based on foreign filing. According to the proposed amend-
ment, patent applicants must complete the deposit before filing patent
applications. The National Bureau of Standards will not grant a filing
date until it has received proof that the applicant has made the deposit.
During prosecution of an application it may be possible to ask the
examiner to make a determination as to the necessity of a deposit. If
one is required, but has not been made, the applicant may, prior to a
final decision rendered on the application, file a request for amendment
of the specification and submit a deposit. If the amendment causes
"substantial changes" 121 to the application, the filing date may be af-
fected. What constitutes a substantial change is not clear, but probably
includes anything that could be considered to be a new matter. If the
deposited material was on hand at the time of filing, however, a strong
argument could be made that a late deposit is not really a new matter.
Presumably, if a specification refers to a deposit that is ultimately not
required, reference to it could be deleted.
It is expected that public access to the deposit will be granted after
the patent application is approved and published in the Patent Gazette.
As with patent specifications and drawings, it is likely that deposits will
be available to the international public. It appears that the patent appli-
cant will be required to authorize release of the deposit. The National
Bureau of Standards and CRCC have not yet agreed upon what restric-
tions may be placed on accessing the deposits, but presumably they will
take appropriate steps to avoid unwarranted public inspection that could
lead to patent infringement.
R. Thailand
Animal, plant and biological processes involved in the production
of animals or plants are not patentable. It is not known whether animals
or plants may be interpreted to include microorganisms. The Patent
Office has never required deposits of microorganisms to fulfill descrip-
tion requirements. 22
S. Turkey
Turkey does not permit patents for microorganisms and has no
121. ROC Patent Law, art. 18(1).
122. Letter from Chavalit Uttasart to Thomas Denberg (July 23, 1990).
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legislation covering the patentability of microorganisms. 12 3
T. Uruguay
Similarly, there is no legislation in Uruguay concerning the patenta-
bility of microorganisms or biotechnology.
124
U. Venezuela
Venezuelan industrial property law does not specifically address the
patentability of microorganisms or biotechnology. Venezuela is in the
process of adopting a new industrial property law, which is expected to
be enacted within two years. The proposed law does not expressly pro-
hibit the patenting of plant and animal life or processes involved in the
generation of such life.' 2 5 Presumably, patenting these types of inven-
tions will be permitted, although it is not known what, if any, provisions
are being made for the deposit of microorganisms.
V. CONCLUSION
As the preceding discussion illustrates, the rules governing deposits
vary widely from country to country. Even in the Budapest Treaty coun-
tries, specific policies vary. Important differences include: (1) whether a
reference to an unnecessary deposit can be deleted from the specifica-
tion; (2) whether non-Budapest Treaty depositories are recognized for
local patenting procedures; (3) whether the best mode must be dis-
closed; (4) whether the deposit must be made before filing the specifica-
tion; (5) the stage at which deposits become publicly available; and (6)
the conditions which can be imposed on the release of deposits. The
policies of the non-Budapest Treaty countries are even more variable.
For example, many South American countries do not allow the patent-
ing of microorganisms at all, while countries such as Israel and New Zea-
land are on the verge of adopting the provisions of the Treaty and are
operating as if they were member states.
The applicant who wishes to gain multi-national rights, without fa-
cilitating infringement by making his microorganisms publicly available,
should pursue to have a detailed understanding of the patent proce-
dures and deposit requirements in the patent offices of interest. Some-
times regulations in one country will nullify the effect of regulations in
others. For example, the United States does not require deposits unless
necessary, but the Philippines always requires deposits which are made
available to the international public when the patent is granted. The
applicant must consider all ramifications in determining the appropriate
strategy and timing for filing in foreign offices.
123. Letter from Ahmet Atalay to Greenlee and Associates (May 9, 1990).
124. Letter from Marcela Hughes to Thomas Denberg (May 21, 1990).
125. Letters from Sonia Lorenzo to Thomas Denberg (May 1990).
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THE EN BANc REHEARING OF IN RE DILLON:
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR PATENT PROSECUTION
MARGARET M. WALL*
JUSTIN DrTURI**
A patent on a chemical composition may be granted if it is estab-
lished that the composition is useful, novel,' and nonobvious.2 The
nonobvious standard divides new and useful technological improve-
ments which result from a genuinely creative scientific effort from those
which merely employ common substitutions or variations.
3
Courts have struggled over the years to determine when a chemical
composition may be deemed prima facie obvious. The Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit's recent decision in the en banc rehearing of In re
Dillon4 reflects this continuing struggle. As a practical matter, the deci-
sion serves to raise the inventor's burden of satisfying the nonobvious-
ness test.
This article examines the policy implications of the Dillon decision
upon both chemical patent application prosecutions and the economics
of the patent system. Section one discusses nonobviousness. Section
two examines the evolution of the prima facie obvious standard for
chemical compositions. Section three discusses the Dillon case. Section
four analyzes the policy implications of the Dillon decision.
I. NONOBVIOUSNESS
Any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof is potentially pat-
entable. 5 A patentable invention must additionally satisfy the "nonobvi-
ousness" test.
6
* Associate Attorney, Greenlee and Associates, P.C., Boulder, CO;J.D., University
of Denver College of Law, 1988; B.A., University of Colorado, 1978.
** J.D. Candidate, University of Denver College of Law; M.S., University of Utah,
1986; B.A., University of Utah, 1980.
1. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (1988).
2. Id. § 103.
3. In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (I 1 How.) 248 (1851) the Supreme Court, in
deciding that a method of making doorknobs from clay was unpatentable, interpreted the
Patent Act as demanding inventiveness (today called nonobviousness). Id. at 267. The
Court said that "unless more ingenuity and skill... were required... than were possessed
by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absence of that degree
of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention." Id.
4. 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
5. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
6. Id. § 103.
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In 1952, Congress codified the nonobviousness requirement in title
35, section 103 of the United States Code. Section 103 provides in part:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not iden-
tically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this
title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains.
7
The addition of this section served only to codify a condition upon
which courts had long since insisted.8 Congress adopted section 103 in
order to stabilize the judicially created "inventiveness" standard. 9 In
doing so, Congress made it clear that to obtain a patent, a device must
be more than simply novel and useful; it must satisfy the "nonobvious-
ness" standard. 10
Thirteen years later, in Graham v. John Deere Co,1 1 the Supreme
Court interpreted this standard. The Court concluded that "the section
was intended merely as a codification of judicial precedents embracing
the Hotchkiss12 condition, with congressional directions that inquiries
into the obviousness of the subject matter sought to be patented are a
prerequisite to patentability."' 3 The Court stated that section 103 per-
mits a more practical test of patentability,14 noting that patent validity is
ultimately a question of law which "lends itself to several basic factual
inquiries."' 5
7. Id.
8. S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, repinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2394, 2399.
9. See Rich, Why and How Section 103 Came To Be, in NONOBVIOUSNESS-THE ULTIMATE
CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY 1:201, 1:206 (J. Witherspoon ed. 1980) where the author
explains:
Out of that decision [Hotchkiss] came the 'requirement for invention'-the re-
quirement that to be patentable an invention had to involve a mysterious quality
called 'invention' .... [The third requirement, beyond the novelty and utility
which were in the statute, and which evolved purely as case law, became.., the
'plaything of the judiciary' and meant anything the judges chose to make it mean.
The author notes that the patent bar perceived an antagonism in the judiciary toward
patents. He suggests that the discontent began with the Supreme Court's decision in
Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941). This Court, while
applying the Hotchkiss rule in a patent case, declared something unpatentable because it
lacked a "flash of creative genius." Id. at 90. The patent bar, irked by this highly subjec-
tive standard, pushed for the codification of the standard which, as the author points out,
was named "inventiveness." S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1952 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2394, 2399 ("This section should have a stabilizing effect and
minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.").
10. See Rich, The Vague Concept of "Invention"as Replaced by Section 103 of the 1952 Patent
Act, in NONOBVIOUSNESs-THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY 1:401, 1:408 (J.
Witherspoon ed. 1980) ("What Section 103 itself says is that what is patented must not
have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art involved, at the time the invention was
made .... This is not a 'standard of invention' and it is not called a 'requirement of
invention.' ").
11. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
12. 52 U.S. (I1 How.) 248 (1850).
13. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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Graham articulated a three-part test for determining nonobvious-
ness: (1) determine the scope and content of the prior art; (2) ascertain
the difference between the prior art and the claims at issue; and (3) re-
solve the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
16
Since the enactment of section 103, there have been numerous de-
cisions involving the evidentiary burden required for establishing a
prima facie case of obviousness. From among a milieu of conflicting
rulings emerges a trend, particularly in the area of chemical patents.
Courts construing early chemical patents required only a showing of
structural obviousness of the novel chemical compound relative to prior
art compounds to create a presumption of obviousness.1 7 More recent
cases have required not only structural similarity, but a suggestion in the
prior art that the novel composition would have the new property.
1 8
II. EVOLUTION OF PRIMA FACIE OBVIOUSNESS IN CHEMICAL
CoMPOsrrIONS CASES
This section examines the role of composition properties in obvi-
ousness determinations. 19 Chemical compounds present a special prob-
lem for nonobviousness analysis. 20 Chemical bonds are formed based
on well known rules. These rules provide the skilled chemist, presented
with a structure on paper, with the ability to synthesize the compound.
2 1
The nonobviousness analysis problem is to determine whether the in-
ventor simply created a novel compound which has the desired proper-
ties by searching through prior disclosures and making minor structural
adjustments to a known composition. This question has driven the judi-
cial quest for a standard to distinguish the nonobvious chemical com-
pound claim.
2 2
16. Id. The Court also stated that secondary considerations of "commercial success,
long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the
circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented." Id. at
17-18.
17. See infra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 35-78 and accompanying text.
19. As used in decisions interpreting section 103, the properties of a chemical compo-
sition are its uses or utilities. A property of a novel composition is said to be unexpected if
it was not previously possessed by related prior art compositions. It is said to be unexpect-
edly improved if the property is shared by the prior art and novel compositions and if the
novel composition demonstrates an unexpectedly improved effectiveness in that shared
property over the prior art composition. A novel composition is said to demonstrate ac-
tual differences from the prior art composition if it does not share the unexpected prop-
erty with the prior art composition. Ifa property of a novel composition is actually shared
with a prior art composition, a distinction is also made as to whether it was known that the
prior art composition possessed the property. Thus, an unexpected property of a novel
composition may be truly new and not actually possessed by prior art compounds, or it
may be new only in the sense that the property was not previously known to be possessed
by prior art compositions.
20. See Note, Standards of Obviousness and the Patentability of Chemical Compounds, 87 HARV.
L. REv. 607, 607 (1974) ("Perhaps no area of patent law is more uncertain than that con-
cerning the application of the section 103 test of 'nonobviousness' . . to chemical com-
pounds ....").
21. See D. CHiSUM, PATENTs § 5.04(b), at 5-312 (2d ed. 1990).
22. There are various articles on the standard for determining nonobviousness in
chemical compounds. See Blodget, Relative Significance-A Concept in Chemical Structural Obvi-
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Prior to the enactment of section 103, an obviousness determina-
tion required a demonstration of close structural relatedness between
the novel composition and the known compositions. 23 Underlying this
early rule was the presumption that structurally similar chemicals have
similar properties. In the early cases, a presumption of obviousness
could be rebutted by a showing that the novel composition possessed a
property not actually possessed by related prior art compositions.
2 4
These early cases do not generally refer to a "prima facie" case of obvi-
ousness; rather, they refer to presumptions or determinations of
obviousness.
2 5
In re Hass26 examined the patenting of homologs of prior art com-
pounds. 27 The court ruled that "[n]ovel members of a homologous se-
ries of chemical compounds must possess some nonobvious or
unexpected beneficial properties not possessed by a homologous com-
pound disclosed in the prior art."
'28
In re Henze 29 extended the ruling of Hass. Henze placed a "presump-
tion of unpatentability" on a composition of matter claim for which the
adjacent homolog was old in the art.30 The court placed the burden on
the applicant to rebut the presumption by showing that the claimed
compound possessed unobvious or unexpected beneficial properties not
actually possessed by the prior art homolog.3 l The court considered it
immaterial that the known compound was not "[r]ecognized or known to
be useful for the same purpose or to possess the same properties as the
claimed compound."
'3 2
To rebut the presumption of obviousness derived from structural
ousness Cases, 63 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 69 (198 1) (justifying the use of the relative significance
of claimed compound with similar structure in the prior art to rebut a presumption of
obviousness); Marquis, An Economic Analysis of the Patentability of Chemical Compounds, 63 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 3 (1981) (presenting an economic analysis of the effectiveness for stan-
dards of patentability in chemical compounds and using the analysis to compare the grav-
ity of a composition claim based on a novel use against the granting of a method claim).
See also Note, supra note 20 (assessing the standards for patentability of novel chemical
compounds).
23. In re Henze, 181 F.2d 196, 201 (C.C.P.A. 1950) (overruled by In re Stemniski, 444
F.2d 581 (C.C.P.A. 1971)).
24. Henze at 201.
25. Id.
26. 141 F.2d 130 (C.C.P.A. 1944). This is the third of three companion cases. The
other two are In re Hass, 141 F.2d 127 (C.C.P.A. 1944) and In re Hass, 141 F.2d 122
(C.C.P.A. 1944).
27. "A series of compounds in which each member differs from the next member by a
constant amount is called a homologous series, and the members of the series are called
homologs." R. MORRISON & R. BOYD, ORGANIC CHEMISTRY 101 (2d ed. 1966). All mem-
bers of a homologous series of chemicals tend to possess the same principle characteris-
tics. Knowledge of the properties and chemical behavior of one member of a homologous
series suggests the properties and chemical behavior of another member of a series. Hass,
141 F.2d at 125.
28. Hass, 141 F.2d at 125.
29. 181 F.2d 196 (C.C.P.A. 1950) (overruled by In re Stemniski, 444 F.2d 581
(C.C.P.A. 1971)).
30. 181 F.2d at 201.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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similarity, the Henze court required that the novel composition contain a
novel property not actually shared by prior art compositions.3 3 The
court indicated that a mere improvement in a property shared with prior
art compositions was not sufficient to impart nonobviousness.
3 4
In re Papesch35 synthesized the Hass-Henze doctrine in light of section
103. The novel compound possessed a structure similar to compounds
in the prior art. The prior art compounds, however, did not possess
certain anti-inflammatory capabilities present in the novel compound.
36
The Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals and Interferences
(Board) rejected the composition claim on the basis of obviousness due
to structural similarities.3 7 The Board stated that the compound was so
similar to the prior art, its obviousness was beyond doubt.3 8 The Board
noted that the fact that compound possessed properties nonexistent in
the prior art could be used only to resolve doubt.
3 9
The Court of Claims and Patent Appeals reversed, stating that the
Board's finding that a showing of properties was necessary only to re-
solve doubt rested on a "fundamental error of law." 40 The court ruled
that since a compound is inseparable from all of its properties, an obvi-
ousness determination requires the consideration of both similarities in
properties and structures.
4 1
The scope of the Hass-Henze rule was limited by several later cases.
In re Mills4 2 limited the legal presumption of obviousness to only adja-
cent homologs. The court found that the prior art compositions con-
taining alkyl sulfates of C8-C1 2, compounds useful as anti-caking agents
in detergents, did not create a presumption of obviousness for methyl
(Cl) sulfates, another type of anti-caking agent.43 The court ruled that
the Henze presumption of obviousness was applicable only to immedi-
ately adjacent homologs and not more distant members of the homolo-
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 315 F.2d 381 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
36. Id. at 383.
37. Id. at 385.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 386.
40. Id. at 391.
41. Id. at 391-92. The court said:
From the standpoint of patent law, a compound and all of its properties are in-
separable; they are one and the same thing .... And the patentability of the
thing [compound] does not depend on the similarity of its formula to that of
another compound but of the similarity of the former compound to the latter.
There is no basis in law for ignoring any property in making such a comparison.
The other factor of importance [in an obviousness determination] is that the prior
art disclosure was not merely of a structurally similar compound but also, at least
to a degree, of the same desired property relied on for patentability in the new com-
pound. Such an 'other factor' must of course be considered because it bears on
the obviousness of the compound, which is, realistically and legally, a composite
of both structure and properties.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
42. 281 F.2d 218 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
43. Id. at 221.
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gous series. 44
The Hass-Henze rule was further limited by In re Stemniski.4 5 In
Stemniski the claimed compounds had an antioxidant property not known
to be possessed by prior art compounds. In fact, the prior art com-
pounds had no known utility. Ruling that the claimed composition was
nonobvious, the court suggested that it was immaterial whether the
prior art compounds actually had antioxidant properties.4 6 The court
explicitly overruled Henze, indicating that the Henze rule does not apply
where the applicant describes a utility for the novel composition, and
the prior art does not disclose or suggest any usefulness for the prior art
compounds.4 7 The court suggested that the applicant was under no ob-
ligation to demonstrate that the unexpected property of the novel com-
position was not actually possessed by the prior art compounds.
4 8
The Stemniski limitation was extended in In re Albrecht.4 9 In Albrecht
the novel composition exhibited unexpected antiviral activity not pos-
sessed by the closest prior art compound. The prior art compound pos-
sessed anesthetic activity but was unsuitable for such use because it
caused skin irritation. The Board found that prima facie obviousness
was not rebutted by the unexpected antiviral activity.50 It ruled that the
inventor had the burden to show that the novel composition did not
produce anesthetic activity.
5 1
Reversing the Board, the court stated that the unexpected antiviral
activity did rebut prima facie obviousness.5 2 The court reasoned that
there was no motivation for those skilled in the art to synthesize the
related novel composition because the prior art disclosed the unsuitabil-
ity of the known compounds for use as anesthetics.
53
The Hass-Henze doctrine was further limited by In re Chupp.54 Chupp
involved a claim for a herbicide structurally similar to prior art herbi-
cides. To rebut prima facie obviousness, the applicant submitted evi-
dence showing that the novel composition produced superior herbicidal
results. 55 The court stated that evidence to rebut prima facie obvi-
ousness "may include data showing that a compound is unexpectedly
44. Id. The court stated:
Where, as here, the invention for which a patent is sought relates to one member
of an homologous series and the disclosure of the prior art is of a non-adjacent
member of the series. [sic] In re Henze ... is not authority for a 'legal presump-
tion' of obviousness of the claimed invention.
Id. (citation omitted).
45. 444 F.2d 581 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
46. See id. at 587.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 587.
49. 514 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
50. Id. at 1393.
51. Id. at 1396.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 816 F.2d 643 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
55. The superior herbicidal property in Chupp concerned selective weed-killing
properties (controlling quackgrass and yellow nutsedge without damaging corn or soy-
beans). Id. at 644.
266 [Vol. 68:2
REHEARING OF IN RE DILLON
superior in a property it shares with prior art compounds .... Evidence
that a compound is unexpectedly superior in one of a spectrum of com-
mon properties, as here, can be enough to rebut a prima facie case of
obviousness.
' '56
By the 1980s, prima facie obviousness decisions began to explicitly
require an analysis of similarity of properties. In In re Grabiak57 the
court ruled that a novel composition exhibiting "safening" 58 activity in
herbicides was not prima facie obvious. 59 The court reasoned that there
was no suggestion in the closest prior art that the structural change be
made nor was there sufficient evidence indicating that the safening activ-
ity was predictable even for closely related structures.60 The court
stated that "[w]hen chemical compounds have very 'close' structural
similarities and similar utilities, without more a prima facie case may be
made." 6 1
In re Payne6 2 contains a similar prima facie analysis. The court ruled
that a prima facie case was made because there was a close structural
similarity with prior art compounds and because the pesticidal activity of
the novel composition was a known property of the prior art com-
pounds. The court stated:
An obviousness rejection based on similarity in chemical struc-
ture and function entails the motivation of one skilled in the art
to make a claimed compound, in the expectation that the com-
pounds similar in structure will have similar properties.
The similarity in chemical structures and properties between
the prior art and claimed compounds is sufficiently close to
support a prima facie case of obviousness.
63
56. Id. at 646. We note that the Chupp ruling is directly contrary to dicta in Henze
indicating that a mere improvement in a shared property is not sufficient to impart nonob-
viousness. See Henze, 181 F.2d 196, 201 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
57. 769 F.2d 729 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
58. A safener protects growing crops from weed killers. Id. at 729.
59. Id. at 732.
60. Id. at 732-33.
61. Id. at 731.
62. 606 F.2d 303 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
63. Id. at 313-14 (citations omitted). See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
where the court held that the Patent Office had not established a prmafacie case of obvi-
ousness because the combination of elements of applicant's gas chromatograph/detector
was not suggested by the prior art and because the temperature range limitation on the
system claims had a different purpose than the temperature range specified in the prior
art. It was immaterial that there was some overlap in the temperature ranges. Id. at 1074-
75. See also In re Wright, 848 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1988) where the court held that the
Patent Office had not established a prima facie case because none of the cited references
suggested the claimed combination of Wright's structure (an improved carpenter's level)
as a solution to the problem of increasing pitch measurement capacity. Id. at 1220. The
court in Wright said:
The determination of whether a novel structure is or is not 'obvious' requires
cognizance of the properties of that structure and the problem which it solves,
viewed in light of the teachings of the prior art.
Thus the question is whether what the inventor did would have been obvious to
one of ordinary skill in the art attempting to solve the problem upon which the
inventor was working.
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A line of post-Henze cases discuss balancing the significance of the
unexpected property of the novel composition with the significance of
the expected properties of the prior art composition.
6 4 In re Nolan6 5
used a balancing test to determine whether the unexpected property of a
novel device was sufficiently significant to rebut evidence of obvi-
ousness.6 6 It found that the unexpected properties did not have a sig-
nificance equal to or greater than that of the expected property to rebut
the other evidence of obviousness.
6 7
A balancing approach was also applied in In re De Montmollin6 8 and
In re Mod.69 De Montmollin involved the rejection of a claim for a water
soluble dye used for dying wool, cotton and cellulose. 70 The prior art
dyes were of a similar structure and could be used for dying wool.
7 1
The appellant argued that the rejection failed to consider the unex-
pected use (cotton and cellulose dyeing) not mentioned in the prior
art.7 2 The court stated that "a single variance in the properties of new
chemical compounds will [not] necessarily tip the balance in favor of
patentability where otherwise closely related chemical compounds are
involved."
7 3
In re Mod involved a claim for a novel antimicrobial agent. 74 The
prior art compounds were structurally related and shared the property
of insecticidal activity with appellant's novel compound. 75 The prior art
compounds, however, did not possess antimicrobial activity. 76 After
balancing the unexpected antimicrobial activity against the shared ex-
Id. at 1219 (citations omitted).
64. See znfra notes 68-78 and accompanying text. While the function of this balancing
is not readily apparent, it is performed following the initial determination of prima fade
obviousness. In at least some of these decisions, it appears that the balancing is done to
determine whether the new or unexpected property is sufficiently significant to rebut the
prima facie case of obviousness.
65. 553 F.2d 1261 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
66. The Nolan invention was an improvement in a gaseous discharge display/memory
device having an electrical memory and the capability of producing a visual display. The
improvement comprised the use of a defined ionizable gaseous medium containing neon
and a small percentage of rare gas (argon, krypton and xenon). Id. at 1262. The device
had the benefits of higher memory margin, higher luminous efficiency, and lower peak
discharge current through the use of the claimed gas mixture. The court found the higher
memory margin to be expected in view of the prior art, and the higher luminous efficiency
and lower peak discharge current to be unexpected properties. Id. at 1267.
67. Id. at 1267.
68. 344 F.2d 976 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
69. 408 F.2d 1055 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
70. 344 F.2d at 977.
71. Id. at 978.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 978 (emphasis in original). The court held:
The claimed substances, as well as those in the prior art, are water soluble materi-
als useful as dyes. Both sets of compounds have the property of being wool dyes
and both result in dyeings on wool fabrics which are fast to washing and fulling.
Under the circumstances and weighing the available evidence, we do not regard the
additional ability to dye cotton sufficient to render the subject matter as a whole
unobvious.
Id. at 978-79 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
74. 408 F.2d 1055, 1055 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
75. Id. at 1055-56.
76. Id. at 1056.
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pected property, the court ruled that the invention was obvious. 77 It
noted that the unexpected antimicrobial activity was not sufficiently sig-
nificant to find nonobviousness. 78
III. THE IN RE DILLON DECISION
There are two In re Dillon decisions. The first is the Federal Circuit
panel decision rendered on December 29, 1989 (the Panel Decision).
7 9
The second is the court's en banc rehearing decision rendered on No-
vember 9, 1990 (the en banc Decision).8 0
Dillon requested a patent for a novel composition comprising a hy-
drocarbon fuel and an effective amount of tetra-orthoesters, and a
method for reducing particulate emissions by the combustion of the
composition.8 1 Dillon's broadest composition claim was directed to a
composition comprising a hydrocarbon fuel and an amount of tetra-
orthoesters sufficient to reduce particulate emissions during the com-
bustion of the hydrocarbon fuel.8 2 Her broadest method claim was di-
rected to a method of reducing particulate emissions during the
combustion of hydrocarbon fuel by combusting a mixture of the hydro-
carbon fuel and an amount of tetra-orthoesters sufficient to reduce par-
ticulate emissions.
8 3
The Board rejected Dillon's patent application on obviousness
grounds. In doing so, the Board cited three prior art references. The
first cited reference taught a composition of tri-orthoesters mixed with
hydrocarbon fuels in order to "de-water" the fuel.8 4 The second cited
reference taught the use of tri-orthoesters in a mixture of hydrocarbon
fuels and immiscible alcohols where the tri-orthoeseters serve as co-sol-
vents to prevent phase separation between fuel and alcohol.8 5 The third
77. Id. at 1057.
78. Id. The court stated:
Inasmuch as the claimed compounds and those of [the prior art] do possess a
close structural relationship and it is not denied that they have a specific, significant
property in common, viz. insecticidal activity, we do not regard the additional
antimicrobial activity discovered by appellants for the claimed compounds suffi-
cient ground to hold that the subject matter as a whole is unobvious.
Id. (emphasis in original). A similar property-balancing analysis is conducted in Solder
Removal Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 582 F.2d 628 (C.C.P.A. 1978). In Sol-
der Removal the court stated "[w]here the reason for the practice suggested by the prior art
is much less significant than the reason derived from the inventor's solution to another
problem, the results may be so unexpected as to support a conclusion of nonobviousness."
Id. at 635.
79. 892 F.2d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1989), withdrawn and superseded, 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
80. 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990). On February 12, 1990, the Commissioner of the
Patent and Trademark Office filed a Petition for Rehearing en banc. Shortly thereafter, an
opposing petition by Ms. Dillon and several amicus curiae briefs were filed with the court.
On May 21, 1990, the Federal Circuit accepted Dillon for rehearing en banc and vacated the
December 29, 1989 panel decision.
81. 919 F.2d at 690-91.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 691.
85. Id.
1991]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
cited reference taught the use of tri-orthoesters and tetra-orthoesters as
water scavengers in hydraulic (non-hydrocarbon) fluids.
8 6
Dillon appealed the Board's decision. The appellate court panel
overturned the Board's decision stating that similarity of structure alone
does not establish a prima facie case of obviousness: "there must be
some reason, arising in the prior act, to expect that the claimed com-
pounds or compositions will have the properties found by the appli-
cant."' 87 The en banc court overruled the panel decision, and affirmed
the Board's rejection of Dillon's patent.8 8 The court found that the
prior art neither taught a fuel composition comprising tetra-orthoesters
for any use nor specifically taught or suggested the use of tetra-orthoes-
ters to reduce particulate emission in the combustion of hydrocarbon
fuels.8 9 The court ruled that there was no evidence of a relationship
between the properties of water-scavenging and reducing particulate
emissions upon combustion. 90
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Dillon Rules
While the en banc Dillon decision does resolve a number of inconsis-
tencies appearing in prior cases, it does so at the expense of inventors.
It has the practical effect of placing a greater evidentiary burden on the
inventor by making it easier for the Patent Office to establish prima facie
obviousness.
The court stated that although a composition is novel and its new
property is not shown or suggested by the prior art compositions, a
prima facie case of obviousness for the composition is made where the
examiner can show that: (1) prior art compounds possess similar struc-
tures to the novel composition, and (2) the prior art gives a reason or
motivation to make the claimed novel compositions. 9 1
According to the court, an applicant can rebut a prima facie case by
showing one of the following: (A) the claimed composition possesses
properties not actually possessed by prior art compositions (Option A);
(B) the claimed composition possesses an unexpectedly improved prop-
erty shared with prior art compounds (Option B); or (C) the prior art is
so deficient that chemists have no motivation to make obvious composi-
tional changes (Option C).92 The court suggests a further rebuttal op-
tion of arguing the relative importance of the claimed compositions
compared with the prior art.93 This option is similar to Option C.
94
86, Id. at 690-91.
87. 892 F.2d 1554, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
88. 919 F.2d at 698.
89. Id. at 691.
90. Id. at 694.
91. Id. at 692. The court notes that the reason or motivation need not be related to
the new problem solved by the novel composition. Id. at 692-93.
92. Id. at 693.
93. Id. at 694.
94. ld. at 692-93. By pointing out that Dillon failed to argue the relative importance
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As to the elements necessary to establish a prima fade case, the Dil-
lon decision is consistent with Hass9 5 and Henze,96 but inconsistent with
such later cases as Payne,9 7 Grabiak,98 Fine,9 9 and Wright.10 0 As regards
the options for rebuttal of a prima fade case: Option A is consistent
with Henze;' 0 Option B is consistent with Chupp;10 2 and Option C and
related dicta regarding "relative importance" of properties are reminis-
cent of the property balancing cases of De Montmollin,' 0 3 Mod, 10 4 No-
/an,10
5 and Solder Removal.1
0 6
The court also overruled Wright '0 7 to the extent that it is contrary
to the en banc definition of a prima fade case.108 The court said that a
prima fade case does not require a suggestion in, or an expectation
from, the prior art indicating that the claimed composition will have the
newly discovered and unexpected property.' 0 9
B. Implications for Biotechnology Practice
The underlying premise of Dillon is that compositions having similar
structures predictably have similar properties. This premise, however,
often fails in the field of biotechnology.
Many patent law practitioners characterize biotechnology and
chemistry inventions as having similar levels of predictability relative to
mechanical inventions.110 Some aspects of biotechnology, however, are
of her composition compared with the prior art, the court suggests that such arguments
may have been considered by the court in rebuttal of the prima facie obviousness. Id. at
695. Unfortunately, Dillon, operating on the assumption that Wright was good law, appar-
ently did not present these arguments to the Board, although they were presented in her
Brief in Opposition to Rehearing. Brief for Appellant Dillon in Opposition to Petition for
Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 9, 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (No.
88-1245). Given the overwhelming significance of the emission reduction property rela-
tive to the de-watering property, it is not inconceivable that had Dillon made the signifi-
cance arguments, her composition claims may have been held to be nonobvious.
95. In re Hass, 141 F.2d 122 (C.C.P.A. 1944).
96. In re Henze, 181 F.2d 196 (C.C.P.A. 1950) (overruled by In re Stemniski, 444 F.2d
581 (C.C.P.A. 1971)).
97. In re Payne, 606 F.2d 303 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
98. In re Grabiak, 769 F.2d 729 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
99. In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
100. In re Wright, 848 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
101. Henze, 181 F.2d 196 (C.C.P.A. 1950).
102. In re Chupp, 816 F.2d 643 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
103. In re De Montmollin, 344 F.2d 976 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
104. In re Mod, 408 F.2d 1055 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
105. In re Nolan, 553 F.2d 1261 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
106. Solder Removal Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 582 F.2d 628 (C.C.P.A.
1978).
107. In re Wright, 848 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
108. In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 693 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
109. Id. The court indicates that even a use limitation in a composition claim (such as
Dillon's limitation that the tetra-orthoester quantity be sufficient to reduce particulate
emissions) will not save a novel composition from an obviousness rejection where struc-
tural similarity to prior art compositions and any motivation to synthesize the novel com-
position have been established. Id. at 693 n.4.
110. See, e.g., R.P. Blackburn, Comments Made at American Intellectual Property Law
Association's Chemical and Biotechnology Practice Course (Chicago (Sept. 14, 1990); San
Francisco (Oct. 5, 1990); and Newark (Nov. 2, 1990)).
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so clearly empirical that they eliminate any predictability of properties
based on similarities of structure.1 1 1 The relative unpredictability in
some aspects of biotechnology is due to the fact that small variations in
structure may or may not result in significant changes in biological
function. 
1 12
For example, the Board has acknowledged the empirical, unpredict-
able nature of monoclonal antibodies." 13 The effect of a single amino
acid or nucleotide substitution in a sequence on the biological function
of the sequence is empirical; thus, the effect on biological function can-
not be known or even predicted with a reasonable amount of certainty
until the substitution is performed and the sequence tested for biologi-
cal function.
14
The relative unpredictability of biological activity of molecules is
directly contrary to the underlying premise of Dillon, i.e., that structur-
ally similar compositions have similar properties.1 15 The following hy-
potheticals illustrate the inequities that can result from the application
of the Dillon rule to biotechnology inventions.
For example, assume it was known in the art that glycoprotein "A,"
having a known amino acid sequence, is an integral membrane protein
in murine muscle cells. Further assume that it was known that the pro-
tein functions in the transport of certain nutrients across the cell mem-
brane by receptor-mediated endocytosis. The question becomes
whether a novel glycoprotein "B" having a 90% amino acid sequence
homology with "A" is deemed nonobvious if it were found to function
as a viral accession site in human muscle cells. The "A" glycoprotein
was previously isolated, characterized and used to manufacture
monoclonal antibodies useful in the diagnosis of certain genetic disor-
ders related to deficient nutrient uptake by muscle cells. In addition to
discovering that glycoprotein "B" is a human muscle cell viral accession
site, purified "B" has been found by the inventor to mitigate infection by
the virus when administered to infected individuals. Purified "B" has
great medical value in the abatement of viral infection of human muscle
cells. Although not previously known, the inventor has also determined
that "A" has a viral accession function in murine muscle cells.
I 11. See, e.g., Kalusa, Alvarez-Morales & Hennecke, Oligonucleolide-directed Mutagenests of
the Rhzzobzumjaponicum nfH Promotor[sic], 188 FED'N OF EUR. BIOCHEM. Soc'Y 37, 41 (1985)
[hereinafter Olgonucleotide-directed Mutageness].
112. B. ALBERTS, D. BRAY, J. LEwIs, M. RAFF, K. ROBERTS &J.D. WATSON, MOLECULAR
BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 97-100 (2d ed. 1989).
113. See, e.g., Ex parte Old, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 196, 200 (PTO Bd. Pat. App. & Int'f
1986) where the Board states:
Although the technique underlying hybridoma technology is well recognized,
nevertheless, the results obtained by its use clearly are unpredictable.
Hybridoma technology is an empirical art in which the routineer is unable to fore-
see what particular antibodies will be produced and which specific surface anti-
gens will be recognized by them. Only by actually carrying out the requisite steps
can the nature of the monoclonal antibodies be determined and ascertained; no
"'expected" results can thus be said to be present.
114. See, e.g., Oligonucleotide-drected .Mlulagenests, supra note 111.
115. In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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Applying the Dillon rule to this scenario, "B" is deemed prima fade
obvious over "A" because it is structurally similar and there would be
some motivation to isolate and sequence "B" to determine and utilize its
nutrient transport function. It is not possible to rebut the prima facie
case by showing that "B" contains a property not actually possessed by
prior art "A" (Option A) because "A" was determined by the inventor
to have the same viral accession function in murine muscle cells. It is
also not possible to rebut the prima fade case by demonstrating an un-
expectedly improved property (Option B). Furthermore, the prima facie
case cannot be rebutted by demonstrating that there is no motivation
provided in the prior art to sequence "B" (Option C). The only possible
means of rebutting the prima facie case is to provide evidence showing
that the unexpected property of viral accession is more significant than
the expected property of nutrient transport.
The Dillon court did not articulate criteria by which to judge the
relative significance of expected and unexpected properties. In De
Montmollin,116 Mod,"I7 and Nolan,118 however, none of the unexpected
properties were held to be sufficiently significant relative to the expected
properties. While it is difficult to know at this stage of the law whether
the viral accession property of "B" would be deemed more significant
than the nutrient transport property of "A," it seems unlikely. The
medical significance of each function seems roughly equivalent. It
seems unlikely that the inventor would be able to rebut the prima facie
case by showing superior significance.
This outcome is inequitable because the viral accession property of
"B" is truly unpredictable from the structure of "A" or its nutrient
transport or viral accession functions. Just because "A" demonstrates
viral accession function does not mean that structurally related "B,"
having 10% amino acid substitution over "A," will also have a viral ac-
cession function.
In some situations, where an unexpectedly improved property of
the novel composition can be shown, the Dillon rule will not have a nega-
tive impact. For example, ribulose 1,5-bisphosphate carboxylase, also
known as "Rubisco," is the enzyme that catalyzes the reaction of CO 2
with 1,5-bisphosphate to form two molecules of 3-phosphoglycerate. 119
Rubisco is located on the stromal surface of thylakoid membranes in
chloroplasts. In addition to its carboxylase activity, Rubisco also cata-
lyzes a competing oxygenase activity. 120 The oxygenase and carboxy-
lase reactions are carried out at the same active site and compete with
each other. The rate of the carboxylase reaction is four times that of the
oxygenase reaction under normal atmospheric conditions at 25"C. The
oxygenase reaction is considered wasteful as it produces a product,
116. In re De Montmollin, 344 F.2d 976, 978-79 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
117. In re Mod, 408 F.2d 1055, 1057 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
118. In re Nolan, 553 F.2d 1261, 1267 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
119. L. STRYER, BIOCHEMISTRY 534 (3d ed. 1988).
120. Id. at 535-36.
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phosphoglycolate, which is not a very versatile metabolite. 12 1 If an in-
ventor were able to alter the amino acid sequence of Rubisco sufficiently
to improve the carboxylase activity relative to the oxygenase activity, it
could provide plants with improved efficiency in carbon dioxide fixation.
Such a plant would have great commercial value because it would sub-
stantially improve crop yields.
122
Under the Dillon rule, the inventor could rebut the prima facie case
of obviousness by demonstrating an unexpectedly improved property
over prior art compositions. The property would be unexpectedly im-
proved because the improvement in carboxylase activity could not have
been reasonably predicted from the amino acid substitutions employed.
While it would be "obvious to try" various substitutions, until such sub-
stitutions were performed and tested in biological systems, their effect
on carboxylase activity could not be known or predicted with reasonable
certainty. 123 Consequently, an "obvious to try" substitution is not an
acceptable basis for an obviousness rejection.'
2 4
Biotechnology is an infant industry which typically requires large
expenditures in research and development in order to obtain a market-
ready product. Many investors have become frustrated with the expense
and time required for development of new products.' 25 Because many
biotechnology inventions cannot be adequately protected as trade
secrets, it is incumbent upon the patent system to recognize the need for
adequate protection for novel compositions having unexpected proper-
ties which might otherwise not be discovered without the benefit of the
system. The vacated Dillon panel recognized this need:
There is merit to the classical explanation that the incentive to
study new variations of known compounds and compositions,
in order to search for new uses, would be diminished if such
new compounds and compositions cannot be patented despite
discovery of new and unobvious properties. The contrary view
carries scant counter-balancing public benefit.
12 6
In the glycoprotein "A" and "B" hypothetical, the "B" amino acid
sequence exhibiting viral accession activity in human muscle tissue
could be easily reverse engineered. Once a pharmacological product
containing effective amounts of "B" was on the market, "B" could be
easily sequenced and its sequence could not be maintained as a trade
secret. Thus, without adequate protection under the patent system, the
inventor cannot recoup sunk coStS127 or benefit from the fruits of his
inventiveness.
The net result of this failure to protect and reward may be to dis-
121. Id. at 536.
122. Id.
123. Ex parte Old, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 196, 200 (PTO Bd. Pat. App. & Int'f 1986).
124. Id.
125. Gianturco, Biotechnology Isn't Dead, FORBES, May 1, 1989 at 410.
126. In ?e Dillon, 892 F.2d 1554, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1989), withdrawn and superseded, 919
F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
127. Set infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
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courage biotechnology innovations. This consequence will not only be
a blow to many industries-such as the agricultural, medical and phar-
maceutical industries-but also a loss to society since these innovations
can vastly improve our quality of life.
C. Economic Policy Implications
The cost to society of granting a patent must be offset by the social
benefit flowing from the innovation. 12 8 In this regard, the patent system
serves as a mechanism through which competing interests are balanced.
This section briefly examines the economic policy implications of the
Dillon decision.
The Dillon claims involve a fuel composition which reduces air pol-
lution from the operation of diesel-motored engines. The question
arises: What incentive did Union Oil of California (Unocal)129 have to
develop this fuel composition? It would appear that in a highly competi-
tive market, Unocal has very little incentive. Assuming that truck drivers
are more interested in the price of fuel than in its features, drivers will
tend to buy the lowest priced product. If Unocal (or any other pro-
ducer) attempts to internalize the research and development costs of its
innovation, demand will favor the lower cost non-innovative competi-
tor's fuel.13 0 Consequently, fuel producers have no incentive to develop
cleaner fuels and governmental regulation of pollution emissions be-
comes necessary.
Ironically, it is governmental regulation which ultimately spurs
much of private research and development in this area. In anticipation
of regulation, fuel producers begin developing fuel compositions aimed
at satisfying the expected governmental requirements. Once the regula-
tion is promulgated, the company which first develops and patents the
128. See generally Marquis, supra note 22 at 58-62. The article discusses private costs
and value versus social cost and value and how it relates to analyzing the patent law
system:
Granted, that there results an increment in national product attributable to inven-
tions that are generated, or whose application is accelerated, by the patent incen-
tive. Against this, however, must be set the reduction in national product that is
attributable to restriction in the use of those inventions which are patented but
which would have appeared at the same time without patent incentive and would
have been free for unrestricted use by anybody.
Id. at 63. See also Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 at 10-11 ("Mhe underlying policy
of the patent system that 'the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of
an exclusive patent,' as Jefferson put it, must outweigh the restrictive effect of the limited
patent monopoly.").
129. Unocal was Dillon's employer.
130. See Marquis, supra note 22 at 58-62. The article discusses why the marginal cost of
the research and development is zero and, therefore, in a competitive market with no pat-
ent protection the innovator cannot recover sunk costs of development. The author
states:
If the invention is used competitively-by anybody who cares to, and without re-
strain or payment-the quantity of goods produced will be so large that the price
at which they are sold will cover no more than the marginal cost; hence, the sell-
ing price will contain nothing for the use of the invention, no return on the sunk
investment.
Id. at 59.
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innovative fuel composition recoups its sunk costs by licensing fees to
other producers who must meet the new standards.
The Dillon en banc decision serves to undermine this incentive. By
placing a greater evidentiary burden on the inventor, the en banc deci-
sion makes it more difficult to obtain composition patents. Composition
patents are generally regarded as more valuable than process patents
because the former allows the patentee to exclude others from selling
the composition, as well as precluding others from actually making or
using it.13 Faced with a lower likelihood of obtaining the more valuable
composition patents, fuel producers are motivated to shift resources
away from research and development and into other more profitable ar-
eas. As a result, society ultimately suffers because of the disincentive
provided to private industry.
V. CONCLUSION
The authors believe that progress in the useful arts is ill-served by
the en banc Dillon decision. The law as set forth in Dillon increases the
evidentiary burden on the inventor without any appreciable benefit to
the public. The decision impairs the capacity of the patent system to
protect and reward those who develop novel compositions having unex-
pected properties. In this regard, applying Dillon to biotechnology in-
ventions may result in incorrect obviousness determinations and
discourage further innovations in the biotechnology industry.
131. U.S.C. § 154 (1988) states that "[elvery patent shall contain ... a grant ... of the
right to exclude others from making, using or selling the invention throughout the United
States ...."
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THE EFFECT OF "INCONTESTABILITY" IN
TRADEMARK LITIGATION
JOAN L. DILLON*
In a trademark infringement action, the plaintiffhas the burden of
proving and will prevail only if it can be established that: (1) the mark is
valid and legally protectable; (2) the plaintiff owns the mark; and (3) the
defendant's use of the mark is likely to create confusion concerning the
origin of the goods or services. 1
The federal registration of a trademark goes a long way towards
establishing the plaintiff's rights. The registration may be introduced as
prima facie evidence of the first two elements of the plaintiff's case.
2
The federal registration, however, does not preclude the defendant
from asserting legal or equitable defenses or defects including those
which may be asserted even if the trademark has not been registered. 3
One of the major benefits of obtaining a federal trademark registra-
tion is attaining the substantive status of incontestability. Subject to cer-
tain limited exceptions, an incontestable registration constitutes
conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to use of the mark
and provides an infringer with only limited grounds upon which to at-
tack the mark's validity.
4
Section 1065 of the Lanham Trade-Mark Act ("Trademark Act" or
"Act") 5 provides that an owner of a federally registered trademark may
acquire incontestable status by filing an affidavit with the Commissioner
of the Patent and Trademark Office.6 The affidavit must be filed be-
tween the fifth and sixth years of the registration's existence or within
one year immediately following any five year consecutive period during
which the trademark is in continuous and exclusive use.7 The registra-
tion is granted incontestable status upon notice by the Commissioner
that the affidavit has been properly filed.8 Once incontestable status is
obtained, the registration is conclusive evidence of the validity of the
trademark, the registration itself, as well as the owner's exclusive right
* Head of the Trademark Group at Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox; Washington,
D.C. B.S. 1963, Washington University;J.D. 1966, Washington University School of Law.
1. Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1338 (3d Cir. 1978).
See also Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Resorts Int'l, Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
227, 230 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1988).
3. Id.
4. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, BA-
sic FACTS ABOUT TRADEMARKS 1 (1988).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988).
6. Id. § 1065.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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to its use.9
Incontestability is a substantive grant created by the drafters of the
Trademark Act of 194610 as an incentive to register.1 1 Incontestable
status enhances the property right of a trademark registration by serving
as a type of quiet title 12 or statute of limitations.1 3 The drafters consid-
ered the incontestability section to be one of the most important sec-
tions of the Act. 14
Once the status of incontestability is achieved, by merely introduc-
ing the incontestable registration into evidence, a plaintiff will have met
the burden of proving the validity of the mark and its registration, the
ownership of the mark, and the exclusive right to use the mark in com-
merce.' 5 The burden of attacking the validity of the mark then shifts to
the defendant' 6 whose options of attack are limited to several carefully
drafted statutory defenses pursuant to section 1115 of the Act. 17 The
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1988).
10. The Trademark Act of 1946 is popularly known as the Lanham Act.
I1. "Mhis bill will bring about ... an incentive to register because it provides in
section 15 . . . an incontestable right. That is, after a mark has been on the principal
register provided by this act for a period of 5 years ... then the mark becomes incontesta-
ble, except when certain defenses are established." Hearings on H.R. 82 Before a Subcomm.
of the Senate Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1944) (testimony of Daphne Robert,
Member of the Trademark Litigation Committee, ABA, Atlanta, Ga.).
12. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985).
13. "[In essence it [section 1115] is simply the establishment of a statute of limita-
tions, just as we have with reference to land and recorded deeds and things of that kind."
Trade-Marks: Hearings on S. 895 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Patents, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. 15 (1942) (statement of Representative Fritz G. Lanham).
14. "Mr. Chairman, it seems to me this [section 11151 is the most important section in
the act, as it is the one which purports to give substantive rights .... Hearings on H.R.
4744 Before the Subcomm. on Trademarks of the House Comm. on Patents, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.
105 (1939) (testimony of Robert W. Byerly, New York Patent Law Association).
15. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Resorts Int'l, Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 227, 230 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
16. Id.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1988) provides for the following defenses:
(1) That the registration or the incontestable right to use the mark was obtained
fraudulently; or
(2) That the mark has been abandoned by the registrant; or
(3) That the registered mark is being used by or with the permission of the reg-
istrant or a person in privity with the registrant, so as to misrepresent the source
of the goods or services on or in connection with which the mark is used; or
(4) That the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a
use, otherwise than as a mark, of the party's individual name in his own business,
or of the individual name of anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or
device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe
the goods or services of such party, or their geographic origin; or
(5) That the mark whose use by a party is charged as an infringement was
adopted without knowledge of the registrant's prior use and has been continu-
ously used by such party or those in privity with him from a date prior to (A) the
date of constructive use of the mark established pursuant to section I057(c) of
this title, (B) the registration of the mark under this chapter if the application for
registration is filed before the effective date of the Trademark Law Revision Act
of 1988, or (C) publication of the registered mark under subsection (c) of section
1062 of this title: Provided, however, that this defense or defect shall apply only for
the area in which such continuous prior use is proved; or
(6) That the mark whose use is charged as an infringement was registered and
used prior to the registration under this chapter or publication under subsection
(c) of section 1062 of this title of the registered mark of the registrant, and not
abandoned: Provided, however, that this defense or defect shall apply only for the
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defendant, however, is limited to these defenses only when the trade-
mark has achieved incontestability status.1 8
A registration may be cancelled at any time if it is obtained contrary
to the provisions of the Trademark Act or the mark becomes a generic
name. 19 Marks which were at one time registered and are now consid-
ered generic abound in trademark lore. Examples of generic trademarks
include: shredded wheat,20 thermos, 2 1 aspirin, 22 and escalator. 23 Even
the famous "Singer" trademark was once considered generic. 24 Follow-
ing massive restorative advertising efforts by the company (and in-
creased competition), Singer recaptured its name from the public
domain, registration was granted to Singer and the mark is now
incontestable.
25
Section 1054 of the Trademark Act provides for the registration of
collective and certification marks.2 6 The two types of marks are substan-
tively and legally distinguishable. A collective mark indicates member-
ship in an organization and may be used by its owner. 27 In contrast, a
certification mark represents only standards of quality of products or
services performed under it and may not be used by its owner.
28
A certification mark must be licensed by the certifier to anyone who
qualifies for its use by meeting the standards set by the certifying
body.2 9 A collective mark owner may refuse membership to anyone
even though the candidate meets the criteria for membership.
3 0
A certification mark registration is treated differently than any other
trademark. Unlike other trademarks, a certification mark does not indi-
cate source or sponsorship, rather, it represents standards of quality of
goods or services.3 1 While the certification mark may meet the criteria
for incontestability, it may be cancelled at any time if it can be shown
that the registrant:
area in which the mark was used prior to such registration or such publication of
the registrant's mark; or
(7) That the mark has been or is being used to violate the antitrust laws of the
United States; or
(8) That equitable principles, including laches, estoppel, and acquiescence, are
applicable.
18. See United States Jaycees v. Philadelphia Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134, 137 (3d Cir.
1981).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1988).
20. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
21. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963).
22. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. Supp. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
23. Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 80 (Comr. Pats. 1950).
24. Singer Mfg. Co. v.June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
25. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Briley, 207 F.2d 519 (5th Cir. 1953).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1054 (1988).
27. See Roush Bakery Prod., Inc. v. F.R. Lepage Bakery, Inc., 13 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA)
1045, 1051 (T.T.A.B. 1989).
28. Worthington Foods, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 732 F. Supp. 1417, 1429 (S.D. Ohio
1990).
29. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1054.
30. See F.R. Lepage Bakery, Inc. v. Roush Bakery Prod., Inc., 851 F.2d 351, 354 (Fed.
Cir. 1988), aff'd in part, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1045 (T.T.A.B. 1989) (quoting VISA. U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 696 F.2d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1982)).
31. Worthington Foods, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 732 F. Supp. 1417 (S.D. Ohio 1990).
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(A) does not control, or is not able legitimately to exercise con-
trol over, the use of such mark, or (B) engages in the produc-
tion or marketing of any goods or services to which the
certification mark is applied, or (C) permits the use of the certi-
fication mark for purposes other than to certify, or (D) discrimi-
nately refuses to certify or to continue to certify the goods or
services of any person who maintains the standards or condi-
tions which such mark certifies .... 32
Section 1052 of the Trademark Act prohibits the use of certain
marks.33 This includes any mark which:
(a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandal-
ous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a
connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or
national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.
(b) Consists of or comprises the flag or coat of arms or other
insignia of the United States, or of any State or municipality, or
of any foreign nation, or any simulation thereof.
(c) Consists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature
identifying a particular living individual except by his written
consent, or the name, signature, or portrait of a deceased Presi-
dent of the United States during the life of his widow, if any,
except by the written consent of the widow.
3 4
The words "consists of" and "comprises" have been construed as mak-
ing the section applicable only to marks which contain, within the mark
itself, inherently deceptive, immoral, or other prohibited matter.3 5
Incontestability prohibits a court from allowing attacks on a regis-
tration based upon causes other than those specifically recognized in the
statute.3 6 The Supreme Court expressly recognized this prohibition in
Park 'T Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc. 3 7 by strictly adhering to the
language of the Trademark Act to disallow an attack on the validity of a
mark due to descriptiveness. The Court stated:
Nothing in the legislative history of the Lanham Act supports a
departure from the plain language of the statutory provisions
concerning incontestability. Indeed, a conclusion that incon-
testable status can provide the basis for enforcement of the reg-
istrant's exclusive right to use a trade or service mark promotes
the goals of the statute. The Lanham Act provides national
protection of trademarks in order to secure to the owner of the
mark the good will of his business and to protect the ability of
consumers to distinguish among competing producers.
38
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1988).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1988).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)-(c) (1988).
35. American Speech-Language-Hearing Ass'n v. National Hearing Aid Soc'y., 224
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 798, 809-10 (T.T.A.B. 1984) ("Audiologist" used in mark signifies one
who has reached a certain level of expertise); Evans Prod. Co. v. Boise Cascade Corp., 218
U.S.P.Q (BNA) 160, 162 (T.T.A.B. 1983) ("Cedar Ridge" signifies to purchasers that the
product is composed of cedar when it is not).
36. See note 17 supra.
37. 469 U.S. 189 (1985).
38. Id. at 197-98.
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Some circuits have gone further than regarding incontestability as a
shield against attack, and have indicated that the incontestability statute
alone provides a right for enforcement of a mark where an infringer is
using a mark identical to the that of the registrant's. 39
Once the plaintiff has established that the mark and registration are
valid, the plaintiff, as owner of the mark, has the exclusive right to its
use. The plaintiff, however, must still prove infringement by demon-
strating that the defendant's use is likely to create confusion.40 The
"likelihood of confusion" issue is a question of law;4 1 nevertheless, in-
contestability does not presumptively preclude the defendant from as-
serting that confusion is not likely to result.
4 2
In summary, the legal substantive status of incontestability achieved
by federal registration greatly facilitates the plaintiff's ability to meet the
burden of proof in an infringement action. Accordingly, it makes sense
to secure this status for those federal registrations that qualify.
39. The Third Circuit has indicated that where an infringer is using a mark identical to
that of a federal registrant's, incontestability, by itself, establishes a right of enforcement.
The court reasons that the statutory grant of the exclusive right to use the mark vests in a
registrant and to allow another to use the same mark defeats the purpose of the statute.
Weil Ceramic & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 673-74 (3d Cir. 1989).
40. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
41. Knorr-Nahrmittel A.G. v. Reese Finer Foods, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 787, 793 (D.NJ.
1988).
42. In resolving the question of confusion, the strength or weakness of a particular
mark may be regarded as lying somewhere on a spectrum. On one end of the spectrum
lies the strongest types of marks: fanciful and arbitrary. Two relatively weaker types of
trademarks are suggestive and descriptive marks. Generic marks are the weakest items on
the spectrum. A defendant may challenge the strength of the plaintiff's mark by alleging
that the mark is descriptive and, thus, not entitled to a broad scope of protection. Worth-
ington, 732 F. Supp. 1417, 1432-34 (S.D. Ohio 1990).

FILE WRAPPER ESTOPPEL AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
GLENN K. BEATON*
I. INTRODUCTION
File wrapper estoppel is a doctrine that limits the extent to which a
patent can be broadened by the doctrine of equivalents. This article
reviews the policy of file wrapper estoppel and considers the application
of that policy by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit (Federal Circuit) to a few typical fact patterns. The conclusion is
that a few recent Federal Circuit decisions have undermined file wrapper
estoppel in a way that is detrimental to the patent system.
The breadth of a patent is measured by what infringes it. Many dif-
ferent devices will infringe broad patents while relatively few will in-
fringe narrow patents. Whether a given device infringes a patent is
determined by reference to the formal claims. Under patent law, every
element of a claim must be present in a device for the device to infringe
the claim literally. Therefore, under patent law claim interpretation, a
claim with elements A, B, and C is broader than a claim with elements A,
B, C, and D. This is because a device with only elements A, B, and C will
infringe the first claim but not the second because it lacks element D.
The doctrine of equivalents states that a device may infringe a pat-
ent claim, even if it lacks an element of the claim, if it contains a substi-
tute element that is "equivalent" to the missing element.' Therefore, a
device with elements A, B, and C may infringe a claim with elements A,
B, C, and D if the device contains a substitute element that is equivalent
to D. The substitute element is equivalent to the missing element if it
performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way
to achieve the same result.
2
* Partner, Beaton & Swanson, Denver, Colorado; B.S., University of Colorado,
1977; J.D., University of Denver College of Law, 1982.
1. See generally Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (hereinafter the "federal circuit") appeared
at one time to apply equivalents to entire claims rather than only to elements of claims, but
now seems to have withdrawn from that expansive approach. Compare Hughes Aircraft Co.
v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983) with Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The confusion that resulted from those two
competing approaches is well documented. See Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co.,
14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374, 1380 (D.C. Neb. 1990); Harris, Three Ambiguities in the Doctrine
of Equivalents, 69 J. PAT. TRADEMARK & OFF. SOC'Y 91 (1987); Hartman, Doctrine of
Equivalents, 70J. PAT. TRADEMARK & OFF. Soc'Y 511 (1988); Nieman, The Federal Circuit
Resolves Ambiguities in the Doctrine of Equivalents, 70 J. PAT. TRADEMARK & OFF. SOC'Y 153
(1988).
2. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608. It is not clear why the doctrine was originally enun-
dated so that the function and way must only be "substantially" the same, while the result
must apparently be exactly the same. A number of cases have allowed the result, function
and the way to be only substantially the same. See, e.g., Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781
F.2d 861, 869 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 750
F.2d 1569, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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There are two limitations on the doctrine of equivalents. The first
limitation is that equivalents cannot be used to expand the claims to
cover the prior art.3 The other limitation, the subject of this article, is
file wrapper estoppel.4 The law of file wrapper estoppel is unpredict-
able. In its broadest formulation, file wrapper estoppel has been held to
mean that the patentee cannot use equivalents to expand the claim
scope in an infringement action in a way that is inconsistent with his
position on claim scope before the Patent Office as reflected in the pat-
ent file wrapper.5 In its narrowest formulation, file wrapper estoppel
has been held to mean that a patentee cannot use the doctrine of
equivalents to expand the claim scope to embrace the prior art.6 The
correct formulation of file wrapper estoppel is somewhere between
these two extremes.
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
File wrapper estoppel under the 1952 Patent Act 7 goes back at least
as far as Graham v. John Deere,8 where the Supreme Court stated:
It is, of course, well settled that an invention is construed not
only in the light of the claims, but also with reference to the file
wrapper or prosecution history in the Patent Office. Claims as
allowed must be read and interpreted with reference to re-
jected ones and to the state of the prior art; and claims that
have been narrowed in order to obtain the issuance of a patent
by distinguishing the prior art cannot be sustained to cover that
which was previously by limitation eliminated from the patent.9
At least three justifications can be advanced for this rule that came
to be called file wrapper estoppel, although these justifications are rarely
articulated. The first justification is the same as for any rule of estoppel:
it is inequitable to allow a person to take inconsistent positions as cir-
cumstances suit him.' 0 This justification parallels the justification for
3. See Loctite, 781 F.2d at 870; Carman Indus., Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 942 (Fed.
Cir. 1983). See infra notes 19 and 36 and accompanying text.
4. File wrapper estoppel is now sometimes called "prosecution history estoppel."
Compare Allied Iron Co. v. Foundry Metal Specialties, Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1017 (E.D.
Mich. 1981) with Hughes Aircraft, 717 F.2d 1351.
5. See, e.g., AlIed Iron, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1019 ("Stated in other words, file wrap-
per estoppel prevents a party from taking inconsistent positions in different transactions.")
(dicta); Hughes Aircraft, 717 F.2d at 1362 ("[File wrapper] estoppel applies to claim amend-
ments to overcome rejections based on prior art and to arguments submitted to obtain the
patent.") (citing Coleco Indus., Inc. v. ITC, 573 F.2d 1247, 1257 (C.C.P.A. 1978) and
Dwyer v. United States, 357 F.2d 978, 984 (Ct. CI. 1966)).
6. See, e.g., Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1351.
7. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988).
8. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
9. Id. at 33 (citing Powers-Kennedy Co. v. Concrete Co., 282 U.S. 175, 185-86
(1930); Crawford v. Heysinger, 123 U.S. 589 (1887); Hogg v. Emerson, 52 U.S. (11 How.)
587 (1850)).
10. See Black & Decker, Inc. v. Hoover Serv. Center, 886 F.2d 1285, 1295 (Fed. Cir.
1989) ("The doctrines of prosecution history estoppel and equivalents are equitable in
nature, requiring courts to engage in a balancing analysis 'guided by equitable and public
policy principles underlying the doctrines involved and by the facts of the particular
case.'" (quoting Loctite Corp. v. Universal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 871 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1985));
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the doctrine of equivalents. The often quoted Graver Tank rationale for
equivalents is that:
The essence of the doctrine is that one may not practice a fraud
on a patent. . . . 'To temper unsparing logic and prevent an
infringer from stealing the benefit of an invention' a patentee
may invoke this doctrine to proceed against the producer of a
device 'if it performs substantially the same function in substan-
tially the same way to obtain the same result.'1 '
If the roots of equivalency are in equity, and the Graver Tank lan-
guage of "fraud" and "stealing" suggest that it is, then it seems natural
that the roots of the file wrapper estoppel limitation to equivalency
should be there too. However, neither the equitable formulations for
equivalency nor the equitable formulations for its limitation, file wrap-
per estoppel, provide much guidance in determining exactly where one
has crossed the line from equivalency into file wrapper estoppel. More-
over, equitable notions against taking inconsistent positions do not
seem sufficient alone to justify the file wrapper estoppel rule. It is com-
mon in the law to allow a party to take inconsistent positions, such as
pleading in the alternative.
12
A second justification given for file wrapper estoppel relates to the
concept that the scope of the patent should correspond to the scope
intended by the patentee and the Patent Office. This justification is
analogous to the rule that a contract should be construed in accordance
with the intent of the parties at the time it was entered into or the rule
that legislation should be construed in accordance with the intent of the
legislators. Reviewing the file wrapper in this sense is a logical exten-
sion of the ancient practice of reviewing the specification and the draw-
ings; 13 the reviewer is merely ascertaining the intended meaning of the
claims.
If the "intent" being ascertained is that of the Patent Office rather
than the patentee, then this is a legitimate justification. The presump-
tion of validity that attaches to patents based on the specialized knowl-
edge of the Patent Office 14 should apply only to that which the Patent
Office intended to fall within the patent. However, if this is the justifica-
tion for file wrapper estoppel, then file wrapper estoppel should not pre-
vent the doctrine of equivalents from expanding the claim scope to
Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Prod. Co., 793 F.2d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir.
1986) ("The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel is 'an equitable tool for determining
the permissible scope of patent claims' as against a specific structure accused of infringe-
ment." (quoting Builders Concrete, Inc. v. Bremerton Concrete Prod. Co., 757 F.2d 255,
258 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 585 F. Supp. 1481,
1489 (E.D. La. 1984) (Failure to apply file wrapper estoppel would be "unrealistic and
fundamentally unfair."); POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 801-821 (5th ed. 1942).
11. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (quoting
Sanitary Refrig. Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
12. See Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 8(e); MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAICE § 8.32 (1990).
13. Hogg v. Emerson, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 587, 606 (1850) ("The Court did right, too,
in holding to the propriety of looking to the whole specification, and also to the drawings,
for explanation of any thing obscure.").
14. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988).
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cover that which the Patent Office did not intend the claim scope to
cover; it should merely remove the presumption of validity from that
expanded claim scope. It is always possible that the patentee is entitled
to a claim scope broadened by the doctrine of equivalents even if the
Patent Office did not intend to allow that broadened claim scope. In
fact, it is possible that the patentee is entitled to a claim scope broad-
ened by the doctrine of equivalents even if the Patent Office affirmatively
intended not to allow that broadened claim scope. The Patent Office
makes mistakes, and the patentee should not be penalized for those mis-
takes. Courts should correct the Patent Office's mistakes, although the
corrections should not be granted the presumption of validity that is
based on the Patent Office's specialized knowledge.
On the other hand, if the intent being ascertained is really the intent
of the patentee rather than the Patent Office, as the cases suggest, 15
then this second justification for file wrapper estoppel carries little
weight. Analogizing the patentee and the Patent Office to parties to a
contract has little validity in this context. The patentee is not a party to
a contract whose intent should control the interpretation of the contract.
The patentee is a person receiving his statutory reward from the govern-
ment for developing and disclosing an advancement in the sciences and
useful arts. As such, the patentee presumably "intends" that his reward
be as great as possible and that the limits to his reward be as small as
possible. He does not "intend" to give up any claim scope at all; he only
"intends" that the patent be issued. There is no negotiation between
the patentee and the Patent Office in the contract sense because neither
has any consideration to offer. The patentee has already given up his
consideration, for he has already developed his advancement in the sci-
ences and useful arts. The Patent Office never had any consideration to
begin with, because it has no discretion to give anything other than what
the Patent Act requires it to give. For the same reason, the analogy be-
tween the Patent Office issuing a patent and legislators enacting legisla-
tion breaks down; unlike legislators, the Patent Office has no discretion.
One might argue that, although the patentee has already developed
his advancement, he has not yet disclosed it until the patent issues. The
patentee, therefore, still has some consideration to give in negotiating
the scope of the claims with the Patent Office because he could abandon
the application and maintain it as a trade secret. As a practical matter,
this argument generally fails because trade secret protection is inferior
to even narrow patent protection for most inventions. Further, trade
secret protection may be lost by the time the patentee is in a position to
threaten to abandon the application, because the invention has already
been commercialized, published in foreign applications, or otherwise
15. See DuPont v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
("[A]rguments made during prosecution shed light on what the applicant meant by its
various terms."); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
1983) ("Depending on the nature and purpose of an amendment, it may have a limiting
effect within a spectrum ranging from great to small to zero."); cf. 4 D. CHisuM, PATENTs
§ 18.05 [1] (2d ed. 1990) (referring to "mutually held construction" of the claims).
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disclosed. Finally, the patentee's threat to abandon the application is an
idle one; the Patent Office does not care if an application is abandoned
and its contents are kept as trade secrets.
The third justification for file wrapper estoppel is a practical one
based on the public's need to determine the claim scope of a patent.
The doctrine of equivalents frustrates the public's ability to rely on the
claims in determining the breadth of a patent, because it requires the
public to consider matters outside the four corners of the patent in mak-
ing that determination. File wrapper estoppel says that if the doctrine of
equivalents requires the public to consider matters outside the four cor-
ners of the patent in determining the patentee's rights, then the public
should be able to rely on the patentee's own interpretation of those mat-
ters. This justification, similar to the detrimental reliance aspect of
promissory estoppel in equity, 16 was expressed well by the Federal
Circuit in Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States International Trade
Commission: 
17
The determination of equivalency by its nature is inimical to
the basic precept of patent law that the claims are the measure
of the grant. This constitutes a deviation from the need of the
public to know the precise legal limits of patent protection
without recourse to judicial ruling. We caution that the incen-
tive to innovation that flows from "inventing around" an ad-
versely held patent must be preserved.1
8
The principle objection to this justification is that it is circular. This
justification for the rule of file wrapper estoppel is that the public relies
on the file wrapper; but the public would not rely on the file wrapper if
there were no rule of file wrapper estoppel. However, it is not exactly
circular, for the fact is that the public looks at file wrappers for a variety
of reasons, and always will, even without the rule of file wrapper estop-
pel. Inevitably, inferences about the claim scope will be drawn from the
file wrapper, and the public should be entitled to rely on those infer-
ences if they are fairly drawn. Therefore, reliance by the public as a
justification for file wrapper estoppel has considerable weight. In com-
bination with the other two justifications which have less weight, it sug-
gests that as long as the doctrine of equivalents is part of patent law, file
wrapper estoppel should be a limitation on it. 19
The important point to learn from a review of the policy considera-
16. See Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528 (Fed. Cir.
1987); Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l. Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558 (Fed.
Cir. 1986); Prodyne Enter., Inc. v. Julie Pomerantz, Inc., 743 F.2d 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1004
(1985); POMEROY'S Eourry JURISPRUDENCE § 805 (5th ed. 1942). Clearly, however, file
wrapper estoppel applies even if the particular defendant never saw the file wrapper.
17. 805 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
18. Id. at 1572.
19. One might argue that the doctrine of equivalents is used less now than it once
was, because now 35 U.S.C. § 112(6) allows expansive functional elements in place ofnar-
row structural elements in a claim. For a discussion of the evolution of the doctrine of
equivalents and the interplay between 'the doctrine and § 112(6), see Hartman, Docinne of
Equivalents, 70J. PAT. TRADEMARK & OFF. Soc'Y 511 (1988).
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tions is that both the doctrine of equivalents and file wrapper estoppel
are rules of equity. As such, they do not lend themselves to inflexible
rules of application. Like any rule of equity, they depend on the subtle
weighing of a number of different factors. Some of the factors that may
be present in some typical circumstances are discussed in the following
section.
Before leaving the discussion of policy considerations, it should be
noted that there is one argument that is clearly not a justification for file
wrapper estoppel. That argument is that file wrapper estoppel is neces-
sary to prevent the doctrine of equivalents from expanding the claims to
cover the prior art. The doctrine of equivalents certainly cannot be used
to expand the claims to cover the prior art, but this is a separate limita-
tion on the doctrine of equivalents that has nothing to do with file wrap-
per estoppel. This is a limitation imposed by section 102 of the Patent
Act;20 claims that are expanded to embrace the prior art are invalid
under the rules of anticipation. The better-reasoned cases are explicit in
stating that the file wrapper estoppel limitation on the doctrine of
equivalents is distinct from the section 102 limitation on the doctrine of
equivalents.
2 1
This misjustification for file wrapper estoppel has spawned some
unfortunate case law, some of which is mentioned in the fact patterns
discussed below. Briefly, these cases seem to state that the only limita-
tion on the doctrine of equivalents is that the claims cannot be expanded
to cover the prior art. If the allegedly infringing device is not actually in
the prior art, then according to these cases file wrapper estoppel will
never preclude a holding of infringement by equivalents. Under these
cases, there is a section 102 limitation on equivalents, but there is no
separate file wrapper estoppel limitation on equivalents.
III. FACT PATTERNS
Discussed below are several typical fact patterns in which file wrap-
per estoppel may be an issue. The discussion proceeds from fact pat-
terns where file wrapper estoppel is more likely to apply to those where
file wrapper estoppel is less likely to apply.
A. Amendments Necessary to Overcome Prior Art That Would Have Barred the
Claim
The first and easiest fact pattern involving the application of file
wrapper estoppel is one where the patentee narrows his claim to over-
come prior art that would have barred the broader claim. In this case,
20. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
21. See Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Carman
Industries, Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Sarkisian v. Sign-Up Corp.,
220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 802, 806 (D. Or. 1983). See also Haworth v. Steelcase, Inc., 685 F.
Supp. 1422, 1440 (W.D. Mich. 1988) ("The alleged infringer need not be practicing the
prior art for the doctrine of equivalents to be barred." (quoting Texas Instruments, 805 F.2d
at 1558)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989).
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the patentee should not be allowed to expand the claim scope by the
doctrine of equivalents in an infringement action to recover the scope
surrendered before the Patent Office. However, as discussed above, this
is not an application of the file wrapper estoppel limitation to
equivalents, but is an application of the section 102 limitation to
equivalents. 2 2 The ambiguous judge-made rules of file wrapper estop-
pel are not necessary when the Patent Act itself supplies concrete and
often-construed rules of anticipation under section 102.
Patent rights are sometimes analogized to property rights. Under
that analogy, there is no need to resort to subtle and complex principles
of equity such as estoppel to arrive at the holding that the metes and
bounds description of property (the claim scope) cannot be expanded to
cover that which is clearly owned by someone else (the prior art). Appli-
cation of estoppel should be reserved for hard cases where the disputed
territory is neither covered by the literal metes and bounds (the claims)
nor owned by someone else (the prior art).
B. Amendments to Overcome Prior Art Reections That Would Not Have
Barred the Claim
The answer to the question of whether file wrapper estoppel applies
is less certain when the patentee narrows a claim to overcome a prior art
rejection which was improper or when the patentee amends his claim
more than necessary to avoid a proper prior art rejection. The patentee
clearly cannot use equivalents to recover the claim scope portion that
was necessary to surrender to avoid the prior art, for that would violate
the section 102 limitation on equivalents and would render the claim
invalid. But may the patentee recover the claim scope portion that was
surrendered, but was not necessary to surrender, to avoid the prior art?
File wrapper estoppel may bar the patentee from recovering the
surrendered claim scope in these circumstances.2 3 Otherwise, file wrap-
per estoppel only prevents the patentee from recovering claim scope
that would have been barred by the prior art. File wrapper estoppel
would then be meaningless, for it would be superfluous to section 102 in
merely preventing the patentee from recovering a claim scope that is
invalid as anticipated.
Whether file wrapper estoppel actually applies in such circum-
stances will depend, of course, on a number of equitable factors. Some
of these factors will be peculiar to the particular case under considera-
tion, but some are common to all such cases. Militating in favor of file
22. See Carmen Industries, 724 F. 2d 932; Sarkisian, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 802.
23. See Fortel Corp. v. Phone-mate, Inc., 825 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Prodyne
Enter., Inc. v.Julie Pomerantz, Inc., 743 F.2d 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Kinzenbaw v. Deere &
Co., 741 F.2d 383 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1004 (1985); Pero v. General
Motors Corp., 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 719 (E.D. Mich. 1986). But see Hi-Life Prods., Inc. v.
American Natural Water-Mattress Corp., 842 F.2d 323 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Great Northern
Corp. v. Davis Core & Pad Co., 782 F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Datascope Corp. v. SMEC,
Inc., 776 F.2d 320 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 721 F. Supp. 28
(D. Conn. 1989).
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wrapper estoppel is that the public's effort to determine the scope of the
patent in the absence of file wrapper estoppel could become difficult
because it could require an extensive review of all relevant prior art to
determine whether the rejection that precipitated the claim amendment
was erroneous and whether the patentee surrendered more claim scope
than was necessary. Also, it is difficult to sympathize with the patentee
who erroneously surrendered more claim scope than was necessary to
avoid the prior art. The patentee already had ample opportunity to dis-
pute an erroneous rejection by reviewing the prior art himself, by com-
municating his position to the Patent Office, and by appealing the Patent
Office decision if necessary. Patent Office procedures allow amend-
ment, argument, and appeal precisely for this purpose. There would
have to be strong reasons to allow the patentee a second opportunity to
expand the patent monopoly, especially when the result is to deceive the
public as to the scope of his patent.
2 4
The unpredictable results of an inflexible rule that file wrapper es-
toppel does not limit equivalents if the rejections were improper or the
amendment was too limiting are illustrated in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United
States.25 The patentee in Hughes Aircraft amended the claims to over-
come certain prior art cited by the examiner. For the dissent, this
presented a classic case of file wrapper estoppel: "The accused S/E
spacecraft do not contain those elements which were expressly included
to overcome prior art .... An infringing article must embody the two
elements I have mentioned, either literally or through an appropriate
equivalent. Those elements show the invention which was patented."
'2 6
The majority asserted that this application of estoppel, to which pat-
ent attorneys and courts had adhered for generations, was "wooden"
and amounted to a "view that virtually any amendment of the claims
creates a 'file wrapper estoppel' effective to bar all resort to the doctrine
of equivalents, and to confine patentee 'strictly to the letter of the lim-
ited claims granted.' ",27 The majority rejected that view and asserted
24. See Texas Instruments, 805 F.2d at 1558; Haworth, 685 F. Supp. at 1441 ("Indeed, a
fundamental purpose of the claims is to precisely demarcate where others may or may not
endeavor." (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369
(1938))).
25. 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Hughes is currently somewhat discredited for its
application of the "entirety" approach to equivalents. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Way-
land, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 941 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("The majority's departure from our recent
precedents is illustrated by an examination of [Hughes] which is clearly being overruled by
the majority, despite not even being mentioned in its opinion.") (Bennet, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988); Kinzenbaw, 741 F.2d 383. But see Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA
Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978 (Fed. Cir. 1989). However, Hughes is still cited fre-
quently for its view of file wrapper estoppel. See, e.g., Black & Decker, Inc. v. Hoover Serv.
Center, 886 F.2d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 1989); LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. ITC, 867 F.2d 1572 (Fed.
Cir. 1989).
26. Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1366. The majority disregarded the dissent's reasoning that
each element must be present for there to be infringement with the "entirety" test. Under
that test, equivalents is applied "to the entirety of the accused S/E spacecraft." Id. at 1363-
64.
27. Id. at 1362 (citing Nationwide Chemical Corp. v. Wright, 584 F.2d 714, 718-19
(5th Cir. 1978)); Ekco Products Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 347 F.2d 453, 455 (7th
Cir. 1965).
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that the Supreme Court had rejected it also.2 8
The Hughes majority mischaracterized the dissent, apparently so
that the holding in Hughes would appear consistent with Supreme Court
precedent or at least Graver Tank dicta. The dissent did not assert that
any claim amendment limits the patentee to the literal scope of the
claim. Such a holding would not only be wooden, but would be wrong
because it would prevent the patentee from relying on equivalents to
broaden the claim in ways unrelated to the amendment. Instead, the
dissent merely asserted the general rule that if a patentee surrenders a
claim scope to avoid prior art during the prosecution, then there must
be strong countervailing reasons to allow him to recover that same claim
scope in litigation. 29 In view of the non-pioneering status of the inven-
tion in this case, there were no such strong reasons.
3 0
The Hughes majority diverged from the long-standing rule of file
wrapper estoppel by shifting the focus from the amendment itself and
the other legitimate equitable considerations, to the prior art that pre-
cipitated the amendment:
The government is not claiming that its S/E spacecraft are built
and operated in accord with the prior art, or that it is merely
following the teachings of [the prior art]. If it had followed
those teachings in constructing its S/E spacecraft, there is no
question that the range of equivalents to which [the patent] is
entitled could not be broad enough to encompass such
spacecraft.
3 1
The majority's statement suggests that the doctrine of equivalents
cannot be used to broaden the claims to encompass the prior art. That
statement merely restates the rule that section 102 invalidates claims
that read on the prior art. The question remains: What is the effect of
the amendment to the claims? According to Hughes, the answer is that
the amendment to the claims has no effect because the claims them-
selves are no longer important. The court proceeds to ignore the claims
and to construct its own fictitious claims.3 2 The court then holds that
the fictitious claims were infringed (which was unfortunate for the de-
28. Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1362.
29. See, e.g., Keystone Driller Co. v. Northwest Eng'g Corp., 294 U.S. 42, 48 (1935);
Borg-Warner Corp. v. Paragon Gear Works, Inc., 355 F.2d 400, 406 (Ist Cir. 1965).
30. Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1366.
31. Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1362.
32. Id. at 1364.
There are striking overall similarities between Williams' claimed satellite and the
S/E spacecraft: (1) each is spin-stabilized; (2) each contains ajet on the periphery,
connected by a valve to a tank containing fluid for expulsion substantially parallel
to the spin axis; (3) each employs sun sensors to sense ISA position; (4) each
requires knowledge of orientation relative to a fixed external coordinate system;
(5) each contains radio equipment for communicating with the ground; (6) each
transmits spin rate and sun angle information to a ground crew; and (7) in each,
jet firing is synchronized with ISA position to effect controlled precession and
thus to achieve a desired orientation .... Clearly, the StE spacecraft are much
closer to Williams' satellite than they are to [the prior art] space vehicle. It is
clear also that, in constructing its S/E spacecraft, the government followed the
teachings of Williams' much more than it did those of [the prior art].
Id. While the majority prefaces this list of comparisons with a reference to Williams'
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fendant and the rest of the public that had lacked the prescience to pre-
dict the court's fictitious claims and had instead relied on the actual
claims).
Hughes apparently holds that if a fictitious claim can be constructed
to establish literal infringement, and the fictitious claim is not invalid
under section 102, then there is equivalence. This rule implies that not
only do amendments to the claims have no effect, but the claims them-
selves also have no effect.
It should be noted in passing that formulating fictitious claims is not
necessarily a bad approach to equivalents,38 but the wisdom of that ap-
proach is beyond the scope of this article. For purposes of this article,
the point is that if fictitious claims are to be the approach, they are sub-
ject to both section 102 and file wrapper estoppel limitations. If the
fictitious claims read on the prior art, then they should be disallowed
under section 102. If the fictitious claims are inconsistent with the file
wrapper, then they should be disallowed under file wrapper estoppel if
the equitable factors so dictate.
Notwithstanding the general erosion of Hughes, some courts con-
tinue to adhere to the notion that the only limitation to the doctrine of
equivalents is that the claims cannot be expanded to read on the prior
art. In Black & Decker, Inc. v. Hoover Service Center,34 another opinion by
the author of Hughes, the court extravagantly criticized the district court
opinion that denied a motion for preliminary injunction on file wrapper
estoppel grounds. In response to the district court's statement that a
particular limiting amendment to overcome prior art estopped the pat-
entee from asserting the doctrine of equivalents to expand the claims
beyond the limitation, the court said:
The amendment cited by the [district] court would be fatal to a
range of equivalents that would encompass (the prior art) or a
similar device ... ; it would not be 'fatal to application of the
doctrine itself.' Considering that virtually every patent applica-
tion is amended, acceptance of the [district] court's statement
as a proper application of prosecution history would read the
doctrine of equivalents out of the law.
8 5
Even if the district court had adapted an inflexible rule that the pat-
entee could never recover a claim scope given up by amendment (and it
is not clear that it did adopt such a rule), such a rule still does not read
the doctrine of equivalents out of the law. Although it is true that most
claims are amended, not all claim limitations arise by amendment; in
claimed satellite, the comparison is not with the claims at all, for it ignores at least three
elements in the claim. Id. at 1366 (Davis, J., dissenting).
33. See, e.g., Insta-Foam Prod., Inc. v. Universal Foam Sys., Inc., 906 F.2d 698 (Fed.
Cir. 1990); Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
34. 886 F.2d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
35. Id. at 1295. (quoting LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. Dudley Shearing, 867 F.2d 1572,
1576 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
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fact, most claim limitations are in the claims from the outset. The doc-
trine of equivalents would still apply to those limitations.
It is ironic that the district court is falsely accused of reading
equivalents out of the law, for that is precisely what the Federal Circuit
proceeds to do to file wrapper estoppel in Black & Decker. The Federal
Circuit's analysis was similar to the formulation of fictitious claims in
Hughes. The court made a comparison showing that the claimed inven-
tion and the infringing device were similar in ways that did not read on
the prior art. Therefore, there was infringement by equivalents. The
prosecution history is irrelevant in this analysis.
The language of the opinion is more subtle than that, duly citing
Hughes and Loctite for the propositions that:
[t]he doctrines of prosecution history estoppel and equivalents
are equitable in nature, requiring courts to engage in a balanc-
ing analysis 'guided by equitable and public policy principles
underlying the doctrines involved and by the facts of the partic-
ular case.' Hence this court has held that the mere fact of
amendment does not necessarily preclude application of the
latter doctrine, pointing out that an amendment may result in a
limiting effect on the range of equivalents 'within a spectrum
ranging from great to small to zero.'
3 6
Notwithstanding this language suggesting a sensitive weighing of
the equitable considerations, the answers to these questions are irrele-
vant according to the analysis actually applied by the court. The only
relevant issue in the court's analysis is whether the equivalent claim
reads on the prior art. If it does not, this court says there can be in-
fringement by equivalents, regardless of the prosecution history.
C. Amendments for Purposes Other Than to Overcome Prior Art
The question here is whether file wrapper estoppel should apply to
limit application of the doctrine of equivalents when the claims were
amended for some reason other than a prior art rejection, such as a sec-
tion 11237 rejection. In principle, one can argue that file wrapper estop-
pel should not apply in such circumstances. The patentee made no
admission concerning the extent of his improvement over the prior art,
and so he cannot be estopped from expanding the scope of his claims.
On the other hand, it may be difficult for the public to determine the
purpose of an amendment in the context of an infringement analysis.
Often there are multiple purposes and sometimes the purpose is not
apparent from the file wrapper without deposing the prosecuting patent
attorney, the applicant, or the examiner. Further, patent attorneys
sometimes amend a claim to avoid prior art under the pretense of some
other purpose. Encouraging this practice does nothing to advance the
sciences and useful arts.
The cases occasionally assert that the purpose of an amendment
36. Id.
37. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
1991]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
was merely to make the claim "more definite" rather than to narrow it,
and that therefore file wrapper estoppel should not apply.38 An amend-
ment may perhaps make a claim more definite without narrowing it if the
amendment has language with the effect of narrowing certain limitations
while broadening others. Unfortunately, a few cases have held that file
wrapper did not apply because an amendment merely made a claim
more definite when, in fact, the amendment clearly narrowed the claim.
For example, in the Andrew3 9 case the court found that a phrase was a
"material limitation because it was added during prosecution" and,
therefore, it precluded literal infringement. 40 The court inexplicably
held that there was still infringement by equivalents and there was no
file wrapper estoppel effect because "it seems more appropriate to char-
acterize the [addition] as a clarification .... [W]here the amendments
were made for the purposes of explication and clarity, the court does not
think it appropriate to invoke estoppel against the doctrine of
equivalents."'4 1 The Court does not indicate what it was about the addi-
tion that made it "more appropriate" to characterize it as a "clarifica-
tion" rather than a limitation.
There may be a good reason, but the court should articulate it so
that the rest of us can keep it in mind next time. It is more likely that
there is no reason, but the court believed that equitable considerations
of the case precluded the application of file wrapper estoppel. That is
an acceptable analysis but, again, the equitable considerations should be
articulated.
A few special circumstances will arise where claim amendments or
cancellations clearly do not give rise to file wrapper estoppel, for exam-
ple, the cancellation of claims in response to a restriction requirement.
42
Such special circumstances are readily distinguishable from others in-
volving claim amendments and cancellations, and should easily preclude
any file wrapper estoppel effect. 43
IV. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of equivalents undermines the important policy that
the public should be able to determine the scope of a patent, a policy
that is crucial to the integrity and respect of the patent system. Depend-
ing on the equitable considerations, file wrapper estoppel may limit the
doctrine of equivalents, and thereby limit the undermining of that im-
portant policy as well. This limitation arises only occasionally but is ra-
38. E.g., Andrew Corp. v. Gabriel Elec., Inc., 847 F.2d 819, 825 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 927 (1988); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Berco, S.P.A., 714 F.2d 1 110 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).
39. Andrew Corp., 847 F.2d at 819.
40. Id. at 824.
41. Id. at 825.
42. See, e.g., Bayer Aktiengesellschaft v. Duphar Int'l. Research B.V., 221 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1056, (D.C.D.C. 1983), vacated, 738 F.2d 1237 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
43. In the case of a cancellation in response to a restriction requirement, for example,
file wrapper estoppel should not apply to the reinstated claims in the divisional application
since the cancellation was in the parent patent.
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tional and fair. Unfortunately, some recent cases have applied or failed
to apply file wrapper estoppel without an intelligible discussion of the
equitable factors involved.
The most distressing of the recent cases are those that have sug-
gested that what the patentee did in the prosecution of the patent is
irrelevant and is no limitation at all on the doctrine of equivalents. The
only limitation, according to these cases, is that the doctrine of
equivalents cannot be used to expand the patent to cover the prior art.
That limitation, although valid, is a separate limitation based on section
102 and is not related to file wrapper estoppel. The faulty reasoning of
these cases would effectively extinguish the doctrine of file wrapper
estoppel.

STEWART V. ABEND: DERIVATIVE WORK USERS BEWARE
I. INTRODUCTION
It is common practice in the movie industry to create a motion pic-
ture based on a copyrighted novel.1 This phenomenon occurs legally
when the author of a copyrighted novel assigns the right or gives his
consent to exploit his copyright by creation of a motion picture version
of the novel.2 The motion picture version is referred to as a derivative
work and may itself be copyrighted,3 while the novel is referred to as the
underlying or preexisting work. This Comment examines a unique
problem related to derivative works and underlying works: the validity
of an author's assignment of exploitation rights for both the original
term and the renewal term of copyright where the author dies prior to
the commencement of the renewal term.
4
The length of copyright for an original work or a derivative work
created before January 1, 1978 is two twenty-eight year terms, referred
to as the original copyright and the renewal copyright, respectively. 5
The two terms were provided to enable an author who had a poor bar-
gaining position during the initial copyright term to renegotiate the ex-
ploitation of his work.6 Thus, both the underlying work and the
derivative work have the right to two terms of copyright. Given the
unique situation of one copyright incorporating another, the remaining
question is whether the rights of one copyright affect the rights of the
other.
The United States Supreme Court recently addressed this very is-
sue. In Stewart v. Abend,7 the Court decided that the rights of the deriva-
tive work owner to use the underlying work during its renewal term are
1. Motion pictures based on preexisting literary works are a phenomenon as old as
the motion picture medium and have figured importantly throughout film history. SeeJasi,
When Works Collide: Derivative Motion Pictures, Underlying Rights, and the Public Interest, 28
UCLA L. REv. 715, 719 n.8 (1981). Classic films such as My Fair Lady (Warner Brothers
1964), The Sound of Music (Twentieth Century Fox 1965), Gone with the Wind (Metro-Gold-
wyn-Mayer 1965), and Doctor Zhivago (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1965) were all created by
consensual agreements between the underlying work owner and the movie studio. See
Melniker & Melniker, Termination of Transfers and Licenses Under the New Copyright Law, 22
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 589, 612-13 n.118 (1977).
2. An author has the exclusive right to authorize another to publish his copyright,
prepare derivative works based on it, merchandise it, perform it, or display it. See 17
U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
3. See infra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
4. See also Note, Assignment of Author's Renewal Interest, 18 IND. LJ. 318 (1943); Note,
Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc. and the Derivative Work Exception to the Termination Right. Inequi-
table Anomalies Under Copyright Law, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 635 (1979) [hereinafter Note,
Rohauer]; Note, Right of Author to Assign Renewal Rights, 17 TEMP. L.Q. 299 (1943).
5. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1988). The initial and renewal term of copyright were first set
out in the 1909 Copyright Act and later preserved in the Copyright Act of 1976. See infra
notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
7. 110 S. Ct. 1750 (1990).
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extinguished when the author of the underlying work dies prior to re-
newing his copyright.8 The Court concluded that until the renewal term
commences, the author of an underlying work holds merely an expec-
tancy to assign which is extinguished by his death. His family or statu-
tory successor 9 can take the renewal term free of any prior
assignments.' 0
This decision is significant because it declares that the derivative
work author, who has been assigned the right to produce, distribute,
and copyright a derivative work, may no longer use his derivative work
without infringing upon the underlying renewal copyright. The Abend
Court was sharply divided on this issue and its ruling is likely to have a
significant commercial effect on the relationships of derivative work
owners and underlying work owners.1 This Comment will focus on the
relationship between the renewal copyright owner and the derivative
copyright owner, and on the significance of Abend, and it will attempt to
reconcile the seemingly polar views of the Court.
II. BACKGROUND
The renewal system and derivative work dichotomy reflect two
deeply rooted policies of American copyright law. 12 The first of these
policies is that an author who copyrights his work should have two
chances at exploiting the work.' 3 The 1909 Copyright Act (1909 Act),
as amended, 14 gave authors and their successors this second chance by
creating two terms of copyright in which each term was treated as a sep-
arate estate.1 5 In other words, Congress intended that the author who
assigns exploitation rights during the first (original) copyright term shall
have a reversionary interest with respect to the second (renewal) term.1 6
8. Id.
9. In the event the author dies prior to the commencement of the renewal term, the
,.statutory successor" is the party eligible to renew the copyright, which is the author's
surviving spouse, children, executor, or next of kin, respectively. See infra note 31 and
accompanying text.
10. Abend, 110 S. Ct. at 1759.
11. Prior to Abend, many motion picture companies relied on the holding of Rohauer
v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977), which
permitted the use of derivative works during the underlying work's renewal term. See infra
notes 71-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Rohauer opinion.
12. Federal copyright law was first adopted in 1790 and later revised in 1831, 1870,
1909, and most recently in 1976.
13. For a general discussion on the policies behind the renewal copyright, see Bricker,
Renewal and Extension of Copyright, 29 S. CAL. L. REv. 23 (1955); Note, Copyright Renewal
Rights, 15 S. CAL. L. REv. 108 (1941).
14. Throughout this Comment, citation to the Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35
Star. 1074, will be to the amended version set out in the Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 391, 61
Stat. 652, unless otherwise indicated. The 1909 Act was superseded by the Copyright Act
of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-901 (1988).
15. Courts treat the renewal term given to authors and their successors as an entirely
new estate. This characterization has important implications on the transfer of renewal
interests. See P. GOLDSTEIN, I GOLDSTEIN COPYRIGHT § 4.8.3, at 466 (1989).
16. The House Report on the 1909 Copyright Act observed:
It not infrequently happens that the author sells his copyright outright for a com-
paratively small sum. If the work proves to be a great success ... your committee
felt that it should be the exclusive right of the author to take the renewal term,
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The second of these policies is to give independent copyright pro-
tection to a derivative work. 17 Congress observed that many artistic de-
velopments are procured through use or adaption of previously
copyrighted material.1 8 Where an original work' 9 based on a preexist-
ing copyright is fixed in a tangible form of expression, 20 it is eligible for
copyright protection.
2 1
Thus, the conflicting rights of two statutory classes come to a head
and present an important and recurring question concerning the mean-
ing and application of the renewal copyright: Does the renewal copy-
right entitle the author's successor to nullify the derivative work owner's
right to exploit his own independently copyrighted derivative work cre-
ated with the author's consent? To reconcile these conflicting interests
it is helpful to examine the historical development of the renewal system
and derivative works.
A. The Statutory Framework
In the 1909 Act, Congress expressed its intent to provide economic
incentive for the creation of artistic works. 2 2 To facilitate this policy,
Congress provided authors or their statutory successors25 with two
terms of copyright: an initial term of twenty-eight years and, upon
and the law should be framed as is the existing law, so that he could not be de-
prived of that right.
H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1909).
17. A "derivative work" is a work based on one or more preexisting works, such
as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion pic-
ture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or
any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work
consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative
work".
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
18. See generally M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, I NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.01 (1978).
19. The standard of originality does not include any requirement of novelty, ingenu-
ity, or esthetics merit, and there is no intention to enlarge the standard of copyright pro-
tection to require them. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976) (Notes of
House Committee on the Judiciary, House Report 1476). Originality means that the work
is independently created and not copied from other works. See, e.g., Roth Greeting Card v.
United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970) (copyright on greeting cards); 1 M. NiM-
MER & D. NIMMER, supra note 18, § 2.01[A].
20. The concept of fixation in a tangible form is important because it represents the
dividing line between common law and statutory protection. An unfixed work of author-
ship, such as an improvisation or unrecorded performance would continue to be subject to
protection under state common law or statute but not under federal copyright law. See
H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 19, at 52.
21. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). Works of authorship include, but are not limited to, liter-
ary works, musical works, dramatic works, pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works, motion pictures, and sound recordings. Id.
22. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). "The economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that en-
couragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.'" Id. at 219.
23. The copyright clause of the Constitution vests Congress with the powers "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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proper application, a second twenty-eight year renewal term free of any
assignments or licenses made during the preceding twenty-eight year
term.
24
The 1909 Act's renewal provisions were based on three grounds.
2 5
First, each copyright term should be relatively long.26 Second, most
works will lose their commercial value and fall into the public domain by
the end of the initial twenty-eight year term unless affirmative steps are
taken to renew the copyright.27 Third, a work that continues to be com-
mercially valuable after twenty-eight years more likely owes its success
to the creative efforts of the author, rather than the contributions of the
derivative work.
28
Under the 1976 Copyright Act (1976 Act), the renewal system was
replaced by a termination mechanism. 29 For works existing in their first
copyright term on or before January 1, 1978, however, the 1976 Act
retained the renewal scheme of the 1909 Act, and extended the renewal
term to forty-seven years. 30 Section 304(a) of the 1976 Act provides
that a copyright may be renewed by the work's author if he is alive at the
time the renewal right vests; by the author's surviving spouse or children
if the author is not alive at the time the renewal right vests; by the au-
thor's executors if the author and the author's surviving spouse and chil-
dren are not alive at the time the renewal right vests; and in the absence
of a will, by the author's next of kin.3 '
The time of vesting is critical to the determination of renewal
rights.3 2 For example, where the author assigns his renewal rights but
dies prior to the renewal date, the assignee will take nothing and the
author's family, executor, or next of kin, respectively, will take all. 33
Thus, the 1976 Act generally codified the renewal provisions of the 1909
Act and continued the historical policy of allowing authors a second op-
portunity to "cash in" on their creative efforts.
The origins of the term "derivative work" are somewhat obscure.
3 4
24. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1909) (amended 1976). Proper application was secured by filing
an application for renewal within one year of the expiration of the first twenty-eight year
term. Id.
25. See P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 15, § 4.8.
26. Id. at § 4.8.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text regarding the termination right.
30. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1988). The 1976 Act codified the renewal provisions of the
1909 Act except for extending the renewal term for an additional nineteen years. Compare
17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1988) with 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1988) (the 1976 Act codified the renewal
provisions of the 1909 Act except for extending the renewal term for an additional
nineteen years).
31. Id. § 304(a).
32. See P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 15, § 4.8.1.
33. See 2 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 18, § 9.06[C]; P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note
15, § 4.8.1.
34. The term did not appear in the 1909 Act, which stated that "versions of works in
the public domain or of copyrighted works when produced with the consent of the propri-
etor of the copyright in such works, or works republished with new matter, shall be re-
garded as new works subject to copyright under the provisions of this tide." Copyright
Act of 1909, ch. 391, § 7, 61 Stat. 652 (1947).
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Section 7 of the 1909 Act provided separate and independent copyright
protection for "new works," including a new work that incorporated, to
some extent, one or more copyrighted works.5 5 This section was in ef-
fect reenacted in the 1976 Act as section 103, where the term "derivative
work"8 6 was substituted for the "new works" language. s 7 Under section
103, the copyright in a derivative work "extends only to the material
contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preex-
isting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive
right in the preexisting material." 3 8 For example, the derivative author
who is licensed to produce a musical opera based on a copyrighted play
is entitled to copyright only that which is original and in addition to the
underlying play, and obtains no rights to the play itself.
3 9
Under the 1976 Act, in certain circumstances, the author of a copy-
right may grant a license to exploit his copyright and at a later date ter-
minate the license. 40 The 1976 Act also provides an exemption for the
termination of derivative works. 4 1 Sections 203(b)(1) and 304(c)(6)(A)
provide:
A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before
its termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of
the grant after its termination, but this privilege does not ex-
tend to the preparation after the termination of other deriva-
tive works based upon the copyrighted work covered by the
terminated grant.
42
Thus, a motion picture based on a copyrighted novel may continue to be
distributed after termination. Any remakes of the motion picture, how-
ever, would constitute infringement. The termination exception of the
1976 Act applies only to copyrights secured afterJanuary 1, 1978. The
Act does not specifically treat the exception's impact on issues raised by
35. The "new work" copyright was limited in two respects. First, it extended only to
new material and not the underlying work. See, e.g., Donald v. Zack Meyer's T.V. Sales &
Serv., 426 F.2d 1027, 1029 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971); Adventures in
Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809, 813 n.3 (7th Cir. 1942); Reyher
v. Children's Television Workshop, 387 F. Supp. 869, 870-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aft'd, 533
F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976). Second, it was limited to the grant
itself. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469, 471 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 849 (1951); Fitch v. Shubert, 20 F. Supp. 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1937). See Gilliam v.
American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 21 (2d Cir. 1976); Note, Rohauer, supra note 4,
at 642. But see Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484,488,494 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 949 (1977); Edmonds v. Stem, 248 F. 897, 888 (2d Cir. 1918).
36. See supra note 17; compare 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1988) with 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1909)
(amended 1976) (providing copyright for derivative works).
37. The term "derivative work" was substituted for "new works" to codify the usage
preferred by judges and commentators. Note, Rohauer, supra note 4, at 638 n.2 1. See, e.g.,
Nom Music, Inc. v. Kaslin, 343 F.2d 198, 200 (2d Cir. 1965); Reyher, 387 F. Supp. at 870.
38. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
39. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
40. See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1988). For an excellent discussion of the termination right
see Melniker & Melniker, supra note 1; Stein, Termination of Transfers and Licenses Under the
New Copyright Act: Thorny Problems for the Copyright Bar, 24 UCLA L. REv. 1141 (1977).
41. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(b)(1), 304(c)(6)(A) (1988). The contours of the derivative work
exception are unmarked and presently unclear. See Note, Rohauer, supra note 4, at 649
n.109.
42. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(b)(1), 304(c)(6)(A) (1988).
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continued utilization of a derivative work during the renewal term of the
underlying copyright secured prior to January 1, 1978.
4 3
B. The Case Law
The conflicting rights of underlying work owners and derivative
work owners regarding the renewal copyright have been a continuing
source of litigation. 44 One of the first cases to address this conflict was
the landmark case Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons,45 where the
Supreme Court held that the assignment by an author of renewal rights
is valid "against the world," if he is alive at the commencement of the
renewal term.4 6 In Fisher, the author of the song, "When Irish Eyes Are
Smiling," assigned all rights, title, and interest in the song, including the
renewal copyright, to Witmark.4 7 Subsequently, the author applied for
the renewal copyright and assigned the rights to Fisher.48 Witmark sued
Fisher for copyright infringement.
In Fisher, the petitioner argued that the reversionary policy of the
renewal term precluded any assignment of renewal interests during the
initial copyright term.49 The Court acknowledged the legislative intent
to provide authors two chances at exploiting their works, but rejected
the idea that an author could completely avoid any assignments made
during the original copyright period.5 0 The Court observed:
It is one thing to hold that the courts should not make them-
selves instruments of injustice by lending their aid to enforce-
ment of an agreement .... It is quite another matter to hold,
as we are asked in this case, that regardless of the circum-
stances surrounding a particular assignment, no agreements by
authors to assign their renewal interests are binding.
5 1
The Court held, as a matter of law, that an author may assign the rights
to the renewal copyright before the expiration of the original
copyright.
5 2
In a later decision, Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc.,53 the
Court expanded the scope of renewal rights. In Miller Music, the co-
author of the song, "Moonlight and Roses," assigned all rights in the
43. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 304 (1988) with 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1988) (the 1909 Act renewal
provisions are not addressed).
44. See generally Jasi, supra note 1.
45. 318 U.S. 643 (1943).
46. See infra note 53, at 375.
47. Fisher, 318 U.S. at 645.
48. Id. at 646.
49. Id. at 645.
50. Id. at 655-57. The Court reasoned nobody would buy what an author could not
sell, and to prohibit an author from making an effective assignment is not consistent with
providing economic incentive for the author.
51. Id. at 656-57 (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 657. While the explicit language of the Copyright Act gives the author an
unqualified right to renew his copyright, the Court did not view this as congressional in-
tent to nullify agreements by authors to assign their renewal interests. See id. at 655-56.
53. 362 U.S. 373 (1960).
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song, including the renewal copyright, to Miller Music.54 The author
died prior to the commencement of the renewal period without a surviv-
ing spouse or child. 55 The executor of his estate renewed the copyright
and distributed the renewal rights to the author's legatees. 5 6 The lega-
tees assigned the renewal rights to Daniels. 5 7 Miller Music sued Daniels
for copyright infringement.
The Court held that when an author dies prior to the renewal pe-
riod his interest in the renewal copyright does not vest, and his statutory
successor is exclusively entitled to the renewal copyright.58 The Court
reasoned that any purchaser of a contingent interest takes the risk that
the contingency may not occur, and is thereby "deprived of nothing."5 9
Under the Fisher and Miller Music doctrines, then, the critical deter-
mination is whether or not the renewal copyright has vested in the au-
thor. Where the author survives to the renewal term, the copyright
vests, and his original intention to assign is controlling. If the author
dies before the renewal term commences, however, any interest he pur-
ported to assign is terminated because all he held was an expectancy.
It has been suggested that when a derivative work is created with
consent of the underlying work proprietor, "a right of property
[springs] into existence" 60 and the derivative work owner may continue
to use the underlying work, as contained in the derivative work, without
infringing the rights of the underlying renewal copyright. 6 1 In one of
the earlier cases which treated this subject, G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc.,62 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit effectively
repudiated the "new property doctrine."
In Ricordi, the author of a novel 63 assigned a playwright the rights to
produce a play based on the novel and to retain the title.64 The author
and the playwright then assigned Ricordi the right to create a derivative
work opera based on the play, but did not include the renewal term.65
After producing the opera, Ricordi wanted to create a motion picture
based on the opera.6 6 However, the author renewed his copyright in the
54. Id. at 373-74.
55. Id. at 374.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 375. The Court reasoned that this result follows not because the author's
assignment is invalid, but because he only had an expectancy to assign. See id. at n.1.
59. Id. at 378.
60. Edmonds v. Stem, 248 F. 897, 898 (2d Cir. 1918). See Rohauer v. Killiam Shows,
Inc., 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977). But see Stewart v. Abend, 110
S. Ct. 1750 (1990).
61. The "new property doctrine" was limited to use of the underlying work as incor-
porated in the derivative work and any remake, sequel, or other exploitation of the under-
ling work was prohibited. For a general discussion of the "new property doctrine" see I
M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 18, § 3.07[A];Jasi, supra note 1.
62. 189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951).
63. J. LONG, MADAME BurrERFLY (1897).
64. Id. at 470.
65. Id. at 470. Since the assignment did not include the renewal term, the court
viewed it as limited to the original term of copyright. Id. at 471.
66. Id. at 471.
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novel and assigned such rights to Paramount Pictures, who also wanted
to make a motion picture, but based upon the novel.67 Ricordi sued
Paramount for a declaratory judgment.
The court concluded that Ricordi did not have any rights to the
novel during the renewal term and therefore could not make a motion
picture version of his opera which necessarily must include the novel.
68
This holding was contrary to the "new property right" theory, since Ri-
cordi was held to have lost his rights to exploit the underlying work, and
could not exploit his own derivative work.6 9 Notwithstanding the fact
that Ricordi and subsequent cases70 repudiated the "new property right"
doctrine, the concept was dramatically revived in the case of Rohauer v.
Killiam Shows, Inc. 71
In Rohauer, the author of a novel 72 assigned the motion picture
rights in the novel to a production company and agreed to renew the
copyright and thereupon assign the renewal rights to the movie com-
pany. 73 The movie company created and copyrighted a motion picture
based on the novel and thereafter assigned all rights to Killiam. 74 In the
meantime, the author of the novel died prior to the renewal period, and
the copyright was renewed by the author's daughter, who assigned all
her "rights, title, and interest" in the novel to Rohauer. 75 Killiam dis-
tributed the movie during the renewal term of the novel, and Rohauer
sued for copyright infringement.
7 6
The Second Circuit held that the continued distribution of the film
did not infringe the renewal copyright in the underlying work.77 The
court acknowledged the Miller Music doctrine,78 in which a purported
grant of renewal rights is ineffective where the owner does not survive
until the renewal term commences. 79 The court justified its decision,
however, by pointing to the copyright in the derivative work itself and
the express language of the 1909 Act.8 0 Section 7, as amended, pro-
vides that a "copyright under the provisions of this title" shall extend to
67. Id.
68. Id. at 471-72 ("A copyright renewal creates a new estate .... clear of all rights,
interests or licenses granted under the original copyright [citations omitted]."). See Fox
Film Corp. v. Knowles, 274 F. 731, 732 (D.N.Y.), aft'd, 279 F. 1018 (2d. Cir. 1922), rev'don
other grounds, 261 U.S. 326 (1923); Fitch v. Shubert, 20 F. Supp. 314, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1937);
H. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 535 (1944).
69. See I M. NiMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 18, § 3.07[A].
70. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (ownership
of the derivative copyright does not affect the scope of ownership of the underlying copy-
right); Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968).
71. 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977). For an excellent discus-
sion of the Rohauer opinion see Note, Rohauer, supra note 4.
72. E. HULL, THE SONS OF THE SHIEK (1925).
73. Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 486.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 486-87.
77. Id. at 494. However, new or "second generation" derivative works could not be
made. Id. at 488.
78. See supra notes 53, 58-59 and accompanying text.
79. Miller Music Corp. v. Charles Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 375 (1960).
80. Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 487-90. The court distinguished Miller Music and other cases
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"new works."8 1 The implicit authority was that the "copyright" con-
ferred by section 7 encompasses the entire derivative work, including
the one or more underlying works, and therefore continued use is not
infringement.
8 2
In addition, the court placed great emphasis on the policy consider-
ations relating to underlying work owners and derivative work owners:
[Tihe equities lie preponderantly in favor of the proprietor of
the derivative copyright. In contrast to the situation where an
assignee or licensee has done nothing more than print, publi-
cize and distribute a copyright story or novel, a person who
with the consent of the author has created an opera or a motion
picture film will often have made contributions literary, musical
and economic, as great as or greater than the original author.
8 3
Furthermore, the court observed that the derivative work owner "has no
truly effective way of protecting himself against the eventuality of the
author's death before the renewal period" or knowing who the surviving
spouse, child, executor, or next of kin will be.
8 4
The Rohauer case, decided in 1977, served as a guide to derivative
work owners who continued to use their derivative works during the re-
newal term of underlying works.8 5 In 1988, this issue was presented to
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the case of Abend v. MCA,
Inc.8 6 The Ninth Circuit rejected the Rohauer approach,8 7 and held that
the continued distribution of a derivative work during the renewal term
of the underlying work was infringement where the author died prior to
the renewal term. 88 The holding in Abend v. MCA directly conflicted
with decisions in other circuits and led to the grant of certiorari in Stewart
v. Abend.
8 9
in that they were concerned only with the reconciliation between a derivative copynght and
the underlying renewal copyright. Id. at 490.
81. 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1909) (amended 1976). The court found that the thrust of section
7 was to protect derivative works, and the "force and validity" language regarding the
underlying copyright had no bearing on the right of the derivative work user to continue
using his derivative work during the copyright renewal term of the subsisting work.
Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 487-90.
82. But see 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 18, § 3.07[A], at 3-37, 3-38 (declar-
ing the assumption erroneous).
83. Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 493.
84. Id. at 493. The court found support for this policy consideration in the derivative
work exceptions set out in sections 203(b)(1) and 304(c)(6)(A) of the 1976 Act. See supra
note 42.
85. See Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 183 n.7 (1985) (WhiteJ, dissenting)
(characterizing the holding of Rohauer as the "prevail[ing] view").
86. 863 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1988).
87. Id. at 1472-78.
88. Id. at 1478. Although the Ninth Circuit held for the underlying work owner, the
court recognized the substantial investment, efforts and talent of the derivative work
owner, and directed the district court to fashion a remedy accordingly. Id.
89. 110 S. Ct. 1750 (1990).
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III. STEWART v. ABEND
A. Facts
Stewart Abend, doing business as Authors Research Company (re-
spondent), brought suit to enjoin continued distribution of the classic
1954 Alfred Hitchcock motion picture, Rear Window 90 (the motion pic-
ture), starring James Stewart and Grace Kelly, by MCA, Inc., Universal
Film Exchanges, Inc., James Stewart and the co-trustees of Alfred Hitch-
cock's estate (petitioner).
In 1945, author Cornell Woolrich agreed to assign the motion pic-
ture rights to several of his stories, including one incorporated in the
motion picture at issue,9 1 to a production company (predecessor-in-in-
terest).92 Woolrich also agreed to renew the copyright in the stories at
the appropriate time and to assign the same motion picture rights to the
predecessor-in-interest for the twenty-eight year renewal term provided
by the 1909 Act.98 In 1953, the predecessor-in-interest assigned the
motion picture rights to petitioner. 94 Rear Window was produced, copy-
righted, and distributed by petitioner in 1954.95
In 1968, Woolrich died without a surviving spouse or child and
before he could renew the short story copyright.9 6 His statutory succes-
sor renewed the copyright and assigned the renewal rights to respon-
dent.9 7 In 1982, petitioner renewed the copyright in the motion
picture, and in reliance on the 1977 Rohauer decision, re-released the
film. 9 8 Respondent brought suit for copyright infringement in district
court.
The district court granted summary judgment for petitioner on the
alternative grounds that continued distribution of the film was permitted
by: (1) the Rohauer rule,9 9 and (2) the "fair use" doctrine.1 0 0 The Ninth
90. Rear Window (Universal Studios 1954).
91. The short story "It Had To Be Murder" was first published in the February 1942
issue of Dime Detective magazine and served as the basis for the 1954 film Rear Window.
92. Id. at 1755. B.G. De Sylva Productions originally obtained the film rights and later
assigned the rights to petitioner's parent, Patron, Inc. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1752.
96. Id. at 1755.
97. Id. at 1756. As executor of the Woolrich estate, Chase Manhattan Bank renewed
the copyright in "'It Had To Be Murder" pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 24 and assigned the
renewal rights to respondent. Id.
98. Id.
99. See supra notes 71, 77-84 and accompanying text.
100. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). The Copyright Revision Act of October 19, 1976, P.L.
94-553, 90 Stat. 2546, codified the fair use doctrine into section 107. The text provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or such or by any other means
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news report-
ing, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or re-
search, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use
made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered
shall include-
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Circuit reversed, 10 1 holding that petitioner's use of the Woolrich story
in its film was not fair use and rejected the reasoning of Rohauer.10 2 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
B. Supreme Court Decision
1. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court held that the distribution and publication of
the derivative work (the film Rear Window) by petitioner, during the
copyright renewal term of the underlying work (the short story), in-
fringed upon the rights of the respondent when the author of the under-
lying work agreed to assign the rights in the renewal term to the
derivative work owner, but died before the commencement of the re-
newal term.10 3 The Court also held the unauthorized use of the Wool-
rich story by petitioner was not fair use.
10 4
The first issue before the Court was whether the death of the prior
work's author, before commencement of the renewal period, extin-
guished the right of the derivative work owner to use the underlying
work. The Court held in the affirmative, reasoning that the renewal pro-
visions of the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts, their legislative history,
and the case law interpreting them established that they were intended
to give the author a second chance to obtain fair remuneration for his
creative efforts, and to provide the author's family or statutory successor
(absent a surviving spouse or child) with a "new estate" if the author
died before the renewal term commenced.
0 5
The Court next considered whether the right of the underlying
work owner to sue for infringement was extinguished by creation of the
derivative work.' 0 6 The Court held that this right was not extinguished,
and that petitioner's contention was unsupported by the Act and con-
trary to the axiomatic principle that a person may exploit only such
copyrighted material that he either owns or is licensed to use.
10 7
The third issue was whether the termination provisions of the 1976
Act may, under the facts of this case, prevent the owner of a preexisting
work from enjoining distribution of a derivative work. The Court held
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit education purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107.
101. Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1988).
102. Id.
103. Stewart v. Abend, 110 S. Ct. 1750, 1760 (1990).
104. Id. at 1768.
105. Abend, 110 S. Ct. at 1758-60.
106. Petitioners argued that the creation of the "new" derivative work under section 7,
extinguishes any rights the preexisting work owner may have to sue. Id. at 1761.
107. Id. at 1761. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text regarding the scope of a
derivative work.
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that the termination provisions do not effect the underlying work
owner's right to sue for infringement and that the express language of
the termination provision indicates that Congress assumed the underly-
ing work owner had such a right.
10 8
The fourth issue was whether the holding in Rohauer v. Killiam
Shows, Inc. 10 9 controlled. The Court held that the Rohauer theory was
not supported by either the 1909 or 1976 Acts and was not the "bright
line rule," but was instead merely an "interest balancing approach." 1 1 0
The fifth issue was whether the rule announced by the court of ap-
peals would undermine a policy of the Copyright Act to ensure the dis-
semination of creative works. The Court, exercising judicial restraint,
decided that this argument was better addressed by Congress than the
courts. I I
The final issue was whether the distribution of Rear Window by peti-
tioner was fair use of respondent's underlying copyright. The Court
concluded it was not. 12
Petitioner argued that a derivative work is independent of the un-
derlying work and not subordinate to the rights of the underlying work
owner during the renewal term. 1 3 Petitioner asserted that its theory of
the case was supported by reading together sections 3, 7 and 24 of the
1909 Act and the termination provisions of the 1976 Act. 1 4 The Court
rejected this "overarching" interpretation of the Act."
15
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the Court concluded that read
together, the various sections of the 1909 and 1976 Acts actually favored
respondent. The Court observed that the plain language of the relevant
statutory sections supported not only the underlying work owner's right
to the renewal term free of any assignments made by the prior au-
thor,"16 but also that the termination exception for derivative works in
the 1976 Act had no effect regarding the renewal rights of the underly-
ing work owner." 17
The Court found ineluctable authority in the case of Miller Music
108. Abend, 110 S. Ct. at 1762-63.
109. See supra note 71.
110. Abend, 110 S. Ct. at 1763.
111. Id. at 1763-65.
112. Id. at 1768-69. Fair use has been defined as "a privilege in others than the owner
of the copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his con-
sent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner by the copyright." Rosemont
Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1009
(1966) (quoting H. BALL, THE LAw OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)).
See also Annotation, Extent of Doctrine of "Fair Use" Under Federal Copyright Act, 23 A.L.R. 3d
130 (1969). See generally Yankwich, What is Fair Use?, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 203 (1954); Note,
Fair Use: A Controversial Topic in the Latst Revision of Our Copyright Law, 34 U. CIN. L. REv. 73
(1965).
113. 110 S. Ct. at 1758, 1761.
114. Id. at 1761-63.
115. Id. at 1753.
116. Id. at 1759-60.
117. Id. at 1763. Congress specifically declined to apply the derivative works exception
of the new termination provisions retroactively, or otherwise alter renewal rights as to
existing works. See H. REP. No. 1476, supra note 19, at 139; Note, Derivative Copynght and
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Corp. v. Daniels, Inc.1 18 Following Miller Music, the Court concluded, a
fortiori, that the assignee of a portion of the renewal rights, for example,
the right to create and distribute a derivative work, must also hold
nothing.119
The Court compared Rohauer to other factual simulations and found
the approach set forth in Rohauer to be problematic. 120 It observed that
"while in some cases Rohauer might make some sense in some contexts,
it makes no sense in others."'12 1 The Court concluded that Rohauer did
not announce a rule but merely a balancing approach.
122
The Court weighed amici123 and the public interest in having access
to derivative works. 124 Amici argued that owners of underlying works
would be able to retire their copyrights or to make such exorbitant de-
mands for future use that it would be economically impossible to further
distribute derivative works. 12 5 The Court dismissed these arguments as
better addressed by Congress than the courts.
126
Finally, the Court determined that the unauthorized use of respon-
dent's preexisting copyright in petitioner's derivative work was not fair
use. 12 7 It noted that the film neither fell into any of the categories of
fair use enumerated in section 107 nor met any of the nonexclusive cri-
teria that section 107 requires a court to consider.'
28
2. Concurring Opinion
Justice White concurred that the result reached in Miller Music re-
quired the result reached by the Court. 12 9 He disagreed, however, that
the decision in Miller Music was required by the Copyright Act.1
3 0
3. Dissenting Opinion
In a strong dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist andJustice Scalia, argued that section 7, by its plain language, cre-
ates an independent copyright in the entire derivative work, entitled to
the 1909 Act-New Clarity or Confusion?, 44 BROOKLYN L. REv. 905, 930-31 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter Note, Derivative Copyright]; Note, Rohauer, supra note 4, at 646.
118. 362 U.S. 373 (1960) (assignee of all rights during the renewal term holds nothing
if the assignor dies prior to the renewal term). See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the Miller Music decision.
119. Abend, 110 S. Ct. at 1760.
120. Id. at 1763. The court used the example of a condensed book, where the contri-
bution of the derivative author is little and that of the original author is great. Id.
121. Id. at 1763.
122. Id.
123. Various motion picture companies submitted amicus curiae briefs in support of
petitioner, while the Copyright Register, the American Songwriters Guild and the Com-
mittee for Literary Property Studies submitted briefs in support of respondent.
124. The petitioner and supporting amici briefs argued that the court of appeals deci-
sion would lead to fewer works reaching the public. Abend, 110 S. Ct. at 1763-64.
125. Id. at 1764.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1768-69. See supra notes 100 & 112 regarding the "fair use" doctrine.
128. Abend, 110 S. Ct. at 1768.
129. Id. at 1769 (White, J., concurring).
130. Id.
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equal treatment with the preexisting work under the renewal and dura-
tion provisions of section 24.131 In other words, once the derivative
work obtained copyright, it was entitled to its own two terms of twenty-
eight year protection without limitation. The dissent argued that the
legislative history supported the contention that a derivative copyright,
made with the consent of the underlying work proprietor, creates a com-
pletely independent work entitled to the same monopoly privileges of
the original work.
13 2
Justice Stevens further argued that once consent had been ob-
tained, and the derivative work was created and copyrighted in accord
with that consent, "a right of property springs into existence."1 33 He
reasoned: "[t]he original copyright may have relatively little value be-
cause the creative contribution of the second artist is far more significant
than that of the original contribution," 134 and Congress intended for
such "new works" to receive independent copyright protection.13 5 The
dissent focused on the consent of the original author and argued that
the "agreement to permit use of the underlying material during the re-
newal term does not violate section 24 because at the moment consent is
given and the derivative work is created and copyrighted, a new right of
property comes into existence independent of the original author's
copyright estate."
1 36
Finally, the dissent criticized the majority's implicit endorsement of
Miller Music. 13 7 Justice Stevens distinguished Miller Music by focusing on
the form of the assignment. Where an author merely assigns the right to
copy and vend his work, the reasoning of Miller Music is valid. He as-
serted, however, that where the author expressly consents to production
of a derivative work under section 7, the copyright on such derivative
work gives the proprietor a superior right.1
3 8
IV. COMMENTS
The result in Abend merely reaffirms the axiomatic principle that an
author or his family should have two chances to seek fair remuneration
for his creative efforts. This basic principle of copyright law has been
131. Id. at 1769-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 1772-75. "The legislative history confirms that the copyright in derivative
works not only gives the second creative product the monopoly privileges of excluding
others from the uncontested use of the new work, but also allows the creator to publish his
or her own work product." Id. at 1775.
133. Id. at 1775 (quoting Edmonds v. Stem, 248 F. 897, 898 (2d Cir. 1918)). See supra
notes 60-61 and accompanying text for the "new property right" doctrine.
134. Abend, 110 S. Ct. at 1775.
135. Id. "By designating derivative works as 'new works' that are subject to copyright
and accorded the two terms applicable to original works, Congress evinced its intention
the derivative copyright not lapse upon termination of the original author's interest in the
underlying copyright." Id. at 1776.
136. Id. at 1777.
137. Id. at 1778. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of Miller
Music.
138. Abend, 110 S. Ct. at 1778. "The possession of a copyright on a properly created
derivative work gives the proprietor rights superior to those of a mere licensee." Id.
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accepted and relied upon since the inception of the 1909 Act. 139 The
decision in Abend should have been unanimous. 140
The dissent trivialized the Court's reliance on the plain reading of
the statute. It creatively argued that the statutory provisions and their
congressional intent were something else.1 4 ' According to the dissent,
reading section 7 in conjunction with section 24 of the Act gives the
derivative work copyright two full terms of protection in the entire deriv-
ative work, when the original work is used with the consent of the author
and when the original work is in the public domain. 14 2 In other words,
the dissent maintains that the derivative copyright extends beyond the
original contribution of the derivative author and includes the underly-
ing work itself.
143
The dissent read into the Act a provision which does not exist, ex-
plicitly or implicitly, in the statutes.144 In addition, its contentions "fly
in the face" of both section 103(b) and the courts' consistent interpreta-
tion of the scope of derivative work protection, which explicitly state
that a copyright in a derivative work "extends only to the material con-
tributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the pre-ex-
isting material employed in the work."1
45
139. See, e.g., Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1960) (an
author's assignment of rights in the renewal copyright is unenforceable as against the au-
thor's executor who obtained the renewal copyright at the author's death); Fox Film Corp.
v. Knowles, 261 U.S. 326 (1923) (a deceased author's executor is entitled to the renewal
copyright); M. Witmark & Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co., 38 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)
(if the author dies prior to obtaining renewal copyright, his agreement to convey rights in
the renewal copyright is ineffective); L. FROLICH & C. ScHWARTz, THE LAW OF MOTION
PICTURES INCLUDING THE LAW OF THE THEATRE 549 (1918) (an author's agreement to dis-
tribute a motion picture version of his work during the renewal term is worthless if the
author dies prior to renewal); Brown, Renewal Rights in Copyright, 28 CORNELL L.Q. 460,
470 (1943) (the renewal term is a highly speculative venture); Chafee, Reflections on Copy-
right Law: 11, 45 CoLUM. L. REV. 719, 726 (1945) (the 1909 Act provides a veto power for
the surviving relatives in respect to the renewal copyright).
140. Abend has not gone without criticism. See B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF
COPYRIGHT 112 (1967) (the statutory interpretation of the Court may have a "peculiarly
perverse" effect); S. SPRING, RISKS & RIGHTS IN PUBLISHING, TELEVISION, RADIO, MOTION
PICTURES, ADVERTISING, AND THE THEATER 95 (1956) (may have an "odd and complicated"
effect); Kupferman, Renewal of Copyright-Section 23 of the Copyright Act of 1909, 44 COLUM. L.
REV. 712, 724 (1944) (using the words "an anachronism"); Note, Abend v. MCA, Copy-
RIGHT L.J. 14, at 16-17 (Feb. 1989) (the Ninth Circuit opinion "does not make sense");
Note, Renewal Rights, A Statutory Anachronism, 10 W. RESERVE L. REV. 263, 272 (1959)
(describing the concept as "anomalous").
141. The dissent reasoned that
[t]he Copyright Act of 1909 elsewhere accords protection to all the writings of an
author .... Congress would hardly have needed to provide for the copyright of
derivative works, including the detailed provisions on the limit of that copyright,
if it intended only to accord protection to the improvements to an original work
of authorship.
Abend, 110 S. Ct. at 1772.
142. Id. at 1772 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143. The dissent noted that the early drafts of the 1909 Act determined that the extent
of copyright protection rests "upon the nature of the work as a whole rather than the
original expression contributed by the copyright author." Id. at 1774.
144. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1909) (amended 1976) with 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1988) (the
derivative work and underlying dichotomy is not addressed).
145. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988). See Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir.
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Congress, in its legislative wisdom, decided not to tamper with the
renewal system, 146 and instead implemented a termination mecha-
nism. 14 7 This termination scheme did not limit the reversionary interest
held by authors and their successors to the renewal copyright. 148 It is
true that the derivative work exception to the termination provisions is
indicative of Congress' belief in the need for special protection of deriv-
ative works. 149 The countervailing and dominant congressional policy,
however, is to protect an author or his statutory successor from unremu-
nerative transfers. 150
The dissent in Abend attempted to sidestep the prevailing policy of
protecting the original work by arguing that the derivative work owner
has "no truly effective way of protecting himself," 15 1 and that the ineq-
uity of the situation supports its view that Congress intended the deriva-
tive work copyright owner receive independent protection despite the
intrusion upon the renewal copyright owner's rights. 152 This conten-
tion merely serves one interest group over another and furthermore im-
plies the existence of a provision in the Copyright Act that it expressly
rejects. The dissent, however, seeks to justify its theory in the Rohauer
doctrine,'15 that a derivative copyright is an independent property inter-
est entitled to its own two terms of copyright without limitation.
15 4
In Rohauer, the central argument, as pointed out by the dissent, was
the inequity in denying a derivative work owner the rewards of his in-
vestment. 15 5 The legislature recognized this relevant policy considera-
1979); Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 20 (2d Cir. 1976); Reyher v.
Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1976).
146. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., IST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVI-
SION: REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE UNITED
STATES COPYRIGHT LAw 53, 57 (Comm. Print 1961); Note, Rohauer, supra note 4, at 658.
147. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988). See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text regard-
ing the termination right.
148. The termination provision of the 1976 Act evidenced a compromise between au-
thors, movie companies, and the Register of Copyrights. See H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1967). See also Ringer, First Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976, 13
COPYRIGHT 187, 188-89 (1977); Note, Derivative Copyright, supra note 117, at 930-31; Note,
Rohauer, supra note 4, at 647.
149. See S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1975). An important limitation on
the rights of a copyright owner under a terminated grant is specified in section 203(b)(1).
This clause provides that notwithstanding a termination, a derivative work prepared ear-
lier may continue to be utilized under the conditions of the terminated grant; the clause
adds, however, that this privilege is not broad enough to permit the preparation of other
derivative works. Id.
150. See supra notes 13, 15-16 and accompanying text.
151. Abend, 110 S. Ct. 1750, 1778 at n.22 (1990) (quoting Rohauer v. Killiam Shows,
Inc.. 551 F.2d 484, 493 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977) (citing Bricker, Renewal
and Extension of Copyright, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 33 (1955))).
152. "Unless § 24 is to overwhelm § 7, the consent of the original author must be given
effect whether or not it intrudes into the renewal term of the original copyright." Abend,
110 S. Ct. at 1777 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153. See supra notes 71, 77-82 and accompanying text.
154. Abend, 110 S. Ct. at 1772.
155. Abend, 110 S. Ct. at 1778 n.22. "[A] person who with the consent of the author
has created an opera or a motion picture film will often have made contributions literary,
musical, and economic, as great as or greater than the original author." Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 493).
[Vol. 68:2
DERIVATIVE WORK USERS BEWARE
tion by providing derivative works with their own two terms of
copyright.1 5 6 This argument not only begs the question why have a re-
newal term, but also flatly ignores section 103 which expressly states
that the derivative copyright cannot include the underlying copy-
right. 15 7 Rohauer has been extensively criticized in past years 158 and
under materially identical facts the Supreme Court has rejected its
reasoning! 15 9
Undeniably the dissent makes a point; neither the 1909 Act nor the
1976 Act effectively treat the derivative work/renewal term scenario.1 60
This congressional oversight does not justify distortion of the Copyright
Act, however. Until Congress amends the Act to specifically treat this
issue, courts must construe the Act as it is written.
One commentator has suggested a statutory amendment in which
royalties automatically accrue to the underlying work owner when the
derivative work is exploited during the renewal term of the underlying
work.16 1 While this suggestion is a step in the right direction, it is also
problematic. It assumes that the renewal copyright owner will always
seek monetary compensation. For example, the renewal copyright
owner who, for his own reasons, wishes to retire his copyright, will be
precluded from doing so by the continued use of the derivative work.
At first glance, the reversionary interest of the renewal term seems
to cut against traditional notions of free enterprise, freedom of contract
and free alienability of property. In the unique case of the renewal copy-
right, however, it actually "thickens the plot" and furthers such tradi-
tional notions by providing additional opportunities to negotiate and
assume risks. Additionally, the upshot of Abend may actually be more
favorable to the derivative work owner than Rohauer.
16 2
Under Rohauer, the renewal of the derivative work was also, pro tanto,
a renewal of the original work. When a copyright is owned jointly by
several individuals, renewal by one such individual suffices to renew the
156. "By designating derivative works as 'new works'.., and accordfing] the two terms
applicable to original works, Congress evinced its intention that the derivative copyright
not lapse upon termination of the original author's interest in the underlying copyright."
Id. at 1776.
157. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988) with 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1909) (amended 1976)
(the sections are diametrically opposed).
158. Professor Nimmer has stated that the Rohauer decision is "plainly wrong." 1 M.
NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 18, § 3.07[A], at 3-40. SeeJasi, supra note 44, at 791;
Mimms, Jr., Reversion and Derivative Works Under the Copyright Acts of 1909 and 1976, 25
N.Y.L. SCM. L. REV. 595, 608-09 (1980); Note, Derivative Copyright, supra note 117, at 919-
21.
159. See Abend, 110 S. Ct. at 1763 (concluding that neither the 1909 Act nor the 1976
Act provides support for the theory in Rohauer).
160. The 1976 Act does not specifically address the issues raised by the continued utili-
zation of a derivative work during the renewal term of the underlying copyright. Compare
17 U.S.C. § 103 (1988) with 17 U.S.C. § 304 (1988) (the 1976 Act does not specifically
address the issues raised by the continued utilization of a derivative work during the re-
newal term of the underlying copyright).
161. See Note, Rohauer, supra note 4, at 659-62.
162. See I M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 18, § 3.07[A], at 3-49.
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interest of all.1 63 Therefore, the heirs, as fellow owners, do not lose
their rights in the underlying work by failing to renew the copyright and
the studio is prevented from producing a remake, sequel, or other ex-
ploitation of the underlying work. 164 Under Abend, by contrast, the heirs
lose any rights they have in the underlying work from failure to renew,
and the motion picture studio is free to exploit the underlying work as it
pleases. 165
The decision in Abend is a very principled and workable decision
which flows inexorably from the Copyright Act. Any potential inequity
that may arise from the use of a derivative work during the renewal term
of the underlying work is a matter better left to Congress than to the
courts.
V. CONCLUSION
The confusion surrounding the renewal copyright and the deriva-
tive work copyright will, in time, subside. The 1976 Act expressly pro-
vides an exception for derivative works. 166 For works copyrighted prior
to January 1, 1978, however, the exclusive right to the renewal term re-
mains. 167 Until the year 2005,168 absent legislative amendment, courts
will continue to apply the renewal system of the 1909 Act together with
the termination scheme of the 1976 Act.
The Supreme Court has decided that the rights of the renewal copy-
right owner are superior to the rights of the derivative work copyright
owner. 16 9 Thus, where the author of the underlying copyright dies
prior to the commencement of the renewal term, the derivative work
owner no longer has any right to exploit the underlying work. In light of
this decision, the motion picture industry, as well as other users of deriv-
ative works, will be well advised to secure the consent of the current re-
newal copyright owner, or risk possible exposure to infringement suits,
declaratory actions, injunctions, or other forms of liability.
Clark L. McCutchen
163. 2 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 18, § 9.05[E], at 9-64, 9-65.
164. 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 18, § 3.07[A], at 3-48, 3-49.
165. The public is also free to exploit the underlying copyright because the failure to
renew causes the copyright to fall into the public domain. Id.
166. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988).
167. Id. § 304(a) (preserving the 1909 Act's two-tier renewal system for all works that
were in their initial copyright term as of January 1, 1978).
168. The ultimate owner of the renewal copyright will not be known until twenty-eight
years after commencement of the initial copyright which potentially is January 1, 2005.
169. Stewart v. Abend, 110 S. Ct. 1750 (1990). This is true only if the author dies prior
to the renewal term, otherwise his original intentions to assign are controlling. See Fred
Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943).
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JOINT VENTURES
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperative agreements between companies are becoming an in-
creasingly attractive means of developing and commercializing intellec-
tual property. This is particularly true in high-technology industries
because the costs and risks of all stages of producing and marketing a
product entail unique concerns.' While many of the risks inherent in
high-technology businesses can be reduced by forming joint ventures,
2
at least one added risk is encountered: the risk of violating antitrust
laws. Currently, legislators, economists, and legal scholars debate the
chilling effect that federal antitrust laws may have on a company's deci-
sion of whether to form a joint venture.
3
Antitrust policies have been in a state of flux for the last fifteen
1. See, e.g., Jorde & Teece, Antitrust and International Competitiveness: Acceptable Coopera-
tion Among Competitors in the Face of Growing International Competition, 58 A'TrrrusT L.J. 529,
530-40 (1989).
2. There are a variety of ways to define a '"joint venture." For purposes of this dis-
cussion, I have adopted the description provided in Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust
Policy, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1982). There, the author characterizes a joint venture as:
[A]n integration of operations between two or more separate firms, in which the
following conditions are present: (1) the enterprise is under the joint control of
the parent firms, which are not under related control; (2) each parent makes a
substantial contribution to the joint enterprise; (3) the enterprise exists as a busi-
ness entity separate from its parents; and (4) thejoint venture creates significant
new enterprise capability in terms of new productive capacity, new technology, a
new product, or entry into a new market. (citations omitted)
Id. at 1526.
Cooperative arrangements other than formal joint ventures would share many of
these same antitrust concerns. In Porter & Fuller, Coalitions and Global Strategy, in CoMPETr-
TION IN GLOBAL INDUSTRIES 315 (M. Porter ed. 1986), the authors prefer the use of the
term "coalition" to describe "formal, long-term alliances between firms that link aspects of
their businesses but fall short of a merger. They include joint ventures, licensing agree-
ments, supply agreements, marketing agreements, and a variety of other arrangements."
"Intellectual property joint ventures" are those cooperative arrangements in which
companies are developing or commercializing technology which is subject to protection
under intellectual property law. Probably the most common examples are research and
development or high technology production joint ventures.
3. See, e.g., Blechman, Use of Joint Ventures to Foster U.S. Competitiveness in International
Markets, 53 AsrrTRuST L.J. 65, 66 (1984) (arguing that the cost of litigation alone would be
enough to prevent business executives from pursuing research joint ventures); Starling,
Trade Deficit and Legislative Surplus: The New Joint Venture Legislation, 58 A nTRusT LJ. 671,
684 (1989) (arguing that proposed legislation may "be more relevant to the perceptions of
business planners than to antitrust realities"); American Stock Exchange Conference Speaker,
Fed. News Serv. (Fed. Info. Sys. Corp.) (Commerce & Trade Section, Oct. 15, 1990) (com-
ments of Attorney General Dick Thornburgh supporting passage of joint production ven-
ture legislation); CBO Finds Problems With Easing Law for Large Joint Production Ventures,
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) Vol. 59, No. 1477, at 174 (Aug. 2, 1990) (Congres-
sional Budget Office study discusses both sides of issue); Scholars, Industry Witnesses Dispute
Need For Joint Venture Legislation, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) Vol. 59, No. 1475, at
72 (July 19, 1990) (academicians and industry representatives debate need for additional
legislation); Antitrust Limit Voted By House, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1990, D, at col. 6 (late ed.)
(broad support for proposed joint production venture legislation).
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years. For example, between 1975 and 1981, the Department ofJustice
completely reversed its position regarding the per se illegality of many
patent licensing practices. What were once considered to be per se viola-
tions are now treated under rule of reason analyses. 4 In the 1970s and
1980s, the courts also displayed a trend toward using a rule of reason
analysis in cases involving joint ventures whenever there might be a
chance of procompetitive benefits. 5
Congressional actions have also had an impact. In 1984, Congress
passed the National Cooperative Research Act 6 (NCRA), which essen-
tially codified the rule of reason approach with respect to research and
development joint ventures. Additionally, several bills proposed during
recent sessions of Congress have suggested that rule of reason analysis
also be applied to production efforts. 7 Recently, one of those bills was
passed by the House of Representatives. 8 H.R. 4611 requires that rule
of reason analysis be applied to joint ventures. However, distribution,
marketing and sales joint ventures are still exposed to full antitrust
liability.9
4. Compare Law on Lzcensing Practices: Myth or Reality?, Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.
(BNA) No. 213, at A-9, 10 (Jan. 30, 1975) (comments of then Deputy Assistant Attorney
General Bruce Wilson announcing the Department ofJustice's "Nine No-No's of Patent
Licensing," licensing acts which the Department of Justice would consider to be per se
illegal) with Lipsky, Current Antitrust Division Views on Patent Licensing Practices, 50 A'rrrrausT
LJ. 515 (1981) (comments of then Deputy Assistant Attorney General Abbot B. Lipsky,Jr.
individually burying each of the "nine no-no's"). It has been suggested that "Mr. Lipsky
... came close to transforming the Nine No-No's into the Nine Yes-Yes's." Ewing, Technol-
ogy Transfers Under U.S. Antitrust Law: A Private View, 1982 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 13, 25
(1982).
5. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.,
472 U.S. 284 (1985) (member's expulsion from buying cooperative not a boycott where
reason for expulsion was failure of member to follow rules necessary to maintain effective
functioning of cooperative); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441
U.S. 1 (1979) (alleged price-fixing characterized as a marketing arrangement reasonably
necessary to effectuate rights of members); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977) (vertical restrictions may have procompetitive effects).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (1984).
7. See, e.g., S. 1006, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S5395-96 (daily ed. May
16, 1989) (statement by Mr. Leahy) (a straightforward extension of the NCRA to include
joint "manufacturing and processing of equipment and materials"); H.R. 2264, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. H1812 (daily ed. May 10, 1989) (amending the NCRA by
striking the term "joint research and development venture" each place it appears and in-
serting in lieu thereof "joint research, development, or production venture"); S. 952,
101st Cong., 1st Sess., 13 CONG. REC. S5039-40 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (designed to
provide protection specifically for joint ventures involved in the research, design, develop-
ment or manufacture of HDTV technology); H.R. 1025, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG.
REc. H277 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1989) (statement of Mr. Edwards) (an amendment to the
NCRA with regard to joint ventures entered into for the purpose of producing, marketing
or distributing a product, process, or service); H.R. 1024, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135
CONG. REC. E425-26 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1989) (statement of Mr. Boucher) (extending the
NCRA to include production joint ventures following a formal certification process); H.R.
423, 10 1st Cong., Ist Sess., 135 CONG. REc. E4 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1989) (statement of Mr.
Wyden) (notification providing limited damages and rule of reason standards and defining
its coverage of "flexible manufacturing networks" to include joint production, marketing
and distribution efforts).
8. H.R. 4611, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H3099 (daily ed.Jun. 5, 1990)
(statement of Mr. Brooks).
9. Id at H3103 (comments of Rep. Moorhead). See also infra notes 84-89 and accom-
panying text.
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These legislative measures are intended to encourage the formation
of socially beneficial joint ventures. However, the guarantee of rule of
reason analysis may be of little solace to potential joint venturers so long
as the courts, with their limited business savvy, are given free reign to
determine what is "reasonable." Until legislation is enacted which bet-
ter defines the acceptable structure and behavior of a joint venture, one
must carefully consider the treatment that a challenged effort might re-
ceive under a court's rule of reason analysis. This note first reviews the
approach historically applied by the courts in rule of reason analyses. It
then addresses the social, commercial and legislative considerations
which uniquely affect rule of reason analysis for an intellectual property
joint venture.
II. ANALYSIS By THE COURTS
Section 1 of the Sherman Act' 0 provides that every contract, combi-
nation or conspiracy in restraint of trade is illegal. " As is apparent from
this broad language, courts were given little direction as to the enforce-
ment guidelines to be applied. Therefore, in the early stages of antitrust
jurisprudence courts developed two general approaches when evaluat-
ing an alleged violation: per se and rule of reason. 12 A practice is a per se
violation of the antitrust laws if the agreement or act is of such an an-
ticompetitive nature that it is inconceivable that there could be any off-
setting procompetitive benefits. If, however, a plausible argument can
be made that there are also social benefits to be gained from the an-
ticompetitive practice, then the courts are expected to apply rule of rea-
son analysis.
The rule of reason approach has been stated in many different ways.
The Supreme Court, however, has settled on one general test: "whether
the challenged contracts or acts 'were unreasonably restrictive of com-
petitive conditions.' 13 Obviously, this test is only marginally more
helpful than the phrasing of the Sherman Act itself. Nevertheless, be-
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aft'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
13. National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978) (quoting
Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911)). See also F.T.C. v. Indiana
Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986) (quoting Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("[w]hether the restraint imposed is such as merely regu-
lates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition")); National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the
Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984) ("[T]he essential inquiry... [is] whether or
not the challenged restraint enhances competition. Under the Sherman Act, the criterion
to be used in judging the validity of a restraint on trade is its impact on competition.");
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 26 (1979) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (whether "the challenged policy [has] a significant adverse impact on competi-
tion"); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) ("Under this
rule, the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restric-
tive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on
competition.").
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cause courts have applied this standard in enough cases, it is possible to
distinguish acceptable practices from those which are unacceptable.
In essence, the Supreme Court standard is a balancing test which
weighs the relevant anticompetitive and procompetitive elements of a
challenged activity. Factors on the anticompetitive side include refusals
to compete, 14 withholding information needed to make cost-based buy-
ing decisions, 15 concerted limitations of service to customers, 16 reduc-
tion of output, 17 price fixing,18 boycotts,' 9 and restrictions beyond
those necessary to meet the acceptable goals.
20
The most frequently cited procompetitive factors generally involve
the creation of various efficiencies in the marketplace. 2' As a practical
matter, these factors can be broken down into two types of considera-
tions, both of which have played key roles in rule of reason analyses.
First is the motive behind the challenged agreement or act. Second is the
scope of the employed mechanism. For example, if a defendant can show
that its motive for entering into the challenged activity was predicated
on a desire to achieve some socially beneficial outcome, and that the
means employed are only those which are necessary, then the likelihood
is much greater that the defendant will prevail under a rule of reason
analysis. 2
2
The definition of a "beneficial outcome" is in itself a balancing act.
It must therefore be kept in mind that even if the motive and scope are
proper, if the challenged practice will produce a clearly egregious result,
an antitrust violation will most likely be found.
The manner in which a court will evaluate a given joint venture
under a rule of reason analysis is far from predictable. However, pre-
ventive measures can be taken. Prior to entering into a joint venture
agreement, the parties should give adequate consideration to the scope
of the agreement and their motives in forming the joint venture. This
practice should place the venture in the best possible light if it is ever
faced with antitrust charges. Therefore, in order to characterize the re-
quired level of social benefit and the nature of unreasonably excessive
means, it is necessary to take a closer look at the rationale used by the
courts.
14. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986).
15. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Prof Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692-93.
16. See, e.g., Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 447.
17. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 468 U.S. at 117.
18. See id. at 107.
19. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.,
472 U.S. 284, 290 (1985).
20. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 468 U.S. at 119.
21. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986); Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 20-23 (1978).
22. It is persuasively argued that in the absence of demonstrated market power, a
joint venture would not be capable of yielding anticompetitive effects sufficient to violate
antitrust laws. While never specifically applied as such by the Supreme Court, there is a
growing body of circuit court authority which would add a market power threshold issue to
this two-part analysis. For a thorough analysis of this issue, seeJorde & Teece, Innovation,
Cooperation and Antitrst, 4 HIGH TECH. LJ. 1, 41- 46 (1989).
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A. Motive and Scope in Supreme Court Analyses
In United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 23 the Court was asked to
consider whether a joint venture agreement between two chemical com-
panies violated section 7 of the Clayton Act.2 4 At issue was the
probability of whether the joint venture would result in a substantial les-
sening of competition. The Court recognized the commercial realities
of the 1940s and 1950s which led to the growth of joint ventures as
viable business entities.
[The] economic significance [of joint ventures] has grown tre-
mendously in the last score years, having been spurred on by
the need for speed and size in fashioning a war machine during
the early forties. Postwar use of ... joint projects led to the
spawning of thousands of such ventures in an effort to perform
the commercial tasks confronting an expanding economy. 25
The Court cautioned, however, that "It]he joint venture, like the
'merger and the conglomeration,' often creates anticompetitive dan-
gers." 26 Finding no proof of "[s]pecific intent to use Penn-Olin as a
vehicle to eliminate competition,"'27 the Court remanded the case to the
trial court for an assessment of the possibility of a substantial lessening
of competition.
The Court's allusion in Penn-Olin to the importance of motive in
rule of reason analysis became more significant fourteen years later in
the next major Court statement addressing the issue. In National Society
of Professional Engineers v. United States,28 the Court's analysis of motive
demonstrated that even seemingly legitimate business incentives may
not avoid antitrust liability if the incentive could also be reasonably in-
terpreted as being anticompetitive by design. At issue was a canon of
ethics promulgated by the National Society of Professional Engineers
(NSPE). The canon required, in part, that "[t]he Engineer will not com-
pete unfairly with another engineer by attempting to obtain employment
23. 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
25. Penn-Olin, 378 U.S. at 169.
26. Id.
27. The Court suggested the following criteria for a trial court to use when assessing
the probability of a substantial lessening of competition:
[Tihe number and power of the competitors in the relevant market; the back-
ground of their growth; the power of the joint venturers; the relationship of their
lines of commerce; the competition existing between them and the power of each
in dealing with the competitors of the other; the setting in which the joint venture
was created; the reasons and necessities for its ecistence; the joint venture's line of com-
merce and the relationship thereof or that of its parents; the adaptability of its
line of commerce to noncompetitive practices; the potential power of the joint
venture in the relevant market; an appraisal of what the competition in the rele-
vant market would have been if one of the joint venturers had entered it alone
instead of through Penn-Olin; the effect, in the event of this occurrence, of the
other joint venturer's potential competition; and such other factors as might indi-
cate potential risk to competition in the relevant market.
Id. at 177 (emphasis added). On remand, the trial court dismissed the complaint without
reaching an analysis of whether the joint venture might result in a lessening of competi-
tion. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 246 F. Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1965).
28. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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or advancement or professional engagements by competitive bidding
. . ,,29 The purpose of the canon was to encourage competition be-
tween engineering firms solely on the basis of technical qualifications,
thereby providing the public with the highest possible quality of serv-
ices. According to the NSPE, the quality of engineering services would
inevitably suffer as a result of attempting to achieve the lowest possible
price. Because many of these services had a direct impact on public
health, safety and welfare, the cost savings would be offset by the possi-
bility of devastating results.
3 0
In its majority opinion, the Court strayed from a consideration of
the legitimacy of the canon. Instead, the Court focused on the increased
burden placed on the purchaser who wishes to make price compari-
sons.3 ' The Court characterized the NSPE canon as "an absolute ban
on competitive bidding" 32 and as "doing away with competition" 33 de-
spite the retention of some price-based competition 3 4 and the availabil-
ity of quality-based competition. Even though the NSPE advanced an
ostensibly legitimate claim of interest in public safety, the Court found
that the NSPE canon had the intended purpose of maintaining price
levels .35
Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence, offered a scope-based rationale
for finding a Sherman Act violation, suggesting that the NSPE's rule was
"grossly overbroad." 3 6 Perhaps recognizing the Court's limited ability
to evaluate the commercial realities of practicing a given profession, he
warned that "there may be ethical rules which have a more than de
minimis anticompetitive effect and yet are important in a profession's
proper ordering."
3 7
A challenged agreement involving intellectual property came before
29. Id. at 683 n.3 (quoting section I 1 of the Society's Code of Ethics, adopted in July,
1964).
30. Id. at 685. The author, having worked for many years as an international engi-
neering consultant, has had first-hand experience with the legitimate value of such a ca-
non. It is not uncommon for purchasers of engineering services to base decisions solely
on price. Many engineering services possess inherent public safety aspects. Therefore, a
decision based solely on cost could result in serious adverse consequences. To avoid this,
many purchasers require decisions to be based on qualifications rather than cost. Purchas-
ers often require a two-part bidding process. The first decision, as to which firm will be
selected, is based on a comparison of the bidding firms' qualifications. Only after making
this choice does the purchaser open the cost proposal to determine whether it can afford
the selected firm. The Court was aware that even the federal government, as well as for-
eign governments, has used this method for selecting engineers. Id. at 694 nn.20-2 1.
31. Id. at 695.
32. Id. at 692.
33. Id. at 696.
34. Even under the canon's guidelines, the NSPE had to be aware that purchasers of
engineering services generally do a considerable amount of informal reputation-based
"price-shopping" prior to asking for bids. A firm's reputation for over-pricing services
would quickly lead to a lack of requests for bids. Nothing in the canon prevents a firm
from charging less for its services. It simply is prevented from making this information
available at the outset of the bidding process.
35. 435 U.S. at 693 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 699 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 700.
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the Court in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 3 8 To
facilitate the marketing of massive quantities of copyright-protected mu-
sic, two organizations, Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) and the American
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), were formed.
BMI and ASCAP made the copyright music available to subscribers by
offering a "blanket license" whereby a subscriber paid for the right to
use all of the material controlled by that organization. Thus, an owner
of copyrighted music who joined one of these organizations could be
relieved of the impossible task of monitoring the widespread use of his
materials. Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) complained that this
blanket license amounted to "illegal price fixing, an unlawful tying ar-
rangement, a concerted refusal to deal, and a misuse of copyrights."
39
The Court was concerned primarily with whether the arrangement
was aperse violation of the Sherman Act. However, in making this deter-
mination, it applied a sort of "mini-rule of reason" analysis to the facts.
The Court held that if the marketing arrangement is reasonably neces-
sary to protect the rights of individual owners under the copyright laws,
there is no violation of the Sherman Act.40 The Court remanded the
case to the Second Circuit, which found that because "the blanket li-
cense has no anti-competitive effect at all,"'4 ' there was no need to reach
the question of whether the arrangement was an unreasonable restraint
on trade.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the Court should have
avoided the remand by making its own rule of reason inquiry.4 2 Having
established that the practice had an anticompetitive effect,43 he sug-
gested that "[t]he current state of the market cannot be explained on the
ground that it could not operate competitively, or that issuance of more
limited-and thus less restrictive-licenses by ASCAP is not feasible."
4 4
Justice Stevens' suggestion that music-performing rights could be nego-
tiated on a different basis 45 reflects a concern others have expressed
about the use of less restrictive alternatives in a rule of reason analysis.
4 6
Specifically, there is almost always a possibility, especially in hindsight,
of creating an equally effective, less restrictive arrangement.
The fact that the ASCAP and BMI arrangements involved intellec-
tual property rights also was of concern to Justice Stevens. Recognizing
the fact that antitrust rule of reason analysis requires close scrutiny of
38. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
39. Id. at 6.
40. Id. at 19.
41. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1980).
42. Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 29-33.
44. Id. at 33.
45. Id.
46. Jorde & Teece, supra note 22, at 48 ("The problem with this form of analysis is
that it can become a 'trump card' in the hands of lawyers and economists who argue that
the benefits of a cooperative arrangement could have been achieved with less restraint on
trade.").
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"great aggregations of economic power,"' 4 7 he noted that the privileges
conferred by patents and copyrights should be strictly limited to the
scope of the statutory grant.
48
Four years later, the Court again addressed the issue of motive and
scope in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the Uni-
versity of Oklahoma.49 This case involved an analysis of the National Col-
legiate Athletic Association (NCAA) plan for televising its members'
football games. The NCAA was concerned that the growth of television
coverage might reduce attendance at the live events. In order to elimi-
nate this problem, the NCAA implemented a plan which restricted the
total number of football games which could be televised, as well as the
number of games which an individual member team could agree to tele-
vise each year. Several of the teams filed for an injunction when the
NCAA tried to prevent them from forming a separate organization
within the NCAA for negotiating television contracts.
After determining that a rule of reason analysis was appropriate, the
Court stated that the anticompetitive behavior of the complaining teams
"place[d] upon petitioner a heavy burden of establishing an affirmative
defense which competitively justifies this apparent deviation from the
operations of a free market."' 50 In attempting to establish this defense,
the NCAA put forth several justifications for its actions, including im-
proved marketing of broadcast rights,5 ' protecting live attendance, 52
and maintaining a competitive balance among teams.
53
The Court dealt with each of these claimed motives separately. It
first held that the record did not support the claimed procompetitive
marketing effects of the cooperative joint venture.5 4 Because the NCAA
had apparently inferred that procompetitive behavior naturally followed
from the formation of joint ventures, the Court was quick to point out
that "joint ventures have no immunity from the antitrust laws ..... 55 It
went on to note, however, that "a joint selling arrangement may 'mak[e]
possible a new product by reaping otherwise unattainable
efficiencies.' "-56
The NCAA's second claim, that the plan was intended to protect
live attendance, was also met with a hostile response from the Court.
Although initially the plan probably was conceived to protect gate at-
tendance, the Court agreed with the lower court's finding that the plan
had since "evolved in a manner inconsistent with its original design."' 57
47. Broadcast I1ustc, Inc., 441 U.S. at 37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. Id.
49. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
50. Id. at 113.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 115.
53. Id. at 117.
54. Id. at 115.
55. Id. at 113.
56. Id. (quoting Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 365
(1982)(Powell, J., dissenting)).
57. Id. at 116.
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A short excerpt from the opinion indicates that the Court had no inten-
tion of accepting this justification for the plan:
The NCAA's argument that its television plan is necessary to
protect live attendance is not based on a desire to maintain the
integrity of college football as a distinct and attractive product,
but rather on a fear that the product will not prove sufficiently
attractive to draw live attendance when faced with competition
from televised games. At bottom, the NCAA's position is that
ticket sales for most college games are unable to compete in a
free market. The television plan protects ticket sales by limit-
ing output-just as any monopolist increases revenues by re-
ducing output.
58
The Court dealt with the NCAA's final argument, that the plan
would help maintain a competitive balance among the teams, by finding
that the rule was too broad. Although noting that some cooperation is
necessary to preserve the competitive nature of college sports, the Court
found that restraints on football telecasts simply did not "fit into the
same mold. '" 5 9 In fact, it was clear that other regulations promulgated
by the NCAA were not only more effective in achieving the desired goal,
they were also "clearly sufficient."
'60
The issue of improper motive was central to finding a violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act in Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federa-
tion of Dentists.6 1 In this case, the Indiana Federation of Dentists (Federa-
tion) had initiated a policy whereby members were asked to refuse to
provide insurance companies with copies of patients' dental X-rays. In-
surance companies had been using these records to verify the necessity
of the dental services which were being provided.
The Federation claimed that the motivation behind instituting this
policy was that "the provision of X-rays might lead the insurers to make
inaccurate determinations of the proper level of care and thus injure the
health of the insured patients .... ,"62 The FTC, however, had provided
the Court with the text of a presentation made to dentists by a founder
of the Federation. Excerpts revealed that the true "motives underlying
the dentists' resistance to the provision of X-rays for use by insurers"
63
were of a less honorable and more pecuniary nature.
64
Obviously, a court's analysis6 5 of the commercial justification of any
58. Id. at 116-17 (footnotes omitted).
59. Id. at 117.
60. Id. at 119.
61. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
62. Id. at 452.
63. Id. at 450 n.1.
64. Included in the presentation were statements such as "We are fighting an eco-
nomic war where the very survival of our profession is at stake" and "The name of the
game is money. The government and labor are determined to reduce the cost of the den-
tal health dollar at the expense of the dentist." Id.
65. The lower courts have generally adhered to the decision-making procedures of
the Supreme Court. Motive and scope considerations are perhaps even more prevalent in
these courts, where it is often easier to determine the legitimacy and necessity of claimed
justifications. See, e.g., Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas, 899 F.2d 951, 965
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proffered motives is colored by a certain amount of bias with respect to
what it believes is really taking place.6 6 Because all contracts have some
anticompetitive characteristics 6 7 they contain within themselves the nec-
essary ammunition to refute an argument for procompetitive character-
istics. The Court used this ammunition in Indiana Federation of Dentists.
Once it established the lack of a legitimate motive, the Court continued
through a full-blown rule of reason analysis, easily finding fault with any
claimed justifications for the policy.
III. SOCIAL, COMMERCIAL AND LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATIONS IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOINT VENTURES
The commercial realities faced by companies developing intellec-
tual property raise considerations which have yet to be addressed by the
courts using rule of reason analyses. The relative freedom and flexibil-
ity of the small entrepreneur provides an effective environment for the
conception of innovative technology. The costs and infrastructure re-
quired to bring this technology to the marketplace, however, demand
the resources of large multinational corporations. 6 8 In addition to look-
ing to small entrepreneurs for innovative ideas, large corporations may
also need to look to each other for the cross-pollination necessary to
successfully develop and commercialize intellectual property.
The literature is replete with discussions of the social and commer-
cial justifications for forming joint ventures regarding the development
and commercialization of intellectual property. 69 Although the motives
(10th Cir. 1990) ("[D]efendant's conduct was undertaken with the intent and effect of
preventing providers from contracting with other insurance companies. At issue in this
case is not a pristine 'agreement ......."(quoting Reazin v. Blue Cross, 663 F. Supp. 1360,
1412 (D. Kan. 1987))); Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 895 F.2d 352, 361 (7th Cir. 1990)
("Getting needed information to the market is a fine goal, but the district court found that
the AMA was not motivated solely by altruistic concerns. Indeed, the court found that the
AMA intended to 'destroy a competitor'.... ); Goodman v. Acme Markets, Inc., Civil
Action No. 88-6447 (E. D. Pa. April 21, 1989) (1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4260) ("These are
reasonable limitations calculated to insure the competitiveness of Acme's store."); Verson
Wilkins Ltd. v. Allied Prod. Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1989) ("A court must first
determine... the legitimate reasons behind the restraint [in order] to survive the rule of
reason.").
66. A legitimate motive will not necessarily preclude a finding of illegality, but it
should put the defendant's case in the best possible light. In Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
United States, the Court explained that "a good intention will [not] save an otherwise
objectionable regulation or the reverse; but.., knowledge of intent may help the court to
interpret the facts and to predict consequences." 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
67. See, e.g., Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988) (recogniz-
ing that only unreasonable restraints of trade are prohibited by the Sherman Act); National
Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-88 (1978) ("restraint is the very
essence of every contract"); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918) ("Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind,
to restrain, is of their very essence.").
68. Porter & Fuller, supra note 2, at 331.
69. See, e.g., Brodley, supra note 2; First, StructuralAntitrust Rules and International Compe-
tition: The Case of Distressed Industries, 62 N.Y.U.L. RE'. 1054 (1987); Grossman & Shapiro,
ResearchJoint Ventures: An Antitrust Analysis, 2J.L. EcON. & ORG. 315 (1986);Jorde & Teece,
supra note 1; Rill, Antitrust and International Corpetitiveness in the 1990s, 58 ANTITRUST LJ.
583 (1989); Weston & Ornstein, Efficiency Considerations in Joint Ventures, 53 ANTITRUST LJ.
85 (1984); see generally R. HALL, THE INTERNATIONALJOINT VENTURE (1984).
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behind the formation of these joint ventures are usually legitimate, the
structure of the arrangement can result in unexpected social costs which
in turn can lead to increased antitrust exposure. When examining how a
court might perceive the motives behind a joint venture, or the scope
necessitated by the commercial realities of the market, potential ventur-
ers need to consider a wide range of factors, including procompetitive
benefits and anticompetitive social harms.
Among the most commonly cited procompetitive justifications for
forming joint ventures are: the resulting integrative efficiencies, shared
risk, greater access to capital, use of complementary technology or re-
search techniques, overcoming entry barriers to domestic or interna-
tional markets, acquiring new managerial capabilities, and reduction of
waste resulting from duplicated research. 70 Balanced against these are
potential social costs which include the shaping of competition, 7T the
possibility of diminished actual or potential competition in the relevant
market, collusion, and the elimination of a "patent race" among rivals
resulting in reduced innovative activity (rather than merely eliminating
waste) .72
A company's decision of whether to enter into a joint venture will
be greatly impacted by the type of venture which will be formed. Cur-
rently, the law guarantees rule of reason analysis only for research and
development joint ventures. 7 3 Thus, the decision whether to limit the
joint venture to research and development, or to extend it to also in-
clude production, can lead to significantly different antitrust considera-
tions. The legislation which guaranteed rule of reason analysis for
research and development joint ventures was adopted in 1984 when
Congress passed the National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA).
74
The NCRA was designed to protect research and development joint
ventures from the full force of the antitrust laws by guaranteeing rule of
reason analysis. It is relatively easy for a joint venture to qualify under
the NCRA. Within ninety days of entering into a written agreement to
form such a joint venture, any party to that joint venture needs only to
file a brief notification with the Department ofJustice. This notice, pub-
lished in the Federal Register, must disclose the parties to the joint ven-
ture agreement and state the nature and objectives of the joint
venture.
7 5
70. See AbbottJoint Production Ventures: The Case for Antitrust Reform, 58 ANTITRUST L.J.
715, 716-19 (1989) (supporting shared risk and duplicated research waste); Porter &
Fuller, supra note 68, at 322-327 (supporting shared risk, greater access to capital, use of
complementary technology, and overcoming entry barriers); S. Radtke & A. Ponikvar, Co-
OPERATIVE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 12-13 (American Mgt. Assoc. Management Brief-
ing 1984); Weston & Ornstein, supra note 69, at 85 (supports overcoming entry barriers,
and acquiring new managerial capabilities).
71. Porter & Fuller, supra note 2, at 325 ("coalitions can influence who a firm com-
petes with and the basis of competition.") This has been framed in terms of facilitating
collusion.
72. Abbott, supra note 70, at 719-22.
73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (1988).
74. Id.
75. See id. § 4305.
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By virtue of filing this notice, the joint venture is assured of a rule of
reason analysis in any future antitrust action.76 Additionally, if antitrust
liability is ever found, the joint venture's damages will be limited to ac-
tual damages, without the possibility of treble damages, which are nor-
mally awarded in antitrust cases. 77 Under the NCRA, however, it is still
possible for the joint venture to be held liable for attorneys' fees and
costs. By showing that a claim was frivolous or without foundation,
though, a prevailing defendant may be able to recover its attorneys' fees
and costs.
78
Even though qualification under the NCRA is quite simple, in the
six years between the passage of the NCRA and 1990, only an estimated
150joint ventures were formed.7 9 Ostensibly because of the limited na-
ture of the NCRA, the filings have been primarily for joint ventures
which have relatively minor competitive importance.8 0 This low number
of filings suggests that research and development joint ventures struc-
tured for more commercially important efforts are willing to forego the
potential protection of the NCRA in exchange for the maintenance of
greater secrecy. It may also be that in some cases, joint venturers per-
ceive no advantage to being guaranteed a rule of reason analysis.
Under the current form of the NCRA, this protection is only af-
forded to research and production joint ventures. The NCRA's rule of
reason guarantee does not apply to joint ventures involved in the manu-
facturing, marketing or sales of the fruits of this technology. 8 ' Thomas
M. Jorde and David J. Teece provide a compelling argument for ex-
tending the protection of the NCRA to include within its scope these
other types ofjoint ventures. 8 2 Jorde and Teece base their argument on
the premise that innovation is a simultaneous process, requiring con-
stant feedback between the laboratory and the field. At the same time,
successful commercialization of technology requires several cycles of
testing a product in the marketplace and then returning to the lab for
incremental improvements. Therefore, it does not appear reasonable to
grant reduced antitrust exposure to part of this process, but not to the
remainder. Under a rule of reason analysis, the need for this "simulta-
neous view of innovation" 8 3 provides a strong argument for the legiti-
macy of the motive and the necessity of the scope of a joint venture
involved in downstream activities.
76. See id. § 4302.
77. See id. § 4303(a).
78. See id. § 4304.
79. See 136 CONG. REC. H3099 (daily ed. Jun. 5, 1990) (comments of Rep. Brooks).
80. Jorde & Teece, supra note 1, at 547 n.56.
81. Production and marketing of the intellectual property itself is allowed, however.
15 U.S.C. § 4301(b)(2) ("the term 'joint research and development venture' excludes [ac-
tivities involvingjoint production or marketing] other than the production or marketing of
proprietary information developed through such venture, such as patents and trade
secrets ....").
82. Jorde & Teece, supra note 1, at 534-36 (more fully described in Teece, Interora-
ganizatonal Requirements of the Innovation Process, 10 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 35
(1989)).
83. Id. at 534.
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This is not to say forward progress has not been made. There is
proposed joint production venture legislation in H.R. 4611,84 which
takes the next step by including production operations in rule of reason
analysis. While this legislation still excludes marketing, distribution and
sales ventures8 5 from rule of reason protection, it does set forth addi-
tional qualifications which reflect the growing concern about American
companies' ability to compete in the international arena. For example, a
production joint venture registering under this program can have no
more than thirty percent of its ownership controlled by foreign enti-
ties.8 6 Furthermore, H.R. 4611 also requires the joint venture to locate
all facilities within the United States.8 7 Finally, in a limited move toward
clarifying rule of reason standards, this legislation specifies that "[f]or
the purpose of determining a properly defined, relevant market, the
worldwide capacity of suppliers to provide a product, process, or service
shall be considered to the extent appropriate in the circumstances." 88
If some version of H.R. 4611 becomes law, lobbying for further
modifications to the NCRA is likely. Already, commentators have sug-
gested improvements beyond a mere extension of rule of reason analysis
to production. Suggestions have included elimination of the award of
attorneys' fees,8 9 clarification of the standards by which a rule of reason
analysis will be applied, 90 creation of a "safe harbor" for smaller compa-
nies, 9 1 and reduction (or elimination) of damages as a remedy.
9 2
Finally, consideration must be given to the fact that there are really
two levels of antitrust concerns faced by companies contemplating the
formation of a joint venture to develop intellectual property. The first
concern is that which we have been discussing-cooperative arrange-
ments between competitors. The second concern is the manner in
which such a joint venture might use the intellectual property it has de-
84. H.R. 4611, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H3099 (daily ed.Jun. 5, 1990)
(statement of Mr. Brooks).
85. See supra note 9.
86. 136 CONG. REC. H3099, H3100 (daily ed.Jun. 5, 1990) (reference to modification
in § 7(a) of the NCRA).
87. Id. Note that at H3099 (Sec. 3 Application of Amendments), a clarification was
added so as not to interfere with the Free-Trade Agreement Between the United States
and Canada.
88. Id. at H3 100 (reference to modification in § 3 of the NCRA).
89. Abbott, supra note 70, at 732.
90. Id. The author suggests that these standards follow the guidelines in U.S. DE-
PARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERA-
TIONS 15-19 (1988) so that "[I]ntellectual property licensing restrictions will not be
deemed illegal unless: (1) such restrictions facilitate collusion in markets not embodying
the intellectual property; or (2) such restrictions go beyond the appropriation of returns
on the intellectual property." Abbott, supra note 70, at 732 n.45. See also W. HOLMES,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAw (Release No. 6, Sept., 1986) at 13-6.
91. SeeJorde & Teece, supra note 1, at 550 (suggesting no antitrust liability for joint
ventures involving less than twenty-five percent of the relevant market). But see Abbott,
supra note 70, at 731-32 (arguing that a market share specific safe harbor would result in
arbitrary line drawing).
92. See, e.g.,Jorde & Teece, supra note 1, at 550. A version of this suggestion has been
incorporated in the proposed National Cooperative Innovation and Commercialization
Act of 1989, H.R. 1024, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. E425 (daily ed. Feb. 21,
1989) (remarks of Mr. Boucher).
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veloped. Analysis of the antitrust concerns for each will necessarily be
separate, so it is imperative to give both areas sufficient consideration as
to the underlying motive for, and the resulting scope of, the
arrangement.
Concerns about the use of intellectual property by a joint venture
go to the previously mentioned "nine no-no's" of patent licensing.
9 3
These are licensing acts which the Department of Justice considers ille-
gal per se. Fortunately, courts generally recognize the possibility that
there may also be procompetitive benefits for most intellectual property
antitrust concerns.9 4 Thus, courts will apply rule of reason analyses in
situations where procompetitive characteristics are present. Although
courts vary in the level of scrutiny and the specifics of the tests they
use,9 5 the motive and scope considerations will generally be the same.
With respect to the intellectual property itself, the balancing tests
are developing favorably toward commercially reasonable cooperative
uses. This is as a result of the general trend toward strengthening intel-
lectual property rights for American companies. While the courts have
made steady progress in this direction, Congress has also climbed on
the bandwagon. Since 1983 Congress has passed more than a dozen
laws in support of intellectual property.96 Even though this may not
make intellectual property "the 'darling' of Congress," 9 7 it does show
that Congress is prepared to take the steps necessary to enable Ameri-
can companies to protect effectively these important rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is widespread agreement that current rule of reason analyses
by the courts are unpredictable. 98 This is especially true in the case of
intellectual property joint ventures. To believe otherwise would be to
take a naive and unnecessary risk. Because even if the government is
satisfied that a joint venture poses no antitrust violations, there is still
the threat of a private suit.9 9 As a result of a private suit, a venture's fate
93. Supra note 4.
94. See, e.g.,Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 446 U.S. 2 (1984) (reaffirming
the rule of reason standards for patent tying established in Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm
and Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980)); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S.
36 (1977) (territorial restrictions); Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co.,
329 U.S. 637 (1947) (grant-backs); A.I. Root Co. v. Computer Dynamics, Inc., 806 F.2d
673 (6th Cir. 1986) (requiring proof beyond mere copyright ownership to establish the
existence of market power); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir.
1979). cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980) (court looks at limited scope of grant-back).
95. See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (exclusive dealing,
tie-outs); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 137-38 (1969)
(package Licensing); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948) (pat-
ent pooling); United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948) (price-fixing).
96. The Battle Raging Over 'Intellectual Property,' Bus. WK., May 22, 1989, at 78.
97. Schapiro, The Role of Intellectual Property Protection and International Conipeittiveness, 58
ANTrrRUST L.J. 569, 574 (1989).
98. See, e.g., Jorde & Teece, supra note 22 at 40 & n.100 (1989).
99. The Department of Justice, in its publications. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDE-
LINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1988) and ANTITRUST GUIDE CONCERNING RE-
SEARCH JOINT VENTURES (1980), has made it clear that it intends to apply rule of reason
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could be decided by ajudge who has been forced to assume the role of a
businessman for the purpose of evaluating commercial reasonableness.
While Congress is moving to better define rule of reason, there remains
much progress to be made.
Until rule of reason standards are codified, joint venturers will have
to rely on the analyses of the courts, which are marginally restricted at
best. Potential joint venturers would be wise, therefore, to pay close
attention to the motive and scope factors when structuring their agree-
ments, as these clearly play an important practical role in judicial deci-
sions. Consider the words of Judge (later Chief Justice) Taft in United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 100 in which he considers how to deter-
mine whether a contract between two parties unreasonably restrains
competition:
[T]he contract must be one in which there is a main purpose, to
which the covenant in restraint of trade is merely ancillary ....
The main purpose of the contract suggests the measure of pro-
tection needed, and furnishes a sufficiently uniform standard by
which the validity of such restraints may be judicially deter-
mined .... [I]f the restraint exceeds the necessity presented by
the main purpose of the contract, it is void .... In such a case
[where the sole object is to restrain competition] there is no
measure of what is necessary to the protection of either party,
except the vague and varying opinion of judges as to how
much, on principles of political economy, men ought to be al-
lowed to restrain competition.' 0 '
Perhaps not so much has changed in the last one hundred years.
James Ball
standards to joint ventures (other than those obviously a sham) before even deciding to
file suit. Private party plaintiffs might not be so understanding, however. A private party
could be any individual, corporation, or state Attorney General as parens patnae on behalf
of citizens. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1182 (D.D.C.),
596 F. Supp. 416 (D.D.C. 1984). In the early 1980s, General Motors and Toyota entered
into discussions concerning a joint venture to produce certain small cars in the United
States. Prior to the time the joint venture obtained a final consent decree, but following
conditional approval by the FTC, Chrysler filed a private action attempting to enjoin the
joint venture. After about a year and a half, the case was settled. Weinbaum, Production
Joint Ventures: The GM-Toyota Experience, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 709, 711 (1989). But see Cargill,
Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986) (standing denied where court finds
private plaintiff (competitor) might be helped, not damaged, by challenged merger); Illi-
nois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (indirect purchaser barred from suit).
100. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
101. Id. at 282-83.
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